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ABSTRACT 
 
The Qatari-funded channel, Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) has been subject to 
criticism as being in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The 
approach taken by AJA Satellite Television to represent the MB, the 
Mubarak regime and other political actors in Egypt, during its coverage of 
four key electoral moments - before and after the 2011 ‘revolution’- is 
reviewed in this research. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied to study the constructive 
effects of AJA’s language in an interpretive way (Parker & Burman, 1993). 
The effect of the language used by two predominant AJA TV programmes, 
Without Borders دودح لاب and Opposite Direction سكاعلما هاجتلاا has been 
investigated and a number of current and former AJA journalists have 
been interviewed. 
 
Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Pier Robinson’s Framing Model, in 
conjunction with Chouliaraki’s Three Rhetorical Strategies (Verbal Mode, 
Agency and Time Space) have been used as analysis tools to study the 
process of AJA’s representation of different political ideologies: the MB’s 
Islamic ideology and the Mubarak regime’s secular ideology. Van Dijk’s 
Ideological Square helps to identify the boundaries between ‘us’ (the 
good) and ‘them’ (the bad), and to classify people according to their 
support of specific ideology against another - the ‘in-group’ or the ‘out-
group’.  
 
AJA positively framed the Islamic MB movement on the basis that the 
group and its members were democratic, Islamic and victims, whereas it 
negatively framed the Mubarak regime and the Military Council in Egypt as 
repressive, secular and villains. The assigned role of different actors 
(including; the Egyptian people and opposition parties) in AJA TV 
programmes changed from one electoral moment to another. While the 
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Mubarak regime, its supporters and the Military Council were represented 
as the ‘out-group’ at all times, the role allocated to the Egyptian people 
and the opposition shifted between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’, 
depending on the political mood they held towards the MB.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Satellite television; Al-Sisi; authoritarian regime; 
Egypt; framing; ideology, military regime; Morsi; Mubarak; Muslim 
Brotherhood; political Islam; Qatari foreign policy; revolution; 
uprisings.  
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STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORITY 
 
I have always thought of media, throughout my professional and academic 
experiences, as a powerful tool that can influence the very nature of 
someone’s identity, beliefs and thoughts. Philip Seib (2008) writes ‘the 
media can be tools of conflict and instruments of peace. They can make 
traditional borders irrelevant and unify people scattered across the globe.’ 
Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s minister of Nazi propaganda said: ‘Give me 
media with no conscience I will give you people who are unconscious’.  
 
The powerful influence of media has encouraged my desire to study this 
field in order to understand how it can impact the way we think, act and 
believe in order to determine what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’. I also 
believe that the answer to either of these, is largely determined by 
someone’s social surroundings and understanding of it.  
 
I have always viewed AJA, since it was launched in 1996, as a channel of 
pride that belongs to Arabs. It has reshaped the very nature of mainstream 
Arab media services which have been government mouthpieces and 
under the control of Arab dictatorships, for a long time. Its daring approach 
and mixture of Arab journalists from almost every Arab nationality, has 
particularly attracted my attention. 
 
I often watch AJA and have always admired not only the fact it reports the 
news from around the world in a very innovative and attractive style, but 
also it has offered me a different perspective of what is happening in the 
Arab world in general, and Palestine in particular, my home country. It has 
placed the Palestine cause at the heart of its coverage. AJA’s daring 
approach, diverse and challenging questions to Arab dictators, and its 
ability to bring opposition voices to us (including Israeli official voices), 
have provided a different side of the story. 
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I passionately watched AJA’s 24-hour live coverage of the uprisings in 
Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and elsewhere when the Arab ‘revolutions’ broke 
out. In a way, I was watching history in the making through AJA, while 
sitting in my living room. 
 
When the Libyan uprising started in 2011, followed by Syria, however, 
criticism of AJA had increased with claims that the channel was aligned 
with Qatar’s foreign policies, and was becoming a platform for promoting 
Islamists, while ignoring secular and other groups. Questions were also 
raised about its coverage of Bahrain. 
 
The channel was seen as celebrating and arguably promoting the victory 
of the MB and equally challenging any opposing voices to the Islamic 
movement. The channel received wide disapproval after the fall of Morsi. 
Its offices were shut down, reporters were arrested and persecuted, and 
journalists were banned from entry. Ahmad Mansour, for example, AJA’s 
presenter and an Egyptian national, could not attend his brother’s funeral 
as he had been declared ‘wanted’ by the Egyptian authorities. All these 
factors made me ask what has changed? Has AJA’s language changed or 
is it people who have changed? Did AJA’s ‘revolutionary’ language change 
after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings or did people’s expectations 
change? I wanted to study AJA’s language, to dig deeper through 
academic research in order to understand what had happened to the 
channel that I had for so long respected, and indeed, loved.  
 
I do not try to make a value judgement for or against AJA, rather I wish to 
offer an explanation of how the channel covered the Egyptian MB in four 
different electoral moments before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011, 
and discover whether the claims made about the channel’s alleged 
support towards the Muslim Brotherhood were sound. 
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Studying Egypt is important for me, not only due to its strategic and 
historic geo-political place in the Arab world, but also because it is located 
next to my homeland, Palestine – Egypt’s stability means stability for the 
Palestinian people as well. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Research Context 
 
The Tunisian, Mohammed Bouazizi2, who immolated himself in protest 
against appalling living standards in his country and died on 17 December 
2010, possibly transformed the geo-political scene in the Arab world 
(Beaumont: 2011; Inbar: 2013; Brownless & Renolds: 2015; Lynch: 2012). 
His death sparked the Tunisian uprising which had a domino effect on 
other Arab countries (see map below) 3 . Tunisian masses took to the 
streets in 2010, protesting against the 23-year-old regime led by President 
Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, and a few days later, Ben Ali and his family fled 
the country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia (Bouzouita: 2014). 
 
People in other Arab countries including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and 
Bahrain also rebelled, demanding change - not only for better living 
conditions but also of their dictatorship regimes. Protests became violent 
in some Arab countries, as angry demonstrators often clashed with the 
security forces. The Egyptians marched on Al-Tahrir Square (ريرحت ناديم: 
Liberation) in Cairo and demonstrated against the longest-ruling regime in 
Egypt’s modern history (1981-2011), led by President Mohammed Hosni 
                                                          
2
 Mohammed Bouazizi, 26 years old set himself on fire in front of a local municipal office 
after being assaulted by police officers in the centre of the Tunisian town of Sidi Zouzid 
(Brownless & Renolds: 2015, P10)  
3
 Map availabale at: http://thebenchjockeys.com/tag/arab-spring/ [retrieved 27/02/2015] 
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Mubarak (Goldschmidt:  2013). Mubarak made a historic decision in 
February 2011 to step aside and hand over power to the Military Council. 
He was arrested in April 2011, together with members of his leadership 
team and two sons, all of whom were prosecuted (Filiu: 2011).  
 
The Yemeni people managed to oust the President Ali Abdullah Salah, in 
what seemed to be a political compromise between Yemeni political 
parties and tribes, following a mass uprising in January 2011 (Bruck, Al-
Wazir, & Wiacek: 2014).  
 
The public uprising in Libya in February 2011 was more challenging: 
Colonel Mou’ammar Al-Qaddafi promised to sweep out demonstrators who 
called for freedom (Abushagur: 2011). The peaceful ‘revolution’ became 
violent as Libyans took up arms and fought the Colonel with military 
support from NATO. Al-Qaddafi was eventually killed by his own people on 
October 2011 (Sawani: 2013).  
 
The violence in Syria prompted one of the worst humanitarian crises in a 
century. The Syrian people began a peaceful protest against Bashar Al-
Assad in 2011, but the situation went out of control and Syria has become 
a battlefield, involving not only the rebels and Al-Assad, but also regional 
and international powers. Hundreds of thousands of people have been 
killed, many have disappeared without trace, and millions have fled the 
country. Al-Assad vigorously fought the rebels and Syria’s civil war still 
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continues to date, without any obvious political or military horizon (Starr: 
2012).  
 
The Arabian Gulf saw the Shi’a-led protests break out against the royal 
family in Bahrain resulting in violence, but the uprising was quashed by the 
Bahraini government (Ulrichsen: 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1: Outline of the scale of upheavals in the Arab Spring Countries
4
 
 
This research studies AJA Satellite Television’s coverage of the Arab 
uprisings, particularly in Egypt. The focus of this research is the 
exploration of how AJA reported on the Egyptian revolt, mainly on the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), before and after the uprising.  
 
The station which, for a long time, was seen as representing Arab national 
identity and managed to capture the ears, eyes, and minds of Arabs, 
recently received widespread criticism. It was accused of being biased in 
                                                          
4
 Map available at: https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arab-
spring-protests-map.jpg [retrieved 22/02/2015] 
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favour of Islamists, namely the MB, and against the Mubarak regime, the 
Military Supreme Council, and other opposition parties (Hamed: 2014).  
 
This research will inspect the channel’s language usage by focusing on 
two of its main TV talk shows (Without Borders and Opposite Direction) 
and interviewing a sample of AJA current and former journalists. 
 
This chapter introduces the rationale behind the research topic, explains 
the research problem(s), presents the main research question and sub-
questions, argument, significance, contribution, objectives and limitations. 
The conceptual framework will be integral to the research, including the 
logic behind applying certain theories: media and religion framing. Critical 
Discourse Analysis, including interview techniques will be applied. 
 
1.2 Research Rationale 
 
Arab media was nothing more than a ‘mouthpiece’ medium, historically 
speaking, orchestrated by Arab authoritarian regimes which obstructed 
any scope for investigative journalism and trusted news (Pintak: 2008). 
The establishment of AJA5 in 1996, however, was a defining moment in 
the chronicles of Arab mass media (Al-Theidi: 2003). Its attractive and 
daring news coverage openly touched on issues considered to be 
forbidden according to Arab standards, and broadcast what no other Arab 
                                                          
5
 Al-Jazeera ةريزجلا is an Arabic word for (the island) which refers to The Arabian 
Peninsula available at: http://www.wordsense.eu/Al_Jazeera/ [retrieved 27/02/2015] 
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news organisation dared to, which substantially assisted in the channel’s 
gain of public approval (Rinnawi: 2006; El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2003). 
The channel’s pioneering elegance and attractiveness motivated other 
Arab channels to follow suit by changing their reporting narrative and 
presentational style to cope with the competition from the newly-
established station. 
 
AJA inspired other channels to open up to opposite viewpoints, and largely 
managed to spice up the Arab media environment and its nuances when 
addressing complex social, political and (or) economic issues that 
mattered most to Arab audiences (Miladi: 2003; Rugh: 2007; Seib: 2005; 
Quinn and Walters: 2010; Ghosh: 2003; El-Nawawy & Iskandar: 2003). 
 
The importance of AJA satellite channel - as a pan-Arabic media service - 
has been widely acknowledged by media scholars. Khalil Rinnawi (2006) 
asserts that shortly after AJA’s launch, it won the hearts and minds of 
millions of Arab viewers and made them not only discover that it was 
possible to have an Arab institution that they could call their own, but it 
was also an example of Arabs turning away from Western news channels 
(Miles: 2005; Miladi: 2003). It had profoundly enabled Arab audiences to 
enhance their national identity, collective morale, and self-belief (Saghieh: 
2004).  
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Khaled Hroub (2011) noted - in his article published online in ABC Religion 
and Ethics - that AJA had created a new venue for political freedom, 
culminating in its unreserved support for Arab ‘revolutions’. The author 
quoted a popular joke when Mubarak stepped down: Three of Egypt's 
former presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat, and Hosni 
Mubarak meet in hell and ask each other how they lost power: Nasser 
replies ‘poison.’ Al-Sadat says ‘assassination’, and Mubarak answers ‘Al-
Jazeera’. This illustrates how the perception of the media such as AJA can 
also have a satirical slant. 
 
Academics such as Sharp (2003), Iskandar and El-Nawawy (2003) argue 
that many of AJA’s correspondents were drawn to work for the station 
because they believed that it would provide an alternative perspective, 
particularly from the American and British news media. Realising the 
power of media and the strong influence AJA had on the Arab public, 
several Arab states recognised the strategic importance of a pan-Arab 
satellite television as an effective and influential public relations tool.  
 
The station stands as an example of pushing the boundaries of what is 
politically possible on Arab television. It gives more than the official view 
and deliberately offers contrasting opinions, creating ripples in the 
stagnant pool of Arabic broadcasting. Its reputation for controversy - 
operating from an Arab capital, Al-Doha (the capital of Qatar), rather than 
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from a European capital - represents a breakthrough in media-related 
development in the Middle East (Sakr: 1999). 
 
Philip Seib (2008) argues that AJA may not be a stalking horse for the 
United States, Israel, Islam, or even Qatar’s ruling family, but it is the latest 
in a line of broadcasting ventures that have sought to use mass media in 
order to establish a pan-Arab identity. 
 
The channel’s funding revenue has been under the academic radar. This 
factor represents an on-going temptation for researchers to define the thin-
line-boundaries between the channel and its major financial sponsor and 
host, Qatar. Tatham (2006) claims, for example, that the failure of AJA to 
approach financial independence is due to limited advertising revenue, 
thus obliging the station to maintain its relationship with the Qatari royal 
family in order to survive. Khalil Rinnawi (2006) however, retains his 
enthusiasm for AJA’s future plans for independence, which seems 
tenuous at present. 
 
It is noted in this research that little academic work exists on AJA, without 
reference to its host country, Qatar, and to the question of its 
independency and ownership. Khaled Hroub, in ABC Religion and Ethics 
(2011) for example, argues that AJA is not a CIA, Israeli or Al-Qaeda tool, 
but a sophisticated ‘mouthpiece’ for the state of Qatar and its ambitious 
emir; its existence would not have been possible without Qatari support  
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The channel, according to Hroub, stands as an amalgamation of Qatar’s 
national ‘branding’ and its foreign policy aspirations.  
 
Zayani (2005) points out that due to the financial support from Qatar, AJA 
rarely criticises the country’s domestic and foreign policies in the same 
vein. Pintak (2008) states that the emir of Qatar did not finance the 
channel in order to obtain a membership card for Washington’s National 
Press Club: ‘He did it for the same reason as he invited the U.S. central 
command to set up a military base, to make himself a player in the region’ 
(p. 22). Rinnawi (2006: p. 98) agrees with Zayani: ‘the internal Qatari 
politics are out of bounds for AJA commentary’. 
 
The Qatari-MB relationship has existed since the second half of the 
twentieth century, according to Zvi Mazel (2009), former Israeli 
ambassador to Egypt, and has had an impact on the Middle East, not least 
on AJA’s coverage of the recent Egyptian uprising. Mazel explains that the 
first wave of the MB came from Egypt in 1954, after Abdel Nasser, former 
Egyptian president, had cracked their organisation. The next wave came 
from Syria in 1982, after Hafez Al-Assad (the late father of Bashar Al-
Assad) bombed their stronghold in Hama. The last group arrived after 11 
September, 2001 (9/11) – from Saudi Arabia. 
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More recently, the political leadership of the Palestinian Islamist group, 
Hamas, moved from Syria to Qatar in February 2012 (Cafiero, 2012). A 
year later, Afghanistan’s Taliban movement opened its first official 
overseas office in Qatar (BBC News, 2013). Qatar’s hosting of Islamists 
may arguably have influenced AJA’s editorial policies - notable is the 
paradox in Qatar’s foreign policies: it not only accommodates Islamists but 
also hosts one of the biggest U.S. military bases, Al-Udeid (Kamrava: 
2013). Academics such as Rinnawi (2006) suggest that Qatar’s implied 
desire to occupy a leading role in the region requires it to have a solid 
public relations tool such as AJA.  
 
Ahmad Azem (2012) argues in his article, ‘Qatar's Ties with the MB Affect 
Entire Region’, published in the Middle East Online site, that the alliance 
between the MB and Qatar is becoming a noticeable factor in the 
reshaping of the Middle East.  
 
Academic discussions on AJA and its relations with Islamic political 
discourse are also noteworthy. Dima Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) argues in 
her study of the channel’s Islamic programme (Shari’a and Life), that the 
pluralism celebrated in the channel’s news and current affairs is 
abandoned in its religious programmes which promote Orthodox Islamic 
discourse. Furthermore, Sam Cherribi (2006)’s analysis of AJA coverage 
of the story of the veil in France between 2002 and 2005, finds that the 
station devoted significant air-time to the views of Islamic leaders.  
10 
 
 
The channel quickly became a star, not only in the Arab world, but also on 
international platforms. AJA made headlines in Western media soon after 
its inception in 1996, following its exclusive broadcasting of Bin Laden’s 
tapes (Seib: 2008). The channel was accused of serving Bin Laden’s 
propaganda by some, while others declared it had a direct link with Al-
Qaeda. These claims resulted in the arrest of AJA reporters, including 
Tayseer Allouni (under house arrest in Spain), who was accused of 
collaborating with Al-Qaeda, especially after he secured an exclusive 
interview with Bin Laden, only a month after the 9/11 attacks in 2011 
(Zayani: 2005). 
 
Haim Malka (2003 p. 19-28) wrote an article, ‘Must Innocents Die?: The 
Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks’, in which he discussed the issue of 
suicide attacks or, as described by AJA, ‘martyrdom operations’ against 
Israel. He claimed that some Muslim clerics and other commentators 
justified these attacks on political, moral, and religious grounds.  
 
The channel was also seen as a platform for principal Islamic clerics such 
as Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi, one of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) spiritual 
leaders. He was jailed in Egypt and stripped of his Egyptian citizenship in 
the 1970s. Qaradawi adopted Qatar as his second home and was featured 
as a permanent guest on AJA’s popular Islamic TV programme, Shari’a 
and Life (Lynch: 2006).  
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Oren Kessler (2012) explains in her article: ‘The two faces of al-Jazeera’, 
that the channel was perceived as favouring ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ 
against ‘dictatorships’, but clearly appeared to be supporting Islamic 
parties. Kessler demonstrates how the channel promoted the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and similarly in Iraq. Words like ‘terror’ and ‘insurgency’ were 
rarely mentioned and were usually replaced with ‘resistance’ or ‘struggle’. 
The article also reflects the U.S. viewpoint on AJA’s coverage of Arab 
uprisings. Kessler quotes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: ‘Al-Jazeera 
has been the leader in that they are literally changing people’s minds and 
attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective’ (Kessler: 2012, p.48).  
 
Kessler’s article projects other opposing views regarding AJA such as 
those of Judea Pearl, who warned that its ‘unconditional support of 
Hamas’s terror in Gaza, the Hezbollah take-over in Lebanon, and the 
Syrian and Iranian regimes, betray any illusion that democracy and human 
rights are on Al-Jazeera’s agenda’. He further asserted: 'I have no doubt 
that today AJA is the most powerful voice of the MB’ (P.53).  
 
Marc Lynch (2006) also commented on the channel’s relationship with the 
U.S. saying that there had been a switch in AJA perception because at 
present, the U.S. and AJA were more aligned in backing democratic 
movements: ‘It’s not like Al-Jazeera or the US have changed that much, 
the issues have changed.’ (p. 65).  
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Hugh Miles (2011) explains how AJA played a substantial role in its 
coverage of the Egyptian uprising, the main focus of this research, and 
kept the momentum going regarding the Egyptian ‘revolution’, due to its 
considerable influence on the Arab street, and its ‘electrifying’ message 
concerning Arab dictatorships. The ‘special relationship’ between AJA and 
the MB attracted academic scrutiny.  
 
Mehdi Hasan (2011) states that in the wake of the Arab uprisings, AJA’s 
correspondents and producers were harassed, arrested, and beaten in 
most Middle Eastern countries, and, in the case of the cameraman, Ali 
Hassan Al-Jaber, killed by pro-Gaddafi fighters in Libya. He wrote in his 
article for the New Statesman (2011), ‘Voice of the Arab spring: Mehdi 
Hasan on Al-Jazeera’6, following his visit to Qatar in order to verify the 
claims: ‘in Egypt, for 18 days straight, Al-Jazeera's cameras broadcast live 
from Cairo's Tahrir Square, giving a platform to the demonstrators, while 
documenting the violence of the Mubarak regime and its supporters’. 
  
The MB secured a landslide victory in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, 
following the fall of Mubarak in 2012, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, 
won the presidential election. Qatar promised billions of dollars to support 
the Egyptian economy in recognition of the new MB-led government, 
aiming to reinforce the party’s position (Cunningham: 2014); consequently, 
                                                          
6
 Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/broadcast/2011/12/arab-channel-jazeera-
qatar [retrieved 10/06/15] 
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AJA’s ‘balanced coverage’ of the MB role in Egypt has been widely 
questioned. 
 
Sultan Al-Qassemi (2012) criticised AJA and its relationship with MB in his 
article, ‘Morsi’s Win Is Al-Jazeera’s Loss’. He argues that AJA’s ‘love affair’ 
with the MB had been evident since the channel’s establishment and 
further claims that this relationship was mutually beneficial due to its 
blatant bias towards the Brotherhood. Ahmed Mansour, AJA’s top 
presenter and MB member was rewarded with several interviews with not 
only Khairet El-Shater, a senior MB leader, but also General Guide 
Mohammed Badie and Mohammed Morsi, the President. Al-Qassemi 
wrote for Al-Monitor news website (2012): ‘The Brotherhood also 
appreciates this relationship and even bizarrely extends official 
congratulations and “support” to AJA on significant occasions. When 
Morsi’s office wanted to kill the story of what seemed to be a fabricated 
Iran news agency interview with the president, it knew exactly who to call’.  
 
The MB’s political practices in Egypt were widely seen as incompetent and 
unable to meet the promises made to the Egyptian people during its one 
year in power (The Economist: 2013; Russell: 2014). A military coup in 
July 2013, backed by the masses, overthrew the newly-elected first civilian 
president, Mohammed Morsi (Carter: 2014; Kirkpatrick: 2013; Masoud: 
2014). The MB’s top leaders, including Morsi, were prosecuted and put in 
jail. Egyptian media outlets linked to Islamists were shut down as were all 
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AJA’s offices; some journalists were arrested and others banned from 
entering Egypt.  
 
President Mohammed Morsi’s fall from power, according to BBC News 
(2014), was followed by about 20 reporters from AJA’s Mubashir Masr 
(Egypt Live)7 and AJE8 being arrested and charged with joining or aiding 
and abetting a terrorist organisation (the MB) and ‘harming national unity 
and social peace’. Peter Greste, an Australian national and former BBC 
staff member, was among AJE’s detainees. He was finally released after 
400 days in prison (The Telegraph: 2015). It has been reported that some 
22 members of AJA’s Mubashir Masr resigned over alleged biased 
coverage: ‘the management used to instruct each staff member to favour 
the MB’, one of the journalists told Gulf News (Sharaf: 2013).  
 
The study of AJA (as a predominant Arab media organisation) and the MB 
(as an Islamic political organisation) is significant to this research. It is this 
intersection between media and religion framing which will be useful for 
this research. The main focus will be on AJA and its relationship with the 
                                                          
7
 The Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr رصم رشابم ةريزجلا (Egypt Live) began broadcasting after the 
2011 ‘revolution’ and focuses primarily on Egyptian issues, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/2013740531685326.html [retrieved 
2/03/2014] 
8
 Many observers note that Al-Jazeera (English) is different from al-Jazeera (Arabic) in 
terms of editorial agenda, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/feb/26/ al-Jazeera-egypt [retrieved 
2/03/14]  
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MB, and a study of some key electoral moments before and after the fall of 
Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, in January 2011.  
 
1.3 Research Problem 
 
AJA has reported on key historical moments in the Arab world since its 
birth: the wars in Afghanistan in 2001; Iraq 2003; Lebanon 2006; Gaza 
2008/09; and more importantly for this research, the Arab uprisings that 
broke out in late 2010. The channel has, by and large, been seen as 
enforcing the sense of Arabness and has ‘revolutionised’ the Arab media 
scene (Arafa: 2013). It has positioned itself in favour of political change 
and encouraged the value of ‘democracy’ against ‘authoritarianism’ in the 
Arab world (Maalouf: 2008). The station has offered a wide-open platform 
for opposition voices, including Islamists (victims) against Arab autocracies 
and external actors (villains). 
 
AJA’s coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for example, generally 
attracted very little criticism, if any, in the Arab world. There was 
insignificant questioning of the channel’s intention in supporting the 
Palestinians (the victims) against the Israeli occupation (the villains). AJA 
reports on the U.S. - Iraq war, arguably illustrates the channel’s support for 
Iraqis against the ‘enemy’, (the U.S. intervention) was comprehensive. The 
channel managed to secure wide approval from its Arabic-speaking 
audiences because its narrative favoured Arab national identity and 
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rejected tyrannical regimes – Libya, Syria, Egypt, and so on - and foreign 
players in the Middle East – U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
the Israeli occupation of Palestine.  
 
The Arab political scene dramatically changed after the Arab uprisings. 
The reports on the outbreak of Arab uprisings originating in Tunisia 
encouraged AJA to dedicate its entire coverage to live streaming, 24 hours 
a day, on the rebellions happening in the Arab world. Some Arab 
protestors often raised banners saying ‘Thank you Al-Jazeera’ for adopting 
and supporting the “revolutions” and overtly standing against the 
authoritarian regimes on the side of the people and ‘democracy’ (Bridges: 
2013: p. 340).  
 
This research argues, however, that in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, 
the internal Arab political scene became profoundly fragmented, and 
particularly complex. People with different political views were hungry to 
take part in the ‘political transformation’ and therefore became polarised. 
Reporting on Arab internal affairs has become uniquely challenging for 
both Arab and international broadcasters. The assumed role of AJA 
supporting one camp (the good) against another (the bad), while claiming 
a ‘balanced’ stand, was particularly unsound and widely debated between 
the Arabs themselves in countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Libya, 
and Egypt. 
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The people had become divided in Egypt between different ideologies: 
revolutionists; anti-revolutionists; Islamists; anti-Islamists; liberal; secular; 
Christians; and so on, since the fall of Mubarak in 2011 (Cohen: 2014). 
The close adoption of the Arab uprisings in general and the Egyptian one 
in particular nevertheless made the channel fall into the eye of the storm 
through its extensive 24-hour coverage – AJA had now become news 
itself rather than a news source. The very nature of the channel’s 
relationship with the MB was therefore noticed by Arabs, and its notion of 
‘impartial’ coverage by ‘favouring’ one opinion and ignoring the opposite 
opinion was noticed (the main focus of this research). 
 
This research aims to complement the few existing scholarly studies on 
AJA and its relationship with Islamists. Few academic studies exist on the 
relationship between AJA and the MB, a void this research intends to fill. 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
Based on critical reading and the existing debate surrounding AJA’s 
coverage of the Egyptian political scene and its representation of the MB 
and different political parties, this research identifies the following 
questions for discussion: 
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Main Question 
 To what extent has AJA’s coverage of the role of MB as part of the 
Egyptian political landscape contributed to the formation of ‘in-
group’ and ‘out-group’ identities in the Egyptian society? 
 
Subordinate Questions 
 How do AJA journalists generally perceive the role of Qatar in the 
Arab uprising countries and the impact of such role on AJA 
narrative?  
 How do AJA journalists respond to the claims of favouring the MB 
and how have they reassessed their journalistic values and 
practices following the Arab uprisings? 
 
1.5 Research Conceptual Framework and Contribution 
 
This research adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main 
methodological approach in an attempt to answer the above questions. 
This methodology is based on data scrutiny from different information 
sources in order to support the validity and reliability of the research 
(Golafshani: 2003). Two different data sources will be collected and 
analysed: (i) text analysis of two well-known AJA TV current affairs talk 
shows; (ii) interviews with some 10 TV presenters; current (at the time of 
this research) and former AJA and AJ’s Egypt Live.  
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The analysis of a combination of different data sources: two television 
programmes and journalist interviews, should assist in discovering 
whether or not AJA consciously stood as a promoter or the ‘mouthpiece’ of 
the MB rather than opposition voices in Egypt, including the ‘remnants’ of 
Mubarak’s regime and the Egyptian Military Council. The two TV 
programmes are: Opposite Direction سكاعلما هاجتلاا and Without Borders دودح لاب 
(see chapter 7 & 8). 
 
The research parameters are four different key historical electoral 
moments: two before and two after the fall of Mubarak in 2011. 
 
Before: 
1. 2005 election 
2. 2010 election 
After: 
3. 2012 election 
4. 2014 election 
 
The aim of studying a variety of data selected from different yet relevant 
periods in recent Egyptian history is to examine whether or not the 
channel’s language changed during these significant phases. The 
representation of different political actors, especially the MB and the 
Mubarak regime, before and after the Egyptian uprising, is of particular 
interest for this research.  
20 
 
 
The application of CDA not only helps researchers to study the 
constructive effects of language in an interpretive way (Parker & Burman: 
1993) but also helps indentify the multiple meanings assigned to the text 
(Phillips & Hardy: 2002). Data selection and analysis will be based on 
relevant episodes obtained from AJA’s digital archives regarding the 
selected four key electoral moments. 
  
The research interviews are a sample from current and former AJA 
journalists. Phillips & Hardy (2002) assert that interviews play a useful role 
in discourse analysis in order to understand the social context of the 
primary text and possibly to reach information which cannot be obtained 
from the analysis of the targeted data. 
 
The relationship between AJA and the MB, as a predominant Islamic 
movement in the Arab world, will be investigated by drawing data from the 
study of media and religion framing as well as the study of media and 
ideology. This will be the main theoretical framework adopted in order to 
understand the channel’s coverage and its verbal mode, representation of 
different actors and the reference to various periods. The description of 
particular events is in accordance with Van Dijk’s ideological square and 
Pier Robinson’s framing models (see Chapter 6). 
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Media, according to Paul Soukup (2002), assists scholars to comprehend 
how and why religion appears in the Arab media as it does, and then helps 
to understand why and how a social force like religion interacts with the 
other primary social forces of the day. By and large, religion has 
overwhelmed the fields of mass communication research and media 
studies in the Middle East (Hoover: 2002). Academics’ common view is 
that the media have become the principal source of religious ideas, and 
the language the media use shapes religious imagination in accordance 
with the genre of popular culture (Hjarvard 2006: p. 2). Lawrence Pintak 
(2008: p. 22) states that, for many Muslims, Islam is not merely a belief 
system but ‘a complete way of life’  
 
This research will also discuss the concept of media framing: whether or 
not AJA’s coverage was sided towards the MB during the historical events 
already mentioned. 
 
The aim is to appreciate the meaning of ‘framing’ which will also be 
studied in this context, in order to clarify how the channel frames both the 
MB and the Mubarak regime – before and after the ‘revolution’ – in order 
to trace any changes that may exist in the AJA setting. This research will 
primarily look at two types: distance framing and empathy framing, as 
defined by Pier Robinson (2002). 
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1.6 Research Significance and Limitations 
 
The overall significance of this research is to explain the basis on which 
AJA TV prgrammes (selected for analysis) represented the ideology of the 
MB as well as the ideology of other agents (i.e.; Mubarak regime, 
opposition parties, the Military Council and so on). The focus of this 
research is AJA’s editorial decisions in talk shows in relation to the ‘Arab 
Spring’ countries in general, and the Egyptian uprising in particular. This 
researcher considered the study of news output and decided to focus on 
TV programmes because, to my knowledge, there is a paucity of studies 
analysing AJA TV programmes, and also to dig deeper on the channel 
narrative in relations to their coverage of the MB. The study of AJA 
representation of the MB in the general news output is therefore out of this 
research scope.  
 
The aim is to comprehend, if proven to be true, how AJA’s language had 
changed before and after the Egyptian uprising. Research on how the 
Egyptian audiences perceived AJA’s coverage of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
(audience research), although important, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Audience research however, could arguably benefit from this present 
project in identifying social themes and cultural implications emanating 
from viewers’ polls and interviews. 
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This research intends to complement the few existing studies on AJA’s 
controversial role in covering the Egyptian affairs, before and after the 
‘revolution’, with reference to the MB. The language that AJA’s TV 
programmes used in reporting both the MB and the opposition, prior and 
subsequent to the Egyptian uprising will be investigated; furthermore, the 
factors which may have influenced AJA’s coverage of Egypt, including its 
relationship with Qatar, will also be examined.  
 
Qatar’s foreign policy and its impact on AJA’s editorial values regarding 
countries such as Bahrain will be briefly discussed in the interviews. 
However, due to the specific scope of this study, in-depth analysis of the 
uprising in Bahrain will not be conducted. Questioned on the link between 
AJA and Qatar’s foreign policy, for example, AJA’s and Qatar’s 
enthusiasm for supporting Libyan rebels against the Al-Qaddafi regime 
(Roberts: 2011), how and why Qatar, and perhaps AJA, supported the 
Syrian opposition (MB) against Al-Assad’s regime (Freeman: 2013), and 
the general perception of the Arab world of why Qatar, and arguably AJA, 
have lacked passion in dealing with the upheaval in Bahrain, which has a 
large Shi’ite population (Friedman; 2012) are important but are out of the 
scope of this research. 
 
The rationale behind the choice to examine the Egyptian uprising in 
relation to the MB but not others is significant: why Egypt and why the 
MB? Egypt is internationally recognised for its political place in the region 
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and reputation as an ancient civilisation (BBC9). It is the largest Arab 
country – by landscape and population - and has played a key role in 
Middle Eastern politics in modern times, and is particularly significant, not 
only due to its economic and geographical position, but also because any 
political changes within its borders will undoubtedly affect the surrounding 
countries (Chatham House: 2009).  
 
Studying the MB is essential to this research (see Chapter 3 for additional 
background information). The MB is one of the oldest and most influential 
Islamic movements in the world (Al-Jazeera website: 2011)10. Egypt's first 
and largest Islamist organisation was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 
1928, and has influenced Islamist movements world-wide with its partly 
political activism and partly charitable work. It renounced violence in the 
1970s, endorsed ‘democratic’ principles and promoted its ideology with 
slogans such as ‘Islam is the solution’, in its vision to create a state 
governed in accordance with Islamic law11. 
  
                                                          
9
 For more information about the significance of Egypt, see: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13313370 [retrieved 7/02/2015] 
10
 Muslim Brotherhood available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2011/02/201126101349142168.html [retrieved 
7/02/2015]  
11
 BBC News (2013): ‘Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood’, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405 [retrieved 7/02/2015] 
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1.7 Summary 
 
The context of Arab uprisings and the role of media coverage were 
discussed earlier in this chapter. It was explained how Arabs perceived the 
media as having a limited scope of investigative journalism before the 
inception of AJA. The establishment of AJA from an Arab country 
transformed the very nature of the media in the Arab world and inspired 
several other media services.  
 
The channel has covered significant historical moments in the Arab world. 
It has always represented the Arab viewpoint rather than that of external 
actors. The channel was seen as a re-inforcement of the sense of Arab 
national identity. Ownership and independence were the major issues that 
brought significant criticism of AJA, and yet, the channel managed to 
maintain its place among Arabs - with each political and military crisis in 
the Arab world, AJA’s popularity grew remarkably, simply because these 
crises arose between the Arabs and external interventions – such as the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003 – or between Arab nationals in opposition to 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
The outline of this research will be offered in the form of eleven chapters. 
With the introduction chapter which introduces the research rationale, 
questions, parameters and significance, the second chapter reviews 
existing academic literature on AJA satellite television, its place among 
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other Arab media services, the station’s role in endorsing the value of pan-
Arab identity, its relationship with its host and owner country, Qatar, the 
channel’s perception of the value of democracy, and the existing literature 
on organisational cultures in Arab newsrooms.  
 
The third chapter sheds light on AJA and the rise of political Islam ideology 
including: existing literature on the channel’s coverage topics related to 
Islamic political movements, the channel adoption of the Arab uprisings, 
and the discussions on Qatar hosting AJA and Islamic parties.  
 
The fourth chapter focuses primarily on the MB, which includes: a brief 
historical background of the movement since establishment, an overview 
of the MB under the Mubarak regime, and the short-term leadership of the 
MB following the fall of the Mubarak regime.  
 
The fifth and sixth chapters draw the theoretical and methodological 
framework of this research. In chapter five, the theory of media ideology 
and religion framing will be explained including understanding religion and 
media in a cultural context, Islam and media, and the theories of media 
framing. In chapter six, the appropriate research methods will be defined, 
this includes: data selection, interview methods, qualitative approach, 
ontology and epistemology, language, power and ideology, and identifying 
the research themes from the selected data.  
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In chapters seven and eight, the empirical data of the selected two 
programmes (Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders and Faisal Al Qassem’s 
Opposite Direction), will be critically analysed by applying the three 
selected rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency and time space) to the 
three selected themes that emerge from the text. 
 
Chapter nine presents the inside accounts of AJA high profile presenters 
of ethical values, perceptions and editorial judgements on topics related to 
the relations between Qatar and AJA, the channel coverage of the 
Egyptian uprising and its alleged relations to the MB, and assessment of 
AJA’s role in polarised Arab world. 
 
Chapter ten and eleven offer discussion and conclusion of the research 
findings that have emerged from the analysis of two empirical data 
sourcres, the research contribution and implications, and future research 
recommendations.  
 
The next chapter will review existing academic literature on AJA satellite 
television, its place among other Arab media services, the role and 
perception of the station in endorsing the value of pan-Arab identity, and 
the existing debates around its relationship with its host and owner country, 
Qatar.  
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Chapter Two 
EXISTING LITERATURE ON AJA SATELLITE TELEVISION  
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
The main research context, the rationale behind the choice of the research 
topic, research problems, questions and sub-questions, conceptual 
framework, and significance were briefly introduced in the previous 
chapter. This chapter will have a closer look at the existing academic 
debates around key previous media studies amongst Arab scholars, media 
and democracy, and AJA and its place among other Arab media services. 
The role and insight of the station in endorsing the value of pan-Arab 
identity will also be reviewed, together with existing debates around its 
relationship with its host and owner, Qatar. 
 
It was noted that many trans-national Arabic news broadcasters such as 
AJA TV, Al-Arabiya TV, and the BBC Arabic TV dedicated most of their 
airtime reporting on outstanding uprisings in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) that more or less reshaped the Arab world. Each channel 
seems to have had its own rhetoric and agenda, each of which has been 
widely challenged (Hashem: 2012). The first public uprising occurred in 
Tunisia, followed by other countries such as Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, 
and Syria, which shook the Arab world. Media coverage of such 
momentous and fundamental developments in general and AJA in 
particular was brought into academic discussions. Questions regarding the 
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channel’s motivation, relationship with Islamic political parties, and its 
independency and legacy of presenting conflicting political views were 
discussed.  
 
It has been acknowledged by academics such as Khaled Hroub (2011) 
that the channel’s establishment founded a new venue for political 
freedom which culminated in its unreserved support for Arab ‘revolutions’. 
He notes in his article, ‘Al-Jazeera: the source of the Arab Spring’, 
published in ABC Religion and Ethics, that the channel covered a plethora 
of Arab masses declaring their demands to the world. He wrote: 
 
The channel cancelled its regular programmes, and was 
transformed into a round-the-clock workshop of live news and 
interviews, switching from one revolution to another. So, while 
the Arab Spring has been a genuine popular uprising against 
decades of corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, its 
rapid spread, which caught almost everyone by surprise, was 
due in part to the influence of Al-Jazeera, which became the 
voice of the voiceless throughout the Middle East (Hroub: 2011, 
ABC) 
 
The channel represented a platform for political and religious opposition 
groups in the Arab countries, according to Hroub; furthermore, some Arab 
enthusiasts may have become impassioned and described the channel as 
the main drive behind the Arab uprisings (Pintak: 2010). These arguments, 
whether exaggerated or not, perhaps explain the power of media as a tool 
of change and not a change agent in and of itself. Pintak further explains: 
‘Al-Jazeera may have set the tone for an aggressive new style of 
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journalism in the Arab world, but at the end of the day, it is still owned by a 
government’ (2010: p. 296). The relationship between AJA and Qatar will 
be reviewed later in this chapter.  
 
This research agrees that it is an overstatement to say that AJA’s role was 
perhaps the main drive for Arab uprisings, but certainly, the channel has 
played a role in offering its platform, not only by reporting on, but also by 
adopting the public uprisings against dictatorship governments, which will 
be later explained (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).  
 
2.2. AJA: A Splash in a Stagnant Arab Media Scene  
 
To understand the significance of AJA’s place among other media 
services, it is worth reviewing Arab media history in order to realise the 
past nature of media before the channel’s inception.  
 
It was evident that since the 1950s, the landscape of Arab media was little 
more than a ‘mouthpiece’ for Arab regimes, as the vast majority of media 
services were owned by Arab totalitarian governments, therefore 
investigative journalism was limited or non-existent (Pintak: 2010). The 
Arab media were very loyal to the Ottoman Empire and largely committed 
to its regulations and norms. No adverse commentaries on the politics of 
friendly countries were permitted, consequently, Arab regimes always 
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thought of the media as one of their possessions and a tool for their own 
interests (Zayani: 2005). 
 
The government-controlled media sources were arguably accepted by the 
majority of people as they had no other choice, however, the defining 
moment of lost public trust in Arab media came after the Arab defeat in the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, despite the existence of Voice of the Arabs Radio - 
known as the ‘nationalist’ Arab media outlet during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
era in the 1960s (Al-Theidi: 2003).  
 
This lack of trust, and the absence of alternative Arab media channels, 
made Arabs turn to foreign-based, Arabic-speaking, short wave radio 
broadcasters, such as the Voice of America, Radio Monte Carlo - Middle 
East, and BBC World Service - Arabic Radio - seeking reliable news 
sources that were perhaps accurate, independent, and more 
comprehensive (El-Nawawy and Iskander: 2003). 
 
The media scene in each Arab country, by and large, varies according to 
long-term politics and short-term needs (Seib: 2008). The Arab media 
weakness, according to Kai Hafez (2008), lies in its inability to secure 
independence due to commercial complications which stand as 
considerable obstructions in providing an effective and trusted media 
service with solid editorial values. Hafez asserts that in the Arab world, like 
anywhere else, mass media struggle for their survival due to financial 
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complexities and lack of political freedom. The public therefore had little 
choice but to go to foreign-based media services or remain with 
government-controlled and (or) commercially funded media that probably 
had little interest in politics, preferring instead to focus on sources of 
revenue for their organisations.  
 
It was recorded that the very first attempt to establish a pan-Arab TV 
channel was in London. The BBC’s World Service partnered with the 
Saudi Orbit Network in 1994, and launched the first pan-Arab satellite 
channel with values of ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ at the heart of its 
editorial practice (Torstrick & Faier: 2009). The introduction of this channel 
represented a modicum of hope for the Arab public. The marriage between 
the Saudi organisation and the BBC, however, soon ended in divorce, as 
the Saudi organisation prohibited any reportage on the Saudi royal family, 
which was unacceptable to the BBC (Al-Jaber: 2004).  
 
It was in such a fragile Arab media environment that AJA satellite channel 
was established. It managed to hire the ready-trained journalists from the 
BBC and offered them a chance to work on a channel which was purely 
Arab and from an Arab country, Qatar. Its inception and scope of influence 
on the Arab public was a turning point in the history of Arab mass media 
(Al-Theidi: 2003).  
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The channel attracted the attention of scholars as much as viewers from 
its inception in 1996. Academics such as Sharp (2003), Iskandar and El-
Nawawy (2003) argue that many of AJA’s correspondents were drawn to 
work for the station because they felt that American and British coverage 
of the 1991 Gulf War was not balanced – it did not cater for the specific 
interests of Arab audiences such as the plight of Iraqi civilians during the 
struggle. The channel consequently believed that it could provide an 
alternative perspective, particularly to the American and British news 
media, and the channel’s strategic importance during times of conflict was 
soon realised by several Arab states. 
 
Scholarly consensus such as that of Rinnawi (2006), seems to exist 
regarding AJA’s inception. It offered not only a decisive remake in Arab 
mass media by acting as a substantial hand in triggering Arab news 
agenda from an Arab-based perspective, but also changed the 
relationship between the Arab and Anglo-European world; nonetheless, 
Khalil Rinnawi notes that the channel established new examples in the 
mass communication environment.  
 
Lawrence Pintak (2010) asserts that the launch of AJA transformed the 
way Arab media functioned. It stirred the ethos of Arab journalism as 
television shows began openly discussing issues that the general public 
had previously addressed behind closed doors.  
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The channel subsequently managed to acquire a leading role in the Arab 
media scene by constructing a competitive drive in some mainstream Arab 
broadcasting, and in playing a central role in liberalising the Arab media 
discourse. This initiated a profound shift which was seen as potential 
inspiration for the reconfiguration of the political system in the Middle East 
region (Zayani: 2005).  
 
Many academics view the existence of AJA as an incentive for other Arab 
channels to improve their broadcasting quality and to encourage diversity 
of views. The station stood as an example of not only pushing the 
boundaries of what is politically possible on Arab television, but also 
reinforcing the basic idea that democratic political concerns are very 
important for the media. The channel was viewed as providing its 
audiences with more than the official government view, and deliberately 
offered opinions from different perspectives, thus creating ripples in the 
stagnant pool of Arabic broadcasting (Miladi: 2003; Rugh: 2007; Seib: 
2005; Quinn and Walters: 2010; Ghosh: 2003).  
 
AJA promptly occupied a unique position in the Arab media world, soon 
after appearing on the scene, and improved the way Arab reporters 
worked. It arguably stood as a viable alternative to Western news 
organisations and attracted global recognition Arab media voices. Some 
Arabic satellite networks adjusted their editorial output, based on AJA 
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format, and realised the need to include more debate-style programmes in 
their talk shows (Sharp: 2003).  
 
It is worth noting that AJA is not a member of the Arab States 
Broadcasting Union (ASBU), although it did apply for membership. The 
Union rejected the application, claiming that AJA failed to respect the 
Union’s code of conduct which included not broadcasting critical material 
against any Arab head of state (Quinn and Walter: 2010). 
 
Academics noted the channel’s influence on other Arab broadcasting 
news networks including Al-Arabiyya (The Arabic), which started operating 
in Dubai Media City in the United Arab Emirates in February 2003 (Sharp: 
2003). Sheik Walid Al-Ibrahim, a Saudi Arabian national, is the owner of 
Al-Arabiyya and the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), and, 
according to Samantha Shapiro (2005), his intention was to provide a 
more moderate alternative to AJA. His goal was to position the channel as 
the equivalent to CNN and Fox News, as an equable and professional 
media outlet that would be known for objective reporting rather than for 
loud and excited opinions (such as those exhibited on AJA programmes). 
Sheikh Walid believed that the market was ready for an alternative Arab 
voice at that time: 
 
Sheik Walid’s personal political interests may also be a 
motivating factor. He is the brother-in-law of King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudi royal family dislikes Al-Jazeera because it 
gives air time to Al-Qaeda, and one of Al-Qaeda’s most 
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cherished goals is the overthrow of the Saudi government 
(Shapiro 2005: New York Times). 
 
The popularity of AJA reflected frustration with the general bias of Western 
media, particularly American. Zayani (2005) argues that the establishment 
of AJA bridges the differences among many internal and external actors: it 
stands for a mixture of Eastern and Western, left and right, religious and 
secular, tribal and urban, local and global.  
 
Academics such as Rinnawi (2006), assert that AJA is a reporter-driven 
rather than a personality-driven news medium, and models itself on the 
BBC and CNN formats, professing approbation of Western stations’ 
roundtable discussion programmes, one-to-one interviews, and 
documentaries. Some even labelled the channel as ‘the Arab CNN’ - 
equivalent to, or arguably better than CNN.  
 
Channels such as Al-Hurra Satellite TV were described by Marwa Samei 
(2010) as part of the strategic U.S. mission for the region whose aim was 
to improve its image in the eyes of the people of the Arab and Muslim 
worlds. The U.S. government decided to sponsor one of its largest and 
most expensive public diplomacy campaigns since the Cold War era: 
Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television channel, in order to achieve this goal. 
This initiative was based on the assumption that the Arab media were 
prejudiced and that their coverage would promote extremism in the region. 
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Philip Seib (2008, p. xii) suggests that ‘the media’ are no longer merely the 
media, in his book, The Al-Jazeera Effect: ‘the media can be tools of 
conflict and instruments of peace, they can make traditional borders 
irrelevant and unify people scattered across the globe. This phenomenon 
– Al -Jazeera – is reshaping the world’. 
 
The significance of AJA’s inception, according to Pintak, is that the 
channel reflects an appetite that is well suited to an audience that feels 
passionately about many of the issues and events it covers; not only that, 
but the channel’s newscasts and talk shows considerably altered public 
perceptions of politics, consequently allowing people to see more of what 
events were occurring, and implicitly encouraging them to become 
involved; yet, this approach was totally absent in Arab media history.  
 
The channel has consequently ‘revolutionised’ the media environment in 
the Arab world by broadcasting what no other Arab news organisation 
dared to: the hard, often harsh truth of Arab life, culture, and politics (El-
Nawawy and Iskandar: 2003). 
 
2.3. AJA: A Scope of Pan-Arab Identity 
 
It is necessary to take a closer look at the channel’s effect on, and its role 
in, Arab national identity, not from the perspective of Western policy-
makers who consider it to be a malignant nuisance, but rather, from the 
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standpoint of its Arab audience, who sees it as a magnifier of shared 
frustrations and aspirations and as a truth-teller (Seib: 2008; Pintak: 2005). 
Philip Seib asserts that it is ‘naïve’ to limit the performance of Arab 
broadcasting according to Western mainstream standards: the political 
structures and cultures are very different from developed democratic 
systems. 
 
The significance of the channel in a changing Arab world was through its 
programmes and news, its presentation of crucial and taboo political, 
cultural and social issues, and the threat that the channel was deemed to 
represent the very hegemony and ideology of dictatorial Arab regimes 
(Zayani: 2005). El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) explain AJA’s ‘daring 
approach’ in touching on issues considered by Arab regime standards to 
be forbidden: sex, polygamy, government corruption, women’s civil rights 
and Islamic fundamentalism. This tactic served not only to present a 
popular station, but also led to the argument on pan-Arab national identity 
for which the channel perhaps played an important role.  
 
The Qatari-based channel made Arabs not only realise that it was possible 
to have an Arab institution which they could admire and call their own, but 
was also an example of Arabs turning away from Western news: it created 
a platform on which Arab public opinion could be extensively expressed 
(Seib: 2005; Miladi: 2003).  
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Seib (2008: p. 22) argues that AJA may not have been a stalking horse for 
the United States, Israel, Islam, or even Qatar’s ruling family, but it was the 
latest in a line of news ventures that had sought to use mass media to 
help establish a pan-Arab identity: ‘Al-Jazeera is a descendent of “Voice of 
the Arabs” (VOA) in that it supplies cohesion to the notion of “Arabness”. 
 
Khalil Rinnawi (2006), the author of Mc-Arabism, thoroughly examines 
AJA’s influence on Arab audiences. He notes that the channel had won 
the hearts and minds of millions of viewers on one hand, and inflated the 
anger of various Arab governments and British and American officials, on 
the other; in a sense, this had given the channel public trust and appeal: 
  
The channel’s attractive presentations, live interviews, news 
brought straight from the scene, the engagement it offers 
viewers through audience participation, high proportion of 
investigative journalism programmes, have all worked to create 
legitimacy as an Arab news and current affairs station (p. 120). 
 
The viewers’ expectations of Arab media changed after the station’s 
inception: Arabs were no longer seen as media consumers in a one-way 
information stream. AJA helped to initiate a new kind of viewer experience 
and fed hungry Arab audiences with news and serious political analyses 
through interactive debates and live public participation. AJA had come to 
play an important role in broadcasting pan-Arab interaction, as it projected 
an inclusive dignity which crossed national boundaries (Zayani, 2005). 
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Zayani elaborates on the significance of the station in the pan-Arab trend 
saying: 
  
The station employs people from various Arab nations who are 
Arabs from almost every corner of the Arab world, with no 
apparent domination of any single group. The lack of a 
dominant group gives the network a pan-Arab ring. The channel 
which broadcasts exclusively in a modern standard Arabic 
language, has gone a long way to creating a kind of 
connectivity between Arab viewers. In many ways, it has 
reinvigorated a sense of common destiny in the Arab world and 
is even encouraging Arab unity, so much so, that pan-Arabism 
is being reinvented on this channel (p. 7).  
 
James Poinwozik (2005) argues that the media is one of three institutions: 
the mosque, the press, and schools that have the power to influence 
people’s lives and their social behaviour, and the newest and perhaps 
most ‘revolutionary’ is AJA. It has, more importantly, been at the forefront 
of Arab satellite channels which have brought about ‘a pan-Arab 
consciousness’ or ‘a pan-Arab imagined community’, consisting of 
individuals who have a sense of collective belonging and an affinity with 
people they have never met, but who actually speak the same language 
and who are not geographically limited (Zayani: 2005, p. 9). 
  
Sakr (2001) and other academics note that the station’s policy of 
portraying ‘the opinion and opposite opinion’ and the criticism it earned 
across the Arab regimes, including Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt and others, 
increased the channel’s popularity (Thussu and Freedman: 2003). AJA, as 
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a ‘pan-Arab’ channel, may be one of the reasons that outside viewers 
perceived it as biased, according to Zayani. He concludes that it is a new 
voice, a new channel, and a new influence on the Arab world and other 
spheres (Zayani: 2005). El-Nawawy and Iskander (2003) write on how 
people react to criticism of AJA by various governments:  
 
[…] with every dramatic action a government has taken against 
Al-Jazeera, its popularity among Arab audiences appears to 
grow. With every attempt to reprimand or silence the network, 
satellite subscription and website traffic increases (p. 128).  
 
Rinnawi (2006) similarly asserts that the AJA’s emergence is a case study 
which describes the various nuances and consequences of Arab 
transitional media on Arab politics, society, culture, and even religion (Al-
Jenaibi: 2007). Tatham (2006) places the station in an Arab nationalism 
standpoint and its exploitation of ‘no red lines’ approach by touching on 
topics no other channels have dared to do. Sakr (1999) illustrates the 
argument of AJA’s acceleration trend towards live and compelling talk-
show programming that obliged the older channels to keep up with the 
competition. Sharp (2003) complements other arguments on the channel’s 
programmes and its implications on the Arab world, and clarifies that the 
approaches of its programmes have proven to be informative and 
entertaining for many viewers; some Arab intellectuals however have 
criticised the approach as being too sensationalist and animated, 
according to Sharp.  
 
42 
 
Quinn and Walters (2010) discuss the ‘revolutionary’ tone and language of 
the station’s broadcasting, and portray the channel as a ‘ripple in a 
stagnant pool’, yet Marc Lynch explains that those people who may even 
look at the channel as a ‘state’ that will itself bring out democracy, are 
mistaken:  
 
What one enthusiast called the Democratic Republic of Al-
Jazeera does not exist. Al-Jazeera cannot create democracy on 
its own, nor compel Arab leaders to change their ways. 
Television talk shows cannot substitute for the hard work for 
political organizing and institution-building (p. 57). 
 
It is worth inspecting academic debates regarding the channel and its host 
country Qatar, after having looked at the added value that AJA contributes 
to the concept of pan-Arab identity. The importance of studying such a 
central factor is to understand how different the channel is from others 
which, over a protracted period, have been accused of being a 
‘mouthpiece’ tool for their owners or governments.  
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2.4. Qatar: A place in the World Stage  
 
Figure 2: Qatar’s
12
 tiny location in the world map  
 
Qatar, a small peninsula in the Persian Gulf, to the east of the Arabian 
Peninsula, occupies approximately 11,437 square kilometres. Saudi 
Arabia is to the west and the United Arab Emirates to the south. The 
estimated total population in Qatar (2015) is 2.2 million (only 12% are 
original Qatari nationals), according to the Qatari Ministry of Development 
Planning and Statistics13. The country is one of the leading exporters of 
gas in the world (Com: 2013) and is listed as one of the world’s richest 
countries (Scott: 2012). The country was selected to host the FIFA Wold 
Cup in 2022 which put Qatar in a universal spotlight in more ways than 
one: the country and FIFA selection committee members are currently 
under investigation (May 2015), following allegations of bribery and 
corruption in order to win the bid (Gibson: 2014); in addition, poor human 
rights records in Qatar (AJA’s and AJE’s host country) reflect abuse of 
                                                          
12
 The map is available at: http://www.101traveldestinations.com/qatar-in-world-map/ 
[retrieved 27/02/2015] 
13
 Available at http://www.qsa.gov.qa/eng/publication/QatarMontlyStatistics/QATAR-
MONTHLY-STATISTICS-FEB-2015-Edition-13.pdf [retrieved 19/06/2015] 
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migrant workers (Amnesty International Annual Report: 2014/15) and 
notable restrictions on freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch: 
2014).  
  
It is argued here that the Qatari-based channel, AJA, remains not only a 
phenomenon that is worthy of exploration but also one which begs better 
understanding (Zayani: 2005). Appreciation of the significance of AJA is 
based on being aware of Qatar’s history and its motivation behind the 
establishment of such a predominant satellite channel. This research 
places the very nature of the channel’s establishment by its host country 
Qatar, as a key element that cannot be ignored in any study related to AJA.  
 
Based on the study of existing academic work on AJA, it has come to light 
that a considerable number of academics have questioned the nature of 
the relationship with Qatar. Academics appear to agree that the channel’s 
inception was part of the Emir’s political reforms and suggest that AJA’s 
establishment sets a new direction for Qatar (Sorenson: 2011). The 
dissolution of the BBC and Saudi joint channel project offered a golden 
opportunity for Qatar to set up AJA and absorb the ‘jobless’ experienced, 
Western-trained journalists (Miles: 2005; El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2002-
2003; Zayani: 2005; Sakr: 2001).  
 
Hugh Miles (2005) presents the history of Qatar and its Emir, at that time, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, as a Western-educated person and 
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more open to political and social ideas acquired from the West. The young 
Emir of Qatar, who took over power from his father in a bloodless coup in 
1992, decided to invest $140 million in a new channel with a mandate to 
freely report the news (Pintak: 2010).  
 
Miles (2005) explains that the political attitude of the new Emir was 
innovative: he constantly declared his policies and ideas, often speaking 
directly to the press. This approach opened the platform for public 
participation in making decisions, unlike the rest of Arab rulers, who 
remained aloof from their subjects. Hugh Miles also acknowledges that 
Qatar dramatically changed under the Emir’s new tangible reforms, 
consequently, the inception of AJA made Qatar feel that it was finally a 
player on the world stage.  
 
The channel transformed the way Arabs saw the world and their own 
region, and also brought prestige and recognition to its host country 
(Pintak: 2010; El-Ibiary: 2006). Miles (2005, p.34) states, furthermore, that 
political openness and public participation is progressive but Qatar is 
neither a democracy nor a police state: ‘it is an autocratic state subject to 
the whim of one man, the Emir, who although, (fortunately) not a tyrant, is 
unelected, unaccountable and all-powerful.’ Miles believes, therefore, that: 
  
The reaction of Al-Jazeera was an act of liberalism, not one of 
democracy, and the channel could be unmade as quickly as it 
was made, if, one day, the Emir changes his mind […] without 
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his continued political and financial benevolence, it would have 
ceased transmitting long ago (p. 35)  
 
El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003, p. 73) suggest, on the other hand, that 
the Qatari process of political change led by the Emir, has enhanced the 
credibility of what was formerly one of the most conservative countries in 
the Arabian Gulf, one of the least inclined to explore social and political 
reforms: ‘in fact, Sheikh Hamad’s actions in the conservative, 
autocratically-governed Qatar amount to “a one-man revolution”. It is 
rather a mixture of both liberalism and autocracy, as Qatar is not the only 
financial source of AJA: other private investors also make monetary 
contributions to the channel, including a Jewish man, which places AJA in 
the conspiracy theory bracket, according to many critics (Rinnawi: 2006). 
 
The channel’s funding revenues open political economy debates by 
academics. Such a theme represents a temptation for researchers to 
define the thin-line boundaries between the channel and Qatar as its major 
financial sponsor. Tatham (2006) and Campagna (2010) claim that AJA’s 
lack of financial independence due to its limited advertising revenue, 
forced the station to maintain its relationship with the Qatari royal family in 
order to survive. Khalil Rinnawi (2006, p.92), however, remains 
enthusiastic that AJA’s future plans will incorporate independence. 
 
Zayani (2005), in the same context, points out that due to Qatari financial 
support, the channel rarely criticises or even addresses the country’s 
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policies that involve the Qatari royal family. The Qatari political leadership 
subtly manipulates AJA for the purposes of controlling Qatari society by 
ignoring domestic issues. Pintak (2005) aligns with other academics and 
states that the motives of the Emir of Qatar are to place his country as an 
important player in the region and to enjoy world-wide approval by 
adopting a middle-of-the road policy by hosting AJA as well as a U.S. 
military base.  
 
Rinnawi (2006, p.98) further states that AJA was compelled to leave one 
topic untouched: internal Qatari politics: ‘Al-Jazeera has worked as the 
fourth estate in the Arab world, its target group, but has left Qatar 
untouched.’ 
 
El-Nawawy and Iskander (2003, p.34) conversely justify the fact that the 
directors of AJA have ‘identified a market demand for serious and 
independent journalism, thereby narrowing and specialising their content 
exclusively to political matters’, and therefore are more concerned with 
being allowed to freely practice their reportage, even though it may mean 
that certain areas are out of bounds. The market demand serves as a 
contrast to most other Arabic-language satellite services which dedicate 
much of their airtime to entertainment. It is worth mentioning that some 
critics note that El-Nawawy and Iskander focus too much on the AJA 
success story and omit to point out the channel’s negative aspects which 
are AJA’s intentions or motives (Lahlali: 2007). 
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Qatar has been subjected to criticism regarding its foreign relations policy. 
The daring approach adopted by AJA was deemed a threat to the 
hegemony of Arab regimes. Strained relationships developed between 
Qatar, the U.S. and some of the Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, because of the channel’s content in its telecasts (Zayani: 2005, 
p.3). 
 
U.S. officials accused AJA of collaborating with the Taliban leadership (it 
was initially the only network permitted in Kabul), and declared AJA as the 
‘mouthpiece’ of Osama Bin Laden, especially after the network aired Bin 
Laden’s tapes on 7 October 2001. U.S. officials consequently complained 
to Qatar and requested that the channel should be required to revise its 
reporting methods and content (El-Nawawy & Iskandar: 2003). 
  
AJA’s talk shows and questionably free debates on programmes such as 
the Opposite Direction, were seen as ‘revolutionary’ in a region where free 
speech was severely limited or virtually non-existent, consequently 
unnerving Arab autocratic regimes - Qatar received complaints and 
objections on several occasions (Miles: 2005). The former Egyptian 
president, Hosni Mubarak, paid a state visit to Qatar in 2000 and was 
taken to the AJA TV station. He remarked: ‘All this trouble from a 
matchbox like this?’ (Zayani: 2005, p. 40) 
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The question of the channel’s censorship and dependence on Qatar was 
brought into academic analysis. Most television channels in the Arab world 
are government-subsidised, partly because a considerable amount of 
money is required by the channels and partly because Arab governments 
have a stake in the media (Zayani: 2005): 
  
Who owns what in the Arab media is an entangled issue and a 
subject of inquiry in itself. Still, the patterns of media ownership 
in the Arab world point to some contradictions. On the one hand, 
governments are ideologically inclined to more 
commercialisation and privatisation. On the other hand, they still 
conceive of media as a state-controlled public service. The 
outcome is an interesting marriage of the two models: the public 
and the private, the ideological and the commercial. As it is, a 
network like AJA is both private and public (Zayani: 2005, p.15) 
 
Khalil Rinnawi (2006) briefly narrates the story of how the Emir decided to 
end media control without much consideration of the implications:  
 
He abolished the Ministry of Information, responsible for 
censorship. It ran radio and television, set quality standards for 
local newspapers. There is no other Arab government that 
functions without such a ministry or its equivalent. Even in the 
United States, many of these kinds of media controls are 
scattered among various federal departments (p. 88). 
 
Rinnawi also suggests that Qatar is the only Arab state that does not have 
a Ministry of Information and that AJA enjoys a unique ownership and 
policy structure. Policy is dictated by upper-level AJA staff, not by the 
Qatari government, although it receives its funding from there. Others like 
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Rathmell and Schulze (2000) assert that the station exists as a highly 
visible declaration of the regime's commitment to liberalisation. Rugh 
(2007), conversely argues that the channel is independent of Qatar and it 
has taken on a different role that seems revolutionary and inconsistent 
with Qatar’s past history. The new measures do not necessarily mean that 
journalists can write whatever they want: the main difference is that now, 
instead of knowing with certitude where the red lines are drawn, they have 
to guess; in practice, the lack of censorship has even proven to be a real 
headache for local journalists who are no longer sure of how far they can 
go: 
 
Since its inception in 1996, the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera Satellite 
Channel has risen to prominence as the most professional and 
independent broadcaster in the Arab world. Drawing on the rich 
and diverse experience of its staff, Al-Jazeera seems to have 
managed to establish a foothold for itself in an Arab media 
scene long characterised by government censorship and 
restrictive policies. As much as Al-Jazeera’s daring attitude has 
won the admiration of millions of viewers around the world, it 
has also generated countless diplomatic incidents involving its 
host and other Arab countries (Zayani: 2006,p. 106). 
 
The Qatari government reduced restrictions on freedom of speech and the 
press, but many Qatari journalists continued to practice self-censorship 
due to real or perceived social and political pressure: 
  
Even though Al-Jazeera sometimes falls short of its ambitious 
goals, it remains the most viable network of its kind in the 
region. Al-Jazeera has revolutionized the Arab Middle East, 
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challenging censorship imposed by the government-controlled 
media and addressing any relevant issue, including weak 
democratic institutions, fundamentalism, state corruption, 
political inequality, and human rights violations (El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar: 2003, p. 216). 
 
Miles (2006) answered the question: Is Al-Jazeera Censored?, in a journal 
article by saying that the station occupies a peculiar space in the Arab 
media - although it presents itself as a beacon of free speech and editorial 
independence in the region, the chairman of the network's board of 
directors is Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al-Thani, the former Qatari Deputy 
Minister of Information. The exact nature of the relationship remains 
opaque, but it is a testament to the Emir’s vision that, so far at least, he 
has been tolerant; whether he continues to refrain from interfering with the 
channel’s output, remains to be seen. Qatar has long had a ‘loyalist’ media 
system, and its newspapers still fall into that general category. The Arabic 
channel, however, has taken on a different role that seems revolutionary 
and inconsistent with Qatar’s past history (Rugh: 2007).  
 
William Rugh (2007) further supports his argument with three reasons: first, 
the channel initially emerged as a taboo-breaker, after a significant political 
change took place in Qatar when the former ruler was deposed by his son, 
who was determined to undertake some reforms in the direction of political 
liberalisation. Second, AJA’s aggressive political attitude can be seen, to 
some extent, as the result of a policy decision by the new ruler to put his 
country on the map, by way of constructing a different international image 
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from his neighbours, and using AJA to stir up controversy in a controlled 
way; and third, because of Qatar’s small size and the fact that AJA 
focuses on regional and international news that is of interest to the Arab 
world as a whole, there is little real news interest on which the channel 
could focus in Qatar, and therefore it has few Qatari taboos to challenge. 
  
The channel is viewed by some as the closest thing to independent 
television journalism currently available in the Arab world (Genntzkow and 
Shapiro: 2004); if there is one exception to the rule of ownership by 
government or government proxy, the only candidate, out of the six 
leading satellite broadcasting channels, is AJA, based in Qatar. This is 
officially an independent station whose ‘only’ connection with the 
government is that it was promised government loans over a period of five 
years (Sakr, 1999).  
 
Critics continue to point out the fact that AJA does not treat Qatar with the 
same degree of scrutiny as it does other Arab governments. The channel’s 
executives have countered that Qatar is relatively free of political strife and 
therefore does not require as much attention as other neighbouring Arab 
countries with a catalogue of questions (Sharp: 2003).  
 
Ahmed Al-Theidi (2003) has looked at the channel censorship from a 
different angle and suggests that the station has sparked a race, not only 
amongst private media, but also within government-sponsored media of 
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the Arab world. They have been pressurised to improve their performance, 
and re-think their old-fashioned methods of censorship in order to retain 
some of their audience. Arab governments have had, therefore, to loosen 
their grip on mass media, and adjust themselves to the new culture of 
debate and live discussions, thus allowing a certain level of criticism. Ali 
Abusalem (2007) agrees with this argument and states that the station 
effectively participated in lifting decades of government control over media. 
The station has given Arab world viewers the opportunity to exercise their 
basic human rights, to freely express their opinions, and to represent an 
Arab perspective on world events, particularly those closer to home. El-
Nawawy and Iskander (2003) write:  
 
Although the Qatari government denies any influence over AJA 
Al-Jazeera broadcasts and editorial policy, most official Arab 
complaints are directed at the Qatari government, not at the 
network. Because Al-Jazeera is a new phenomenon in the Arab 
world, and because Arabs are not accustomed to an 
independent Arab network, free of government control, many 
refuse to accept that Al-Jazeera truly operates on its own. They 
simply cannot separate Al-Jazeera from Qatari government (p. 
88). 
 
The motivation, as explained above, of Qatar being behind AJA has been 
of interest to academics. Such motivation is regularly questioned during 
times of crises in the Arab world.  
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2.5. AJA and Democracy 
 
Although it is out of this research scope, it is beneficial to generally 
present an overview of existing scholar discussion around media and 
democracy and how AJA viewed its role in endorsing democratic values in 
the complex and changing Arab world. 
 
In defining the term democracy, Leo Bogart (1998) suggests that the term 
democracy is hard to define as no single political system can lay exclusive 
claim to the term. He notes that democracy is often defined by what it 
opposes, rather than as an operational format for any specific kind of 
government.  
 
Over the past decade the paradigm of democracy and democratic 
practices have dominated the analysis of political change, reflecting the 
dramatic transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern and Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, and East Asia, while the new literature on 
democratisation has pointedly excluded the Arab world (Wickham 1994).  
 
Bogart (1998) correctly notes that any answer to the question of whether 
media serve democracy must be qualified; which media, and among what 
part of the public? Generally, media can serve democracy only when 
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those who manage them feel a passionate responsibility to create it and 
maintain it.  
 
Michael Schudson (2008, p.8-9) argues that democracy and journalism 
are not the same thing; democracy does not necessarily produce 
journalism, nor does journalism necessarily produce democracy. 
Schudson (ibid) presented six primary functions news has served or can 
serve in a democracy. The six functions journalism has frequently 
assumed in democratic societies, in different combinations and with 
different emphases, are: 
1. Information: the news media can provide fair and full information so 
citizens can make sound political choices. 
2. Investigation: the news media can investigate concentrated sources of 
power, particularly governmental power. 
3. Analysis: the news media can provide coherent frameworks of 
interpretation to help citizens comprehend a complex world. 
4. Social Empathy: journalism can tell people about others in their society 
and their world so that they can come to appreciate the viewpoints and 
lives of other people, especially those less advantaged than themselves. 
5. Public Forum: journalism can provide a forum for dialogue among 
citizens and serve as a common carrier of the perspectives of varied 
groups in society 
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6. Mobilization: the news media can serve as an advocate for particular 
political programmes and perspectives and mobilize people to act in 
support of these programmes. 
 
Zizi Papacharissi’s (2009) views that journalism is based on democratic 
values, but can thrive with or without democracy; in dictatorships or 
monarchies, journalists’ coverage of abuses of power are typically 
instrumental in cultivating democratic resistance.  
 
Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko (2000: p. xii) introduce three duties 
for media to democracy and note that the emergence of a free and critical 
press is a key indicator of the transformation to democracy. The writers 
suggest the media’s duties to democracy flow from three premises; [1] to 
act as a watchdog against the state, [2] to supply accurate and sufficient 
information, [3] to represent the people in the sense of adequately 
reflecting the spectrum of public opinion and political competition.  
 
To test these three premises of Scammel and Semetko on AJA, this 
research suggests that before the uprising, the channel has represented 
the notion of media power in the Arab world since the very moment of its 
inception as it - directly or indirectly - criticised Arab tyrant regimes and 
acted as the most perceptible watchdog against states. The channel has 
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also supplied Arabs with not only information but also brought all opposing 
views to people’s living rooms throughout its informative daring approach. 
After the fall of Mubarak, the Arab world has evidently become fragmented 
hence what stands as democratic practices – represented in the ballot 
boxes - has been in question and widely controversial.  
 
This research argues that both the channel and its host country, Qatar, 
mutually benefit from their coexistence. The station has an unwritten 
understanding of avoiding any criticism of the state of Qatar (as discussed 
in chapter two, three and seven).  
 
Tokunbo Awoshakin (2010; p. 49-50) explains the Nigerian model of 
mature democracy, in which media has always been a vehicle for social 
reengineering and political redirection. The Nigerian journalists have 
successfully shown consistent attempts to look for more effective ways to 
engage the public. They also aimed to create opportunities for members of 
the public to come aboard and shoulder some stake in a participatory 
democracy (Awoshakin 2010). 
 
Democracy is usually thought of as a product of Western Enlightenment 
thinking but many of the critical questions that revolve around the linkage 
of media and democracy occur in the non-industrial world (Bogart 1998). 
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Such critical thinking of media-democracy linkage opens the platform for 
this research to discuss AJA representation of the MB in relations to 
democracy and ideology (discussed in chapter six and seven). 
 
2.6. Orginalisational Cultures in Arab Newsroom:  
 
In this section, this research reviews key previous studies amongst Arab 
journalists in order to clarify the connections between the wider political 
influences in the region and the organisational cultures in Arab newsrooms 
(particularly pan-Arab news outlets such as AJA). In general, studies on 
journalism and politics tend to focus on journalists themselves, the 
structure of their media organisations or the socio-political and 
technological context outside the newsrooms (Benson, 2004).  
 
In his sociological analysis of news production, Schudson (2000) suggests 
three main influences on this production process: political economy of the 
society, the organisation of the newsroom, and the political culture 
surrounding the news outlets. Building on that model, Benson (2004, p, 
80) suggests three major factors which shape news coverage of politics: 
economic, political and inter-organisational, where the first two factors are 
subsumed within the political economy approach while the third factor 
encompasses individual as well as organisational factors. He also 
emphasises the need to examine historical and cultural contexts before 
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analysing such major factors in order to explain the intertwining 
relationship between journalism and politics.  
 
Arab studies adopting a political-economy approach (e.g. Ayish, 2002, 
Rinnawi, 2006, Rugh, 2007) focused on the new western style 
programming and reporting in pan-Arab media such as AJA. Ayish (2002) 
suggested that this new style was due to the fact that many journalists in 
those outlets were trained, and previously worked, in the West. The news 
agenda of such outlets remain regional (Rinnawi, 2006) which is applied 
also in talk shows such as AJA’s programmes (Rugh, 2007). This, 
however, does not mean that such outlets are completely autonomous 
from national pressures, as their content can still be determined by 
external political pressures, national or regional (Boyd-Barrett and Xie, 
2008).  
 
A previous study (Tarabay, 1994), for instance, examined the patterns of 
ownership in Pan-Arab and Lebanese press and identified three patterns: 
editor-owner, semi-organisational, and government-owner. In the case of 
the Lebanese press, in particular, the study linked the press with religious 
factions such as the case of An-Nahar, owned by a Greek Orthodox family 
versus Assafir which is owned by a Shia family (ibid.).  
 
Moreover, Ayish (2002) categorises pan-Arab news media into three 
categories: traditional, reformist, and liberal commercial. The first pattern 
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includes traditional television channels, such as the Syrian Satellite 
Channel, which, still very much follows the traditional editorial orientation 
in its news output. The second category refers to channels such as Abu 
Dhabi (which has now ceased to function as a news channel and has 
turned into a family channel), with higher journalistic professional 
standards in order to compete with other news channels. Then, the third 
category includes channels such as AJA, driven by its professional rather 
than political interests. Studies focusing on AJA journalism (e.g. Ghadbian, 
2001; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006) suggest that the 
channel has played a pivotal role in challenging the customary role of 
government-controlled media thereby raising the professional standards of 
Arab media. For instance, politicians have to respond to AJA’s critical 
reporting of their policies which explains why the channel’s offices were 
shut down in several Arab cities (Hammond, 2007).  
 
Given the proliferation of new and social media in the MENA region, some 
recent studies (e.g. Hamdy, 2009; Khamis, 2011; Ayish, 2010) suggest the 
rise of citizen journalism. Ayish and Mellor (2015), for instance, argue that 
the recent uprisings in the region helped trigger a new use of social media 
in journalism and activism. One example is the coverage of the Syrian 
conflict, which was described as one of the most socially mediated events 
in the region. With the censoring of state media, Syrian citizens turned into 
storytellers and set up their own local news agencies feeding news to 
overseas media including satellite channels (Ismail 2012, 106).  
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In light of the increasing role of new media in Arab newsrooms, especially 
post-Arab Spring, Khaled Abdel Sattar (2013) argues that political factors 
constitute an important factor in implementing innovative policies in Arab 
newsrooms, such as hiring social media editors or using SMS services.  
 
The recent uprisings have also brought hope for the relaxation of state 
control of media and its heavy censorship. However, a recent study (el 
Issawi & Cammaerts, 2015) of Egyptian journalists argues that those 
journalists struggled to uphold a monitorial role after the end of the MB 
rule, to which many private and public media were opposed. Instead, 
journalists re-assumed their traditional role as mouthpiece for the military 
regime especially asmany private outlets were controlled by political and 
military elites. As such, their oppositional journalistic style against the 
Brotherhood was only an expression of their collaboration with the 
traditional elites (ibid.). 
 
Other studies about the organisational structure of Arab newsrooms 
adopted the theory of gatekeeping. Applying gatekeeping theory to the 
Saudi context, for instance, Almaghlooth (2013) argues that gatekeeping 
is an important concept in analysing the Saudi media landscape. Through 
interviews with Saudi journalists, Almaghlooth (2013) shows various 
aspects of post-production gatekeeping including editing material after 
publication, deleting posts and news items, blocking and pressure on 
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microbloggers. He also argues that gatekeeping can be manifested in 
blocking social issues such as women’s issues, or religious issues.  
 
Moreover, in their scrutiny of AJA’s organisational model, Zayani & 
Sahraoui (2007, p. 171) argue that AJA “has many of the symptoms that 
plague Arab organisations”. For instance, staff did not feel empowered 
and their “level of commitment to the mission of AJA is not as strong as it 
was in the first few years of the network’s history” (p. 175). Internal reward 
system such as promotion is not systematic combined with the “clan 
mentality” such as in hiring native Qataris (ibid.). In terms of content, 
Zayani & Sahraoui (2007, p. 172) argue that AJA is toning down its 
populist appeal in covering crises but “it still comes off as the channel of 
Arab discontent, giving an outlet to people’s anger and frustration about a 
Middle East that is going through troubled times.” 
 
Drawing on Cultural Studies, Mellor (2008 & 2011) argues that Arab 
journalists are cultural producers articulating their ideologies about politics 
and pan-Arab identity. In line with Zelizer’s argument (1993/1997) that 
journalists form their own interpretive community, Arab journalists here 
form an interpretive community with their own shared practices and 
narratives (see also Mellor: 2011, p. 6). 
 
Journalists actively negotiate their professional identity and autonomy from 
the political regimes by “redefining their role in society” (Mellor, 2008, p. 
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318). For instance, in her study amongst journalists in pan-Arab media 
outlets including AJA and its rival Al Arabiya (as well as BBC Arabic), 
Mellor (2011) argues that such pan-Arab media has a global news agenda 
and their journalists therefore see themselves more detached from their 
local political news and more attuned to regional news agenda. They also 
see their pan-Arab institutions as more visible and credible via-a-vis their 
local counterparts, and this motivated some of them to pursue their dream 
of joining a global news media outlet such as the CNN.  
 
Other studies amongst Arab journalists tended to highlight their attitudes 
particularly towards Western political powers. For instance, Pintak and 
Ginges (2008) surveyed more than 600 journalists in selected Arab 
countries in order to analyse their attitudes toward their mission post-9/11. 
They argue that Arab journalists value their commitment to the Change 
Agent function, in that they see their mission as contributing to the 
development of their societies. Ramaprasad and Hamdy (2006) argue that 
Egyptian journalists, for one, regarded the value of supporting pan-Arab 
identity as one important function of mass media.  
 
Another survey amongst a sample of Arab journalists in the MENA region 
(Pintak and Ginges, 2009) showed that Arab journalists were critical of 
western media coverage of the region although the study also highlighted 
the economic and ethical pressures facing Arab journalists and their 
autonomy as watchdog, a role that they themselves adopt from Western 
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practices. In terms of their ethics, those journalists saw themselves as 
representative of a Muslim culture which unites the region and they were 
therefore interested in covering issues which they regard as important in 
improving the lives of Muslims in the region such as poverty and education 
(ibid.). Moreover, in his comparison between journalists in pan-Arab 
outlets with their local counterparts, Valeriani (2010) argues that national 
identity is one important assessment variable for those journalists who 
assess each other’s work according to their national priorities, which 
makes the news agenda very much determined by national and/or 
regional interest. 
 
To sum up, the above studies highlighted the significance of the political 
context in analysing news culture in local and regional newsrooms in the 
Middle East. Although a few of the above studies highlighted the 
importance of national and regional identity (e.g. pan-Arabism) in defining 
journalists’ roles, they did not touch upon the impact of values and ethics 
on journalistic practices in pan-Arab media (including AJA), and here lies 
the contribution of this study as it presents the findings of interviews 
collated with selected AJA journalists showing how they justify their 
coverage from an ethical viewpoint.  
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2.7 Summary 
 
It was evident in the existing literature that AJA has managed in no time to 
be able to position itself as a leading media service in the Arab world, 
following a long period of government-owned media. The channel has 
founded a culture that media cannot only be a representative voice of the 
majority of regular and marginalised Arabs, but has also defied the very 
existence of Arab authoritarian regimes. The channel’s tone of ‘electrifying’ 
language, daring approach and attractive presentation, has encouraged 
other Arab media services to follow the same technique, and therefore has 
arguably changed the very nature of the way Arab media function. It won 
the hearts and minds of millions of ‘hungry’ Arab audiences, soon after its 
inception, by telling them what they wanted to know, maybe not what they 
should know; nonetheless, for many Arabs, AJA, as a media source, 
represents pan-Arab identity. 
 
The question of the relationship between AJA and Qatar is substantial in 
any academic work regarding the channel. The motivation of Qatar to 
launch AJA is arguably clear: many academics seem to agree that the 
channel is a public relations tool and a ‘mouthpiece’ for Qatar, a place that 
has many paradoxes in terms of having the biggest American military base, 
and also hosting Islamic movements such as Hamas and Taliban, 
described by the international community as ‘terrorist organisations’.  
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Academics have also raised several questions on the channel’s 
independence and ownership, and therefore the impact of AJA’s editorial 
coverage and impartiality in reporting stories relating to Qatar appears to 
be either under-researched or not critically investigated. What seems 
limited in the existing literature on AJA is the in-depth analysis of 
identifying its relationship with Islamic discourse, including its association 
with Islamic political parties, particularly the MB in Egypt, which is the main 
focus of this research.  
 
Identifying the story of AJA’s establishment, its place among Arab media, 
its pan-Arab identity, and unpacking its relationship with Qatar, underpins 
this research’s focus in following the development of the channel in the 
Arab world. This background review, more importantly, gives this research 
an overview of whether or not AJA’s construction of its place in providing 
an ‘impartial’ news source (presenting Opinion and the Opposite Opinion 
رخلأا يأرلاو يأرلا) in the Arab world has changed. This is revealed through 
examining the channel’s relationship with the MB in Egypt.  
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on AJA, the channel’s significance 
and place among other media services and its relationship with Qatar. The 
next chapter will look at the scholarly discussions on AJA in relation to 
Islam and Islamic political parties, before and after the outbreak of the 
Arab uprisings.  
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Chapter Three 
AJA AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IDEOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The significance of AJA in the Arab world, the place it inhabits among 
other Arab media services, and the questions of its ownership and 
independence in relations to its host country, Qatar, was discussed in the 
previous chapter. This chapter focuses on reviewing the existing academic 
literature on AJA’s relationship with political Islam in general and in 
particular the MB in Egypt.  
 
This chapter seeks to build on the few academic works available regarding 
the channel’s alleged role of its positive representation of the Egyptian 
Islamic movement, the MB. This chapter also looks at the role of Qatar, 
AJA’s host country, its accommodation of Islamists and Islamic 
movements, and the impact this has on the channel’s editorial practices - 
a topic of academic interpretation. Discussions around the channel’s 
reportage of the Arab uprisings will also be discussed.  
 
Academics have often mentioned that AJA has generally provided a 
platform for ‘opposing voices’ to Arab dictator regimes, in which case, the 
MB is perhaps seen as the most prominent in the Arab world.  
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3.2 AJA: A platform for Islamic Ideology  
 
Debates on AJA’s relationship with Islam and Islamic political parties is not 
recent; in his article: ‘How Arab is Al-Jazeera English?’, Abeer Al-Najar 
(2009, p. 4) notes that one of the main challenges facing AJE in the West, 
for example, is its brand, specifically, the reputation of its sister channel, 
AJA - a channel that has been accused of representing ‘terrorists and 
Jihadists’, ‘Jihad TV’, ‘Killers with Cameras’, ‘the most powerful ally of 
terror in the World’, and so on, by many U.S. officials  
 
The fall of Mubarak in January 2011 attracted much academic 
commentary. Sultan Al-Qassemi (2012), for example, criticised AJA and its 
relationship with the Islamic movement, the MB, in his article: ‘Morsi’s Win 
Is Al-Jazeera’s Loss’ and claims that AJA’s connection with the MB was 
evident since the inception of the channel. He also notes that tthe main 
guest of its chief religious programme, ‘Life and Shari’a’ is none other than 
Yousef Al-Qaradawi, a well-known member of the MB, and a permanent 
resident and citizen of Qatar. The channel, according to Al-Qassemi, 
spared no effort or time in promoting Al-Qaradawi through its various 
channels. 
 
The management of AJA showed great foresight when, a few days after 
the fall of Mubarak, it launched AJ Mubasher Misr (Egypt Live), a 24-hour 
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channel dedicated to Egyptian affairs and arguably supporting the MB and 
its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, in its coverage. 
 
The championing of AJA, according to Gillies Kepel (2009, p.5), did not 
start or end with the MB. Kepel argues that Al-Qaradawi’s explanation of 
Israeli attacks, for example, as ‘martyrdom operations’ reinforces his 
argument that because every Israeli, including women, has done military 
service, they are all combatants, even though they may temporarily be in 
civilian clothes; consequently, suicide attacks against Israeli civilians are a 
legitimate means of Jihad (in the path of Allah).  
 
Kepel also openly accuses AJA of providing Islamist extremists the 
platform on which to express their views, and notes that ‘without Al-
Jazeera there would be no Al-Qaeda, because such operations could only 
become instruments for mobilisation if they were broadcast favourably by 
a non-Western satellite TV channel’ (p. 5). Hanna Rogan (2008) has a 
similar opinion and considered AJA as a media instrument to spread the 
message of Al-Qaeda.  
 
It was claimed that there was a confluence of interests between AJA, the 
Qatari TV channel, and Al-Qaeda in the discussions on how AJA’s media 
policy transmits Al-Qaeda messages (El-Zein: 2012). Hatem El-Zein 
argues that one of the main reasons for the channel’s fame is AJA’s 
exclusive access to Al-Qaeda messages and ‘terrorist’ leaders because of 
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its backing of this group: ‘Al-Jazeera has supported Al-Qaeda which 
knows the importance of media in its war’ (p. 442). He noted, however, 
that until AJA aired the Al-Qaeda tapes, American officials praised the 
channel for its free speech ethos. 
 
3.3 AJA: Adopting the Arab Uprisings 
 
AJA Satellite TV played a substantial media role in the Arab world, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, and helped in transforming the very 
nature of media perception, not only in the Arab world, but also around the 
globe, due to its attractive presentation, live interviews, fast news-
gathering, public engagement, and style of investigative journalism 
programmes. Such dynamics gave the channel the legitimacy to be 
referred to as ‘the’ Arab news and current affairs station. Deborah Horan, 
(2010), in her report ‘Shifting Sands: The Impact of Satellite TV on Media 
in the Arab World’ writes: 
 
[…] Al-Jazeera has covered a string of Middle East conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza—building its reputation 
across the region, though not without controversy. The channel 
has come under harsh criticism for its coverage of Osama bin 
Laden, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran, with Bush 
administration officials leading the charge that its reports were 
anti-American. It has also been criticized in the West for 
showing graphic violence (Horan: 2010p. 10) 
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Mehdi Hasan (2011) states in an article for the New Statesman regarding 
the recent Arab Spring events, that AJA’s correspondents and producers 
were harassed, arrested, and even killed, in their attempts to capture the 
current news: 
 
As Arab governments toppled from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya - 
and, last month, Yemen Al-Jazeera has been on hand to beam 
the pictures of ecstatic protesters, revolutionaries and rebels 
into the living rooms of ordinary Arabs across the region - and 
beyond […] In Egypt, for 18 days straight, Al-Jazeera's cameras 
broadcast live from Cairo's Tahrir Square, giving a platform to 
the demonstrators, while documenting the violence of the 
Mubarak regime and its supporters (Hasan: 2011) 
 
Aref Hijjawi (2011), Programme Director, AJA in Qatar, notes in his article: 
‘The role of Al-Jazeera in the Arab Revolts of 2011’, that the function of 
AJA in mobilising the Egyptian streets was minimal. The channel imprinted 
one idea in people’s minds: that everybody believed Egypt still lived in the 
shadow of a regime that defied time. Hijjawi explains that what kept the 
streets ablaze was the stubbornness of Egyptian youth, aided by the 
strong presence of an organised force on the street, the MB. The channel 
was very clear and immutable in its pro-rebellion stance, in contrast to 
other stations that visibly wavered. 
 
The station sacrificed much of its diversity by devoting most of its 
broadcasting and a larger part of its newscasts to the headlines of the day. 
It lost a considerable portion of its viewers who migrated towards BBC 
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Arabic, France24, AJE, and so on, by failing to satisfy the viewers’ desire 
for more diverse and interesting regional and local information (Hijjawi: 
2011). Hijjawi concludes (p.72) that a television station does not create a 
revolution, nor does it participate in it, despite what some researchers may 
think; at most, ‘it is like a panel on the highway telling the revolutionaries 
that “you are on the right path”’. 
 
The Economist published an article in 2010 entitled ‘Al-Jazeera: More 
powerful than ever’, in which it notes that AJA was considerably more 
controversial than its English counterpart (AJE). Pro-Western Arab 
governments, particularly those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (which denied 
AJA a local office), repeatedly accused it of bias: they said it favoured the 
MB, Egypt's chief opposition, and Hamas, the Islamist movement that runs 
Gaza and refuses to recognise Israel. The article also states that the 
former AJA service's head, Waddah Khanfar, and his news editor, Ahmed 
Sheikh, were both West Bank Palestinians reputedly enjoying close 
relations with Hamas. Many of the station's Egyptian staff members were 
believed to be sympathetic towards the Brotherhood (of which Hamas is a 
branch of) which they refuted:  
 
AJA’s bosses deny bias but explain that Palestine and 
especially the plight of Gaza are bound to top the agenda for 
Arabs. The sometimes emotional lexicon of struggle is, they say, 
inevitable. Shaheed, or martyr, is deemed a fair term for a 
suicide-bomber. The phenomenon of political Islam, they have 
argued, badly needs friendly illumination (The Economist, 2010). 
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Hugh Miles (2011) also comments on the impact of AJA during the 
revolution, and notes how the station kept the momentum of the Egyptian 
revolution on-going. He states that while AJA was reporting live, hundreds 
of thousands of people were calling for the end of the regime, the Egyptian 
national TV showed very few incidents, only the scenes of quiet Cairene 
streets; in addition, when AJA was producing live streaming of people 
queuing for bread and petrol, the Egyptian TV showed ‘happy shoppers’ 
with full fridges from footage filmed at an unknown time in the past. The 
enormous influence that AJA had on the Arab street through its 
revolutionary message against Arab dictatorships, made Arab ‘dictators’ 
feel considerably uncomfortable, if not alarmed: there were already hints 
of insurrections in Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain.  
 
It is these ‘electrifying messages’ and nuances in AJA’s programmes, the 
main focus of this research, that are important in order to understand how 
they represented the conflicting political parties in Egypt. Mehdi Hasan 
(2011) questions the accusations that the channel was a platform for 
Islamist parties and they were over-represented on the channel’s output. 
Khanfar, according to Hasan, defends the stance of the channel and 
justifies this representation by saying: ‘there are too many Islamists on the 
screen, not because of an editorial decision or an editorial bias, but 
because Islamists right now are the most influential movement in the Arab 
society’. 
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The channel was blamed for stimulating Arab ‘radicalism’ and feeding anti-
Western sentiments, but it still denied having any agenda other than 
presenting the views and opposing views of its guests. AJA was being 
perceived as the channel that advocated all the supposedly dangerous 
‘isms’ that appeared in Arab world media such as ‘Islamism’, ‘terrorism’, 
‘populism’, ‘anti-Semitism’, and so on (Lamloum: 2004: p. 12) 
 
Kai Hafez (2004) argues that AJA is more critical of the United States than 
many other Arab media. Mamoun Fandy (cited in Hafez’s article) from 
Georgetown University in Washington, also notes that, as early as 2000 
AJA represented a new kind of alliance between nationalists and Islamists 
– a view that, until today, is shared by some critical Arab journalists.  
 
Mohammed El-Nawawy (2004) explains that the ‘emotionality’ and ‘anti-
Americanism’ of AJA’s reporters was evident when covering the battle of 
Fallujah (Iraq) between American troops and Iraqi resistance fighters in 
2004. Arab television was generally not able to report the variety of 
political views on the war in Iraq in 2003, and oppositional perspectives 
against Saddam Hussein were given little or no attention. 
 
The criticism that the channel receives on its relations with Islamists is 
arguably not only driven by AJA’s editorial practices but also by the 
intimate relationship between Qatar and Islamists, which will be discussed 
in the following section.  
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3.4 Qatar: A Host for AJA and Islamic Parties 
 
It is interesting to note that the host and the principle financer of AJA, 
Qatar, also hosts and debatably finances Islamic parties such as the MB, 
Hamas, and Taliban, which raises questions about Qatar’s intentions and 
the impact of these relations on AJA’s editorial practices. A channel that is 
owned by Qatar, a country that hosts Islamists perhaps puts both Qatar 
and AJA in a frail position – neither is able to deny this apparent long-
standing relationship. 
 
Zavi Mazel (2009) argues - in an article published in Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs - that there was ‘never any doubt’ about the network’s 
political orientation: starting from being pro-Palestinian since the second 
Intifada; broadcasting against the United States at the time of the 
Afghanistan conflict (Bin Laden’s video and audio tapes); pro-Saddam in 
Iraq; behaving as the Hezbollah ‘spokesman’ in the Second Lebanese 
War in 2006; reportage of the Gaza war, in which a senior AJA reporter 
stationed himself at Al-Shifa Hospital, from where he broadcast a stream 
of carefully selected horror pictures, and so on. Mazel quotes the Egyptian 
critical writer, Maamun Fendi, who wrote in Asharq Alawsat that some 50 
per cent of the network’s personnel belonged to the MB.  
 
Fandi claims that by embracing Islamists while hosting American military 
bases, Qatar has found the perfect ground for Islamists to attack Arab 
76 
 
leaders. He further argues that AJA had become a weapon in the hands of 
an ambitious Emir Hamad, who may have been driven by the Islamic 
parties, particularly the MB, and who was ‘threatening’ the stability of the 
Middle East. He also accused the AJA and Qatari relationship as a 
‘dangerous phenomenon’: 
 
[…] with the Muslim Brothers increasingly aligned in recent 
years with Iran, by repeatedly attacking the Sunni Arab regimes 
and inciting against them, Al-Jazeera is serving as an important 
instrument for Tehran and its effort to undermine their internal 
stability […] with the help of the powerful satellite network he 
created, the Emir of Qatar, a man who does not overly care for 
democracy and freedom of expression, is trying to assume the 
mantle of a great power, aided and abetted by the Muslim 
Brothers – one of the most extreme movements in the Muslim 
world. (Fandi, cited in Mazel: 2009). 
 
Wadah Khanfar, a Palestinian and former director of the AJA, was born 
and raised in Jordan where, consistent with a MB background, he was 
educated as an engineer. The same report indicates that he was also a 
student activist, organising a student union in keeping with a Muslim 
Brotherhood setting. An article published by The Economist (2011): ‘Al-
Jazeera why did he go?’ (Referring to the resignation of Khanfar) attracted 
critical opinion that although AJA did not sponsor rebellion, it did promote 
one particular aspect: 
 
Colleagues who quit the channel complain that Mr Khanfar 
packed its staff with Islamists, many of them sympathetic to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In coverage of Libya, for example, Al-
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Jazeera has put Islamist factions, some of which happen to be 
backed by Qatar, in the spotlight at the expense of secular 
rivals. Perhaps the appointment of a member of the emirate’s 
ruling family as the channel’s new chief will curb such 
enthusiasm (The Economist: 2011) 
 
The American Foreign Policy Council’s ‘World Almanac of Islamism’, gave 
an overview of Qatar and its relationship with Islam, and explains that 
Islamism is very much an ‘in-house’ phenomenon in Qatar (American 
Foreign Policy Council: 2014). It pointed out that a necessary precondition 
for the rise of an Islamist opposition is the decline in government 
legitimacy and efficacy. These governments use their control of the media 
to create a monopoly on reporting, making the reportage itself a tool in 
regional rivalries.  
 
The review defines the nature of Wahhabi Qatar and notes that Qatar’s 
government and ruling family have traditionally been strongly linked to 
Wahhabi-Hanbali Islam 14 . Not only is Wahhabi Islam the official state 
religion, but Islamic jurisprudence is the basis of Qatar's legal system: civil 
courts have jurisdiction only over commercial law.  
 
Among the political exiles who sought refuge in Qatar are prominent 
figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom fled persecution at the 
hands of Nasser’s Egyptian government during the 1950s. Some of these 
                                                          
14
 ‘Wahhabi doctrine is based on the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence and is 
characterized by acceptance only of original texts of the Quran, the hadith, and the sunna’ 
(Rabasa: 2004: 15) 
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exiles reportedly laid the foundations for the Qatari Education Ministry, and 
taught at various levels there until the early 1980s. (American Foreign 
Policy Council: 2014, p. 291)  
 
The nature of Qatari media was clarified: since the 11th September 
attacks on New York and Washington, AJA underwent a process of 
increasing ‘Islamisation,’ with many of its more secular staff replaced by 
Islamists. The channel was alleged to have moved away from its rather 
ideologically diverse origins to a more populist — and more Islamist — 
approach. It was increasingly becoming a participant in the sectarian feud 
between Shi’a and Sunni, and Qatar itself was centrally placed in this 
battle: on the one hand, it hosted an American military base on its soil, 
where tanks and vehicles damaged in the fighting were serviced and sent 
back into battle to protect the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq, and on the 
other, Qatar’s Sunni majority saw (and still see) Shi’ite Iran as the main 
threat to the region (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014 p. 291). 
 
The questions asked in this overview are aligned with this research’s main 
investigation: how much of AJA’s increasing Islamist slant is a matter of 
design and how much is evolution? Has the station been changing its 
approach in order to promote the interests of the Qatari ruling family, or is 
the shift a simple reflection of the growing popularity of Islamist causes in 
Arab society? Whatever the true cause (and they are not mutually 
exclusive), AJA is more than a mirror of public opinion and is increasingly 
79 
 
taking the initiative in influencing events, rather than merely reporting on 
them. 
 
Oxford Analytica (2005) published an article: ‘The Advent of Terrorism In 
Qatar’ in which it also claims that Qatar has a long-standing tradition of 
hosting exiled Islamic ‘terrorists’ and radical preachers from Algeria, 
Chechnya, Egypt, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. Elizabeth 
Weingarten (2010) explains in her article in The Atlantic, the reason 
behind Qatar’s strong ties with Islamic groups is to allow the free flow of 
funds through the country:  
 
Beyond Qatar's alleged funding of Al-Qaeda and its ties to Hamas 
and Iran, it has also tried to bolster its reputation by allowing 
money to flow freely through the country, no questions asked. 
Implementing more scrutiny would likely anger terrorist groups and 
put Qatar at greater risk (Weingarten: 2010).  
 
Mohammed El-Oif (2011) states in his article in Le Monde: ‘What to do 
about Al-Jazeera?’ that the editorial position of the satellite TV network 
AJA, based in the Qatari capital of Doha, has allowed Qatari foreign policy 
to shape trans-national Arab sentiment. The channel drives its legitimacy 
from its media professionalism and its approach of blending ‘pan-Arabism’, 
‘Islamic sensitivity’ and ‘liberalism’, has empowered AJA’s success and 
reach. The channel became an important media tool of the ‘revolution’ in 
January 2011 in Egypt, in spite of the closure of its office in Tahrir Square 
when the Mubarak regime shut down the Internet. It was AJA that 
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disrupted that communication strategy. El-Oif also speculates on the 
equivocality of the situation: 
 
How do supporting Arab revolutions serve the interests of the 
local dynastic regime? Or defending Hamas against Israel but 
also against Fatah? These are concessions made by leaders to 
the Arab journalists they employ, and to public opinion. They 
are the price Qatar has to pay for sending warplanes to Libya or 
hosting Israeli leaders in Doha (El-Oif: 2011). 
 
Steven Stalinsky (2007) identifies the fact that Arab reformists who had 
witnessed first-hand incitement by AJA often discussed its connection with 
the MB (Ikhwan) movement. This organisation is one of the world's leading 
Islamist groups, based in Egypt and founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna 
(see Chapter 4). Today, its ideology influences groups ranging from 
Hamas to Al-Qaeda. He writes: ‘Many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood 
use Al-Jazeera for their own platform’ (Stalinsky: 2007).  
 
Judea Pearl (cited in Oren Kessler: 2012) claims, as many other critics do, 
that the channel had ‘unconditional’ support for Hamas’s ‘terror’ in Gaza, 
the Hezbollah takeover in Lebanon, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes, 
and that it is an illusion that democracy and human rights are on AJA’s 
agenda. Pearl continues by putting the channel’s strategy more plainly: ‘I 
have no doubt that today Al-Jazeera is the most powerful voice of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’ (p. 52). 
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Pearl’s arguments are based on his personal opinion rather than analysis; 
although his point of view is generally echoed by commentators, little has 
been done on the subject at academic level. This research attempts to 
examine whether or not AJA is the most powerful voice for the MB in 
Egypt, or whether it is only a platform for diverse ideologies, including 
secular movements. 
 
AJA became more widely known in the West, principally when it made 
headlines in Western media following its broadcasting of Bin Laden’s 
tapes. Some Western commentators, as previously discussed, accused 
the channel of serving Bin Laden’s propaganda while claiming a direct link 
between Al-Qaeda and AJA (Figenschou: 2013). These claims were later 
made solid by the arrest of a few AJA reporters such as Tayseer Allouni 
(under house arrest) on the grounds that they collaborated with Al-Qaeda 
by serving them financially, especially after he secured an exclusive 
interview with Bin Laden, only a month after the 9/11 attacks in America 
(Beckman: 2013; Zayani: 2005). 
 
Dima Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) focuses on one particular programme, 
which, by definition, is a religious programme, but she observes that the 
channel’s general abandonment of its diversity was illustrated by not 
presenting both views from different religious backgrounds. Dima presents 
an interesting argument, however, on which this research could further 
build a case by investigating the current news programmes such as 
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Opposite Direction and Without Borders, and examining the language and 
what stands beyond it in AJA’s framing of the MB, before and after the fall 
of Mubarak (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
The nature of the language used by AJA, according to Haim Malka (2003), 
is ‘biased’. He notes the different Islamic views and analyses one 
particular incident:  
 
[…] three main arguments have emerged: the first, endorsing 
the attacks of September 11 and against Israeli targets, the 
second, rejecting attacks like September 11, but supporting 
attacks against Israeli targets, and the third, rejecting all suicide 
attacks, wherever they take place. This academic piece shows 
how Qaradawi has gained popularity and legitimacy throughout 
the Arab world by questioning the authority of the state, and he 
reaches a broad audience through his regular appearances on 
the Arabic satellite channel, Al-Jazeera (Malka: 2003, p. 8). 
 
Malka further asserts that Qaradawi has emerged as one of the pre-
eminent Islamic religious figures in the Arab world, and arguably 
represents the mainstream of Arab Muslim society. Oren Kessler (2012) 
highlights the channel’s backing of the Islamic movement, Hamas, in its 
rivalry against the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), ‘It’s unmistakable 
— Al-Jazeera is not just pro-Palestinian, but pro-Hamas’ (p. 53).  
 
Previous analysis research was made on the fragmentation of U.S. cable 
news media, specifically comparing CNN and The Fox News Network, 
showed that Fox consistently resonated more and was thought to have 
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less bias with a more conservative audience and CNN was more likely to 
resonate with people who viewed the press, as a whole, as a less biased 
entity (Morris, 2005; 2007). 
 
The rising power of political Islam ideology was not only limited to the Arab 
media but also to the Western ones. Kelsey Glover (2011) explains how 
the U.S. media (CNN and Fox News) framed the MB during the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011. Her research specifically focuses on the 
characterisation of, and information reported about Egypt’s leading 
political opposition group, the MB, both during the revolution and directly 
following Mubarak’s resignation. Glover’s study examines the portrayal of 
the MB by CNN and Fox News through a content analysis of television 
broadcast transcripts. She notes that the change in the Egyptian 
leadership put the ‘revolution’ in the headlines of virtually all major news 
media outlets in the U.S., due to the rise of MB and its playing a potential 
leadership role in Egypt. Glover finds the results were most often 
associated with radical Islam or a threat to democratic ideals, after 
examining the context in which the MB was discussed through both cable 
network transcripts: 
 
The significance of portraying MB in such a manner will almost 
certainly affect American public opinion of the MB when taking 
into account America’s sensitivity concerning Terrorism. 
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, the MB was evaluated as 
a threat instead of as a positive part of a pluralistic system in 
Egypt (Glover: 2011: p. 130). 
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The fact that Glover’s analysis is primarily focused on the U.S. media 
network in relation to the MB supports this research on how media framing 
of the MB can directly or indirectly shape public perception and opinion 
about it. 
 
The decline of secular political parties in the Arab world has strengthened 
Islamic opposition, which exerts a powerful influence on social norms 
throughout the Arab world (Touzani: 2009). It is at this juncture between 
media and religion - which is the main emphasis of this research project - 
that the focus on AJA and its relationship with MB is relevant; although a 
significant topic, it has been under-represented in Arab and Western 
scholarship, with the exception of a few studies focusing on AJA’s 
promotion of the Islamic veil. Sam Cherribi (2006) for example, argues 
AJA is equivalent to the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) and not to 
Cable News Network (CNN). He based his study on an analysis of AJA’s 
coverage of the story of the veil in France between 2002 and 2005, 
showing that the channel had devoted significant time to the views of 
Islamic leaders, and argued that the channel’s religious message was 
mono-denominational. 
 
Khaled Hroub (2011), in his article ‘Qatar: the source of Arab Spring’ on 
the ABC website, describes the channel as having pushed the boundaries 
of information by providing live coverage of major developments in the 
Arab world and elsewhere:  
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It is a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the 
Arab countries…. Al-Jazeera is not a tool of the CIA, Israel or 
Al-Qaeda. Rather, it is the sophisticated mouthpiece of the state 
of Qatar and its ambitious Emir, Hamad Al-Thani. Simply put, 
the Al-Jazeera success story would not have been possible 
without Qatar's backing. For Al-Thani, Al-Jazeera is integral to 
the national "branding" of Qatar and its foreign-policy 
aspirations (Hroub: 2011).  
 
Hroub’s argument regarding the channel is seen as integral to the national 
branding of Qatar and its foreign policy aspirations. To what extent have 
Qatar’s relations with Islamic groups affected the channel’s attitude 
towards Islamic parties, considering that it is host to both AJA as well as 
exiled MB members such Al-Qaradawi? Hroub particularly notes that 
Qatar created strong links with both Israel and many Islamist movements, 
including Hamas and Hezbollah. This paradox of Qatar’s association with 
Islamic parties as well as with the West and Israel requires investigation.  
 
Ahmad Azem (2012) authored an article published in Middle East Online: 
‘Qatar's Ties with the Muslim Brotherhood Affect Entire Region’ in which 
he argues that the association between the MB and Qatar was becoming 
noticeable in the restructuring of the Arab world. He based his assertion 
on three reasons: 
 
First, the relationship ensures that Islamists will not criticise 
Qatari government policies or be active there. Second, as 
Islamists head towards power in several countries, Qataris are 
in a position to expect special economic and political treatment 
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in each. Third, Qatar will be well-positioned to mediate between 
Islamists and their rivals and also between Islamists in general 
and the West (Azem: 2012). 
 
Looking at the intimate ties between Qatar and MB benefits this research, 
as it could be argued that such relations could be directly or indirectly 
represented as a basis for AJA having a solid bond with MB, translated 
throughout its programmes, including ‘Shari’a and Life’ (Al-Qaradawi is the 
main speaker), and its agenda in promoting MB by providing them with the 
space and time to project their viewpoints.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The channel’s relationship with Islamic political Islam in general was noted 
by observers in terms of AJA’s religious programmes, the channel’s 
regular guests such as Al-Qaradawi, the history of its staff such as the 
former director of the channel, Wadah Khanfar, and Ahmed Mansour, who 
were known to be active members of the MB, and the language used by 
AJA in its news and current affairs programmes that reflected the 
channel’s policies and agenda.  
 
The close ties between Qatar, AJA’s host country, and the MB can open 
academic interpretation on the effect of this association on AJA’s editorial 
practices, seen by observers as a public relations tool for the tiny country 
of Qatar. This research, nonetheless, raises the question: is it a 
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coincidence that Qatar hosts Hamas and the Taliban offices, and granted 
the newly-elected president at the time, Mohamed Morsi, billions of U.S. 
dollars? Does this warm welcome extended to these Islamic groups, 
directly or indirectly influence the channel’s coverage of Islamic political 
parties such as the MB? These questions are once again, open to 
academic debate. 
 
AJA’s coverage of the popular uprisings in the Arab world in general, and 
Egypt in particular, also gives a clear idea of the channel’s position in 
endorsing ‘the opposition’ against dictatorships. The channel’s language 
and ‘electrifying messages’ were clear and therefore, it could be seen that 
the channel positioned itself to backing one side of the story rather than 
the other. The station was a clear platform for an opposing voice of the 
Mubarak regime, yet unaccommodating for the views of Mubarak’s 
supporters. 
 
The next chapter presents an overview of the history of the MB which is 
said to be one of the oldest Islamic movements in the Arab world. It is 
essential to this research to understand what the MB symbolises, who its 
members are and their motivation, and what they have undergone since 
the movement’s inception and during certain historical periods, particularly 
before and after the Mubarak regime’s tenure.  
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Chapter Four 
THE MB: KEY OPPOSITION POWER IN EGYPT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The existing debates around AJA’s coverage of the Islamic political parties 
were examined in the previous chapter. This chapter primarily looks at the 
MB movement during different political stages in Egypt.  
 
To better understand the central question of this research regarding AJA 
and the MB in Egypt, this chapter projects an overview of the history of the 
movement. This overview is not an in-depth study of the MB per se, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but a glimpse at the stages that the MB 
encountered, before and after the fall of Mubarak’s regime. A discussion of 
the significance of the movement’s history will follow, and the place that 
the MB occupies in the wider Egyptian political scene will also be 
discussed.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that the MB movement is the world’s oldest, 
largest, most influential Islamist organisation - and yet the most 
controversial - that has been condemned by both conventional opinion in 
the West and radical opinion in the Middle East (Leiken and Brooke: 2007; 
Harvey: 2012; Brennan: 2013; Tadros: 2012; Castle: 2013). The map 
below shows the MB’s diffusion in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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Figure 3: The diffusion of the MB in the Middle East Northern Africa 
15
  
 
Topics relating to political Islam as a perception, generally speaking, and 
to Islamic parties, specifically to the MB, have been discussed in existing 
literature. The dominant view among researchers is that Islamic 
movements have, for a long time, been seen in the Arab world as well-
organised and the most influential opposition entities. Some scholars claim 
that, in many instances, any political activity that does not involve 
mainstream Islamists will eventually collapse, and its credibility or 
effectiveness will be challenged (Brumberg: 2009).  
 
Sergio Bianchi (2012) also discusses the MB in his article: ‘The Brothers’ 
spring: the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood: towards a new populist 
Islam?’ He suggests that the movement is the most important 
phenomenon in the modern world of Islam, above all, in the Arab region. It 
                                                          
15
 This researcher pin-points the countries in which the MB exists. The Middle East 
Northern Africa map available at: 
https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arabspring-map-black-and-
white.jpg [retrieved 27/02/2015] 
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is a phenomenon that has grown exponentially in the last few decades, 
according to Bianchi’s argument, resulting in preparation to meet its full 
potential by taking advantage of the spaces that have been created, in 
light of the Arab Spring. He further asserts that the MB is the best 
equipped force, ideologically and organisationally, to manage the post- 
Mubarak transition. The movement has been able to connect with satellite 
television, exploit the numerous opportunities of the moment, and 
possesses the necessary global dimension to ‘talk’ both to the West and to 
the most conservative elements of Islamic society in order to express its 
vision and mission.  
 
The movement is perhaps one of the most prominent, and in most places 
such as Egypt, non-violent, with a less radical vision of the world, and 
certainly one of the longest-lasting Islamist groups (Provencher: 2011; 
Fuller & Kupershoek: 2004). Provencher cites Feiler (2011), who explains 
how the movement is well rooted and has strong connections with the 
people by providing them not only with different political perspectives 
based on moderate Islam, but also offering them social, cultural and 
educational amenities: 
 
The organisation built its popularity by deftly deploying social 
services, such as constructing hospitals, pharmacies, and 
schools, along with forming strategic alliances. In 1954, 
however, soon after the movement’s establishment, the MB 
was never able to fully implement its policies into actions due to 
the government of Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s fear of the 
movement’s growing influence. [He] banned the organisation for 
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the next decade and a half and systematically tortured 
members of the Brotherhood (Feiler: 2011, p. 21). 
 
The MB, an established organisation, over 80 years old, has a long history 
of being the victim, having been continually repressed, first under the 
Egyptian monarchy (MB’s founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was murdered in 
1948 by King Farouk’s police), followed by even greater persecution under 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and then Abdel 
Fattah Al-Sisi, the current president of Egypt. It has been noted by some 
academics that the MB has always been seen by the West as radical, anti-
Western and overtly hostile to Israel (Wistrich: 2012). Bianchi (2012) 
argues that the MB as a movement is an ideal political party, well-prepared 
to take over the transitional period in Egypt, following the fall of Mubarak’s 
regime. The MB had invested heavily in political, social and economic 
factors for decades, which helped it to gain widely-based popularity in 
Egypt and elsewhere.  
 
The MB’s relationship with the media is scarcely represented in existing 
literature, but this research argues that the movement received significant 
external support for its voice, namely, from AJA. The channel arguably 
provided the platform to promote – directly or indirectly - the movement’s 
ideologies and plans for a transitional period, depicting them as a viable 
alternative to authoritarian regimes, able to bring to the people a 
developed political system and social justice; although it is premature to 
conclude whether or not the nature of the relationship between AJA and 
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the MB is robust, this research presents the hypothesis that AJA may have 
had a role in endorsing the MB’s movement on Egypt’s political scene, 
both as a predominant opposition Islamic political party and as a 
movement perhaps seen as representing an Islamic identity.  
 
The MB realised the power of media and frequently capitalised on every 
chance to denounce and criticise the U.S. and Israel, a source of 
embarrassment for the Mubarak regime who fundamentally believed in 
establishing a solid relationship with the U.S. (Palmer M. & Palmer P.: 
2008).  
 
The overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 2011 and the rise of MB in the 
Egyptian political leadership campaign encouraged some writers to claim 
that the movement tried to take control of the Egyptian state media, which 
hitherto had been a mouthpiece for the regime and a tool used against 
opposition. Muhammad Shukri (2012) notes in his article: ‘Egypt's 
Brotherhood accused of trying to control media’, that ever since Mubarak 
stepped down, the MB had consistently accused state media outlets of 
adopting a hostile line towards it; consequently, the editors-in-chief of 
state-owned papers (Al-Ahram) were directly appointed by the chairman 
(who was also head of the Supreme Council of the Press under Mubarak) 
of the Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council; for many, loyalty to 
the regime was an essential, if unstated, requirement for applicants:  
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The current Shura Council, controlled by Islamists from the FJP 
[Freedom and Justice Party]
16
 and the ultra-conservative 
Salafist Nour party, decided to change the way editors-in-chief 
were appointed. New criteria for applicants were introduced, 
and a selection committee, chaired by someone affiliated to the 
MB, was established. Many complained that the Islamist-
dominated committee would only offer posts to loyalists (Shukri: 
2012, BBC Monitoring). 
  
Sergio Bianchi (2012) asserts that the MB achieved several 
accomplishments by winning the elections in various Arab countries 
including Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. This indicates that the movement 
was the most organised opposition to Arab regimes. Other writers such as 
Azarava and Tadros (2007) question the movement’s intentions and plans 
in dealing with minority civil rights, and note that the MB tried to limit public 
liberties by banning alcohol, Western novels, and individual artists from 
performing in Egypt. The development of the MB securing majority seats in 
the parliamentary election of 2012 – following the fall of Mubarak - alarmed 
secularists, who were wary of the Islamists’ latent conservatism and 
authoritarianism (Dalacoura: 2012).  
 
The MB victory and that of its presidential candidate, Mohammed Morsi, 
represented a significant mark in the history of the MB. This victory, as 
shall be seen later, soon came to an end by the fall of Mohammed Morsi in 
                                                          
16
 The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was established by the Muslim Brotherhood 
and supplied its leaders. Details available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-15899548 [retrieved 2/03/2015] 
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a military coup, backed by the masses in July 2012, which arguably puts 
the MB back into the victimisation bracket. 
 
What is the MB? How has it survived since inception? How did the 
movement and its members evolve from being one of opposition working 
‘underground’ to one that attained a leading position during a sensitive 
transitional period following the fall of Mubarak - and then fall again 
following a military coup that took place shortly after being in power for 
only a year?  
 
To present an overview of the answers to such questions, this research 
looks back at the history of the MB in Egypt, before and after the era of the 
former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak.  
 
4.2 Brief History of the MB 
 
Steve Coll (New Yorker: 2012) introduces the vision of the MB through its 
founder: 
 
Hassan Al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher, founded the MB 
in 1928. His goal was to restore economic and political power 
to the Islamic world by creating governments grounded in 
conservative Islamic principles. Although it started in Egypt, the 
Brotherhood established branches worldwide—there are 
Brotherhood-influenced movements and political parties in most 
of the world’s Muslim majority nations, from Asia to the oil-rich 
Gulf States to North Africa. 
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Egypt is the country where Islam has had an organised political movement 
since 1928, according to Sami Zubadia (2000). This is not to say, however, 
that it was not preceded by a ferment of ideas and debates, including the 
notable reforms of the late nineteenth century, but the MB was the first 
movement to organise and mobilise followers at a popular level, and 
rapidly developed programmes and strategies.  
 
Kinza Khan (2011, p.1) touched on the first milestone of the MB. She 
pointed out that during the 1920s, ‘it was the age of ideology, in which the 
urban space started growing and new classes and elites were created in 
Egyptian society’. This movement, as Khan observes, was different from 
the preceding Islamic movements because it was all inclusive, bound 
together by feelings of close association and therefore appealed to a wider 
audience: it interacted with the local events in Egypt, as well as being the 
largest religious movement in the modern Middle East. It had, furthermore, 
an overwhelming impact on many other political Islamist groups in other 
Arab countries. The movement represents the most organised and well-
funded opposition in the country. It offers both its charitable services and 
da’wa (literally ‘call to God’ or preaching), which has operated outside 
state control (Azarava & Tadros: 2007, p. 48). 
 
The founder of the MB, Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna, who was from the city of 
Ismailiyya (situated on the west bank of the Suez Canal), from where he 
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recruited members by going door-to-door, and building a movement held 
together by ‘meticulous organisation and strict master-discipline relations’ 
(Hanna & Capstone: 2010).  
 
The MB movement materialised from Egyptian society’s growing contempt 
towards the ruling monarchy, its manipulation by the British, and the 
general secular nature of the political system:  
 
By the 1930s the organisation had quickly grown throughout 
Egypt and began to spread across the Middle East and began 
to face extreme persecution by the monarchy (Glover: 2011: p. 
126). 
 
Tensions rose in the 1940s between the MB and the Egyptian regime, as 
did the violence carried out by the MB’s militant wing known as the ‘Secret 
Apparatus’ that assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi in 1948 
(Glover: 2011). Glover’s narrative is that the secret government police 
assassinated its founder, Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 in retaliation, and 
forced the movement to operate in secret. The political landscape of Egypt 
changed drastically in 1952 with the coup d’état led by the Free Officers, 
ultimately abolishing the monarchy and installing Gamal Abdel Nasser as 
President.  
 
The MB suffered its most severe repression under Nasser’s regime. It 
allowed no political dissent and arrested, imprisoned and tortured 
thousands of members held in concentration camps. One of the MB 
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members, Sayyid Qutb, took to writing about his disillusionment with the 
secular Nasser government during his imprisonment. He suffered 
abhorrent treatment and poor health, and became one of the most 
influential Islamist ideologues in history. Sayyid Qutb’s books, most 
famously Milestones, have become part of the basic ideology of almost 
every Islamist movement today - from the MB to Al-Qaeda - depending on 
its interpretation. Sayyid Qutb, a leading theoretician of the MB, executed 
by the Egyptian government in 1966, strongly objected to any notion of 
popular authority. Wistrich (2012) wrote about the MB’s vision: 
 
The Brothers learned from this harsh school the need for 
caution, yet they have never deviated from Hassan Al-Banna’s 
central axiom: Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, 
the Qur’an is our law, Jihad is our way, dying in the way of 
Allah is our highest hope. Their radical vision remains focused 
on the comprehensive attainment of a fully Islamic society and 
way of life (p. 24). 
 
The MB had been different from earlier reformers since its establishment in 
Egypt in 1928: it combined a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern, 
grass-roots and political activism. The MB pursued an Islamic society 
through Tarbiyyah ةيبرت (preaching and educating), concentrating on first 
changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally societies; 
although the Brotherhood's origins were lower-middle class, it soon 
pushed Islamisation into the local bourgeoisie and then into the palace 
(Leiken & Brookes: 2007). 
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Sana Abed-Kotob (1995, p. 322-334)’s article, ‘The Accommodationists 
Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt’, gives 
an explanation of the objectives and strategies expressed within the 
movement. She discusses two scholarly discourses on the MB: 
‘confrontationists’ and ‘accommodationists’. Confrontationists attribute an 
anti-democratic, hostile philosophy that encourages violence and terrorism 
and poses a risk to the movement in both regional stability and Western 
interests. Accommodationists, on the other hand, argue that hostility and 
violence are not inherent in all the factions of the Islamist movement, and 
that prudence requires the West to display a willingness to cooperate with 
what might prove to be an inevitable rising power in the Middle East.  
 
Accommodationism, according to Abed-Kotob, is in the interest of regional 
stability that people identify and come to terms with those groups willing to 
work within the contours of the modern nation-state, in order that they may 
prevent the violent seizure of power by the more militant factions. She 
asserts that the MB describes its organisation as more than a political 
party or a charitable, reformist society; rather, it is a spiritual, worldwide 
organisation that is: (i) a da’wa (call) to the Qur’an and the Sunna (tradition 
and example) of the Prophet Muhammad; (ii) a method that adheres to the 
Sunna; (iii) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul; (iv) a political 
association; (v) an athletic association; (vi) an educational and cultural 
organisation; (vii) an economic enterprise; and (viii) a social concept. She 
writes: 
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The central objective of the contemporary Brotherhood 
continues to be the establishment of an Islamic state that is 
governed by human, man-made laws by the shari’a (Islamic 
law). Whereas the former system of legislation implies the 
sovereignty of man over man, this being interpreted as man’s 
servitude to man, the latter testifies to the sovereignty of God 
alone. Divine sovereignty is equated with man’s liberation and 
therefore must be enforced if the state is to be other than 
nominally Islamic. It is critical to most Muslims that sovereignty 
cannot be assumed by man […] (Abed-Kotob: 1995: p. 322) 
 
The movement was ultimately able to survive Nasser’s persecution. It 
emerged onto the political scene after his death and the transfer of the 
presidency to Anwar Al-Sadat in 1970. Sadat quickly began to reverse 
many of his predecessor’s policies and initiated a liberalisation of the 
political structure, which permitted the MB to reconstruct itself after the 
devastation caused by Nasser’s draconian treatment. Al-Sadat, in fact, 
allowed the MB a measure of vocal opposition as long it stayed within 
specific boundaries, and for most of his rule, the movement experienced a 
reasonably tolerable political landscape. It was also during this time that 
the MB officially renounced violence as a method of bringing about change. 
Once Al-Sadat initiated and secured peace with Israel through the Camp 
David Peace accords in 1978, however, the MB’s criticisms of his regime 
and of the President himself became vociferous. Al-Sadat reacted with 
cruelty and carried out his own mass arrests against its members. The MB 
was not the only Islamic group unhappy with Sadat’s relationship with 
Israel and America, and, in October 1981, a radical Islamic extremist group 
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assassinated Al-Sadat while he was reviewing a military parade (Perry: 
2004; Soage and Franganillo: 2010). 
 
Steven Cook (2012) argues that the group may have ceased to be an 
organised presence after its brutal defeats by Nasser in 1954 and 1965. 
Hosni Mubarak, the little-known vice-president at the time, came to power 
following Al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981. 
 
4.3 The MB and the Mubarak Regime 
 
Power was handed to Al-Sadat’s vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, who soon 
declared a state of emergency in the country, and therefore granted 
himself absolute authority to deal with what he considered as domestic 
threats, which lasted for more than twenty-five years. Although Mubarak 
allowed a fair amount of political liberalisation and pluralism within the 
Egyptian political environment, the MB had participated in parliamentary 
elections since 1984 and yet their limited representation was not sufficient 
to undermine the absolute control of the government party over the 
legislative body (Glover: 2011). The MB more recently made significant 
gains in the parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2005 in which it won 88 
out of 444 seats (Glover: 2011).  
 
President Hosni Mubarak (at that time) was able to more sharply 
distinguish between political dissent and direct challenges to the authority 
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of the state in Egypt than his predecessor, Anwar Al-Sadat. Islamic groups 
such as the MB were arguably allowed more space to participate in 
political and economic life and to express their criticism of government 
policies under Mubarak. They published newspapers, appeared in the 
media, opened schools, and ran financial institutions. Their influence was 
felt both in the universities and in professional organisations such as those 
of doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Esposito and Piscatori: 1991; Shehata: 
2010).  
 
Recognising the strength of such Muslim sentiment, the Mubarak 
government itself arguably attempted to enhance its Islamic credentials by 
publishing its own Islamic newspaper, Liwa' Al-Islam (The Islamic Banner), 
whose circulation of 750,000 copies soon rivalled that of Al-Ahram and Al-
Urwah Al-Wuthqah (Arabic: The Firm Tie). 
 
Mubarak allowed the MB movement to play a significant role in the early 
1980s, in order to be able to confront violent groups like the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad and Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya which threatened his rule. He 
used intimidation and force on the MB throughout the 1990s, when many 
of the group’s prominent leaders were court-martialled for the first time 
since Nasser’s era (Al-Anani: 2012). Mubarak’s main battle during the 
three decades he ruled Egypt was against Islamic movements and trends, 
according to Anani. Mubarak benefited from the mistakes made by his 
predecessors Nasser and Al-Sadat in dealing with these movements. He 
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did not try to destroy them, particularly the MB. Mubarak did not give them 
the freedom to fully practice their activities as did Al-Sadat, who paid for it 
with his life: 
  
Mubarak sought to manipulate the Islamic movements in a way 
that would guarantee that they did not become too powerful or 
expand too far into the community. He did not try to uproot 
them in a way that would have led to violent reaction that would 
have threatened the stability of his regime. He did not give the 
Islamists any opportunities for legitimate representation in 
political life [...] The MB, therefore, committed itself to the rules 
of the game as set by the regime […] whenever they tried to 
increase their political influence, they were met by repression 
from security forces, political exclusion, and social harassment 
[…] (Al-Anani: 2012: p. 10-11) 
 
Some argued that despite the fact that the Mubarak regime tightened the 
grip on Islamists, particularly the MB, when tens of thousands of members 
were arrested and subjugated to further oppression, the MB still managed 
to capture twenty per cent of the seats in parliament in the 2005 election 
(Provencher: 2011), which is unprecedented in the history of the MB.  
 
Kirpatrick and Goodman (2011) state: 
 
Banned since 1954, the Brotherhood has for more than a 
decade operated as a de facto political party, running 
independent candidates who all used the same slogans and the 
same platform and all caucused together. In the 2005 elections, 
the Brotherhood won 88 seats in Parliament, or about 20 per 
cent of the total, but the Mubarak government pushed the 
group out of the country’s most recent vote last fall, in elections 
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that were widely seen as fraudulent (The New York Times: 
2011). 
 
The Mubarak regime seized millions of dollars in assets and arrested 
some of the group’s top financiers in late 2006. Mass arrests of the MB 
activists had become routine, with more than 800 being detained in the 
lead-up to the 2008 municipal elections. The ruling National Democratic 
Party, furthermore, pushed through a constitutional amendment banning 
religiously-oriented parties (Hamid and Kadlec: 2010).  
 
Kelsey Glover (2011) quoted several scholars who assert that during 
Mubarak’s era as president over the last 30 years, he had systematically 
depicted himself and his regime as the only roadblock between the 
Islamists, namely the MB, and the establishment of an Islamic state (Al-
Awadi: 2009, Stilt: 2010).  
  
The Muslim Brotherhood not only transformed into a terrorist 
organisation but also eventually spawned some of the most 
violent terrorist organisations throughout the world. The Muslim 
Brotherhood became the prototype for the Muslim 
fundamentalist terrorist organisations and some of its members 
later created organisations such as Hamas and Al-Qaeda. 
(Stilt: 2009, p. 953) 
 
Stephan Rosiny (2012: p7) states in a wider context that the MB and 
moderate Islamist groups had already enjoyed significant successes in 
(relatively) free elections, including those in Jordan 1989, Algeria 1991, 
Egypt 2005, and Palestinian Territories 2006. The three main reasons 
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behind such successes, according to Rosiny, are: i) the movement’s 
network of religious, social and political institutions; ii) organisational 
structures; and iii) experience at their disposal that the new oppositional 
forces still did not have. 
 
It is worth mentioning the conclusion drawn by Kinza Khan (2011), before 
moving the discussion to the revolution and post Mubarak era. She notes 
that the MB of Egypt had changed its position on democratic participation 
throughout the course of its development: from its establishment until the 
present time. Khan (2011) asserts that the largest change that took place 
occurred in the early 1980s, when the organisation publically announced 
its goal to become a political party, and later when it obtained seats in 
parliament. The reasons for this change include societal and international 
pressure, the group’s increased passion under political suppression, and 
its realisation that the best way to achieve its goals would be to join the 
political system itself.  
 
The role played by the Islamic movement in the early stages of the 
Egyptian ‘revolution’ was that they participated in the uprising, particularly 
the MB, albeit in a non-institutional and undeclared way. The MB 
movement engaged in the revolt within a few days of its beginning, 
specifically starting with the ‘Friday of Rage’ on 28 January 2011. The 
Brotherhood’s position had been unclear before 25 January 2011, when its 
youth wing still had a strong individual presence from the first day, a 
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phenomenon that led the Brotherhood to make a public decision and 
actively participate in the revolution over the ensuing weeks (Al-Anani: 
2012).  
Over the revolution’s first three weeks, the Brotherhood 
maintained a strong presence in Tahrir Square, and a 
Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Beltagy, was one of the most 
influential figures in the field, not to mention the official 
Brotherhood representation within the revolution’s Youth 
Coalition through the participation of Islam Lotfy, Mohamed al-
Kassas, and Mohammed Abbas, despite the differences that 
emerged later between the Brotherhood leadership and the 
Brotherhood’s youth wing (Al-Anani:.2012: p. 8).  
 
Approval was given on 6 June 2011 for the establishment of the Freedom 
and Justice Party that emanated from the MB, according to Anani: a 
vehicle consciously modelled after the Turkish Justice and Development 
Party. Ewan Stein (2012) argues that although there were some questions 
raised concerning the establishment of the party and its programme and 
future relationship with the Brotherhood, it represented a significant step 
towards legitimately integrating the group into the political process. The 
MB was by far the most organised force in Egypt after Mubarak’s ruling 
party. It had been in operation for decades as an officially-banned but 
nonetheless tolerated movement which had (and has) taken care of social 
welfare services in many parts of the country where the regime had failed 
to meet the needs of the people (Hellyer: 2011).  
 
The Israeli writer, Amichai Magen (2012) states in alignment with Hellyer’s 
view, that after only eighteen days of mass protests, Hosni Mubarak 
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handed over power to the military on 11 February 2011 — ending what 
Magen calls ‘the pharaoh’s thirty-year reign as president’. Crowds poured 
into Tahrir Square (located in central Cairo) to celebrate and to demand a 
swift transition to civilian rule. The following day, the Egyptian army 
suspended the country’s constitution and said it would rule by martial law 
until general elections were held in 2012. Elections were currently being 
held for the Lower House of the Egyptian parliament, with the MB widely 
expected to emerge as the largest political party in the country: 
 
[… ] it is only the organised Islamists who are truly positioned to 
exploit opportunities for acquisition of power. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, in particular, has an unparalleled organisational 
network and no compunction in using its mosques, schools, 
and charities in the service of its electoral ambitions (Magen: 
2012: p. 14). 
 
The relationship between the military and the MB was set to be a crucial 
element in the path which Egypt took, and was subject to much debate 
and speculation. The military had been accused of making under-the-table 
deals that allowed the Islamists to participate unhindered in the political 
system in return for protecting the military’s interests (Zahid: 2012). 
Mohammed Zahid (2012) also notes that post-Mubarak Egypt was marred 
by uncertainties and the path forward was littered with obstacles, but the 
MB was positioning itself to dominate the political scene for years to come. 
The complex relationship between the diverse political actors that have 
emerged in this latest environment, all competing for a share in a new 
Egypt, continues to unfold and shape an unpredictable transition process.  
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The table below (figure 4) lists the key developments in the history of the 
MB since its establishment: 
 
Year Development 
1924 Abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish National Assembly 
1928 The Muslim Brotherhood is founded in Egypt by Hassan Al-Banna. 
1948 The Egyptian government proclaims the dissolution of the 
Brotherhood. The Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi 
is murdered by Muslim Brotherhood member, Abdel Meguid Ahmed 
Hassan.  
According to the Brotherhood there are half a million members in 
Egypt. 
1949 Al-Banna assassinated by gunmen in Cairo. 
1950 Martial law is removed and announcements on the Brotherhood fade. 
MB re-legalised, but only as a religious organisation. 
1951 Hassan Al-Hudaybi, considered a moderate, elected as leader of the 
Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb enters the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt on 
his return from United States. 
1952 Members of the Brotherhood take part in anti-British riots in Cairo. A 
military coup, with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, puts an 
end to British colonial rule over Egypt. 
1954 (October) failed assassination attempt on President Gamal Abdul Al-
Nasser by Brotherhood member, Abdul Munim Abdul Rauf, motivated 
by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement relating to Suez. Persecution and 
imprisonment of members of the Brotherhood (4,000 arrested) 
including Qutb, sentenced to 15 years hard labour.  
Organisation goes underground and many members flee to Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. 
1964 Egyptian President Nasser proclaimed general amnesty - including 
many MB members. 
Association made legal again and several prisoners released. 
1966 1,000 Brothers arrested, 365 sentenced, and Sayyid Qutb hanged by 
Egyptian Government as well as other top-level Brotherhood leaders. 
1968 President Nasser releases 1,000 members of the MB. 
1970 (September) Death of Egyptian President Nasser. Anwar Al-Sadat 
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becomes president of Egypt - initiates a more tolerant policy towards 
the MB. Many MB prisoners released. 
1975 General amnesty in Egypt frees all MB remaining prisoners. 
1976 MB was not allowed to participate in elections as political party, only 
as individual candidates - obtaining 15 seats. 
1979 The MB vigorously opposes the signing of a peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. 
1980  (June) failed attack against Al-Assad in Syria. The Syrian Parliament 
outlaws Brotherhood in Syria. Army organises repression - climax in 
Hama massacre. 
1981  (September) More than 2,000 dissidents, mostly members of FM, 
arrested in Egypt (October) Egyptian President Al-Sadat killed by four 
members of radical movement Jama'at Al-Jihad, founded by Faraj, 
former member of the MB disappointed with its moderation. 
1984 The MB in Egypt is readmitted as a religious organisation. 
Participates in general elections in coalition with new WAFD Party - 
obtaining 8 parliamentary seats. 
1987 MB obtains 37 seats in coalition with Liberal-Socialist Party and 
Labour Islamic Alliance. 
1992 
 
Victory of the Islamic movements in Algeria elections. 
1992 Salsabil affair. Discovery of a plan to seize power in Egypt by MB 
through infiltration of state institutions and security apparatus 
1995: New wave of repression and arrests of MB members on eve of 
elections to National Assembly. Eighty members of the Shura 
movement imprisoned. 
2000 MB members 17 seats in the political elections. 
2005 General elections in Egypt - members of the Muslim Brotherhood win 
88 seats, becoming the biggest political opposition. 
2007 Constitutional amendment prohibits establishment of political parties 
of a religious nature, arrest of Khairat Al-Shater, Deputy General 
Guide of the MB. 
2011 After the fall of Mubarak, MB in Egypt register (April 30) new Party of 
Freedom and Justice to participate in the elections of 2011 and 
following parliamentary elections. 
Figure 4: Chronology of the MB (Bianchi: 2012: p. 54) 
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4.4 The MB: Short-Term Leadership of Egypt 
 
The remarkable MB victory in a narrow election following the fall of 
Mubarak in 2011, allowed the MB to form the first civil government in 
Egypt. Led by the successful presidential candidate, Mohammed Morsi17; 
not only, was the group the country’s first Islamists, Morsi was also its first 
civilian president (Sharp: 2012; Magstadt: 2014; Agbese & Kieh: 2013). 
Morsi’s rule, however, only lasted for one year before he was ousted by 
General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in a military coup in July 2013: an action that 
was a manifestation of the unstable Egyptian mood (Al-Awadi: 2014). 
What occurred that led to the ousting of the short-term President Morsi?  
 
President Morsi promised to be a president ‘for all Egyptians’ on his 
appointment, and addressed the Egyptian people saying: ‘You are the 
source of all authority and legitimacy’. He also pledged that he would not 
give up the ‘people’s revolution’ until its objectives were met (Alianak: 
2014, p. 86). The Egyptian people, however, began to feel that Morsi was 
exceeding his powers as president by appointing MB members to his 
government, and accused him of permitting Islamists to monopolise the 
political scene. 
 
                                                          
17
 According to a running tally on the Al-Ahram website, Morsi leads Shafiq (Morsi’s 
opponent) by 900,000 votes (cited in Sharp: 2012: 1), available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/ui/front/townvotes.aspx [retrieved 1/03/2015] 
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The BBC website ‘Profile: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi’ explains that ‘Public 
opposition to Mr Morsi’ began growing in November 2012 when, wishing to 
ensure that the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly could finish 
drafting a new constitution, the president issued a decree granting himself 
far-reaching powers (The Guardian: 2012).  
 
Some critics argue that Morsi’s declaration was ‘effectively putting himself 
above the law’ and granted him additional unlimited dictatorial powers 
(Isakhan: 2014: p. 157; Cambanis: 2015). Morsi’s decree – which cast 
doubts on Morsi’s democratic commitment - was the beginning of the end 
for Morsi’s presidency; while Morsi and his supporters viewed that decree 
as protecting the people’s revolution from anti-revolutionists, it created a 
furious reaction from non-Islamists who called for massive protests against 
Morsi and the MB (Al-Anani: 2015): 
 
While Morsi justified his decree as “an attempt to fulfil the 
popular demands for justice and protect the transition to 
constitutional democracy”, the opposition, which hastily formed 
under a loose umbrella called the National Salvation Front 
(NSF), tread it as an attempt from Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood to consolidate their grip on power. Not surprisingly, 
a few days after Morsi issued his decree, violence and deadly 
clashes broken out in front of his presidential palace among his 
supporters and opponents (p. 232).  
 
The writing up of Egypt's new constitution was another dilemma that 
Morsi’s presidency faced. It was approved by the constituent assembly, 
despite a boycott by liberals, secularists and the Coptic Churchprotesting 
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against the lack of inclusion of leftist groups and women, and also 
following accusations that the MB was trying to dominate the constitution 
by padding it with its allies (Cesari: 2014; Sallam: 2014). 
 
The political scene in Egypt became more complicated as a growing 
number of angry protestors took to the streets of Egypt. The military had 
warned that such political crisis might lead to the collapse of the state. 
Movements in opposition to the MB, particularly liberal and secular ones, 
formed a campaign called Tamarodدرمت (Arabic: Revolt) which set out to 
collect signatures for a petition to which millions of people subscribed, 
demanding that President Morsi should step down and calling for a new 
presidential election (Abdelrahman: 2014). Tamarod called for mass 
protests to mark the first anniversary of the day Morsi was handed power, 
and, on 30 June 2013, millions of protesters took to the streets across 
Egypt (Ahram Online: 2013). 
 
The mass protests encouraged the military council to warn Morsi on 1 July 
that it would intervene and impose its own ‘roadmap’ if he did not satisfy 
the public's demands within 48 hours (BBC News: 2013: Morsi’s Profile).  
 
As the deadline approached, President Morsi insisted that he was Egypt's 
legitimate leader and that any effort to remove him by force could plunge 
the country into chaos. General Al-Sisi, on the other hand, had already 
announced on 3 July 2013, on state television that Morsi had been 
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removed from office, the controversial constitution had been suspended 
and a transitional period imposed, led by the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(Al-Saleh: 2015).  
 
Morsi’s last speech came via his Twitter account, according to Al-Saleh, 
denouncing what he described as a ‘Military Coup’ and asking people to 
reject it, but he was later arrested and put in prison. Mass protests were 
staged by his supporters on the streets of Cairo, demanding his release 
and immediate return to power.  
 
The army responded by storming protests on 14 August 2013 and 
arresting key Brotherhood figures and killing at least 600 MB members 
and supporters on a security crackdown in Raba’a Al-Adawiya Square and 
Al-Nahda Square (the two places in which the MB members and their 
supporters held as protest locations), a move which was widely 
condemned by human rights organisations (Amnesty: 2014). Morsi was 
later charged in court for inciting murder and violence as well as 
conspiring with Hamas, when the group was accused of prison break-outs 
in 2011; moreover, the MB movement was declared a terrorist 
organisation (Wain & Joyce: 2014).  
 
Mohammed Morsi and 16 other top MB leaders – including the supreme 
leader, Mohammed Badei - were sentenced to death on charges of 
delivering secret documents abroad between 2005 and 2013; the 
113 
 
sentences were upheld by Egypt court recently (in June 2015), (BBC 
News: 2016)18. 
  
4.5 Summary 
 
The MB movement has been a significant and well-rooted political 
organisation in Egyptian society since its establishment in 1922. It has 
been through different stages of harassment, subjugation and sanctions: 
from the assassination of its supreme leader Al-Banna; oppression under 
the Nasser and Al-Sadat eras; and oppression and banishment under the 
Mubarak regime. The place occupied by the MB on the Egyptian political 
scene has been evident. Although it has operated underground for a long 
time, it has played a significant role in politics and made different 
governments (Nasser, Al-Sadat and Mubarak) feel the pressure that it is a 
growing Islamic political movement that has considerable popular support.  
 
The MB emerged as a major political force following the ousting of 
Mubarak. The Freedom and Justice Party established as the group’s 
political arm, went on to win half the parliamentary seats in the general 
elections in 2012; though long supressed as an illegal organisation, the 
MB won wide support as a civil society network of social empowerment 
and religious reform. Its sweeping victory of 47 per cent of the seats in the 
House of Parliament was attributed by observers to its long history of 
                                                          
18
 Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33147206 [retrieved 19/ 06/ 
2015] 
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social service, religious appeal and public sympathy for its oppression. Its 
considerable success in political contestation however, undermined the 
people’s popular trust when it failed to keep its promises such as not 
seeking to dominate parliament and not to field a candidate for the 
presidency (Bahri: 2012).  
  
Bianchi concludes:   
 
The MB appears as the set of movements that today is best 
equipped as an organisational and ideological profile to 
respond to the challenges of the Arab spring, since before 
others were able to critically review their own ideological 
baggage and modernise its facilities, making the head of their 
organisations from third generation of reformers. It's easy to 
assume that they will play prominent roles in the Arab 
transitions, which have contributed to the insurrection in 
countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria. Even in the 
Gulf region, from Iraq to Bahrain, Kuwait and up to Saudi 
Arabia their presence is important and constantly monitored for 
the potential threat they represent to the regional governments 
(p. 48). 
  
Hellyer (2011) conversely notes that it is important not to fall into the trap 
of viewing the Egyptian political spectrum as divided primarily between 
‘liberal’ and ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. There are several other forces, 
including ‘fairness and equality’ leftists and Arab nationalists. The relative 
strength of these various groupings however, is highly contested, and it is 
not clear which of them is electorally significant.  
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The existing literature relevant to AJA and the MB has been reviewed in 
this chapter. The next chapter will examine the theoretical framework 
utilised in this research.  
116 
 
Chapter Five 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIA IDEOLOGY AND 
RELIGION FRAMING  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A brief history of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was presented in the 
previous chapter. This chapter studies the theoretical framework for 
religion framing and media ideology. The existing literature on AJA’s 
background information, its place among Arab media and the channel’s 
relation to political Islam was reviewed in order to establish whether its 
purported close connections with Islamic movements, particularly the MB 
in Egypt, before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011, were verified. 
Studying media religion framing and media ideology will assist this 
research to comprehend the nature of the channel’s coverage of the MB in 
Egypt.  
 
The study of media and religion, according to Paul A. Soukup (2002), 
underpins the understanding of how and why religion appears in the media 
as it does, and how and why a social force like religion interacts with the 
other primary social forces of the day. 
 
History cannot be made without the presence of the ‘media’ as some form 
of communication (White: 2007), therefore, the history of religion is 
perhaps directly connected to the history of the media. It appears that the 
association between media and religion in antiquity was long-standing, for 
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example, the telling of myths and sketches in cave paintings to justify 
inexplicable phenomena (Soukup: 2002). 
 
Daniel Stout and Judith Buddenbaum (2002) note that the term ‘science of 
religion’ was first used by Max Miller in 1867 (Kitigawa, 1959, cited in Stout 
and Buddenbanum 2002) as psychology began to address how religion 
shapes personality and public perception. Freud (1938) later considers 
religion as a key to understanding emotion and regarded spirituality as a 
manifestation of feelings of helplessness. He acknowledges religion as an 
emerging element in modern psychology, because ‘religion’ is treated as 
an ‘orientator’ of cognition (knowing) and affect (feeling), psychology, 
according to Freud, offers media researchers a framework on which to 
think about media content and audiences.  
 
The intersection between media and religion began receiving scholarly 
attention in the mid-20th century (Hoover: 2002). Thanks to media 
technology, religion was brought into people’s homes, streets and places 
of power (Stolow: 2005, p. 120). These helped to structure images in 
people’s minds which not only constitute people’s individual reality but 
arguably also formulate people’s political and social perceptions (Thorn: 
1978).  
 
Departing from this argument, Al-Jazeera (Arabic) (AJA), as a media 
service similar to many others, brought into people’s homes various social, 
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political, cultural, religious and economic topics. The relevance of the 
aforementioned to this research is to investigate whether the channel 
brought the MB’s ideology, as an Islamic party (where Islam as a religion 
and Islamic values are at the heart of its politics), into people’s homes, and 
more significantly, whether the channel structured the people’s perception 
regarding this movement. 
 
Berger argues that the media of mass communication - from radio to 
television and the Internet - have made knowledge of alternate religious 
possibilities more generally available than ever before (2007). Religion has, 
by and large, overwhelmed the fields of mass communication research 
and media studies (Hoover: 2002). Nonetheless, religion - as Hoover 
argues – has been a particular challenge to both theory and research, 
owing to its fundamental prominence; it has proven formidable as a 
discipline that traces its intellectual roots to positivist social science.  
 
Stewart Hoover and Nadia Kaneva (2009) also explain that for most of the 
20th century, it was assumed that religion would decline in importance and 
influence. They note: 
 
This assumption was long held by secularisation thesis in the 
social sciences and humanities which assumes that the 
intellectual and moral religious fruits of modernity, education, 
economic, liberalisation, increasing human liberty and 
autonomy would make religious faith less and less necessary (: 
p1). 
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Academics such as Hjarvard believe that the media have become the 
primary source of religious ideas, and the language the media use shapes 
religious imagination in accordance with the genres of popular culture:  
 
The media representations of the supernatural world have 
acquired richness in detail, character and narrative, making the 
supernatural appear natural (Hjarvard: 2006, p. 2). 
  
Based on this argument, the examination of AJA’s language is imperative 
to this research. It will give an idea of how it was used to form people’s 
understanding, not only of Islamic political ideology represented by the MB, 
but equally to secular ideology represented by the Mubarak regime and the 
military. 
 
It can be argued that although media often play a decisive role in shaping 
public perceptions of religion and cultural diversity, it may also be 
disruptive when focusing on negative aspects of a certain faith, particularly 
those related to fundamentalist views (Lefebvre: 2009).  
 
Based on Lefebvre’s discussion, this research examines the role that AJA 
played regarding the MB in Egypt: whether it assumed a decisive role in 
formulating the Egyptian public’s perception by favouring the MB and 
providing a stage for a movement that had long been subjected to the 
intolerance of totalitarian regimes, or simply played a disruptive or divisive 
role by arguably enforcing the MB’s political ideology (‘us’: the good) 
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against other ideologies (‘them’: the bad) and secular and liberal ones (see 
Chapter Six, Van Dijk’s Ideological Square). 
 
5.2 Understanding Religion and Media in a Cultural Context  
 
Understanding religion in a cultural context is immensely significant. The 
perception of religious ideologies and practices may vary from one society 
to another, as this research argues, and may even have conflicting 
opinions. What may be seen as ‘extremism’ in one culture, for example, 
may not be seen as such in another. Religion may be treated by AJA (a 
pan-Arab and arguably religious channel) differently from the BBC (an 
international and arguably secular channel).  
 
Stewart Hoover (2002) rightly states that studies of media and religion 
should take into account the question of ‘lived’ culture and actual practice. 
They should be methodologically daring, inventive, and creative, and 
should consider religion in the broadest possible terms. A wide range of 
issues present themselves as ‘religion’ when, in fact, they may not be; at 
the same time, a range of things may deny that they are an element of 
religion but resemble it in principal ways. Both of these are important areas 
of cultural inquiry: ultimately, it is the question of the social construction of 
religious experience that is central. How and where that is articulated and 
given a meaning, and in what manner, should be the analytic field where 
media and religion research is active. 
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The media, according to Hassan Hamed (2004), are considered as the 
most powerful creators and transmitters of cultural images. Media images 
and media presentation of different cultures and civilisations are decisive 
factors on how the public perceives cultural differences. The media 
facilitate the education of audiences about universal human concepts, 
such as the universal importance not only of respect for human rights and 
tolerance, but also respect for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, 
throughout the world (Hamed: 2004). 
 
The definition of what constitutes religion as a social norm, according to 
Nancy Ammerman (2007), is controversial among researchers (see 
Beckford 2003, cited in Ammerman). Some cultures and institutions 
strongly discourage the presence of any apparently religious meanings or 
practices; although religion is about how people make sense of their world, 
constructing a religious presence and defining goals for action are two 
different kinds of symbolic work, each with its own potential effect on 
collective action (McGuire: 2007; Lichterman: 1996).  
 
Paul Soukup (2002) records in his article: ‘Media and Religion’ that, 
despite the desire for a broader understanding of religion and its effect on 
daily events presented by reporters, the culturally ‘received view’ of 
religion makes this difficult. Hoover (cited in Soukup: 2002) identifies 
several factors from this ‘received view’ that makes reporting on religion 
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problematic: (i) a growing secularisation has led to less news coverage of 
religion; (ii) many regard religion as a private matter; (iii) religion lies 
outside the realm of empirical data; (iv) religion is too complex a subject; 
and (v) religion is inherently controversial. 
 
Religion is a personal response to seeking meaning in one’s life and in 
one’s universe. Religious expression is generally found within 
institutionalised religion, but the formal creed, rituals, devotions, and moral 
codes do not exclude a personal experience.  
 
The central question of the cultural studies approach, explained by Robert 
While, is concerned with how individuals in groups use media to construct 
religious meaning in their lives, and how this religious meaning relates to 
many other aspects of human existence (White: 2007). The most 
significant impact of media, according to Marshall McLuhan’s 
‘Understanding Media’ (1964, cited in Robert White, 2007), is not on 
individual psychology but on whole cultures and societies.  
 
Stig Hjarvard (2006) approves of the theory that the interface between 
media and religion should be considered in their proper cultural and 
historical contexts, and the ‘mediatisation’ of religion is not assumed to be 
a universal phenomenon, neither historically, culturally nor geographically. 
As a channel of communication, the media have become the primary 
source of religious ideas, and, as a language, the media mould religious 
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imagination in accordance with the genres of popular culture. The media, 
as a cultural environment, have therefore taken over many of the social 
functions of institutionalised religions, providing both moral and spiritual 
guidance and a sense of community: 
 
The interesting point may not be how much and what kind of 
religion is distributed by the various types of media. For a 
sociological understanding of the role of modern media in 
relation to religion, it is much more important to understand how 
modern media do not only represent religious issues, but also 
change the very ideas and authority of religious institutions, and 
alter the ways in which people interact with each other when 
dealing with religious issues (Hjarvard: 2006: p. 1). 
 
Joshua Meyrowitz (1997, cited in Hjarvard, 2006), suggests three media 
metaphors to distinguish between different aspects of media 
communication: media as a channel, media as language, and media as 
environment:  
 
1. The metaphor of media as a channel draws attention to media 
transporting symbols and messages across distances from 
senders to receivers; according to this point of view, therefore, 
the research should focus on the content of the media: what 
kind of messages are transmitted, what topics occupy the media 
agenda, how much attention one theme acquires compared to 
another, and so on. The media are distributors of religious 
representations of various kinds; for example, key religious texts 
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like the Bible, The Qur’an, hymn books and so forth, are also 
media products that are distributed both within religious 
institutions and through general media markets. The media, in 
the sense of independent media production and distribution 
companies are, however, channels for the distribution of texts 
originating from religious institutions, only to a limited extent. 
2. Media as a language focuses on the various ways the media 
format their messages and frame the relationship between 
sender, content and receiver; in particular, the choice of medium 
and genre has an influence on important features like the 
narrative construction, reality status and mode of reception of 
particular messages, and as a consequence, the media will 
adjust and mould religious representations to the modalities of 
the specific medium and genre in question. 
3. Media, as environment, will draw interest that concentrates on 
the ways media systems and institutions facilitate and structure 
human interaction and communication; since environments are 
much more stable than individual messages, this metaphor 
encourages studies of broader historical changes - how the 
invention of the printing press revolutionised the distribution of 
information in society, for instance. 
 
Hjarvard (2006) notes that in earlier societies, social institutions like the 
family, school, and the church were the most important providers of 
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information, tradition and moral orientation for individual members of 
society. Today, these institutions have lost some of their former authority, 
and the media have, to some extent, taken over their role as providers of 
information and moral direction, and at the same time, the media have 
become society’s most important story-tellers about society itself: 
 
The media’s specific impact on religion may be manifold and at 
times contradictory, but as a whole the media as channel, 
language, and environment are responsible for the 
mediatisation of religion. Mediatisation designates the process 
through which core elements of a social or cultural activity (e.g. 
politics, teaching, religion etc.) assume media form (Hjarvard: 
2006: p. 4). 
 
The media are large-scale suppliers of narratives – fictional and factual – 
about adventures, magic occurrences, the fight between good and evil, 
and so on (Clark: 2005, cited in Hjarvard: 2006). 
 
Hoover (2002: p. 2) notes that the realms of both religion and the media 
are themselves transformative and being transformed:  
 
Religion today is much more a public commodified and 
personalised set of practices than it has been in the past. At the 
same time, the media (movies, radio, television, print and 
electronic media, and more) are collectively coming to 
constitute a realm where important projects of ‘the self’ take 
place-projects that include spiritual, transcendent, and deeply 
meaningful “work”. This means that, rather than being 
autonomous actors involved in institutionalised projects in 
relation to each other, religion and media are increasingly 
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converging. They are meeting on a common turf, the everyday 
world of lived experience. 
 
Different media touch different senses—the ears, the eyes, the whole 
consciousness—and the individual responds by constructing the meaning 
of the text according to the major sense influence, thereby producing an 
‘oral culture’ or a ‘visual culture’. The perspective of McLuhan and his 
student, Walter Ong (1982), also helped to shift interest of religious 
communicators from broadcast effects to the interaction of medium and 
religious cultural movements. 
 
5.3 Islam and Media 
 
Pintak (2008) says that Islam is, first and foremost, a religion, but, for 
many Muslims, it is ‘a complete way of life’. He explains that the advent of 
broadcasting, audio cassettes, fax and ultimately, satellite television in the 
late 20th century, and the flood of new media that have transformed 
communication, have redefined Muslim identity politics and put control of 
science into the hands of anyone possessing a computer. The Islamic 
approach, according to Pinak, calls for the media to actively ‘form’ or 
‘shape’ a ‘correct opinion’ in the minds of news consumers, hence, a pro-
active stance built on a specific agenda, in this case da'wa, the Muslim call 
to follow the straight path to God. 
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Pintak points out that most Arab broadcasting laws prohibited criticism of 
the head of state, defamation of religion, or undermining public order, and 
additional taboos were observed by broadcast editors based on local 
customs and political circumstances. He argues that, for AJA, the 
sensitivity regarding Qatari foreign policy in the complex evaluation that 
took place in the newsroom and the upper reaches of AJA’s management, 
meant the essential question became: 'will this have a negative impact on 
Qatar's foreign policy?’, before controversial stories were aired. 
 
The primary mission of Arab journalism, according to Pintak, was that of 
fostering political and social change in the Arab world, with a secondary 
role of defending the Arab and Muslim people and their values against 
outside interference.  
 
Chandra Muzaffar (2004) states that the stereotyping of Islam and Muslims 
in today’s media has a long history behind it. Islam as a religion has been 
reviled by sections of European scholarship and popular literature, for 
more than a thousand years. Tracing prejudiced references to Islam - 
prejudices which were later transmitted through the writings of reformers 
like Martin Luther, playwrights and poets such as Shakespeare and Dante, 
and historians of Gibbon’s ilk – the late Erskine Childers, a distinguished 
diplomat and scholar said:  
 
The theme of Islam as a ‘curse of the world’, the product of ‘a 
strain of cunning, of revenge, of self-indulgence’ beginning with 
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Muhammad and infecting all Muslims, persisted even in 
Western academic circles into the twentieth century (p. 22) 
 
Muzaffar adds: 
 
In both the West and the Muslim world, segments of the media 
have instead chosen to project their differences as a way of 
proving that it is only their position that is right and legitimate, 
while the position of the other is wrong and illegitimate” 
(Muzaffar: 2004,p. 28).  
 
The early encounter between religion and social sciences, broadly 
speaking, was affected by the positivistic assumptions of some social 
scientists. Religious people who wished to use social science approaches 
to study their religions, often found secular social scientists to be 
unwelcoming because of their own positivistic and materialistic prejudices 
(White: 2007). Robert White (2007) clarifies that in more recent years, 
social scientists have broadened their outlook and have become more 
receptive to both qualitative research methodologies and to the study of 
religion; nevertheless, much of the growing interest in religion has 
overlapped a growth of social and political problems around the world 
which have roots in religious differences:  
 
The war in Iraq is a case in point. Failure to take account of the 
complexity of religious factors in that country has been a major 
contributor to the escalating chaos there during the last few 
years. The political role religion can assume even in the 
modern world has become painfully evident there and in many 
other trouble spots. Conflicts, even those that appear purely 
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political, often cannot be resolved without a deep 
understanding of the religious factors that influence the various 
parties involved (p. 21).  
 
White (2007) also argues that the most influential contemporary religious 
movements owe less to modern communication media such as the internet, 
than they do to combinations of more traditional forms of communication 
The Islamic fundamentalist movement has been exceptionally successful 
in this respect. Robert White also asserts that Islamic fundamentalism has 
spread its message largely by word-of-mouth and print media. Its 
promoters, however, have been alert to the appearance of new 
possibilities. The Middle East seems to have been used to reinforce the 
influence the fundamentalists had long been fostering through more 
mundane means, such as direct interpersonal contact during the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca, and in religious schools throughout the Muslim world. 
 
This complex political case, in line with White’s argument (2007), provides 
an example of a situation that co-mingles religious influences with mass 
media and many other cultural influences. The study of cases of this kind 
requires attention with regard to a large number of factors that demand a 
holistic research methodology. This will ensure that as many of those 
factors as possible are given an opportunity to be recognised, and their 
influences given their due weight. 
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Leon Barkho (2009) asserts that while guns may not be available to 
everyone, words, thanks to today’s advanced information technology and 
digitalisation, are everywhere: television, newspaper, radio and the 
Internet: 
 
Arabic television is dominated by religious programmes and the 
number of Arabic satellite channels which are wholly devoted to 
Islam and Islamic issues outstrips those dedicated to 
entertainment and news (p. 85). 
 
Barkho continues his argument by saying that even the most influential -
news channels rely on their religious programmes to seek and sustain 
wide viewership. AJA, for example, has propelled Sheik Yousef Qaradhawi 
to ‘star status’ in the Arab and Muslim world, owing to his weekly phone-in 
programme: Al-Shari’a Wal-Hayyat يرشلاةايحلاو ةع  (Islamic Shari’a and Life). 
Televised radical clerics’ rhetoric is more forceful and perhaps more 
convincing for the average person, than that of the print and official media; 
after the events of 11 September 2001 many Islamic websites noted 
substantial increases in traffic, as people sought to understand Islam as a 
religion and possible motivation for the attacks (Bunt: 2009,p.153). 
 
Mohamed Zayani (2009) points out that, in the case of AJA, upon the 
transmission of the controversial Al-Qaeda videotapes, the station was 
accused of serving as a mouthpiece for the so-called ‘terrorist’ 
organisation, thus providing Bin Laden with a platform from which to 
preach Jihad on ‘the West’ in general, and the U.S., in particular. AJA’s 
131 
 
claim to transmitting unbiased news notwithstanding, the channel has 
often been blamed for its ‘sensational’ approach and for its tendency to air 
what viewers want to see.  
 
Cultures, like individuals, change through the communication of 
information, the mass media represent one of the major vehicles that 
influence the way people view politics, society, culture and religion, in 
some instances, the mass media may even instigate change (Sterin: 2012: 
p7):  
 
Historians generally consider the period between mid-18th 
century and today as the ‘age of democracies’. It is during this 
period and, to a large degree though mass media, that 
democracies were born and upheld. The media can influence 
the public and political agendas by making the process of 
government transparent to the people. 
 
Ali Al-Kandari (2011) states that the political influence of a religion in a 
society may be feeble or powerful, depending upon its perceived role in 
that society: religious media might guide Muslims to know what Allah 
forbids or allows. Many people currently telephone in to live programmes 
to obtain a fatwa (a ruling) on the Haram (forbidden) and Halal 
(permissible):  
 
During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the coverage of Arab 
news networks portrayed Americans as the merciless killers of 
civilians. During those wars, the Al-Jazeera network ran some 
video tapes of Osama Bin Laden who claimed that the 
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American war on terrorism is a war on Islam, reminding viewers 
of the middle ages when Christian crusaders invaded Muslim 
lands. The problem in much of this coverage is that it conflates 
the actions of Western politicians with Christianity (Al-Kandari: 
2011,p. 208-209). 
 
Philip Seib explains the religious element as a factor in the Arab political 
uprisings, in his online article: ‘Religion and the Awakening’ (2012). He 
notes that Islam is an important part of the lives of most Arabs. The 
uprisings of 2011 include a religious dimension that needs to be thoroughly 
and critically investigated.  
 
The circulation of the Worldwide Web, and the introduction of satellite 
news channels into the Muslim world, have somewhat changed the very 
nature of mass media in that sphere, with the Al-Jazeera network at the 
forefront of these changes, described by many scholars as an Arabic-
language channel that provides a pluralist and diverse perspective of world 
views to audiences in the Arab world (Golan & Skiousis: 2010); some have 
argued, however, that the channel pushes a pan-Islamic perspective in an 
attempt to shape world public opinion (Cherribi: 2006).  
 
5.4 Media and Religion Framing 
 
How do the media frame religious ideologies? This is a significant question, 
at the core of this research, and requires attention in order to examine if 
and how AJA represented the MB’s political ideology, and the nature of 
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language it used, which may or may not have reflected the channel’s 
endorsement of the movement.  
 
 The article: ‘Media, Religion and Framing’, by Stout and Buddenbaum 
(2003), suggests how religion is depicted by journalists, which is a key 
area of interest to researchers of media and religion, even though scholars 
seem to disagree in their interpretations of news coverage. Framing has a 
value far beyond merely knowing what is in the news. The study of media 
and religion also determines the types of information that ultimately 
contribute to public opinion about particular religions. Knowing what type of 
information is available is very important, given that treatment of religious 
groups is tied to the kind of information available to citizens.  
 
Unpacking the nature of information and knowledge AJA channel 
broadcasts about the MB is essential for this research and underpins the 
channel’s policy and its relationship with religion and religious groups such 
as the MB. The media, according to Lynn Schofield Clark (2007), 
fundamentally participate in defining and highlighting what can count as 
religion, and what should be seen as outside the boundaries of religion or 
spirituality, and give people stories and examples that provide the arena in 
which this ‘boundary work can be delivered’.  
 
Charles Hirschkind and Brian Larkin (2008,p.4) note that McLuhan’s 
argument regarding the influence of media lay not in the messages they 
134 
 
circulate but in their technical effects on the human sensorium and society 
at large:  
The effects of media do not occur at the level of opinions or 
concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception 
steadily and without any resistance (p. 4).  
 
The question of religion and media has been subject to considerable public 
and scholarly debate, highlighting the new possibilities for religions to 
articulate themselves in public, and to assume a political role as a result of 
the easy accessibility of electronic mass media (Hischkind and Larkin: 
2008). The media, therefore, is a significant social agent, with the potential 
to influence community perceptions (Akbarzadeh and Smith: 2005), 
including religious perception and ideologies. Based on this argument, this 
research argues that AJA acts as a social advocate with potential influence 
on community perception; disputably, the influence may not be on all 
community layers, but possibly on one political group such as an Islamic 
political party, particularly the MB.  
 
The media plays an important social role in the community, according to 
Shahram Akbarzadeh and Bianca Smith (2005). It has the ability to 
influence people which mean that journalists are also shaped by various 
social forces which contribute to their understanding of Muslims and Islam. 
How one perceives particular events is generally influenced by various 
factors, including one’s background, education, and a wider social and 
cultural environment; editorial practices and writing styles, therefore, also 
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significantly shape the type of language and images that form portrayals of 
Muslims and Islam, and the type of information provided. The key question 
here is whether journalists allow their personal religious beliefs and 
practices to influence their reporting of religion.  
 
The most straightforward news report is the outcome of 
unavoidable choices that reflect the journalist’s sensibilities in 
weaving together fact and interpretation. We have illustrated in 
the ways stories can vary according to choices and emphasis, 
source selection, descriptive versus insinuation language, and 
even poetic license that reshapes the fact to fill the truth 
(Linchter, Rothman, and Lichter 1986: p. 165 – cited by 
Biernatzki 1995). 
 
The media have the power to shape the public mind and develop public 
opinion in the political arena and in modern society. They are able to 
explore an issue by analysing the difference between external reality and 
the image carried in people’s minds (Thorn: 1978). 
 
The academic discussion on the inter-relation between media and religion 
is important; however, this research contends that by definition, being a 
supporter of a particular religion or a particular religious group is 
prejudiced.  
 
5.5 Media Framing 
 
Media framing has become both an integral concept and a method of 
analysis in the field of mass media studies (Rane: 2014). Studying framing 
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in this research is imperative to learn if and how AJA framed the MB 
during key electoral moments, before and after the fall of Mubarak; both 
framing and representation of events and news in the mass media can 
thus thoroughly affect how news recipients come to understand these 
events (Price, V., Tewksbury, D. & Powers, E.: 1995).  
 
The understanding of framing helps to more generally deepen the 
theoretical insight into the political influence of the news media, and into 
the relationships between the elites, media and the public (Entman: 2009). 
Robert Entman explains that the verb ‘to frame’ (or framing) refers to the 
process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, 
and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that 
reality; on the media level, journalists’ framing of an issue may be 
influenced by several socio-structural or organisational variables 
(Scheufele: 1999).  
 
The concept of media framing is significant because it offers researchers 
an alternative to the old ‘objective and bias’ paradigm. It helps in 
understanding the mass media effect, and it offers valuable suggestions 
for communications practitioners (Tankard: 2001). Hackett (1984), (cited in 
Tankard: 2001, p. 96) suggests that the concept of framing is one of the 
useful approaches because it has the potential of ‘getting beneath’ the 
surface of news coverage and exposing the hidden assumptions. 
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Piers Robinson discusses the framing model in his book: The CNN Effect 
(2002) and projects two types of framing: distance framing and empathy 
framing which will be scrutinised in this research. Distance framing, for 
example, is illustrated in words such as ‘remnants’ or foloul, coup, military 
council, and criminals, whereas words such as victims, tortured, children 
and innocents, suggest empathy framing. 
 
Victimisation framing, as Kendall (2011) points out, identifies specific 
villains or persecutors – ranging from national political leaders and top 
corporative executives to individuals designated ‘ordinary street criminals’. 
Most of framing analyses are not explicitly annotative because they focus 
on exploring the realm of what is, rather than what ought to be in the 
news: 
 
Journalists dedicated to a ‘watchdog’ role may not readily 
accept a political actor’s framing of an issue or event at face 
value; rather, they may see it as their job to reframe the actor’s 
point of view. (Lawrence: 2010, p. 165) 
 
Lawrence’s argument is essential for unpacking how AJA journalists who 
are ‘dedicated watchdogs’, frame and re-frame the MB in the complex 
Egyptian political scene, and how they detect any sense of support in 
AJA’s news coverage.  
 
The verbal representation by AJA of different ideologies including Islamic, 
secular and liberal, are fundamental to this research. Ruth Wodak (1989: p. 
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59) asserts that assuming ideology is a system of ideas based on value 
judgements and attitudes, which aids certain forces within a society to 
further their interests or stabilise their power, a descriptive approach which 
elucidates the origin activity of such structures of ideas serving political 
powers, by analysing the means and patterns by which ideology is 
linguistically realised.  
 
Most media scholars believe that media texts articulate coherent ways of 
seeing the world. Hence, ideological analyses of mass media products 
focus on the content of the messages—the stories they tell about the past 
and the present—rather than the “effects” of such stories (Croteau & 
Hones: 2013). David Croteau, William Hoynes (2013, p. 159) explain: 
“Ideology is a decidedly complicated term with different implications 
depending on the context in which it is used [...] When Marxists speak of 
“ideology,” they often mean belief systems that help justify the actions of 
those in power by distorting and misrepresenting reality. When we talk 
about ideology, then, we need to be careful to specify what we mean by 
the term.” 
 
In the study of social movements, ideology is generally invoked as a cover 
term for the values, beliefs, and goals associated with a movement or a 
broader, encompassing social entity, and is assumed to provide the 
rationale for individual and collective action (Snow & Byrd: 2000, p. 120). 
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Igbarumah (1990: p.3) notes that ideology can be said to be the role of 
ideas in shaping the minds of individuals. Political influence, however, is 
not limited to the expression of support or opposition by the news media. 
In keeping with the general process of framing, the political ideology of a 
news medium will also be reflected in ways in which the news package is 
constructed to make it more familiar to audiences (Wolfsfeld: 1997, p. 40) 
 
To sum up, the approach in which media frame ideologies, including those 
based on religion, is significant as media communicate the ways of seeing 
our world and then shaping our views and values. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has identified media and religion as a theoretical framework 
to test and ascertain the very nature of the relationship between AJA, a 
pan-Arab media outlet, and the MB, as a religious and political Islamic 
movement. It helps to trace whether or not AJA and (or) the MB have 
employed political Islam’s ideology to endorse the movement’s political 
status. This research agrees that the cultural context is important when 
discussing religion framing through the media. What may be seen in one 
country as terrorism may be viewed in a different light by another.  
 
Islam and the media were discussed. The relationship between both also 
depends on how a particular media service sets its agenda to frame Islam 
140 
 
or Islamic political organisations: for example, how AJA frames the MB is 
vastly different from the way Al-Arabiyya channel does, which is arguably 
seen as opposing the MB. The language and the presentation of the MB, 
as an example, are determining factors in evaluating where a particular 
media service stands. 
 
The next chapter will project the methodology of this research and identify 
data selection and appropriate analysis tools. Critical discourse analysis 
will be the primary approach for scrutinising the collated data of AJA’s two 
programmes. Interviews will also be a helpful technique and enable this 
research to obtain original data which cannot be obtained from the 
analysis of the actual text. Van Dijk’s ideological square and Robinson’s 
framing models, in conjunction with Chouliaraki’s three rhetorical strategies 
(verbal mode, agency and time space) will also be applied.  
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Chapter Six 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between religion and the media was discussed in the 
previous chapter. This intersection between media and religion is 
important for this research as media representation of religion (political 
Islam ideology) is moulded by the framing process. How the MB (Islamic 
political movement) is represented in AJA’s text is determined by the 
selection and highlighting process (framing) of specific topics, events and 
actors, while disregarding others. The selection process of emphasising 
and de-emphasising particular ideas or actions leads to the discussion of 
van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ by which he explains how different 
ideologies are divided between us (positive) and them (negative ). This 
research examines such separation in different rhetorical strategies 
according to Chouliaraki (explained later). 
 
This chapter outlines the targeted data for analyses (in terms of source, 
period and selection) and the principal methodological techniques in the 
text analysis of AJA Television’s coverage of the Egyptian MB, before and 
after the fall of Mubarak. The study of the language of two AJA TV talk-
shows, Opposite Direction and Without Borders, as well as the data 
collected from interviews, will be critically examined using the qualitative 
research approach. 
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Qualitative research, including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
interview techniques will be useful methods for analysing the data selected 
for this research. These techniques help to obtain, endorse and verify the 
data gathered in different ways (McMurray: 2004) and provide a richer, 
contextual base for interpreting the end results (Kaplan & Duchon: 1988; 
Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock: 1999). The aim is to achieve 
truthful results through in-depth analysis of the channel’s language and the 
rhetoric adopted in discussing the complex Egyptian political scene, during 
four different electoral periods - before and after the fall of Mubarak in 
2011 - and examines verbal representations of different political actors 
and ideologies, during key political changes, before and after the Egyptian 
uprising.  
 
The interpretation of the constructive effects of language is best presented 
in the critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach (Parker & Burman, 1993), 
by which the multiple meanings assigned to the text are inspected (Phillips 
& Hardy: 2002). The application of CDA helps this research to judiciously 
scrutinise social realities which stand behind the language of AJA 
regarding its representation of the MB, during the proposed period of this 
study.  
 
Interviews, furthermore, will assist this study to obtain data which cannot 
be extracted from the actual analysis of the AJA text contained in its two 
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TV programmes. The interview technique allows researchers to look at 
insider views or justifications for certain actions (Jovcheolovitch: 2000) by 
countering with the question of why such an action happened in a certain 
way and not in another.  
 
The ontological and epistemological approaches will be considered in this 
chapter, predominantly the Interpretist (Constructionist) approach, with 
consideration given to the Realist position, deemed to be the most 
beneficial for this research. Interpretists and Realists believe that the world 
in which one lives is socially constructed, and therefore, personal 
prejudices and their interpretation cannot be ignored. 
 
6.2 Data Selection: Population and Sampling  
 
The term ‘population’ of data constitutes a multi-faceted investigation of 
persons, objects and events, whereas a ‘sampling’ of data is a specific 
portion of a ‘population’ (Kumar: 2002); in practical terms, if the selection 
of AJA’s two programmes is considered to be the ‘population’, then 
‘sampling’ is the selection of specific episodes in four electoral moments in 
relation to the MB and the Mubarak regime.  
 
Data selection in this research will be based on analysing relevant 
episodes of two TV talk-shows obtained from AJA’s digital archives, 
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covering four key electoral moments in Egypt: two before and two after the 
Egyptian 2011 revolution.  
 
The TV programmes which will be examined are two popular, current-
affairs talk-shows: Without Borders and Opposite Direction:  
 
 
Figure 5: The two main targeted TV programmes to be analysed  
 
(i) Without Borders: presented by Ahmed Mansour. Each episode 
hosts one guest, usually selected from senior public figures, and 
often top Islamic leadership. 
(ii) Opposite Direction: a weekly TV programme presented by 
Faisal Al-Qassam, in the same format as the American Cross 
Fire production that hosts two guests with extreme opposite 
views. 
 
The choice to examine the above two AJA flagship TV programmes (each 
has a different format) is to offer this research suitably representative 
content to assess the channel’s language and its relationship with social 
Opposite Direction Without Borders 
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reality. Unlike news, these two key TV programmes offer in-depth debate 
on a wide range of political and social issues directly linked to Arab 
countries, including the growing political role of the MB movement and the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt, before and after the 2011 uprising, and the 
controversial discussions surrounding the movement’s role.  
 
Having reviewed the existing literature, not many studies focused on TV 
programmes as most studies focused on news such as (Miladi 2006, 
Barkho 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, the examination of these two programmes set the ground of 
further future research for the channel’s general newscasts and the 
language used. The two selected TV programmes and presenters are:  
 
(A) Without Border’s Ahmad Mansour 
 
Without Borders (دودح لاب) was (at the time of writing) a weekly, one-to-one 
programme which broadcast on the AJA channel, presented by one of 
AJA’s predominant television hosts, Ahmad Mansour. The programme 
hosted Arab leaders, influential people, politicians, experts, and decision-
makers and allowed them to discuss particular topics related to politics, 
economy, religion, and other issues.  
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Noticeable is the fact that Mr Mansour was both the presenter and the 
producer of the programme. He selected the topics, guests, talking points, 
and then moderated the programme himself. Mansour explained to this 
researcher that his role, as a presenter, was to open the discussion and 
then play the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ – to show an objective stand - in 
which he represented the opposite view held by his guest:  
 
If the guest is a minister or a president, I adopt the view of the 
opposition, whereas if the guest is from the opposition, I adopt 
the government’s view (email interview with Mansour 2014). 
 
Some critics claimed that Ahmad Mansour had strong ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood (ITP News: 2014), arguably evidenced by being rewarded 
with several interviews with the top leadership of the movement including 
its Supreme Leader, Mohammed Badei, his deputy, Khairat El-Shater, the 
Egyptian former prime minister, Hisham Qandil, and the deposed 
president, Mohammed Morsi (Al-Qassemi: 2012). 
 
Mansour’s social media accounts - Twitter and Facebook (which have a 
considerable number of followers19), reveal that, since the outbreak of the 
Egyptian uprising, the presenter’s views were expressed in favour of the 
MB: he denounced the overthrow of the MB’s elected president, 
Mohammed Morsi, and showed robust opposition to the Military Council.  
 
                                                          
19
 On Twitter and Facebook, Ahmad Mansour has some 377,000 followers [retrieved 
1/03/2015] 
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Mansour openly criticised the Mubarak regime, and described the ‘military 
coup’ in July 2013 as orchestrated by ‘Mubarak’s remnants’ (Foloul: لولف), 
after the MB had been in power for only one year. In November 2013, for 
example, shortly after the fall of Morsi, Ahmad Mansour posted a Tweet on 
his Twitter account, addressing the Military-General, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, 
and promising him retaliation for his actions against the MB:  
 
Hey you, Al-Sisi, killer and war criminal, wait for a daily painful 
strike to your head from me, through an article, a programme, 
or a Tweet, on behalf of bereaved mothers, widows and 
orphans (November, 2013)
20
.  
 
When asked about his views reflected on social media platforms, and the 
risk they may have shown that he held an imbalanced viewpoint as a TV 
programme moderator, Mansour insisted that journalists and programme 
presenters across the world expressed their personal views on their social 
media platforms. These views, according to him, were not necessarily 
mirrored in what they presented on TV:  
 
I’m like them. If you go back to my articles and posts I wrote 
during Morsi’s presidential time, you will find that most of them 
stand against him, as well as his way of ruling. Such views are 
not reflected in my programme (email interview with Mansour: 
January 2014).  
 
                                                          
20
 Researcher’s translation 
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Mansour was declared a ‘wanted’ person by the Egyptian authorities, 
following the fall of Morsi in 2013. Abdel Bari Attwan (2013), the former 
editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab newspaper, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, wrote an 
article in which he asserted that the perceived association of Mansour to 
the MB was common knowledge. Attwan criticised the action that the 
Egyptian authorities had taken against AJA’s presenter, as it was based 
on trumped-up charges, not on facts, according to him. Attwan also 
pointed out that Mansour had declared that Morsi should be re-instated, a 
possible reflection of the presenter’s association and supporter of the MB 
and its members:  
  
The affiliation of Mansour to an Islamic group, namely the 
Muslim Brotherhood, isn’t a secret. He himself has publicly 
declared it in his articles and interviews. He has stood on the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s protest stage, aggressively criticising the 
Military Council and supporting the legitimacy of Mohammed 
Morsi […] and demanding his return to his presidential palace 
 
Mansour’s ‘wanted’ status prevented him from travelling from Qatar to 
Egypt to attend his brother’s funeral in April 2014, due to the allegations 
made by what he called ‘the leaders of the military coup’ (Shaban, 2014).  
 
Mansour was also sentenced to 15 years in prison by the Egyptian 
authorities, accused of torturing and sexually assaulting a lawyer during 
the 2011 uprising against the former president, Hosni Mubarak (Daily 
News Egypt, 2014). His response, according to AJA’s website (2014), was 
to utterly deny the accusation, and, in retaliation, he attacked the Egyptian 
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military regime and judicial system in Egypt, ‘led by General Abdel Fattah 
Al-Sisi’, the new Egyptian president. He charged them with fabricating the 
claim without any concrete evidence. Mansour wrote:  
 
Several people have asked me to comment on such a verdict. I 
do not comment on corrupt verdicts, coming from a corrupt 
legal system and a bloody [military] coup and criminal regime 
(Al-Jazeera (Arabic) website: 2014).  
 
The Egyptian authorities reacted by confiscating Ahmad Mansour’s assets 
and belongings in Egypt (Al-Shorouk Online, 2014). This action against 
the presenter was not the first: during the 2005 election, he was assaulted 
by two unknown men, while waiting for his guest outside AJA’s office in 
Cairo (see Appendix EP3, EX4). This incident reflects the tense political 
situation in Egypt on the one hand, and how Mansour was possibly 
regarded as an opponent of the Mubarak regime, even before the 
Egyptian uprising, on the other. 
 
Ahmad Mansour, by openly expressing his political views and passionate 
statements on social media platforms, was therefore perceived as heavily 
involved (active participant) in the political scene in Egypt, with strong 
views in favour of the MB and against the Mubarak regime, which is 
perhaps problematic, not only for the reputation and objectivity of his 
programme which he moderated, but also for AJA as a whole.  
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(B) Opposite Direction’s Faisal Al-Qassem 
 
Opposite Direction (Aletejah Al-Moakes سكاعلما هاجتلاا) is a weekly TV 
programme presented by Dr Faisal Al-Qassem, a Syrian, who used to 
work for the BBC’s Arabic radio, before joining AJA TV (BBC News: 1999). 
He is a British national and studied journalism at a U.K. university 
(Cherribi: 2006).  
 
Al-Qassem’s programme is different in structure and style from Mansour’s 
Without Borders, in that Aletejah Al-Moakes is a live, in-studio weekly 
programme (inspired by CNN’s famous Crossfire current events TV 
programme, Nawawy & Eskander: 2003) - hosting two guests, each with 
strong views from opposite ends of the political spectrum. The debates 
either focus on a particular political issue related to a certain country or on 
a pan-Arab matter. Mohammed Qarqouri (2014) observes that, soon after 
the programme begins, the discussion moves from its initial rational 
approach to screaming arguments, followed by a catalogue of verbal 
abuse and even physical attacks between the two guests. 
 
The programme is arguably one of the most popular and controversial 
shows of its kind in the history of Arab television, and has attracted both 
endorsement and denunciation to Qatar, AJA’s host country (Democracy 
Now: 2006). Opposite Direction has managed to invite both wide approval 
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from Arab people and considerable condemnation from Arab governments 
(Dabbous-Sensenig: 2006).  
 
Sam Cherribi (2006) explains that the presenter attempts to be ‘impartial’ 
when introducing each of the guests’ views at the beginning of the 
programme; during the discussions, however, he often overtly takes sides 
and therefore relinquishes his position as an ‘objective’ moderator. It is not 
unusual, according to Dabbous-Sensenig, for guests on the programme to 
begin shouting and having, what appear to be ‘temper tantrums’ (2006). 
The programme often been dominated by more by emotion and lack of 
‘rationality’ (Abdelmoula: 2012, p. 184). 
 
Brian Whitaker of The Guardian newspaper wrote that the secret of the 
programme’s popularity, according to the programme presenter, Al-
Qassem, was that it broke all the Arab world’s taboos (Whitaker: 2003). Al-
Qassem told Whitaker: ‘in the past, in the Arab world, you couldn’t even 
talk about the price of fish, because that might endanger national security, 
as far as the security services were concerned’. Al-Qassem mentioned the 
Algerian government as an example of the disapproval of his programme 
by some Arab states: 
  
They cut off the electricity supply so that people could not watch 
the programme, because we were talking about the military 
generals and how they [were] wasting the money of Algerians 
(Whitaker: 2003).  
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The programme’s presenter frequently denounced Arab leaders whom he 
often negatively described as ‘symbols of corruption, backwardness, and 
tyranny (ةيعجرلاو دادبتسلااو داسفلا زومر) (Pintak: 2006: 165). Al-Qassem’s claims 
regarding the disconnection of electricity in Algeria being linked to his 
programme were unsubstantiated21. 
 
Al-Qassem posted comments on his social media pages (Twitter and 
Facebook) on various political occasions, asking why the Yemeni 
government cut off the supply of electricity in Yemen, as soon as his 
programme started.22 This may have been coincidence, as power supplies 
in the Middle East are unreliable at the best of times, but it is argued here 
that the aim behind relating power cuts to the presenter’s controversial 
programme was to draw attention to it: he wanted to show that autocratic 
governments were afraid of the ‘freedom of expression’ (ريبعتلا ةيرح) that Al-
Qassem and his guests adopted, and that it would encourage viewers and 
their friends to denounce such ‘undemocratic action’. Al-Qassem is a 
nationalist, unlike Mansour, who is allegedly an Islamist and said to be a 
member of the MB, and yet appears to support the MB, not from an 
Islamic ideology point of view, but more likely driven by his strong stand 
against authoritarian regimes. 
  
                                                          
21
Irregular electricity supply in the Middle East (and Africa, for that matter) occurs for 
many reasons – see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21752819 [retrieved 
28/12/2014] 
22
 http://yemennow.net/news383157.html [retrieved28/12/2014] 
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The existing debates surrounding the programme are significant, yet lack 
the rigours of academic analysis which this research attempts to cover in 
this chapter. The presenter appeared to have strong views against 
dictatorships and favoured democracy. He seems to have viewed his 
programmes as ‘revolutionary’ which encouraged the value of freedom of 
expression and invited people to revolt against the symbols of 
backwardness and corruption, particularly regarding Arab regimes. The 
vision of bringing about democracy and freedom is, without doubt, widely 
debated in the Arab world. This Western concept, however, has torn the 
region apart and created chaos in the name of ‘freedom’ and immature 
democracy. It is interesting to observe how Al-Qassem, as a supposedly 
neutral moderator, presented different, often passionate views. The 
selection process he and his guests adopted for specific actions or events 
in order to credit or discredit one side or the other, are inspected through 
the lexical choices, representation of different actors, and the ideologies or 
values highlighted in the sample texts.  
 
The presenter’s stance made his programme widely contentious, as the 
definition of the politically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is a matter of opinion in the Arab 
world. The presenter’s political stance and the direction of the discussion 
will be examined as well as the nature of his questions, time allocated to 
each guest, and his provocative style. 
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The selection of data from the above TV programmes is primarily based 
on four key electoral moments (see Fig. 6 below) in which the MB 
participated. Each moment represents a different phase in a different 
political situation. The variability of this selection helps this research to 
obtain an understanding of AJA’s language before and after the Egyptian 
uprising.  
 
 
Figure 6: Four targeted key electoral moments in Egypt 
 
 2005: the MB participated in the parliamentary election as an 
opposition party and won 87 seats out of 444, which represented 
the MB as a challenging rival to Mubarak’s National Democratic 
Party (NDP). 
 2010: in the wake of the Arab uprisings, the two main opposition 
political parties (MB and Wafd) boycotted the second round of the 
2010 parliamentarian election, declaring the existence of 
widespread fabrication in the first ballot. The final results showed 
•2005  
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
•2010  
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Before the fall of 
Mubarak 
•2012  
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
•2014 
Presidential elections. 
After the fall of 
Mubarak 
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that the NDP won 83 per cent of the seats, which signalled the 
beginning of the end for Mubarak and his party. 
 2012: following the fall of Mubarak, the MB’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP) won almost half of the parliamentary seats and was 
able to form a government. The FJP's then chairman, Mohammed 
Morsi, won the presidential election and became Egypt's first 
democratically-elected president, winning 51 per cent of the vote in 
a deeply divided run-off against retired military commander and 
former prime minister during Mubarak’s time, Ahmed Shafiq.  
 2014: following the fall of FJB’s Morsi, most of MB leaders were 
arrested and the military chief, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, took command 
of running the country. Al-Sisi was appointed commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces in Mohammed Morsi’s government, and became 
the Egyptian president, nine months after taking over from Morsi. 
Morsi and other top MB leadership members were arrested, dozens 
of its supporters killed, and FJP was banned and dissolved.  
 
The process of selecting the sampling episodes for analysis was based on 
two steps: shortlisting episodes of the two programmes directly linked to 
Egypt in four different years, as previously mentioned. This was done by 
reading the headlines of each episode and inner text, and using keywords 
directly referring to the four significant electoral periods of which the MB 
was part, for example, the parliamentary or presidential election (تاباختنلاا 
ةينالمربلا), Muslim Brotherhood (نيملسلما ناوخلاا), Islamic movements (تاكرحل ةيملاسلاا), 
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and opposition parties (ةضراعلما بازحا), and so on. Based on this process, this 
research identifies some 24 episodes (12 episodes in Without Borders, 
and 12 episodes in Opposite Direction) in the two selected programmes 
during four key electoral moments.  
 
For Without Borders, each episode will be given a code and number in the 
text analysis: episode = (EP). Each episode will have a number (EP1 to 
EP12) in ascending order (see list of Without Borders episodes in 
Appendix 1.1); for example (EP1 = 26/10/2005 - Title: The expected 
political role of the MB in Egypt) and (EP12 = 7/05/2014 – Title: Yousef 
Nada: Egypt’s Coup will break from within the military), and so on (see 
Appendix 1.1). 
 
A similar system will be applied to the second programme (Opposite 
Direction): each of the 12 selected episodes will have the same code (EP) 
and a number from (EP13 to EP24) in ascending order (see list of 
Opposite Direction’s episodes in 2.1); for example, (EP13 = 31/05/2005 – 
Title: The MB’s political activities in Egypt) and (EP23 = 20/05/2014 – Title: 
Will the issue of national security be used to scare people in Egypt?), and 
so on (see Appendix 2.1)  
 
Some extracts of the actual episodes will be retrieved from the text as 
samples, in order to illustrate the main themes. Extracts will be given code 
‘EX’ and a number, which will be either included within the actual text 
157 
 
analysis or reference made to it in the Appendix with extract numbers; for 
example, extracts taken from Without Borders programmes will be given a 
number (from EX1 to EX44) and extracts from Opposite Direction will be 
given a number from (EX1 to EX32) (see Appendix 1.2 and 2.2)  
  
6.3 Interviews 
 
A total of ten interviews with AJA TV presenters were obtained in this 
study: (six interviews with presenters currently working with AJA, (at the 
time of this research) and another four former AJ and AJ Egypt Live TV 
presenters (some who resigned over allegations of bias).  
 
This research primarily targeted TV presenters (who were) working for 
AJA channels (the pan-Arab news channel ةيرابخلاا ةريزجلا and AJ’s Egypt Live 
رصم رشابم ةريزجلا). The process of selecting the interviewees was not an easy 
task and was mostly based on the availability of the AJA TV presenters 
and their consent to participate in this research. It was challenging to 
convince some of the presenters (inside and outside of AJA) to participate 
due to the complex political situation in the Arab world, as some of them 
explained.  
 
The reason of interviewing high profile AJA TV presenters is because they 
were closely involved in covering Arab news in depth and were at the 
frontline, representing AJA’s editorial policies through reading the 
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newscasts, moderating interviews, and moderating talk-shows such as 
Without Borders and Opposite Direction.  
 
A senior TV presenter, for example, Mohammed Krishan, in AJA TV 
(current presenter and interviewed in this research), was a member of the 
panel which designed AJA’s editorial guidelines. Others, such as Waddah 
Khanfar, former Director-General of AJA (interviewed in this research), 
was a decision-maker in determining the channel’s editorial stand in 
covering the uprisings before he decided to step down from the post. The 
unique access to such high profile presenters and the former director will 
certainly enrich this research and give in-depth testimonies in relation to 
different topics.  
 
The ethical considerations were taken into account in this research 
regarding the interview process. It entailed approaching some of AJA 
presenters for their comments, and their written consent to use their 
testimonies. This research approached about 18 current and former 
presenters in AJA and AJ Egypt Live, of whom only ten agreed to 
participate while others either refused to participate or ignored the request.  
 
Opposite Direction’s Faisal Al-Qassem (as key presenter for this study) 
was approached, but he stopped answering the telephone, despite 
promises of co-operation. Others, such as Without Borders’ Ahmad 
Mansour, requested that the questions should be sent to him by email; 
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most of his answers were either more general rather than specific to the 
questions, or he ignored the questions. Two of the AJA journalists 
interviewed were willing to speak to this researcher, but requested not to 
be named, which has been respected. 
 
A request to participate in this study was sent to some of the former AJA 
TV presenters who resigned over bias allegations concerning AJA’s 
coverage of the Egyptian uprising, refused to become involved, in spite of 
being given the option of remaining anonymous contributors. Two officials 
in AJA, the editor-in-chief and the director-general ignored the requests.  
 
The interviews (which were mostly obtained through telephone or Skype 
conversations), were, nevertheless, equally and substantially important for 
the data analysis that is based on the two TV programmes. The interviews 
obtained provided important additional information and answers which 
were not clearly or fully obtained from the data analysis of the two 
programmes. 
 
The process of identifying the interview questions and themes, in a semi-
constructed interview style (as shall be seen later), has been prepared in 
this research with a set of questions, some specific, directly relating to the 
channel and its editorial role played in the Egyptian scene regarding the 
MB and the Mubarak regime, and the allegation of favouring Islamists. 
Other questions were generic and discussed the role of Qatar (in terms of 
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ownership and independence), the rise of Islamists and then the fall of the 
MB in Egypt, the channel’s motto, and so on (see interview questions in 
Appendix 3). 
 
6.4 Qualitative Research Approach 
 
This study uses the qualitative method as a primary analysis approach in 
order to examine and interpret the language used, to inspect the 
references made to the language (verbal mode) and the assigned role of 
different actors (agency) at different times (time space), incorporated in the 
targeted text in relation to the MB and the Mubarak regime.  
 
The qualitative research methodology chosen for this study enables one to 
‘read between the lines’ of the language used within a social surrounding 
context (transitivity), in an attempt to rationalise the actions taken and the 
actors behind this action (Newman: 1998; Silverman: 2010). Greenhalgh 
and Taylor (1997) explain the difference between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches: 
 
Quantitative research should begin with an idea (usually 
articulated as a hypothesis), which then, through 
measurement, generates data and, by deduction, allows a 
conclusion to be drawn. Qualitative research, in contrast, 
begins with an intention to explore a particular area, collects 
‘data’ (observations and interviews), and generates ideas 
and hypotheses from these data, largely through what is 
known as inductive reasoning (1997: p. 740). 
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Michael Trumbull (2005, p. 102) asserts that qualitative research is 
inclusive of interpretative and naturalistic slants. Researchers, according 
to Trumbull, study things in their natural settings, in an attempt to make 
sense of phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative research incorporates the study, use, and collection of a variety 
of empirical material: interviews, observations, historical background and 
interaction that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings 
in the lives of individuals (Denzin & Lincoln: 1994; Patton: 2002). It is in 
this broad term that covers a wide range of techniques and philosophies 
which is not easy to define (Hennik et al: 2011); consequently, qualitative 
study allows researchers to examine people’s experiences in detail, by 
using a set of research methods such as in-depth interviews and life 
histories and biographies (Hennikp. 8 - 9).  
 
The benefit of qualitative approach for this research is the possibility of 
reading through the data in depth, and, by relying on an interpretative 
technique, it offers not only the possibility of understanding what exists 
beyond the language discourse and the hidden nuances featured in AJA 
TV programmes, but also a way of discovering whether or not the channel 
was favouring the MB, as an Islamic political party during the period under 
study, and how AJA envisioned the ideology of political Islam and Islam in 
reporting on the MB.  
  
162 
 
Margarete Sandelowski (2000,p. 336) notes that researchers conducting 
qualitative studies rely on the collection of as much data as possible which 
will allow them to capture the totality of the elements of an event that have 
been accumulated to make it the event that it is. This method helps to 
examine the various meanings in a text, and involves some degree of 
interpretation when approaching it (Graneheim and Lundman: 2003,p. 
106).  
 
The qualitative approach, by and large, looks at the significance - a taken-
for-granted or an assumptive enquiry that studies meaningful social action 
(Schwandt: 2001). Data collection is often turned back on itself to provide 
the understanding of the growth and development of the field as a whole 
(Kung-Shankleman: 2006). Evelyn Jacob (2001) points out that the 
distinction between ‘theory-oriented’ and ‘practice-oriented’ qualitative 
research is often blurred, as data is rarely collected merely to make a 
theoretical argument or to bring about improvement.  
 
This researcher is aware of the criticism surrounding the qualitative 
research method and the claims that it lacks scientific rigour (Mays & 
Pope: 1995, p. 109; Charmaz: 2008). The approach, nevertheless, is still 
commonly used as a valid technique, not only in order to understand 
social realities, but also to make sense of social practices. Researchers 
normally utilise qualitative methods to seek a ‘deeper truth’, which, 
according to Greenhalgh’s and Taylor’s article, ‘Papers that go beyond 
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numbers’ (1997, p. 740), this is hard to obtain through quantified systems. 
Quantitative research, however, usually deals with numbers, uses 
statistical models to explain the data, and is considered ‘hard’ research 
compared to qualitative research. Qualitative research is therefore 
considered appropriate for this paper, which attempts to avoid numbers 
and deal with ‘interpreting’ social realities - ‘soft’ research (Atkinson, Bauer, 
and Gaskell: 2000).  
 
The study of language as a social discursive practice lies at the heart of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA), as it offers validity and reliability of data 
(Golafshani; 2003). ‘Language as a social practice’, according to 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997), is crucial as it is a discourse that gives rise 
to important social issues.  
 
CDA provides a set of strategies as an integrated type of dialogue analysis, 
for unveiling the assumptions and hidden messages in a text, the 
discursive practices, and the surrounding social context (Huckin: 1997, p. 
6; Harvey: 1997, p. 128). Huckin perceives the primary activity of CDA lies 
in the close analysis of written or oral texts that are deemed to be 
politically or culturally influential on a given society. Discourse analysis is 
viewed not simply as an act of ‘linguistic description’, but more as ‘socio-
linguistic explanation’, attempting to answer the question: ‘why do 
members of specific discourse communities use the language the way 
they do?’ (Bhatia: 1997). This research endeavours to address the 
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question of AJA and the MB, and, in line with Bhatia’s assertion, it 
consequently requires sound understanding, not from linguistic 
descriptions alone, but equally importantly, from a socio-linguistic position.  
 
CDA offers a powerful arsenal of methodical tools that can be deployed in 
the close reading of editorials, ‘op-ed’ columns, advertisements, and other 
public texts (Huckin: 2002, p. 3-4). It enriches the analysis further by 
insisting that such close reading can be done in conjunction with a broader 
contextual analysis, including consideration of discursive practices, inter-
textual relations, and socio-cultural factors. It might, therefore, be the best 
choice for analysing written texts, social semiotics for visual media, and 
socio-linguistics for classroom discourse (pp. 3-4). CDA stands at the 
heart of the study of the effects of AJA’s language, while interviews are an 
integral part of the qualitative method applied in this study. 
 
The interviews technique also plays a useful role in discourse analysis, as 
stated by Bhatia, in order to understand the socio-linguistic context of the 
different actors. This research applies interview techniques as a primary 
source for data analysis, which is essential in order to comprehend the 
strength of interviews and is a commonly recognized research method. 
Interviews, according to Horrocks and King (2010), have become a 
ubiquitous aspect of contemporary life and are frequently used within a 
wide range of methodological traditions in qualitative research. Interviews 
are regarded as among the most familiar strategies for collecting 
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qualitative data (Di Cicco-Bloom & Crabtree: 2006, p. 314), and are 
widely-used research methods as they generate information which the 
researcher cannot obtain by observation alone (Berger: 2000, Jorgensen 
& Phillips: 2002). 
 
Mason (1996) defines this method by saying that an interview, in its 
simplest form, is a conversation with a purpose between a researcher and 
an informant; although face-to-face interviews are considered to be the 
most suitable investigative form for gathering important, supporting 
information, telephone interviews are the best alternative for collecting 
sufficient data (Weiss: 1994; Seidman: 2013). There are three commonly 
used types of interviews in scholarly research (cited in Al-Theidi, 2003, 
p.15): 
 
i. Unstructured Interviews: the researcher concentrates on 
generating information from the informants in a casual setting, but 
he or she has limited control over the responses; 
ii. Semi-structured Interviews: the researcher has a written list of 
open-ended questions to ask the informants, whilst maintaining the 
casual nature of the interview; and 
iii. Structured Interviews: the researcher uses a list of questions with 
a specific set of instructions for the respondents. Self-administered 
questionnaires are categorised as structured interviews. 
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The semi-structured interview method, as defined above, will be used in 
this study. A sample of current AJA presenters, as well as some of those 
who resigned, will be interviewed, in order to make sense of the channel’s 
editorial choices around different topics (explained later).  
 
Phillips & Hardy (2002) assert that interviews play a useful role in 
discourse analysis in order to relate to the primary text. The interviews in 
this research offer an exclusive opportunity to apprehend the views of AJA 
journalists on topics that are not necessarily expressed in the channel’s 
programmes, thus enabling this researcher to obtain an ‘inside’ 
perspective of AJA’s journalists regarding how the channel covered MB 
affairs in Egypt, the language it used, the factors that led to such language 
use, the channel’s relationship with its host country, its place in the Arab 
world, and so on. 
 
6.5 Research Ontology and Epistemology 
 
It is significant for this research to realise the meaning of the two terms: 
ontology and epistemology, which is best explained by David Marsh and 
Paul Furlong (2002, p. 185):  
 
If an ontological position reflects the researchers’ views about 
the nature of the world, their epistemological positions reflects 
their views of what we can know about the world and how we 
can know it; literally an epistemology is a theory of knowledge. 
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Marsh and Furlong (2002) project three different approaches towards 
these terms: 
  
(a) Positivist 
(b) Interpretist (often called Constructionist)  
(c) Realist 
 
The writers, therefore, assert that the positivist stand is that there is no 
appearance or reality dichotomy, and that the world is real and not socially 
constructed: ‘the world exists independently of our knowledge of it’ to the 
positivist, but is unlike that of the Interpretist position (constructionist). 
Marsh and Furlong (p. 186) explain the connections between ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, and note that positivists employ a 
quantitative approach, while realists use both qualitative and quantitative, 
and Interpretists only use the qualitative approach. 
 
This researcher disagrees with the positivist argument, in that the world 
exists independently from a prior knowledge, but stands in line with 
interpretists and realists, as the world is governed by social norms and 
knowledge. The world, therefore, does not exist independently of 
knowledge and the understanding of it, but is shaped by ideology, 
awareness, values, beliefs and interpretations of it.  
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This research adopts the interpretist approach which includes 
consideration of the realist’s position, therefore, the qualitative method will 
be applied in order to help establish ‘how’ people understand their world 
(Marsh and Furlong: 2002). Marsh and Furlong also remark that the 
argument for other approaches such as positivism, merely offers opinions 
or subjective judgements about the world, which makes a response from 
someone from the interpretist tradition difficult as ‘it is based on a totally 
different ontological view and reflects a different epistemology and thus, a 
different view of what social science is about’. Thomas A. Schwandt says: 
  
The qualitative technique is the activity of making sense of, 
interpreting, or theorising data. It is both art and science, and it 
is undertaken by means of a variety of procedures that facilitate 
working back and forth between data and ideas (2001, p. 6).  
 
Interpretists argue that the world is socially or discursively constructed, 
therefore, in ontological terms, as noted by Marsh and Furlong (2002), this 
position is reinforced by the ‘anti-foundationalist’ view, which believes that 
there is no real world to discover which exists independently of the 
meaning which actors attach to their actions. The supporters of this 
interpretist approach believe that ‘objectivity’ is improbable, noting that 
there is no ‘objective truth’ that exists, as the world is socially constructed 
by an individual’s own views, feelings, and the surrounding social norms, 
in line with realists, who consider that not all social phenomena - and the 
relationship between them - are questionable. Marsh and Furlong (2002) 
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note: ‘realists do not accept what appears to be so, or, perhaps more 
significantly, what actors say so, is necessarily so’.  
 
It is essential to read between the lines and beyond the language that 
exists through a systematic examination of AJA’s language, which 
allegedly supports one political group or another. The realist, according to 
Malcolm Williams (2006), questions the fact that the social world is ‘real’ 
because of causal tendencies. Social constructionists, on the other hand, 
say that objects have no properties outside of their social setting: they are 
constructed by the setting, and that construction is usually created as a 
linguistic structure.  
 
Williams (2006, p.14) writes: ‘social construction can be “real” and the “real” 
can be socially constructed’, therefore, objectivity hardly exists in a socially 
constructed world because what may be seen by one person as objective 
reality is not necessarily viewed as such, by another. The constructivist 
paradigm, moreover, contains the naturalistic, hermeneutic, or interpretive 
pattern.  
 
Tom Rockmore (2005) describes constructivism as most interesting in the 
context of the theory of knowledge, consequently, the core concern of 
constructivist authors consists of fundamental re-orientation: the centre of 
attention must no longer be held by the ontologically-intended ‘what’ 
question but by the epistemologically understood ‘how’ question (Bernhard 
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Poerksen: 2011). The reflection of the constructivist approach – based on 
Poerksen’s assertion – will be helpful to this research, as the intention is to 
analyse the ‘How?’ rather than the ‘What?’ question. 
 
How AJA socially constructs itself in the Arab world, and how it employs 
language the way it does in relation to different groups and ideologies, are 
questions that mainly rely on the socio-linguistic stance (including the 
representation of language, power and ideology) integrated in its editorial 
values, journalistic beliefs, and its own perception of the Arab world within 
the social context. 
 
6.6 Language, Power and Ideology  
 
Textual discourse analysis includes conversations, interviews, 
observations, and written materials, according to Linda Philip (2007), 
which are considered to be a hybrid of linguistic and social theory that 
focus on discourse within social practice. The discussion surrounding 
discourse analysis is very much based on the grounds that there are inter-
relations between language, power and ideology, and between how the 
world is signified in texts, and how people look at their world (Stubbs: 
1997).  
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Based on Stubbs’s assertion on the inter-relation between language 
(lexical choice), power (actors) and ideology (action), the analysis of AJA 
text (two programmes and interviews) will be constructed.  
 
Power, by and large, is linked to any discourse, and is not initiated by 
language itself as ‘language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by 
the use powerful people make of it’ (Weiss and Wodak: 2003, p. 14). This 
means that the ideology of power represented by ‘actors or agency’ is very 
much determined by the selection of language which defines someone’s 
identify and then is transformed into action(s).  
 
Media (as a form of power) are used as a mediation power (an actor) 
according to Pasha (2011, p. 60), through which social meanings are 
produced, stored, distributed and consumed on a mass scale: ‘what the 
media are actually doing is offering their audience selective presentations 
of selective events’. Pasha (2011) presents Fairclough’s view (2001, p. 41) 
who suggests that mass media discourse involves hidden relations of 
power: text producers in mass communication address an ‘ideal subject,’ 
construing their own notion of their ‘ideal reader,’ and by these means may 
succeed in influencing audiences to accept particular social realities in 
accordance with their ideological scope and view of it. Hartley (1982, p. 
47) explains how the news takes the discourse form it does as something 
determined by ‘the way the news-makers themselves act within the 
constraints’. 
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The process of ideology is best explained by Van Dijk (1998,p. 6), who 
notes that groups with certain ideologies such as communism and anti-
communism, socialism and liberalism, Islamism and secularism, and so on, 
are largely governed by their specific beliefs about the world, their 
interpretation of events, and understanding of their social practices. This 
type of ideology generates polarisation of people into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and 
the audience begins to produce and consume discourse in terms of a ‘we’ 
and ‘they’ dichotomy.  
 
This process of polarisation leads to what Van Dijk describes as an 
‘ideological square’ which clarifies the dichotomous character of the 
fundamental discourses in societies. This ideological square, according to 
Van Dijk, separates the ‘in-groups’ from the ‘out-groups’ through both 
emphasis and mitigation: ideological discourses categorically emphasise 
the good ‘self’ and the bad ‘other’ and instantaneously mitigate these two 
concepts. Van Dijk (1995) asserts that the articulation of ideologies is 
often based on several forms of the ideological square: 
 
I. Emphasises positive things about us; 
II. Emphasises negative things about them; 
III. De-emphasises negative things about us; 
IV. De-emphasises positive things about them. 
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The forms of Van Dijk’s ideological square and the process of 
emphasising the good ‘us’ or the bad ‘them’, moves the discussion to the 
‘framing’ process, in which framing different actors or actions is based on a 
specific ideology. Framing, according Robert Entman (2009), refers to the 
process of selecting and highlighting (or emphasising and mitigating) 
some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhances the salience of an 
interpretation and evaluation of that reality; at the media level, journalists’ 
framing of an issue may be influenced by several socio-structural or 
organisational variables (Scheufele: 1999). Framing helps to deepen the 
theoretical insight more generally into the political influence of the news 
media and into the relations among elites, media, and the public (Entman: 
2009).  
 
It is in this selection and highlighting process (emphasising some aspects 
and de-emphasising others) that the influential role of power or social 
factors can be explained, in which language, power and ideology are 
represented in the targeted data in this study. There are two types of 
framing models ‘distance framing’ and ‘empathy framing’, according to Pier 
Robinson (2002). Robinson explains that the way an action is framed 
defines the standpoint of the actors. The selection or emphasis of some 
adjectives or verbs assigned to actors such as; ‘kill/killing’, 
‘dictate/dictating’, and ‘loot/looting’ generally suggest ‘distance framing’ 
with negative implications, whereas, adjectives and verbs such as 
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‘reform/reforming’, ‘suffer/suffering’ and ‘support/supporting’ suggest 
‘empathy framing’ with positive inferences.  
 
Departing from the ideological square and the framing model, AJA’s text 
regarding its coverage of different actions (different electoral moments) 
and actors (the MB and the Mubarak regime) at different times will be 
scrutinised. This process will enable this research to identify adjectives 
and verbs incorporated in the text and the different roles assigned to 
actors at different times.  
 
Three important features, in line with discussions on language, power and 
ideology, are central to the rhetorical strategies in the sample texts: verbal 
mode, agency and time space, according to Chouliaraki (2006, p. 77), and 
will be examined below.  
 
Verbal Mode 
 
Language usage or verbal mode is represented in the transcripts of each 
episode, and performs fundamental classificatory activities. It includes and 
excludes foregrounds and backgrounds, justifies and legitimises the 
content, and separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ or the model of good ‘self’ and ‘bad 
others’.  
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This research raises the following questions regarding language in the 
analysis of the text:  
 
 What is the main idea or topic?  
 What are the actions and story behind it?  
 What is the verbal mode (adjectives and verbs) that are used to 
emphasise the description of the MB and the Mubarak regime? 
 How was the actor framed? 
 
Agency (Actors) 
 
It is important to trace the assigned power relationships that existed before 
and after the 2011 Egyptian revolution, at different electoral periods, in 
order to analyse the position held in connection with the social context: 
how the two programmes represented different actors regarding the MB 
and the Mubarak regime (the Egyptian people, opposition parties, the 
Military Council, Women, Copts, and so on).  
 
The process of language representation is very much related to the 
discussion of ‘transitivity’, which suggests a distinction between transitive 
and intransitive verbs associated with participants and the circumstances 
(Halliday cited in Pasha: 2011, p. 117). Transitivity incorporates the 
relationships between the process (verbs) and the participants involved 
with it (subjects and objects). Transitivity includes identifying who is set as 
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agent (‘doer’ or ‘sayer’), what is set as a goal (upon whom the action is 
performed), and the processes (doing or saying). 
 
The assigned role of actors (agency) aims to promote or condemn the 
particular ideology of that actor: for example, victims or persecutors, 
democratic or dictatorial, Islamic or secular. The incorporation of 
humanistic enquiry in the analysis of journalism could contribute not only 
to unravelling how the authority of this profession is constructed, but also 
to the journalists’ authority in constituting the social world as a discursive 
practice (Zelizer: 1993/1997; Fairclough: 2002, p. 309).  
 
Journalists deploy a range of strategies as a means of distributing power 
among the different agents, therefore, when discussing the role of different 
actors several questions will be asked, including: 
 
 How this agent was represented?  
 What are the adjectives and verbs associated with this agent?  
 What role or actions was this agent assigned in the text? 
 How is this agent represented in terms of the ‘ideological square’ 
and ‘framing?’ - Positive things about ‘us’ and negative things about 
‘them’. 
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Time Space 
 
Time space, as a third rhetoric strategy, is imperative in the analysis of 
AJA’s text, in order to uncover the presentation of language and actors at 
various times.  
 
1. How were the different actors assigned in the text, namely the MB 
and the Mubarak regime, represented in the past, the present and 
the future? 
2. How the ideological square of emphasis and mitigation was used 
on the positive ‘us’ and the negative ‘them’ to represent different 
times? 
3. How did the construction of language and actors change from one 
time to another?  
 
The thoughts resulting from the set of questions raised in the three 
strategies will assist in detecting common themes that emerge from 
selected text.  
 
6.7 Research Themes  
 
Theme identification is one of the most fundamental tasks in qualitative 
research and yet one of the most mysterious. They can however, be found 
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through in-depth and line-by-line scrutiny (Ryan and Bernard: 2003, p. 81). 
Themes are abstracts that are often blurred and come in all shapes and 
sizes, which, according to Ryan and Bernard (2003), can be found in two 
different approaches: inductive and a priori. Themes in the inductive 
approach can originate from the actual data and the a priori approach is 
based on a researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the 
phenomenon under study by reviewing existing literature.  
 
The process of retrieving the themes from the data is what theorists call 
‘open coding’, ‘talent-coding’, or ‘qualitative analysis’ (Berelson: 1952). 
Bogdan and Biklen (1982, p.165) propose reading over the text at least 
twice in order to extract a general idea about the themes.  
 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975, p. 83) suggest several techniques that can be 
used to look for themes in the data, such as repetition and similarities and 
differences. Repetition is one of the easiest ways to identify themes: some 
of the most obvious themes in a corpus of data are those ‘topics that occur 
and re-occur’. Similarities and differences, according to Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) is the ‘constant comparison method’ which involves 
searching for similarities and differences by making systematic appraisals 
of data units. This research utilises both inductive and a priori approaches 
to identify common themes in the text of AJA’S two programmes and 
interviews. 
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6.7.1 Themes emerging from the text of two programmes  
 
This research focuses on the inductive approach for the selected AJA 
episodes by identifying repetition and adopting the constant comparison 
method. Three common themes emerged from the data scrutiny:  
 
Theme 1: victimisation versus criminalisation 
Theme 2: democracy versus dictatorship 
Theme 3: Islamisation versus secularisation  
 
The retrieval process of these three emergent themes was based on both 
Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Robinson’s Framing Model. The course 
taken to retrieve these themes in the text (see Chapters 7 and 8), was built 
on three concepts: verbal mode, agency and time space, together with the 
strategy questions discussed earlier, in connection with the MB and the 
Mubarak regime during four electoral instances. 
 
Theme 1: this research has observed that repetition and constant 
comparison of references or words used in the TV programmes suggest 
victimisation of the MB and the criminalisation of the Mubarak regime. 
Each electoral moment repeatedly reflected that some references 
(adjectives and verbs) were used about the MB, such as: ‘banned group’ 
(ةروظحم ةعامج), ‘legally pursued’ ( ينوناق ةقحلاما ), ‘subjected to cruel security 
strikes’ (ةيساق ةينمأ تابرضل ضرعتت), ‘subjected to policy of arrest, harassment and 
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pursuance (ةينملاا ةقحلالماو قييضتلاو لاقتعلاا ةيساسل ضرعتت), and so on. The constant 
comparison method revealed that these references indicated victimisation 
of the MB and criminalisation of the Mubarak regime which committed 
these actions at various times. 
 
Theme 2: the text incorporated some repeated references that suggest the 
MB’s commitment to the value of democracy such as: ‘the choice of the 
people’ (بعشلا رايخ), ‘democratically elected’ (ايطارقميد بختنم), ‘trusted by the 
people’ (سانلا ةقثب ىظحت), ‘brings social justice’ (ةيعامتجلاا ةلادعلا ىلع لوصحلا), 
‘seeking reform’ (حلاصلال ىعست), ‘seeking devolution of power ( ةطلسلا لوادتل ىعست), 
‘achieving development and political stability’ ( ارقتسلااو ةيمنتلا ىلع لوصحللر  ي سايسلا), 
and so on; some references, on the other hand, recurrently suggest the 
negative aspect of Mubarak’s dictatorship such as: ‘corrupted regime’ ( ماظن
دساف), ‘inheritance of power’ (ةطلسلا ثراوت), ‘responsible for political blockage 
and stagnation’ (ي سايسلا دادسنلاا دوكدرلا نع لوؤسم), ‘obstructing development and 
causing political chaos’ ( ةقاعا ةيسايسلا ى ضوفلا نم ةلاح داجياو ةيمنتلا ةيلمع ), and so forth. 
  
Theme 3: other references emphasised in the programmes suggest that 
the MB supports the Islamisation value. Such references include words 
such as: ‘Islamic identity’ (ةيملاسا ةيوه), ‘adopting the Islamic project’ ( ينبتت
يملاسا عورشم), ‘bearer of awakening project based on Islamic values’ ( لمحي
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يملاسا ساسا ىلع ةضهن عورشم), ‘Islam is the solution’ لحلا وه ملاسلاا), ‘peaceful jihad’ 
(يملسلا داهجلا), and so on.  
 
These three themes will be further discussed in the following chapters.  
 
6.7.2 Themes for Interviews 
 
The process of selecting themes and questions for interviews was largely 
established on two grounds: existing literature (a priori approach) and the 
text of the two TV programmes (inductive approach).  
 
This research initially identifies some general, yet relevant, questions and 
themes that emerged from reading existing academic work and current 
news reports (a priori approach) on AJA and the debates surrounding its 
role in covering the Arab uprisings in different countries (particularly Egypt), 
the nature of its relationship with Islamists, including the foundation of the 
allegations raised regarding the channel’s relations with the MB, the use of 
critical language in social media by some of AJA presenters, and the on-
going debates about the channel’s ownership and editorial independence 
(Qatar). Other questions that emerged were based on the critical reading 
of the actual text of the two targeted programmes (inductive approach) 
and the rationale of the assigned ideological square and framing in the text 
of the two programmes. This includes the presenter’s vision of the role of 
different actors, the representation of these roles and the verbal mode 
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assigned to them (including victimisation and criminalisation, democracy 
and dictatorship, Islamisation and secularisation), and the vision of the 
channel’s ‘objective or impartial’ motto of representing an opinion, on one 
side, and the contradictory opinion, on the other (see chapter 9). 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
Different methodology techniques will be used in this paper, including 
qualitative research, critical discourse analysis and interviews.  
 
The interviews with some of AJA’s former and current journalists 
and/about the two TV programmes (Without Borders and Opposite 
Direction) will be critically examined. The benefit of the qualitative research 
method is to uncover hidden meanings of the language AJA uses within 
the Arab cultural context, and validates the end results. Interviews, 
moreover, help researchers to obtain data which is not available from the 
analysis of the actual text of the two programmes.  
 
The ontological and epistemological interpretist approach (with the leaning 
towards the realist’s approach) is adopted, and will assist in studying and 
explaining the language of AJA and its journalists, in an attempt to 
understand the surrounding socially-constructed context. 
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The next chapter will critically analyse the text of AJA’s Without Borders, 
presented by Ahmad Mansour. The language of the programmes and 
what stands beyond it in four key electoral moments (two before and two 
after the toppling of Mubarak) will be scrutinised and measured by using 
three Rhetorical Strategies as tools for analysis: verbal mode, agency and 
time space. The model of the ‘Ideological Square’ process as presented 
by Van Dijk (1995), will be complemented by Chouliaraki’s Rhetorrical 
Strategies in the analysis of the two programmes in order to understand 
the action taken and identify the language references and actors’ 
representation in different times and spaces.  
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Chapter Seven 
AJA’S WITHOUT BORDERS TV PROGRAMME: A 
PLATFORM FOR THE MB 
 
 
Figure 7: (Ahmad Mansour (on the right and one of his guests) [retrieved from 
Without Borders, (episode date 7/5/2014) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the data selection, qualitative 
methodological approach, including critical discourse analysis (CDA) and 
interview techniques, in which language, power and ideology were 
discussed. The ideological square of Van Dijk, rhetorical strategies of 
Chouliaraki (verbal mode, agency and time space), and the framing model 
of Robinson will be used, and the process of transitivity (verbs relating to 
subject and object) in terms of action and actors, will also be applied.  
 
The language utilised in Without Borders, a well-known and principal AJA 
TV programme, will be inspected in this chapter. The implications of the 
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language used and the messages conveyed are important to this study, in 
order to understand how Ahmad Mansour, AJA’s presenter of Bila Hudood 
- دودح لاب - (Without Borders), represented the MB and the Mubarak regime 
in different electoral moments, before and after the Egyptian uprising.  
 
It is considered necessary to first give a brief outline of Ahmad Mansour’s 
background before analysing the text, with the aim of better understanding 
the nature of the effect of language which had become integral to his 
programme. 
 
7.2 Without Borders: Text Analysis 
 
The analysis of a sample of Without Borders episodes featuring key 
figures of the MB, suggests that the programme framed the MB as the 
‘victim’ of the Mubarak regime’s ‘brutality’. The MB movement was 
depicted as a bearer and promoter of a civilised mission with a grand 
political vision for the future and as a viable alternative to authoritarian 
regimes (Mubarak’s and his so-called ’remnants’). This mission adopted 
by the MB, entailed a series of political and social reforms, working closely 
with the opposition’s political actors, offering sound governance in Egypt, 
based on an ‘Islamic awakening project’.  
 
The former secular regime, on the other hand, is portrayed in دودح لاب 
(Without Borders) as the perpetrator (of criminal acts), the root of Egypt’s 
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problems, and the main obstacle hindering Egypt’s political progress. This 
regime practiced torture and oppressive policies, according to Mansour 
and his guests, which not only excluded movements such as the MB, but 
also many other opposition groups. 
 
This research has identified three dominant themes (discussed in the 
previous chapter), which emerged from critical reading of the text 
(inductive approach). The repetition of some references (adjectives, verbs, 
subjects and objects) and the constant comparison method, based on 
three grounds for the inter-relation between language, power and 
ideology:  
 
(i) victimisation versus criminalisation 
(ii) democratisation versus dictatorship  
(iii) Islamisation versus secularisation 
 
The selection process for these three themes was based largely on the 
actual text scrutiny. It is through Van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ of the 
‘good self’ and the ‘bad others’ that the themes were retrieved, and the 
conceptions of victimisation of the MB (empathy framing and ‘in-group’) 
and criminalisation of the Mubarak regime (distance framing and ‘out-
group’), that were identified. The value of democratisation and dictatorship, 
moreover, also located on the same scale as the representation of the two 
concepts, was not only based on the grounds of empathising power 
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relations between ‘us - the democratic’ and ‘them - the dictators’, but also 
on the way this programme’s framing representation of actors and as 
mitigating ‘negative us’ and ‘positive them’. The incorporation of verbal 
mode, agency and time space in the text, appears to present the MB 
positively, with an ambitious political vision, and the Mubarak regime, 
negatively, as a hindrance to the process of democracy. The theme of 
Islam (or Islamisation), as a political ideology, was also represented in the 
text: the painting of the MB as the bearer of the Islamic awakening project 
(as divine agents of Allah or God) in terms of ‘positive us’ and ‘negative 
others’.  
 
The three rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space), in 
conjunction with the ideological square and framing model, will be useful 
bases for scrutinising the text of the selected samples. 
 
 
7.2.1 The MB: victims of the Mubarak regime of all time  
 
The reference to victimisation was largely dominant in the analysis of the 
sample text; as shall be seen, where there is a victim or object (the MB as 
acted upon), there is a subject (the Mubarak regime as actor) and a verb 
or adjectives relating to the action or process of victimisation. 
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The term ‘victimisation’ in criminology, as discussed by Sandra Walklate 
(2007), is related to the power of the media and the salience of a symbolic 
image or lexical choice in shaping dominant understanding of 
criminalisation and victimisation. The media play a central role in informing 
and cultivating people’s everyday perceptions of crime and disorder 
through the illustration of victimisation. The media (such as AJA) create 
symbolic identities (action or verbs and adjectives) for sufferers (the MB as 
object) and for villains (the Mubarak regime as subject) (Ferrell: 2005 – 
cited in Walklate: 2007: 468).  
 
It was noted in the text that this programme presents the MB as ‘victims’, 
while the former regime as ‘villains’. This juxtaposition of victimisation and 
criminalisation is marked by the linguistic selection (‘verbal mode’) 
ascribed to the brutality of Mubarak’s regime. The critical lexical choice 
often embraced by the presenter (Ahmad Mansour) and some of his 
guests (primarily from the MB) was noted in the process of selecting and 
highlight the suffering endured by the MB members. This selection 
process and the highlighting of key words that signify the nature of 
suffering (action and process), the sufferer (acted upon), and the villain 
(actor), falls in the heart of the ideological square and framing model.  
 
The leaders of the MB (as main actors) hosted in AJA’s Without Borders 
programme were given the platform to elaborate on their policies 
(ideology) and suffering under the former regime. The presenter allowed 
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the MB guests the time to highlight the pattern of victimisation by moving 
regularly between different times (history and the present), in order to 
illustrate the sacrifices the movement had made throughout its troubled 
past, in the context of the positive and negative paradigm. 
 
The verbal mode in the Without Borders programme includes metaphors, 
terminology and connotations to emphasis the framing of ‘us’ (the in-
group) and ‘them’ (the out-group). 
 
The examination of the nature of the verbal process, including the 
assigned transitivity model (adjectives and verbs), is illustrated in the table 
below through the linguistic allusions and adjectives incorporated in the 
programme, describing both the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to 
the victimisation versus criminalisation theme:  
 
The MB movement (object) The Mubarak regime (subject) 
Banned group 
 
Banning the MB 
Subjected to cruel security strikes 
 
Has cruel security services  
Legally pursued Using the judicial system to 
pursue the MB 
 
Subjected to policy of arrests, harassment and 
pursuit 
 
Threatening and spreading 
alarm among people 
Members excluded from running 
Parliamentary election in 2005  
 
Fabricating election 
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Sacrifices  Oppression 
Legal and constitutional struggle  
 
Unlawful and dishonest  
Stand by the deprived Egyptian people  
 
Working for their own interests 
Figure 8: The representation of MB and the Mubarak regime in terms of victimisation 
and criminalisation  
 
The interview with the former deputy head of the MB, a few weeks before 
the Egyptian parliamentary election in October 2005, allowed both the 
presenter and his guest, Khairat Al-Shater, Deputy MB Supreme Leader, 
to distance themselves from Mubarak and to show empathy towards the 
MB:  
 
Mansour: […] The MB, officially described as a banned group, is 
the most controversial political power in Egyptian society. Despite 
the cruel security strikes they’ve had since the assassination of its 
first founder and mentor, Hassan Al-Banna on 12 February 1949, 
observers consider them to be the most organised and influential 
political group in Egyptian society. (EP1: EX1). 
 
It is noteworthy that in this sample the representation of the ideological 
square can be realised; how Mansour presented the process of emphasis 
and mitigation (including and excluding) the different actors as ‘the bad’ 
and ‘the good’ in both discursive practices and semantic relationships.  
 
The presenter’s lexical choice of the adjective ‘banned ةروظحم’, for example, 
stands as a reference to the MB movement being the victim (the object on 
which the action of banning was performed). Although the verb ‘to ban or 
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‘banning’ may be deemed to represent an objective description of the 
actual status of the movement during the Mubarak regime, the emphasis 
on ‘ban’ signifies the sympathising element to those subjected to the 
banning (the MB) and refers to the ‘bad’ subject or actor (the Mubarak 
regime). 
 
The presenter evidently allied the adjective of ‘banned’ group ةروظحلما ةعامجلا 
to the adverb ‘the most' رثكلأا more than once: the most controversial power 
لدجلل ةراثإ ةيسايسلا ىوقلا رثكأ, the most organised and influential in the Egyptian 
society  يرصلما عمتجلما يف اريثأتو اميظنت رثكلأا which aims to emphasis a connotation by 
which the MB, despite banning and cruel security strikes (negative 
emphasis on Mubarak), was still a dominant, organised and influential 
power in Egyptian society (positive emphasis on the MB). 
 
The presenter’s narrative in the 2010 parliamentary election also seemed 
predictive of the political picture before the results, implying a significant 
occurrence by forecasting the fabrication of the results by the Mubarak 
regime and a prolonged tenure of presidency (EP6: EX5). 
 
The victimisation of, and suffering endured by the movement was 
reinforced by its Supreme Leader, Mohamed Badei, who was hosted to 
discuss the Egyptian general election in 2010, during peak political tension, 
immediately before the public uprising in that year. The Mubarak regime 
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had made mass arrests and suppressed the MB members during the 
electoral campaign, resulting in accusations that the election had been 
‘fabricated’. The Mubarak’s party was, at that time, accused of 
manipulating votes to ensure a sweeping victory in the parliamentary 
elections (The Guardian: 201023).  
 
Badei recounts to Ahmad Mansour how the former regime subjected the 
MB members, including its leaders, to unjust imprisonment, military trials, 
and confiscation of their private properties:  
 
Badei: There’s no party in this world that takes such procedures 
towards their opponents by making arrests, attacking homes, 
looting properties, confiscating private and public companies, 
disrespecting legal and constitutional articles which they’ve 
sworn to respect, wasting the verdicts of courts issued, and still 
being issued, up to this date. Despite all this, there’s no way out 
but the way of using a legal and constitutional struggle to restore 
our rights and the Egyptian people’s stolen rights (EP6: EX9). 
 
Mansour had rightly asked the reasons behind the MB’s participation in a 
‘fabricated ةفيزم ’ election, and Badei was given uninterrupted time to 
expound the movement’s vision, the brutality of the regime, and the level 
of suffering it had faced, which, according to the guest, were the main 
reasons for the MB’s participation in the election - in order to rescue the 
                                                          
23
 The Guardian, 2010: ‘Egyptian elections: opposition alleges fraud’, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/29/egyptian-opposition-alleges-election-
fraud [retrieved 4/06/2014] 
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Egyptian people from long-standing injustice from the Mubarak regime, by 
what he described as a ‘legal and constitutional struggle نلا ينوناقلا يروتسدلا لاض ’.  
 
The language used by Badei was a clear example of the systematic 
approach to underpin the suffering of the movement by emphasising and 
re-emphasising the actions committed by the Mubarak regime. The 
transitive verbs, in terms of action and actors of a ‘corrupt-corrupted’ 
regime دسافلا ماظنلا’, ‘ loot - looting properties تاكلتمم ىلع ءلايتساو’, ‘ arrest لاقتعا’, 
and ‘steal - stolen rights ةبولسلما يرصلما بعشلا قوق’ not only meant to distance 
and deepen the gap between the people and the regime (‘them’), but also 
invited the people to empathise and support the MB (‘us’) in order to 
eliminate such atrocities: voting for the MB would therefore bring about 
justice and a democratic system to the people’s ‘stolen rights ةبولسلما قوقحلا’ 
by the Mubarak regime (EP6: EX6).  
 
The affirmative use of the verb ‘restore…لصحن’ and the pronoun ‘our’ (our 
rights انقح ’ and the noun phrase (Egyptian people) positively refers to the 
suggestion of harmony between the MB and the Egyptian people (‘in-
group’) and distinguishes the Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) as the 
executor of the action: the thief of their rights. 
   
Badei asserted: ‘We stand to say to [Mubarak] that he is the oppressor قنف 
ملاظ اي ملاظلل لوقنو’. The repetition of the first person pronoun ‘we’ – like the use 
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of ‘our’ - in the above example (6: EX6), not only refers to the MB 
members as the victims but also to other actors, the Egyptian people and 
opposition parties, who had been similarly subjected to the regime’s 
oppression. The implied message, as this research reads, was that the 
MB, Egyptian people and the opposition were on one side (the victims) 
and the Mubarak regime (the perpetrators) on the other. This is an 
illustration of emphasising the boundaries between the ‘good’ self, and the 
‘bad’ others.  
 
The Egyptian mass protests took to the streets soon after the 2010 
election, and eventually Mubarak was unseated; a move which was widely 
seen as a glimmer of hope towards the path of ‘justice and democracy’ in 
the country, and returning to the Egyptian people their ‘stolen rights’, as 
earlier pledged by the MB’s top leader, Badei. 
 
Parliamentary and presidential elections were held one year after the fall 
of Mubarak in 2011, in which Islamists made history in both elections 
(Kirkpatrick: 2012) by winning almost half of the parliamentary seats, and 
were therefore entitled to form a government, and its presidential 
candidate, Mohammed Morsi, became the Egyptian president (EP7: EX7).  
 
Ahmed Mansour’s television episode on a discussion regarding this 
‘electoral victory’, appeared, on the one hand, to celebrate the victory of 
the MB which had long been subjected to aggression and suppression by 
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the Mubarak regime, and on the other, blamed the ‘remnants’ ( لولف’) of 
Mubarak’s regime for obstructing the implementation of the MB’s political 
grand vision of democracy, based on Islamic ‘awakening’ (ةضهن) (explained 
later). 
 
Mansour invited the newly-elected MB president, Mohammed Morsi, to 
appear on his programme, on the first anniversary of the January 25th 
revolution – the date chosen was arguably no coincidence - it held, as this 
research argues, a cherished symbolism for the end of the tyrannical 
regime and the birth of a new era for Egypt’s prosperous future, led by the 
MB.  
 
The presenter did not hesitate to emphasis the factor of suffering in the 
past in his introduction to Morsi, by highlighting that after many years of 
being unjustly ‘banned’, the MB had now gained the trust of the Egyptian 
people and would be leading Egypt through a representative process by 
the first civil government elected, after decades of military control:  
 
Mansour: Today, millions of Egyptians have gone out on the 
streets and squares to celebrate the first anniversary of January 
25th revolution, which has begun to bear its fruit […]. This step 
stands as a defining mark in the history of Egypt and the MB 
organisation, which was described by the Mubarak regime, 
before the revolution, as a ‘banned organisation’. This so-called 
‘banned organisation’ has now become the choice of the 
people’s majority vote (EP7: EX7). 
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Noticeable is the fact that the MB’s success was positively emphasised as 
‘a defining mark in the history of Egypt and the MB  رصم خيرات يف ةقراف ةملاعناوخلإاو ’, 
and implicitly depicted the MB as the ‘saviours’ (subject) of the Egyptian 
people by gaining their trust and leading them to the shores of an 
‘awakening’ and democracy; conversely, the presenter’s decision to use 
the phrase ‘banned group ةروظح ةعامج‘ twice in his introduction, arguably 
reflects his personal stance towards the MB, by assigning the adjective 
‘banned’ as a negative and distance verbal connotation for Mubarak, while 
using a positive verbal reference to the MB by stressing ‘them’ as ‘the 
choice of the people’s majority vote  ناوخلإل ةيبلغلأاب توص يذلا بعشلا رايخ يه تحبصأ
نيملسلما’. The representation of the ‘Egyptian people’ as the ‘subject’ and the 
MB as ‘object’ (acted upon), illustrates the ‘in-group’ process by 
denouncing the Mubarak regime and electing the MB - a reversal of 
circumstances.  
 
A few months later, following his interview with Morsi, the narrative of what 
was previously described as a movement that marked a ‘defining moment 
in Egypt’s history’ by gaining the trust of the Egyptian people, had shifted. 
It appeared that the MB was struggling to fulfil its promises made to the 
Egyptian people. Consequently, the public discontent began to increase 
against the MB’s leadership in less than a year of being in power.  
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Mansour wanted to continue addressing the challenges the MB’s 
leadership was facing, and in order to achieve this aim, he invited the 
current Prime Minister, Hesham Qandeel, in late 2012 to participate in two 
consecutive episodes. Mansour pinpointed the MB’s ‘inheritance of 
political chaos’ created by Mubarak and his government.  
 
Strong metaphoric and passionate language was embedded in Mansour’s 
introduction to Qandeel, underlining the ideological square and framing 
models of ‘us’ (the victims) and ‘them’ (the perpetrators). He, alongside his 
guest, reasoned about the MB’s incompetency, by stressing the fact that 
the movement had not been given a chance by the people, the deep-state 
ةقيمعلا ةلودلا, and controlled media, to start rebuilding and re-ordering a 
country that had been damaged by the ‘dictatorial and corrupt’ regime and 
its remnants  لولف: 
 
Mansour: … It’s extremely unlucky for any party to lead a nation, 
following a revolution. Whatever this party does, it will not be 
able to sew the holes which have turned the state dress into a 
mess. Following the revolution, freedom has become a form of 
chaos. The success of removing the tyrant, made people feel 
that they are bigger than anyone who governs them, regardless 
of his size and status - even if this person has been chosen by 
them. This is the reality of the people in Egypt today. The people 
who have been under dictatorship and corruption for more than 
six decades do not want to give their ruler a few weeks, months, 
or years to think about how to re-knit a new dress for the country, 
after electing the first civil president in its modern history. (EP8: 
EX10). 
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The above example shows how the presenter employed a vivid, 
empathetic, emotive and lexical choice favouring the MB, by blaming not 
only the ‘dictatorship’ and ‘corruption’ of the overthrown Mubarak regime 
but also the Egyptian people who were not willing to give the MB the time 
to ‘reknit a new dress دلابلل ديدج بوث ةعانص ديعي’ or rebuild the damage left by the 
Mubarak regime in the past ‘six decades’. This example illustrates the 
presenter’s conscious choice of a passionate and elevated language and 
questions his neutral stand. 
 
The role assigned to the Egyptian people in the above sample, apparently 
shifted and placed them in the (‘out-group’), after having been in the ‘in-
group’ for some time. The stress of the adverbial phrase (the first ةرم لولا) in 
relation to Morsi as a ‘civil president’ (يندم سيئر), and in its modern history’ ( يف
 راتثيدحلا هخي ), is another example of the emphasis and mitigation process: 
positive emphasis and empathy for the actor (the MB’s representative) 
voted for by the people in a free election, whereas mitigation (or de-
emphasis) of the reasons behind the core question of why Egyptian 
people were not willing to give the MB’s leadership a chance.  
 
The mass protest and the military ‘coup’ ended the MB’s one year of 
control in July 2013. Members of its top leadership (including President 
Morsi) were arrested, and tens of thousands of their supporters were 
199 
 
injured or killed during the protests against the ‘coup بلاقنلاا’ which 
demanded the return of the ‘legitimate President يعرشلا سيئرلا’, Morsi.  
 
The ousting of Morsi was, once again, the deciding factor for the linguistic 
choice in this programme. It primarily stressed the victimisation of the MB’s 
leadership and its members by repeatedly referring to the ‘killing’, ‘torture’ 
and ‘arrest’ perpetrated by the armed forces, and the leader at that time, 
General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. It was noted that both Al-Sisi and Mubarak 
were categorised in the ‘out-group’: 
 
Ahmad Mansour: […] such a coup was met by sacrifices of 
thousands of martyrs, and tens of thousands injured and 
imprisoned (EP12: EX8). 
 
The use of the noun in the plural ‘sacrifices تايحضت’ and the noun ‘martyrs 
ءادهش’ suggests a value-laden lexical choice which reflects the level of 
empathy of the speaker (presenter).  
 
Moving between history and the present (time space) in the text, Mansour 
underlined the ‘endurance دومص ’ of the MB movement under severe political 
conditions for the last sixty years, in which it had experienced many crises 
in various other countries, but considered this crisis to be the biggest in its 
history (EP11: EX43).  
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The former military officer, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, (responsible for 
ousting Morsi), ran for the presidential election in June 2014, and won 96 
per cent of the votes. Al-Sisi's critics (including Mansour) argued that the 
figure was inflated, as many polling stations appeared to have been empty 
throughout the polling dates, according to the Guardian newspaper 
(2014)24. 
 
Al-Sisi, as another perpetrator (agent) of oppression, was negatively 
framed in this programme, together with the Mubarak regime and its 
supporters, following the fall of Morsi. Ahmed Mansour addressed this 
development by hosting two episodes with Yousif Nada, Commissioner of 
International Relations for the Muslim Brotherhood. The first one on April 
2014, entitled ‘Nada: Al-Sisi is not qualified to rule and the MB will not 
give-up اوملستسي نل ناوخلإاو مكحلل لاهؤم سيل ي سيسلا :ادن’, highlighted Al-Sisi’s election 
and the presenter and his guest repeatedly stressed the idea that Al-Sisi 
was an unlawful leader and incompetent to lead the country, let alone the 
Military Council. They also emphasised that he had been supported by 
external actors who were conspiring against the MB (EP11: EX43).  
 
The second episode was two weeks before the Egyptian presidential 
election on 7 May 2014, in which Ahmad Mansour produced the 
programme from Paris: ‘New coalition against the coup … Does it gives a 
                                                          
24
 Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/abdel-fatah-al-sisi-
presidential-election-vote-egypt [accessed 5/6/2014].  
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glance of hope? ؟لمأ ةقراب لكشي له ..بلاقنلاا دض ديدج فلاحت’. He hosted the former 
member of the Egyptian National Security Council (Al-Shoura Council), 
Tharwat Nafe’a, to discuss a national document introduced by political 
parties opposing the military coup, in order to form a new political coalition. 
Their aim was ‘to restore 25th January’s revolution and democracy’, as 
well as to plan a clear political future, after ‘the coup’ that had ousted 
Morsi (EP12: EX8). The episode was arguably a platform for an open plea 
calling for the ‘honest نيصلخلما’ political parties and the ‘people with 
conscience  رئامضلا باحصاةيحلا ’ (the Egyptian people), to act quickly and revolt 
against the ‘illegitimate military coup  يركسعلا بقنلاا ةداق’ led by Al-Sisi, and 
bring back the ‘legitimate president يعرشلا سيئرلا ’, Morsi. 
 
Another dominant theme emerged from the critical analysis of this 
programme in addition to the notion of victimisation: the MB and its grand 
political vision were depicted as a viable alternative to the authoritarian 
regime. 
 
7.2.2 The MB: Alternative to Mubarak’s authoritarian regime  
 
The value of democracy versus dictatorship is another dominant theme 
that surfaced from the selected data. The MB was represented as 
reasonable replacement for Mubarak’s dictatorship as it had far-reaching 
political plans for Egypt’s future. The MB was presented positively as 
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seeking reform, establishing devolution of power, ready to work with 
different political parties and prepared to entertain co-existence with Copts. 
The table below illustrates how the MB and the Mubarak regime were 
represented in the text: 
The MB The Mubarak 
Demanding reform  Corrupt regime  
 
Seeking devolution of power Inheritance of power 
 
Working together with other political parties Singling out and excluding other 
parties 
 
Creating political dynamics and change Responsible for political 
blockage and stagnation 
 
Achieving development and political stability Obstructing development and 
causing political chaos 
  
Having few women candidates Creating challenging 
environment for women to 
operate  
 
Working together with Copts and the Church oppressed under Mubarak 
 
Building an independent, modern and 
democratic Egypt  
Damages Egypt with fake 
promises of reform 
 
Establish honest media  Control media services  
 
Establish free and honest judicial system  Control judicial system 
 
Figure 9: The representation of MB democracy versus Mubarak dictatorship 
 
The MB narrative before the fall of Mubarak, for example, was by and 
large, focused on their demands to reforms the ‘corrupt دسافلا ’ regime. Al-
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Shater, the MB’s Deputy Supreme Leader, repeatedly put the request for 
‘reform حلاصلاا’ at the heart of the movement’s politics, during the 2005 
election: 
 
Al-Shater: We urge the government [the regime] to start the 
reform process. We would accept the reform to start gradually 
but a serious one, clear and specific in order to accomplish a 
true reform in this country (EP1: EX19, EX20 and EX29). 
  
Al-Shater stressed the idea that the legitimate political vision of the 
movement demanded the attainment of ‘true reform يقيقح حلاصا’ by 
establishing a culture of ‘political participation ةيسايس ةكراشم’, ‘diversity عونت ’, 
‘accepting the others رخلاا لوبق’, and ‘devolution of power ةطلسلا لوادت’. He 
denounced the process of the parliamentary election in 2005 as ‘false 
democracy’ and noted that it was exaggerated by the media and the 
security services in their positive description as part of the course towards 
‘true democracy’ (EP1: EX27).  
 
The notion that the MB’s political participation was one of cooperating with 
other political actors was also represented in this programme’s text (EP1: 
EX20 and EX 21 - EP 6: EX 30 and EX34); for example, in 2005, Al-
Shater moved back in history and listed the number of political 
collaborations that the MB had had with others: 
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Al-Shater: If you look at Egyptian modern history, you would 
not find any political power that has collaborated with other 
powers as much as the MB. The MB has coordinated with Al 
Wafed Party in 1984, had a coalition with the Labour and Free 
Party in 1987. Now and before the election, with the start of 
political dynamics and before, we have approached Al-Arab 
Nasserite Partly, Unity Party, and Wafed Party and offered 
them [the opportunity to form a committee to draft a political 
project to save this country [Egypt] and establish political and 
constitutional reforms (EP1: EX29).  
 
Noticeable is the fact that the presenter (Mansour) had given his guest (Al- 
Shater) the space and uninterrupted time to elaborate his point.  
 
The opposition parties in the above sample were represented positively or 
neutrally as the ‘in-group’ by working together with the MB to ‘save this 
country دلابلا ذاقنلا’. The use of the verb ‘save’ may have a patriotic 
connotation in order to show that the MB was making every effort to 
achieve democratic practices by ‘establishing political and constitutional 
reforms ةيروتسدو ةيسايس تاحلاصا’. 
 
Morsi, furthermore, expressed his commitment to democratic values in 
January 2012, and noted that the MB was moving towards stability and 
development. The mission, according to Morsi, was to establish a ‘new 
and stable Egypt ةرقتسمو ةديدج رصم ’, ‘modern Egypt ةثيدح رصم’, and ‘democratic 
Egypt ةيطارقميد رصم that had modern constitutional aspirations ثيدح روتسد’ 
(EP7: EX22). Noticeable is the repetition of the same noun: ‘Egypt’ three 
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times with three different positive adjectives: ‘stable ةرقتسم ’, ‘new ةديدج ’, and 
modern ةثيدح ’, which signifies positive framing of the MB’s grand political 
vision of Egypt’s future democracy.  
 
Morsi also reflected on the process of how his grand political vision would 
be carried out in the same episode (EP7), by working side-by-side with 
other opposition powers and ‘founding a balanced parliament for all parties 
on a percentage-based representation  
ً
اربعمو 
ً
انزاوتم 
ً
لايكشت نالمربلا ليكشت نوكي نأ ىلع  
ً
اضيأ
دعاقلما بسن نع’ (EX31), another example of the projected inclusion of 
opposition powers (neutral or positive demonstration).  
  
This positive or ‘impartial’ representation of the opposition parties radically 
changed by late 2012 immediately before the MB lost power. Mansour 
projected the Egyptian opposition actors in Egypt not only negatively but 
also used offensive language to describe them: 
 
Mansour: Dr Qandeel, how come all ‘the remnants’ of the 
previous regimes: Nasserites, leftists, communists, artists, 
dancers, drummers, are in coalition against the government? 
Do you follow the political scene or not? 
Qandeel: Democracy - democracy has opposition and opposite 
views. (EP9: EX28). 
 
This sample clearly reflects Mansour’s subjective lexical choice. His critical 
portrayal of the opposition was offensive as he equated the different 
ideologies of Egyptian opposition powers (actors) to ‘dancers نيصقارلا ’, 
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‘drummers نيلابطلا ’, ‘artists نينانفلا ’ and ‘remnants  لولف ’, which essentially have 
negative connotations (extremely insulting in Arab culture) and is based on 
the ideological square which categorises them as the ‘out-group’. The 
Prime Minister, Qandeel, did not attempt to refute the presenter’s 
denunciation of the opposition powers, but limited his answer to showing 
his commitment to ‘democracy’, in his reply. 
 
The Copts and women were positively or neutrally represented in the text, 
before and after the fall of Mubarak. Mansour opened the platform for his 
guest, Al-Shater (EP1), regarding the MB’s relationship with the Copts, as 
illustrated in the example below, to clarify the significance of this 
connection, painted in the programme by Al-Shater (Deputy of the MB’s 
Supreme Leader), with positive use of two adjectives: ‘healthy ةيحص ةقلاع’ 
and ‘continuing ةرمتسم ’. 
 
Mansour: In relation to the Copt candidate, what is the nature 
of the coalition between you the Copts? 
Al-Shater: Regardless of religion, we strongly believe that the 
representation of Copts - as much as other political parties - in 
the political life is inevitable. We talk about Egypt and its 
awakening and progress following its status of extreme 
backwardness; in the wake of the triangle of: backwardness, 
corruption, and oppression [referring to the Mubarak regime] we 
have been living under, we believe that all political power must 
exist and be represented. Our relationship with Copts is healthy 
and continuing. It does not exist because of the election only 
(EP1: EX36, EX37 and EX38).  
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This ‘healthy positive relationship’ classified the Copts as part of the ‘in-
group’, while the ‘out-group’ (the regime) remained ‘distanced’ with the use 
of three different negative adjectives: ‘backwardness فلخت’, ‘corruption داسف’, 
and ‘oppression دادبتسلاا’ in reference to the Mubarak regime – ‘them’ (the 
‘bad others’). 
  
The MB’s vision towards women was likewise positively or neutrally 
signified. The MB attempted to show caution towards citing women by 
saying: ‘we do not want to expose women candidates to challenges لا  نأ ديرن
تايدحتلا هذه لثم ىلإ ةأرلما ضرعن’ ‘harassments and arrests قييضتو تلااقتعا’ perpetrated 
by the Mubarak regime during fierce electoral battles such as those in 
2005 (EP1: EX35); yet again, the verbal representation of the MB (subject) 
regarding women (object) with the words ‘not to expose them’ to 
‘harassment’ suggests the ‘good self’ (the MB) and ‘bad other’ (the 
Mubarak regime).  
 
The representation of this actor (Mubarak) was largely negative, 
considering that he once led the Military Council. Some MB guests (such 
as Badei and Al-Shater) stated that most of the MB members were given a 
military trial before being jailed during the Mubarak regime, and described 
the fall of Morsi as a ‘military coup  يركسعلا بلاقنلاا’ (EP1 - EP6: EX16 – EP12: 
EX8), which had decisive implications. Those who believed in Morsi’s 
legitimacy described what had happened as a ‘military coup’, whereas 
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those who believed that Morsi’s ousting was legitimate, refuted the term 
and described it as ‘a correction of the revolution’s path ةروثلا قيرط حيحصت’.  
 
Morsi’s fall in 2013 witnessed the Egyptian media, President Al-Sisi, and 
businessmen always being negatively represented. The media, according 
to Qandeel, (former prime minster), ‘distort[ed] هوشت’ the image of Egypt by 
painting a picture of chaos (EP8: EX39). Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, furthermore, 
was regarded in this programme as the leader of the ‘military coup’ who 
was building a ‘false democracy, attempting to legitimise the coup and 
seeking international recognition فارتعلاا ىلع لوصحلاو بلاقنلاا ةنعرشل ىعسيو ةفيزم ةيطارقميد
يلودلا (EP12: EX8 and EX11). 
 
Noticeable is the fact that different actors (agents - the MB, Mubarak, the 
media, women, the Military Council, and so on), were assigned specific 
roles in the programmes and were variously presented at different stages, 
both before and after the fall of Mubarak:  
 
Actors Positive Negative Neutral 
Before the fall of Mubarak 
The MB X   
Mubarak  X  
Opposition 
powers 
X  X 
Egyptian people X  X 
Women X  X 
Copts X  X 
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Businessmen  X  
Judicial system   X X 
Media  X  
The military   X 
After the fall of Mubarak 
The MB X   
Mubarak  X  
Opposition 
powers 
 X X 
Egyptian people  X X 
Women X   
Copts X  X 
Businessmen  X  
Judicial system   X  
Media  X  
The military   X  
Al Sisi  X  
Figure 10: The assigned role of different actors in Egypt before and after the fall of 
Mubarak 
 
The assigned roles of the ‘Egyptian people’ and the ‘political opposition 
powers’, for example, were represented either positively or neutrally 
before the fall of Mubarak, as being the victims and the source of power 
and legitimacy; after Mubarak’s regime was toppled, their representation 
shifted to being either neutral or negative by noting that they were not 
willing to give the MB government a chance.  
 
The accreditation which included or excluded the foregrounds and 
backgrounds of each guest is noteworthy in this research. How were the 
guests introduced in this programme? Mansour usually began each 
episode with a long description about his guest, including several 
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references to dates, facts and places, in order to add an objective 
viewpoint: 
 
Mansour: In this episode, we try to introduce the MB’s vision 
for Egypt’s future and their project to evolve it [Egypt] through 
our dialogue with Dr Mohammed Morsi, the president of 
Freedom and Justice Party. He graduated from The 
Engineering College, Cairo University in 1975, got his Master’s 
in Filzat Engineering from Cairo University, and was awarded 
his Ph.D from South California University in 1982. He worked 
as assistant professor in North Ridge University in the U.S. - in 
California between 1982 and 1985. He worked as a lecturer and 
head of Filzat Engineering department in Zagazeeq University 
from 1985 until 2010. He was a member and president of the 
parliamentary block for the MB in Parliament between 2000 and 
2005. He was selected as the best parliamentarian in the world 
due to his performance […] (EP7: EX26)
25
.  
 
Mansour could have listed only one or two credentials or recent jobs held 
by each guest. It can be argued, however, that the emphasis placed on 
the MB leaders’ educational background added to their status as 
intellectual elites who combined both faith and education.  
 
The listing and the selection of particular details of each date of his guests’ 
imprisonments (as in Badei and Al-Shater’s accreditations), arguably 
sought to achieve objectivity and factuality in offering not only a credible 
programme to his audiences, but also to demonstrate that the leadership 
                                                          
25
 See also (EP1: EX23) for Al-Shater introduction and (EP6: EX25) for Badei’s 
introduction. 
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of the MB had paid a heavy price and had been subjected to the injustices 
of different regimes. The presenter intended to send a message that in 
spite of the group having made many sacrifices, it now had the 
qualifications and therefore deserved a chance to lead the country as an 
alternative to the autocratic regimes.  
 
Mansour, however, used a different approach towards his guests from the 
ruling party (Mubarak’s regime). He omitted to list any of their credentials 
such as education or political achievements in his introductions (EP5: 
EX44). Only a few guests from the Mubarak regime or its supporters 
appeared in Mansour’s programme (most of them rejected the invitation). 
The different ways of guest presentation therefore presents the question of 
whether the presenter was an ‘objective’ moderator. 
 
The MB’s commitment, as an Islamic movement, to democracy and 
awakening was an apparent factor in the programme. The value of 
Islamisation will be assessed in the following section, in order to explain 
how it was represented in Mansour’s programmes.  
 
7.2.3 The MB: Comprehensive Islamic project for Egypt  
 
Having projected the MB’s references and commitment to democratic 
values, the representation of the MB’s vision to Islam or Islamisation will 
be inspected as the third emergent theme.  
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This research notes that at the beginning of each episode, the programme 
presenter, Ahmad Mansour, started his episode with a full Islamic 
greeting: ‘In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate and the Most 
Merciful’ (ةتاكربو الله ةمحرو مكيلع ملاسلا), which arguably reflects the presenter’s 
religious Islamic status, given his background as an Islamist. 
 
The verbal mode in the programme incorporates illustrations of the Islamic 
vision and values of the MB. The table below explains the MB’s use of 
references that directly or indirectly suggest the use of Islamic values in its 
political narrative: 
 
The MB 
We have Islamic identity  
 
Adopting Islamic project 
 
Bearer of awakening project based on Islamic 
values  
 
Islam is the solution and the Qur’an is also the 
solution 
 
criticising the MB means criticising Islam itself 
 
Egypt awakening project includes Muslim 
individuals, Muslim family, Muslim society, 
Muslim institution, attain Islamic unity  
 
Adopting peaceful Jihad 
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Punishment will come to people on Judgement 
Day [referring to Mubarak and others] and 
then God’s wrath will be harder on the day 
after.  
 
The Creator of people gave them the right to 
believe in him [God]. People are free to 
choose their own beliefs and faith. 
 
Figure 11: The representation of the MB’s Islamic values in Without Borders TV 
programme  
 
The MB’s Islamic identity was overtly marked by Al-Shater in the 2005 
election, in which he affirmatively illustrated the movement’s political and 
Islamic vision of the ‘Islamic Awakening project’: 
  
Al-Shater: We do not hide our Islamic identity, we have an 
Islamic project: an awakening project for Egypt based on 
Islamic values. This is our beliefs and approach. We do not find 
any problems describing ourselves as such, or loudly marketing 
this slogan (Islamic identity) […] I say not only Islam is the 
solution but also the Qur’an is the solution. (EP1, EX12). 
 
The verbal boundaries are represented by ‘we’ or ‘our’ as a separation 
ideology (Islamists ‘in-group’) and may also refer to ‘them’ or ‘they’ (other 
political powers as the ‘out-group’). Al-Shater explained in the same 
episode (EP1, EX14), what he meant by ‘comprehensive Islamic 
awakening لماكتم ةضهن عورشم’. He clarified that the aim of his movement was 
not to rule but to achieve an ‘awakening’ for Egypt. This ‘awakening’ starts 
with ‘Muslim individuals ملسلما درفلا’, the ‘Muslim family ملسلما تيبلا’, ‘Muslim 
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society ملسلما عمتجلما’ and a ‘Muslim state  ةلودلاو ةملسلما ’, and seeks to reach an 
‘Islamic unity ةيملاسلاا ةدحولا’.  
 
Badei also explained (EP6) that the MB’s legitimacy comes from Allah 
(God) and the movement is devoted to its motto: ‘Islam is the solution  ملاسلاا
لحلا وه’:  
 
Badei: Our legitimacy comes from Almighty Allah, so the group 
carries the flag of reform, the promotion of virtue, the prevention 
of vice, and advice to rulers for the benefit of the country [...]. 
Mansour: have you abandoned your motto: ‘Islam is the 
solution’ which you’ve raised during this period? 
Badei: No we have not. 
 
The use of the noun (Allah الله :هللاجلا مسا) as the subject (a divine actor) 
which gives the ‘legitimacy’ (action) to the object (the MB: recipient of the 
divine legitimacy), arguably represents their positive and highly spiritual 
status as an Islamic political group. The use of different positive verbs: 
‘carry reform حلاصلاا ةماقا ’, ‘promote virtue ةليضفلا رشن ’, ‘prevent vice  رلا عنمذةلي ’, 
and ‘advise rulers مكاحلا ةحيصن ’ suggests that the MB had assigned 
themselves the role of divine or (Allah)’s agents or messengers to achieve 
comprehensive political and theological Islamic values in Egypt, as a 
complete way of life.  
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Badei also invokes the words of the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad), calling Muslims to peaceful jihad, in order to achieve justice 
and prevent oppression in his attempt to inspire the Egyptian people (the 
victims مولظلما ) to take action against Mubarak’s regime (in his words: ‘the 
murderers’) to save themselves from death. Reference to the Qur’an and 
the Hadith is frequently made by MB guests on the programme, in order to 
justify not only their right to fight an oppressive regime, but also to square 
this battle with the teachings of Islam. They are left unchallenged by 
Mansour: 
 
Badei: Do you imagine that this is something we should do 
nothing about? We stand to say to the oppressor [Mubarak] that 
he is the oppressor. We are encouraged to stand against that, 
as described and advised by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) 
when he said: “The best jihad is a word of truth about an 
oppressor Sultan”; and we say as the Prophet once said: “the 
fear of people should not stop you from saying the word of truth 
when you acknowledge wrong-doing because this won’t change 
your divine livelihood (EP6: EX15).  
  
The Islamic narrative and references such as the above, add to the 
authenticity of the MB’s demands and justification for its battle against the 
former regime(s). Badei’s reference to the injustices to which they had 
been subjected under the Mubarak regime, was a warning that it would not 
receive retribution from the MB, but would incur God’s wrath on the ‘Day 
After’ (Judgement Day), ( EP6: EX16). 
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The language usage and references to Islamic values used in presenting 
the MB was explicitly described as being the bearer of Islamic values, 
compatible with the value of democracy and reform, whereas the Mubarak 
regime and his ‘foloul’ or remnants were largely represented as deterring 
the progress of democracy, and would be subjected to Allah’s divine wrath 
and punishment, was left unchallenged by the AJA presenter. 
 
7.3 Summary 
 
Ahmad Mansour’s TV programme, Without Borders, was examined in this 
chapter, in which the language of the programme and what stood behind it 
was scrutinised. It was argued that before the fall of Mubarak, Mansour 
presented the MB as victims, and the Mubarak regime as villains. The 
programme provided the platform for the MB’s political grand vision to be 
expressed. The language of the programme noticeably celebrated the 
victory of the MB after the fall of Mubarak, and largely blamed Mubarak’s 
‘remnants’, not only for hindering the implementation of the MB’s political 
vision, but also the development of a civilised Egypt. Following the fall of 
President Morsi in 2013, the programme became an active campaigner 
against what was described as ‘the military coup’ led by General Al-Sisi 
and Mubarak’s ‘remnants’, as well as promoting the idea that the MB was 
still a victim of conspiracies. 
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It can be argued that the channel directly or indirectly showed positive 
representation to the MB’s ideology, not only because of the movement’s 
political and Islamic ethics, but also due to being the so-called ‘victim’ and 
the opposition and long-standing historical movement standing against 
tyrannical regimes, including Mubarak’s. This assertion was widely 
perceived by AJA that the MB was a growing force that could not be 
ignored (Reuters: 2014)26, not only in Egypt, but also across the Arab 
world.  
 
The programme, moreover, positively projected the MB’s grand political 
vision of Islamic Al-Nadha project (‘Islamic awakening لاةوحص ةيملاسلإا ’). 
Before the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the channel had long presented the 
movement as one of the powerful Islamic political forces on the Egyptian 
political scene. The fall of Mubarak saw AJA appear to favour the MB as 
an alternative power to the authoritarian regime in Egypt, by allowing 
Mansour to regularly host the movement’s top leadership to speak out 
about its electoral programmes, and its vision for a better Egypt, based on 
the Anglo-American concepts of democracy, justice and freedom.  
 
The programme was widely seen as a defender of the MB’s political 
incompetence and lack of political judgement in leading the Egyptians 
during a very complex transitional period. It blamed Mubarak’s ‘foloul’ (the 
                                                          
26
 Reuters (2014): ‘Arab governments accuse a defiant Al-Jazeera of supporting 
Islamists’, available at: http://www.firstpost.com/world/arab-govts-accuse-a-defiant-al-
Jazeera-of-supporting-islamists-1599375.html [accessed: 1/12/2014]. 
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Military Council) and other liberal and secular political parties for the MB’s 
ineptitude during its one year in power.  
 
The following chapter reviews samples from Opposite Direction, presented 
by Faisal Al-Qassem. His programme focuses on similar political issues as 
Ahmed Mansour’s, but has a three-way structure: two guests with robustly 
opposing views, and the presenter as moderator of the debate. The 
selected text of Opposite Direction will be scrutinised through the 
ideological square, framing models and in conjunction with the three 
rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space).  
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Chapter Eight 
AJA’S OPPOSITE DIRECTION TV PROGRAMME: A 
PLATFORM AGAINST ARAB GOVERNMENT  
 
 
Figure 12: Al-Qassem (in the middle) and two Egyptian guests with opposing 
views. Retrieved from Opposite Direction, (episode on 02/07/2013) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Ahmad Mansour’s TV programme, Without Borders, was examined in the 
previous chapter, in which the verbal mode, agency and time space were 
scrutinised in accordance with Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and 
Robinson’s Framing Model. It was argued that the MB was represented as 
‘victims’ and the Mubarak regime as ‘villains’, by regularly emphasising the 
atrocities committed against the movement. It was noted that Without 
Borders had provided a platform for the MB’s political grand vision to be 
positively communicated. The linguistic process included transitivity (verbs 
and adjectives - subject and object – action, actor, and acted upon), 
emphasised the separation line between the MB (‘us’ - democratic) and 
the Mubarak regime and supporters (‘them’ - dictatorial). Islamisation as 
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MB’s principle ideology was positively represented in the narrative, by 
regularly evoking the words of the Hadith and the Qur’an, which aimed to 
distance the Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) and represent the MB as the 
divine agent of a comprehensive ‘Islamic awakening’ project (‘in-group’).  
 
The texts of the selected samples of Opposite Direction presented by 
Faisal Al-Qassem, are examined in this chapter. The programme has a 
different design and structure from Without Borders, although it often 
addresses similar political issues. Al-Qassem usually invites two guests 
each week with strongly opposing political views to debate certain topical 
issues.  
 
The three Rhetorical Strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space) in 
conjunction with Van Dijk’s Ideological Square theory and Robinson’s 
Framing Model will be applied to the analysis of Opposite Direction. 
Twelve selected episodes linked to four electoral moments before and 
after the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, will be scrutinised in this 
chapter.  
 
The linguistic choice (verbal mode) made by Al-Qassem, the presenter, it 
is argued here, was often inflated or passionate (adjectives describing the 
action of the subject ‘us’ and the object, ‘them’) with colourful metaphors 
and elusive connotations, not only to credit the MB and the opposition 
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parties standing against the Egyptian ‘dictatorship’ regimes, but also to 
depict the movement as a viable alternative, particularly for Egypt.  
 
A discussion of power relationships (agency) will be made, considering the 
changing assigned role of different actors. People and opposition powers 
standing against the dictatorship were represented positively and as the 
‘in-group’, whereas after the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian people and 
opposition parties were represented as two groups: revolutionaries, 
positively characterised as the ‘in-group’, and the foloul: Mubarak’s 
‘remnants’ negatively depicted as the ‘out-group’.  
 
Al-Qassem and some of his guests regularly referred to different times, 
highlighting the years of suffering endured by the MB and ordinary 
Egyptian people under past governments and the current Mubarak regime. 
Al-Qassem blended his subjective views - often offensive - with ‘objective’ 
facts, aiming to increase credibility and viewership of his programme.  
 
8.2 Opposite Direction: Text Analysis 
 
The themes that emerged from the Opposite Direction sample texts will be 
analysed through the inductive approach, similar to the methodology 
adopted for Without Borders. The same discourse analysis techniques – 
Van Dijk’s ideological square and Robinson’s framing models – will be 
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applied to examine the rhetorical strategies: verbal mode, agency, and 
time space in the three themes that surfaced: 
 
1. Victimisation versus criminalisation 
2. Democratisation versus dictatorship  
3. Islamisation versus secularisation  
 
The implications of the verbal mode in relation to transitivity will be studied 
in order to understand the lexical choices made when describing a 
particular action taken. The examination of the assigned role of different 
actors is equally important, which will help to understand the ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ (the performer of the action and the receiver of the action). The 
examination of time space is also significant in order to trace the reasons 
and context of moving between the past and the present by the guests 
and presenter.  
 
8.2.1 Standing with the ‘victims’ against the tyrannical regime 
 
The sample texts revealed the argument surrounding victimisation versus 
criminalisation made in the programme. The MB was painted as the victim 
(object: acted upon) while the Mubarak regime as the tyrant (subject: 
actor). It seems that the lexical choice (verbs or adjectives) and the action 
taken exhibit a catalogue of connotations, exaggerations, subjective and 
often abusive and unrealistic narratives, to denounce and separate the 
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Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) from the MB (‘in-group’). The representation 
of people and the opposition parties moved between neutral and negative 
in the programme. The presenter and the MB guests often referred to 
history, in order to highlight the oppression they had been subjected to by 
the Mubarak regime (as the victims ‘acted upon’).  
 
Studying the verbal process and the assigned transitivity model, the table 
below illustrates examples of the verbal allusions and adjectives which 
were repeatedly highlighted throughout the programme in describing both 
the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to victimisation and 
criminalisation: 
 
The MB movement (object) The Mubarak regime (subject) 
 
Banned group Banning the MB 
 
Subjected to persecution, oppression, pursuit 
and intimidation 
 
Corrupt and tyrannical 
Subjected to the culture of arrests and 
incarceration 
Carried out arrests and jail 
sentences against the MB and 
opposition parties 
 
banned from electoral campaigns in 
universities and public places 
Electoral campaign control 
and fabricated results  
 
Lived under oppression for decades ‘Killer’ and oppressive regime 
 
Figure 13: The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to idea of 
victimisation versus criminalisation 
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The MB candidates ran as independents in the 2005 parliamentary 
election and won 88 seats in Parliament out of 454 (20 per cent or one-
fifth of the total seats), thus increasing the MB’s popularity among 
Egyptians, at that time (Hamid: 2014).  
 
The two sample episodes under review regarding the 2005 election 
exposed the verbal mode of the MB and the presenter, by and large, as 
separating the good side (Islamists: the MB) from the bad one (dictator: 
Mubarak regime) - a typical example of Van Dijk’s ideological square. The 
presenter (Al-Qassem) underlined a principal idea of the MB’s victimisation 
by emphasising that the movement had won a significant number of 
parliamentary seats in Egypt, in spite of ‘fabrication ريوزت ) ) ‘persecution’, 
عمق) ) ‘oppression’ هطضادا ) ), ‘pursuit’ ةقحلالما) ), and ‘uprooting’ مهلاصئتسا ) ) . The 
listing of different negative adjectives referred to the action taken by the 
Mubarak regime against the MB (object: subjected to such atrocities) 
which suggested empathy towards the MB and distancing it, not only from 
Mubarak’s regime, but also from other Arab governments in the Middle 
East: 
  
Isn’t it true that Islamists won a massive percentage of the 
Egyptian parliamentary seats in spite of all the pressure, 
fabrication and bullying? - an Islamist asks. What if the elections 
were free and fair? Islamists could have won more than 90 per 
cent of the seats, [...] Aren’t such elections in most Arab states 
proof that Islamists are the number one power in the Arab street, 
in spite of persecution, oppression, being pursued and uprooted 
by Americans and Arabs? […] but on the other hand, don’t the 
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voters who vote for the Islamic trend reflect ignorance and lack 
of democratic maturity? Did the Egyptians really vote in the MB, 
or was it a protest vote because they hate the regime? Who 
said that Islamists are oppressed by Americans and Arabs? 
They would not have participated in the election without 
American blessing (EP14, EX0) 
 
The provocative and emphatic tone of Al-Qassem’s questions in the above 
example was evident (arguably introduced to equally represent the 
opinions held by opposing sides). The nature of the questions listed by Al-
Qassem, may seem, at first glance, to represent both viewpoints, albeit 
conflicting (Islamists - the MB) and (secular - the Mubarak regime), but, on 
deeper analysis, it becomes clear that the actual format of the text and the 
hidden meanings reflect empathy (positivity) towards the MB and the 
stand taken against Arab authoritarian regimes.  
 
The incorporation of different adjectives such as: ‘pressure’ (طوغضلا) 
‘bullying ةجطلبلا' ) ) ‘persecution’ (دهطضا), and so on, pinpoint the notion of the 
movement’s victimisation. The Mubarak regime (villain) was represented 
negatively and - arguably – the presenter aimed at not only disgracing the 
regime for the ‘crimes’ it had committed against the opposition, particularly 
the MB (victims), but also illustrating the fact that this ill-treatment 
eventually led to the popularity of the MB in gaining support from the 
Egyptian people (in-group). 
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Al-Qassem’s attempt to conceal his subjective views was evident in the 
above example. The attribution to an arbitrary person: ‘an Islamist asks’ 
(يملاسا طشان لئاستي), maybe deceptive and debateable: is it aimed at pursuing 
objectivity in order to distance himself, as a balanced moderator, from any 
accusation of favouritism? Who and how credible this ‘Islamist’ was, as the 
source of affirmation was not supported by verifiable evidence. 
 
Noticeable was the fact that the set of questions asked by Al-Qassem 
represented the opposite viewpoints to those of the MB. The intention was 
possibly to encourage audiences not only to reject the questions but also 
to embrace the opposite view (Islamists). It seems arbitrary for the 
presenter, for example, to raise the issue of ‘who said that Islamists are 
oppressed by Americans and Arab leaders?’ ( ايكريمأ نومولظم نييملاسلإا نإ لاق نم 
؟ايبرعو). The question may indicate contempt towards those adopting such a 
view, but proves exactly the opposite, as it was widely known that 
although Islamists were subjected to oppression, they were also operating 
underground (EP14: EX0, EX1 and EX3). 
 
Fateh Elrawi, the guest representing the Islamist’s view in the discussion 
of the 2005 election, referred to history, and emphasised that Al-Banna 
(the founder of the MB) started from Ismalyyia’s coffee shop and from 
grassroots: ‘For more than 60 or 70 years this movement has been 
subjected to torture and injustices’ (ملظلاو باذعلا نم ةيملاسلإا ةكرحلا ىلع بصُي) (EP13: 
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EX9); similarly, the idea of victimisation was also embraced by Rafeq 
Abdelsalam, an Islamic activist invited to talk on the show about the 2005 
election and the rise of Islamists. He was given an uninterrupted 
opportunity to air his views. He highlighted adjectives that suggested 
empathy towards the MB and its victimisation, noting that in spite of the 
MB and other Islamic movements being banned ةروظحم ) ) and subjected to 
the regime’s pursuit and oppression (داهطضاو ةقحلام) its electoral performance 
had emerged as superior to all political opposition parties (EX14: EX4). 
The principle intimation behind highlighting the paradox of the negativity to 
achieve positivity in this example is evident in the guest’s narrative 
(supporting Islamists or the Islamic view). He employed different adjectives 
to paint the villainous actions perpetrated by the Mubarak regime (subject) 
against the MB (object: acted upon) to positively embrace the MB’s 
position.  
 
The verbal nuances of the presenter and his guests during other electoral 
moments generally remained the same. The presenter allocated three 
different episodes to the 2010 presidential election and before the eruption 
of the Egyptian public uprising. The dominant tone of the episodes largely 
blamed not only the Mubarak regime, as seen in the 2005 election’s 
narrative, but also the Egyptian people for accepting the status quo. A 
catalogue of abusive connotations and metaphors were employed by Al-
Qassem to generally describe the Arab people’s situation, particularly 
focusing on the Egyptians: 
228 
 
  
Al-Qassem: Why are Arab nations proudly talking about honour 
and dignity while they are the most supressed, living with 
injustice, oppression and dictatorships? Isn’t it the case that our 
people are like a man who proudly talks about his adventures 
with women while he is (sexually) impotent? Why do we fake 
manhood when we fear our own shadow? Why do we fake 
heroism when we are a nation of cowards? Why do we speak 
courage when we are the weakest of the universe’s nations? 
Has any Arab leader not committed the same sin that he 
commits against his people? When does an Arab nation revolt 
against its oppressor other than in its dreams? (EP17: EX12).  
 
The incorporation of different negative adjectives by the presenter in the 
above example questioned the Arabs’ honour (ةماهشلا) and dignity ( اركةم ) and 
branded them (the Arab masses) as sexually (adjective) impotent (نينع), 
faking heroism (ةلوطبلاب قدشتن) and cowards (نبجأ), which are considered to be 
most insulting and provocative in Arab culture. The representation of 
‘helpless’ Arab people (object: acted upon) as the victims of the Arab 
regimes (subject: actor) made them weak and not averse to living under 
totalitarian control.  
 
It could be argued here that the hidden intention behind using different 
nouns such as ‘supressed’, ‘injustice’, ‘oppression’ and dictatorship’ was 
aimed at illustrating that the action taken by Arab regimes was criminal on 
the one hand, and a message for Arabs to rebel, on the other. It can also 
be argued that the presenter intended to invite people to join the right path 
(in-group), by inspiring them to revolt against oppression, and distance the 
229 
 
dictator regimes, including Mubarak’s (out-group). (EP15: EX11 and EP17: 
EX12). 
 
The Egyptian people took to the streets following the Tunisian uprising and 
revolted against the Mubarak regime. They accused it of fabricating the 
presidential election by winning more than 90 per cent of the votes. 
Mubarak stepped down and handed over power to the Military Council. 
The MB’s political position was becoming stronger, in the meantime, and it 
decided to put forward its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, against Ahmad 
Shafiq, the prime minister during Mubarak’s regime. The programme 
discussed this particular issue: people were divided on whether to vote for 
the Islamists or for one of Mubarak’s ‘remnants’ (Shafiq). The Egyptian 
people were placed in the ‘out-group’ in that episode, as they were being 
blamed by the presenter for their indecision: ‘how could the great Egyptian 
people - who had revolted against the dictator - replace the tyrant يغاطة ) ) 
with one of its “tails” (بنذلا)?’ The Egyptian people were once again being 
reproached for their ‘unjustifiable’ fear of Islamists and for not being willing 
to give the MB a chance to govern (EP18: EX13). 
 
The Egyptian people were not the only actors rebuked in the programme: 
the Military Council, now in control, was aggressively represented. The 
fact that Mubarak had come from the military was repeatedly emphasised 
by referring to history. The objective, as this researcher argues, was to 
stress the link between Mubarak and the military (out-group) as villains, or 
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two sides of the same coin. This was evident in the MB guest’s narrative. 
He stated that for more than 60 years the military had been the reason for 
poverty (رقف), backwardness (فلخت,) ignorance ( (لهج , diseases (ضارما), 
dictatorship (دادبتسا), corruption (داسف), looting resources (تاورث بهن), and so on. 
This was the same narrative previously used to describe the Mubarak 
regime: 
 
Ahmad Barakha (MB): Military control has been widespread 
in Egypt for 60 years, what did they give us? They brought 
us poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, dictatorship, 
corruption, looting resources, and so on […] until we need a 
revolution.  
Al-Qaseem: Briefly, do you want to say that voting for one of 
Mubarak’s ‘foloul’, Ahmad Shafeq, is a result of intentional 
smearing of the revolution in Egypt for over a year?  
Ahmad Barakah: Revenge. 
Al-Qassem: Revenge against the revolution, is that possible? 
Ahmad Barakah: Without doubt! This is the simple reality of 
which the Egyptians, Arabs and the world are aware. 
  
The above sample illustrates how the presenter appeared to have made 
little effort to challenge the MB guest’s argument; instead, he was 
questioning the blame laid on Mubarak and his supporters by emphasising 
the separation line between the MB (‘good’ side) and the Mubarak regime, 
‘foloul’ and military (‘bad’ side).  
 
The reference to revenge (ماقتنلاا) on the revolution was evoked by the MB 
guest and stressed by the presenter, by charging the ‘foloul’ (Mubarak’s 
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‘remnants’) for conspiring (ةرماؤم) against the revolution and the 
revolutionaries. The ideological square representing the ‘out-group’ here 
includes different actors: Mubarak’s regime, the Military Council, Shafiq, 
and the ‘deep state’, which includes the media and businessmen (EP18: 
EX14).  
 
This accusation of revenge was denied by Nabil Sharaf Aldine, an activist 
supporting Shafiq against the MB. He was regularly interrupted during this 
episode, and was not allowed to refute the allegations made by the MB 
guest and Al-Qassem (EP18: EX15); in addition, Shafiq (the candidate 
standing against Morsi), was branded a ‘killer of revolutionaries’ by Al-
Qassem, when he asked: ‘how could people vote for the killer of 
revolutionaries (راوثلا لتاق)?’, which again aimed at distancing Shafiq and 
supporting the MB (EP18: EX18). 
 
Public discontent against the MB began to grow in Egypt soon after 
Morsi’s election. Egyptian opposition parties formed a movement named 
Tamarod (rebel درمت), demanding Morsi’s resignation, and threatening a 
campaign of civil disobedience if he remained in office (DW News 
Website: 2013). It was a critical time for both the MB and Mohammed 
Morsi, Egypt’s first civilian and Islamist president. He was ousted by the 
military on 3 July 201327, after only a year in power. This event divided 
Egyptian society between those who supported the Islamists and those 
                                                          
27
 see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18371427 [retrieved 29/12/ 2014] 
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who did not. Morsi’s removal was considered by the Islamists to be a ‘full 
military coup’ ( يركسع بلاقنا) and against the will of the people, and the 
‘continuation of the January 25 revolution ( لا ةريسلم لامكتساةروث ), by his 
opponents (Kingsley and Chulov: 2013). 
 
Al-Qassem presented an episode entitled: ‘Who has led Egypt into a mess 
and destruction?’ in the wake of this serious development. The answer 
was that Egypt was facing a ‘counter-revolution’ (ةداضم ةروث) led by the 
‘remnants’ of Mubarak’s regime. 
 
The presenter stated that demonstrators standing in Al-Tahrir Square in 
Egypt, calling for the MB president to step down, were inviting ‘the corrupt 
regime to return’ (دسافلا ماظنلا ةدوع) (EP20: EX21). It is in this example that 
different actors are characterised in accordance with Van Dijk’s ideological 
square: the MB and the Egyptian people as the ‘in-group’ and the Mubarak 
regime and ‘remnants’ as the ‘out-group’.  
 
Mr Shurbani (a member of the Tamarod movement) queried the so-called 
‘balanced’ nature of Al-Qassam’s questions and his ‘unbiased’ moderation 
of the programme. Noticeable in the example below is how the presenter 
asked his guest (opposing the MB) several questions, but gave him little 
chance to reply, which raised the issue of the presenter’s impartiality: 
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Al-Qassem: let me ask you a simple question. Let’s assume 
that you’ve successfully managed to remove this president 
[Morsi] in such a revolutionary and street-wise way. You have 
put yourself in a jungle game or followed the law of the jungle. 
Let’s say that you’ve taken the leadership after Morsi, and have 
attained authority, do you think that Morsi’s supporters will 
leave you easily, or it will shake the land below your feet and 
will lead Egypt to a storm of coups, and so on? The man came 
through the ballot boxes and should go through ballot boxes, 
instead of death boxes. Do you want coffin boxes [sic] or ballot 
boxes?  
Abdel Aziz Shurbasi: the way you format the question is very 
important. Al-Jazeera (Arabic)’s motto is ‘opinion and the 
opposite opinion’, which means you present both views and 
remain impartial. What you’ve just said has no traces of 
impartiality. (EP20: EX29) 
 
Mr Shurbasi became aware of Al-Qassem’s subjective language, the 
unfair distribution of time and constant interruptions. Shurbasi warned Al-
Qassem that he would abandon the live production on several occasions, 
unless he was given a fair opportunity to speak: ‘If you don’t give me equal 
time, I shall leave the programme’. It was evident that Abdel Aziz Shurbasi 
had been constantly interrupted and allowed to speak for much less time 
than his opponent representing the MB’s viewpoint28: a blatant violation of 
AJA’s guidelines for programme presenters. 
 
                                                          
28
 The time distribution was not equal (words were counted by this researcher). Abdel 
Aziz Shurbasi, an activist (against the MB) was given almost half of the time (1,728 words) 
in comparison to that (3,089 words) given to Hani Salah El-Din, Media Advisor for the MB 
political party’s Freedom and Justice,  
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It can be argued that the above text placed doubt on Al-Qassem’s 
balanced approach in his questions to his guests. He implied, once again, 
that the MB was the victim (object) of a conspiracy theory (action), led by 
Mubarak and his supporters (subject). The presenter made unsupported 
statements to the opposition guest, and accused him of not appreciating 
Morsi’s conciliatory offers of forming an inclusive government. 
 
The military coup - supported by the Egyptian masses – which overthrew 
Morsi and put him in prison29, initiated another of Al-Qassem’s Opposite 
Direction programme called: ‘After toppling Morsi: Was there any 
conspiracy against Islamists or not?’ Al-Qassem made little attempt to hide 
his anger and frustration through the questions he raised: 
 
Isn’t it ridiculous to say to Islamists: you are welcome to 
participate in the election but on one condition, you cannot win? 
Why do they put pressure on Islamists and then call them 
extremists? Wouldn’t this push Islamists to go for the 
ammunition box instead of the ballot boxes through which they 
were victorious? (EP22).  
 
General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi seized power through a ‘military coup’ on 
May 2014, prior to the Egyptian presidential election. He vowed to tackle 
‘terrorism’ and restore ‘security’ to the Egyptian people that had been lost 
                                                          
29
 BBC (2014): ‘What's become of Egypt's Morsi?’, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24772806 [retrieved 25/01/2015] 
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during the years after the Egyptian uprising (BBC News: 2014)30. The 
question of ‘national security’ (يموقلا نملاا) which was often used to alarm 
Egyptian people, was a talking point in the programme. 
 
Two guests with extreme views were invited: Mahmoud Attya, Egyptian 
lawyer and general co-ordinator of the coalition party, ‘Egypt Above All’, 
representing opposite views to the MB, and Mohammed Qudosi, Egyptian 
writer, representing the MB’s view. The core of the episode was to 
question the very nature of Egyptian national security over democracy. 
Those who opposed the MB called for the military to intervene in order to 
control a country in chaos, even if that meant bringing back the old 
Mubarak regime and dictatorship through its ‘remnants’, according to Al-
Qassem.  
 
Attya’s viewpoint, standing against the MB’s governance, was challenged 
and even mocked by the presenter, when he tried to make a point that 
Egypt was facing a ‘great conspiracy’  ىربك ةرماؤم) ) as were many other Arab 
countries. Al-Qassem contested the use of the phrase ‘universal 
conspiracy’ ( نوك ةرماؤمةي ). 
 
Attya: Egypt was subjected to a great conspiracy as much as 
other Arab countries in the region. 
Al-Qassem: Great conspiracy?  
                                                          
30
 BBC News (2014): ‘Egypt's Sisi vows tough line to bring security’, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27751813 [retrieved 29/12//2014] 
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Attya: Of course. 
Al-Qassem: Universal, right? 
Attya: It is not universal, no. 
Al-Qassem: I thought you had taken it or were stealing it from 
Bashar [Syria]. 
Attya: Bashar has nothing to do with this. 
Al-Qassem: Possibly, stealing it from this person [Bashar] who 
uses the word ‘universal’ as though the whole world was 
conspiring against him. (EP24: EX30) 
 
This research argues that the idea of Al-Qassem evoking the example of 
Bashar Al-Assar in Syria was to say that the atrocities committed against 
the MB in Egypt were very similar to those in Syria.  
 
Al-Qassem repeatedly interrupted his anti-MB guest and embedded his 
own views by using phrases that may have indicated objectivity, but were 
arguably an attempt to hide his personal view: ‘many have said…’ ( لوقي 
نيريثك) is an example of Al-Qassam’s aim to give his opinions authority and 
credibility, yet he chose not to substantiate ‘many’ by not quoting specific 
names.  
 
Al-Qassam’s programme, Opposite Direction, similar to Mansour’s Without 
Borders, not only provided an opportunity for important members of the 
MB to voice their opinions, but also acted as an agent for the MB’s grand 
political vision, discussed in the following section.  
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The presenter moves between the past and present to prove or disprove 
his argument, and allows uninterrupted and unchallenged space for his 
‘favoured’ guest to elaborate on various topics that particularly frame the 
Islamists and the MB in a positive light, due to their long suffering under 
autocratic regimes. The MB would be able to make positive changes in 
Egypt and elsewhere through democratic practices, according to him, and 
thus replace the ‘villains’ of secular military regimes such as Mubarak’s.  
 
While the role of Mubarak’s regime and the military were represented 
negatively at all times (out-group), the assigned role of different actors, 
including the Egyptian people and the opposition parties, regularly 
changed from a neutral position to a negative one (in-group to out-group). 
The role of the MB, however, was steadily represented as positive (with 
empathetic tones) to illustrate its victimisation on one hand, and on the 
other, its capability to govern in a democratic fashion, as a viable 
alternative to an authoritarian regime.  
 
8.2.2 The MB: democratic choice of the people 
 
The programme used positive language towards the MB and regularly 
projected the movement as a leading opposition party, as victims that had 
been subjected to injustice but were now a qualified alternative to 
repressive governments. This displayed a distancing language towards 
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dictatorship regimes such as Mubarak’s and promoted the MB’s ideology 
and commitment towards democratic values. 
 
The presenter and his guests from the MB habitually emphasised the 
victimisation of the MB as the recipient (acted upon) to highlight the bad 
practice of democracy from the Mubarak regime (perpetrator of the action). 
The solution to eliminate dictatorship in Egypt and elsewhere, according to 
the presenter and his Islamist guests, was to bring about freedom and 
democracy through the MB.  
 
The table below shows regular references (transitivity: actor, action, and 
acted upon) used to describe Islamists (the MB) and the Mubarak regime 
in relation to democracy and dictatorship: 
 
The MB Mubarak and supporters 
Calling for reform and willing to participate in 
the political process 
 
control of media and security 
services 
Historical movement 
 
Agents for U.S. and Israel  
The only social and political power that stands 
against the ruling regimes 
Cause of poverty, backwardness, 
ignorance, diseases, continued 
dictatorship, corruption, plundered 
resources 
 
Denounces violence, accepts democracy, 
respects human and women’s rights 
 
Discredits the revolution 
Better alternative to most Arab governments 
 
Dictatorship (‘shit’ democracy) 
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more organised and accepted than other 
social powers 
Destroys general public opinion 
on the principles of culture, 
identity and diversity 
 
Widespread, diverse, and inclusive displays a 
different social layer 
Egypt faces a great conspiracy 
from Islamists 
 
Stands against dictatorship, corruption, aims 
to liberate homelands 
 
Controls the state resources 
[Islamists] arrive at the chair of power via 
ballot boxes, not tanks 
 
Democracy is totalitarianism not 
according to ballot boxes 
Diversity: Morsi appoints a Copt as his deputy 
 
No political diversity 
Islamists heart of democracy, progress, and 
national liberation 
 
Apply the law of the ‘jungle’ 
Figure 14: The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to 
democracy and dictatorship 
 
It was noted that the programme promoted the idea of democratic values 
and encouraged comprehensive political change that required – in the 
case of Egypt – replacing the Mubarak regime, thus giving the opportunity 
to the MB to rule through a free and democratic system (ballot boxes). 
 
Al-Qassem, produced two episodes in relation to the 2005 election: the 
first, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s political activity’, prior to the election in 
May, in which he discussed the implications of the rising power of the MB, 
not only in Egypt, but across the Arab world; and the second, ‘Islamists 
sweep victory in the Arab elections’ (EP13 and EP14).  
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The title of the first episode appeared to be general and neutral. The 
second one arguably reflected positive and embellished language 
favouring the MB, in order to celebrate its ‘sweeping’ victory (حساك زوف) . His 
approach towards the Egyptian regime under Mubarak, on the other hand, 
reflected a negative (distancing) position for losing seats to the MB. The 
use of the adjective ‘حاستكا’ (to sweep or sweeping), for example, could be 
interpreted as being both positive towards the MB and exaggerated. It 
might be true that the MB had won a significant number of the 
parliamentary seats (88) but certainly not enough to qualify the party to 
lead the country. The word ‘sweep’ implies an ‘overall majority’, which was 
not the case in the 2005 election.  
 
The presenter depicted the MB’s ‘revival (ةضهن) as a strong democratic step 
for the movement, as it offered a viable alternative to authoritarian regimes 
across the Arab world. He stressed two main points: (i) although the 
historical movement (the MB) had been the victim of dictatorship, now, as 
a peaceful movement, it was ready to be part of a democratic process and 
embrace political participation; and (ii) the MB, as an Islamic political 
movement, was accepted by the international community.  
 
The presenter’s lexical choice of the questions in the sample (EP14: EX1), 
representing the government’s viewpoint, is overstated and can be viewed, 
as this researcher argues, as misleading. It indicates that the government 
undervalues the movement’s importance. Al-Qassem gives an example of 
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one of the Saudi officials’ statements which described the MB as ‘the 
source of the curse in the Arab world’ (يبرعلا ملاعلا يف ءلابلا لصأ). Although Al-
Qassem’s statements and questions were sometimes obscure, they did 
emphasise the fact that Arab governments in the region viewed any 
opposition parties seeking to achieve social and political justice - including 
the MB – as a real danger to its leadership. 
 
The principle idea of the MB as a deep-rooted movement in Egyptian 
society was regularly stressed. The message was that the MB (Islamists) 
and the Egyptian people were in one sector (in-group) and the dictators 
were in another (‘out-group’):  
  
Rafeq Abdelsalam (Islamist): The MB is much more organised 
and accepted than other social powers on the Egyptian scene 
[…] they [MB members] have managed to organise themselves 
and extend into the depths of Egyptian society as well as many 
other Arab countries (EP14, EX4) 
 
Visible was the positive language used to depict the MB’s political activity 
by using assertive phrases such as ‘are more organised’ رثكأ نومظنم) ) and 
‘accepted’ ( لوبق لحم) in Egyptian society. The verbal evaluation by the MB 
was against other political parties, arguably aimed at achieving a positive 
message for the MB as a ‘trusted’ movement while negative (or distant) 
message for others, including the Mubarak regime. This researcher 
argues that there is a hidden separation line between (‘us’: Islamists) and 
(‘others’: opposition parties and Mubarak’s secular regime).  
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The ethics of the MB were underlined by Al-Qassem: ‘denounced violence’ 
فنعلا نوضفري) ), ‘accepted democracy ةيطارقميدلاب نولبقيو' ) ), ‘respected human 
rights’ (ناسنلاا قوقح مارتحا) and ‘women’s rights’ (ةارلما قوقح). The intended 
message was to highlight the movement’s positivity in being committed to 
the values of democracy (EP14: EX1). 
 
The Egyptian people were distantly framed in other episodes hosted by Al-
Qassem, in which he accused them of being passive, unable or unwilling 
to change their political reality under Mubarak’s dictatorship. The episode 
on 25 November 2010 debating the topic: ‘Why do Arab people not 
revolt?’, focused on blaming the Arab people in general, and the Egyptians 
in particular, for showing little concern about the status quo (EP17:EX12). 
  
Al-Qassem often appreared to give himself both the right and the time to 
express his personal views in this epsiode. He strongly rejected the idea of 
‘national security (يموقلا نملاا) and described it as part of ‘illusion slogans’ 
(ةيمهو تاراعش) and ‘lies’ ةبوذكا ) ) made up by the military to control and 
discourage people from accepting democracy and change:  
 
Al-Qassem: For more than sixty years, Arab nations, especially 
Egypt, have lived under the impact of illusiory slogens and lies, 
only the sound of battle has been heard. They have been living 
for the past 40 to 50 years under the shoes of the military. Now, 
the Egyptian people have revolted and then returned to the 
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same story: national security and fighting terrorism. Many have 
said that such military generals are not able to acquire any 
political, economic or popular gains, so they create the 
scarecrow of terrorism and fighting terrorism and therefore use 
the protection of national security as a reason. They [the 
people] say democracy does not work for us because of 
security […] 
Attya: This is….[interrupted].  
Al-Qassem: Every time two police officers are beaten, you tell 
me national security […] (EP 24). 
 
Aggressive and subjective language used by AJA’s presenter, Al-Qassem, 
is evident throughout his programme. He regularly refers to history (time 
space). The connotation that the Egyptian people had been living ‘under 
the shoes of the military’ (ركسعلا ةيذحا تحت) – very insulting in Arab culture - 
for the last 40 - 50 years suggests that people who had suffered under the 
Mubarak regime (and the military), had revolted against it due to its 
corruption and tyranny and had democratically voted in the MB, were now 
back to living in misery (EP24: EX32). The above example stood as an 
illustration of the presenter’s attempt to distance the Egyptian people from 
the military and the Mubarak regime.  
 
Al-Qassem questioned the meaning of democracy during the 2010 
presidential election - which Mubarak was expected to win - when he said: 
‘the president (referring to Mubarak) controls media services, security 
services and all state means’, noting that it was ‘silly ةفاخس' ) ) to even call it 
an election, when the party opposite (referring to the MB) was banned 
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from embarking on an electoral campaign in universities and public places 
(EP15: EX11). 
 
The presenter continued to voice his personal view that the MB was a 
victim of Mubarak’s regime and the military, and blame the Egyptian 
people for willingly accepting the humiliation of military control, once again, 
for ‘security reasons’ (ةينما بابسا). The fact that the Egyptian people 
demonstrated their dissatisfaction by revolting against Mubarak’s 
government in January 2011, seemed to perplex the presenter, but did not 
prevent him from promoting the MB and the former president, Mohammed 
Morsi, as the best option for a better Egypt. 
 
The mass protests that took place in Egypt in 2010, following the Tunisian 
uprising led to demands for President Mubarak to step down. He 
relinquished his presidency after 18 days of protests, and handed over to 
the Military Council (Daily Mail: 2011). The Islamists’ prospects of playing 
a substantial role in the Egyptian political scene had now become 
increasingly predictable (Cambanis: 2011). The international community, 
on the other hand, particularly the U.S., remained concerned about how to 
deal with the rise of political Islam, especially after Mubarak had been 
ousted by popular demand (Hamid: 2011).  
 
Mohammed Morsi, a leading member of the MB, ran as presidential 
candidate in 2012 against Ahmed Shafiq, (last prime minister in the now 
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deposed Hosni Mubarak’s government) 31. Morsi won, although the votes 
were very close: 52 per cent to Morsi and 48 per cent to Shafiq (Spencer: 
2012). The MB and its supporters’ dreams of an Islamist leading the 
country had finally been realised. This realisation did not last for long, 
however; public dissatisfaction with Morsi’s government began to emerge 
soon after his election, and increased during his one-year tenure. 
 
Al-Qassem hosted an episode in September 2012 – ‘The victory of 
Islamists and the defeat of other parties’ - following the ballooning criticism 
of Islamists being in power and the political incompetence of the MB’s 
leadership. The title may suggest defending the idea of the rise of political 
Islam against those who had ‘conspired’ against them.  
 
The language used in the episode, as shall be seen below, was in defence 
of the right for Islamists to hold ‘legitimate power’ in Egypt, as they had 
won the public vote in free, democratic elections against other parties, 
particularly the secular ones (EP20: EX21). Al-Qassem said:  
 
They [Islamists] arrived to the chair of power via ballot boxes, 
not tanks […] Do secular movements want the Arab nations to 
fit their own size and wishes?  
 
                                                          
31
 Background of the two candidates(Morsi versus Shafik) available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2012/06/201261482158653237.html 
[accessed 31/12/2014] 
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He rejected the comparison between the MB and the 
Taliban:  
 
Isn’t it ridiculous to say that elected Islamists are like Taliban 
groups?  
 
The changing critical tone of the presenter is noticeable, as the narrative 
moves between two ideologies: ‘secular’ versus ‘Islamists’, rather than 
specific actors (the MB and the Mubarak regime). The aim, as this 
research argues, was to widen the distance between the ‘in-group’ (MB 
and its supporters) and those standing against it, such as the Mubarak 
regime and other political parties (‘out-group’). 
  
He stressed the fact that the MB president, Mohammed Morsi, had been 
imprisoned on several occasions for his political activities during the 
Mubarak era. Al-Qassam’s language, it is argued here, reflects the actual 
stand adopted by AJA in supporting the MB and framing them, not only as 
the legitimate power, but also as victims of the Mubarak regime and what 
is known as the ‘deep state’ in Egypt.32  
 
Al-Qassem then sheds light on the MB’s political openness by appointing 
a Christian deputy president, and started to ask leading questions: 
 
                                                          
32
 The term ‘deep state’ originated in Turkey – available at: 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130915/egypt-deep-
state-military-sisi [retrieved 13/06/2014] 
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Al-Qassem: who told you that the Islamists are not protecting 
the minorities? Do you know that the president has appointed a 
Copt deputy? 
Nabil Fayad (opposing the MB): I’m not sure what mandate this 
deputy has. 
Al-Qassem: Have you heard the speeches of Islamists and 
others when they say that we are the rulers for the entire nation, 
not only for our followers? (EP20: EX21) 
 
The presenter stood firm, yet again, in challenging his guests who 
opposed the MB’s political stand. He positively painted the MB leadership 
as committed to democracy by appointing a Coptic deputy president and 
an inclusive government for all Egyptians, not only for its supporters. Nabil 
Fayad’s point was vaguely addressed. He was right to challenge Morsi’s 
appointment of a female Copt as his deputy as, it is argued here, it may 
have been a token gesture to show that Morsi’s government was ‘inclusive’ 
of all Egyptians. 
 
Public discontent against the MB’s short-term government, ending in 
President Morsi’s deposition in 2013, was the background for another of 
Al-Qassem’s programmes. He hosted an episode to discuss the reasons 
behind the opposition’s unwillingness to give the MB a chance (EP20). He 
lost his temper and used insulting terms regarding the parties that 
opposed the MB government. He described the Egyptian National 
Salvation Front ( (ذافنلاا ههبج  – which supported the rebel movement Tamarod 
- as ‘The National Destructive Front (بارخلا ههبج). He also used the phrase 
‘shit-democracy’ (ةيطارخميد) when he referred to the so-called ‘democracy’ 
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practiced in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, as a reflection on the 
victimisation of the MB. It is another example of how the presenter voiced 
his own prejudices, while claiming to host an objective and balanced 
programme. Al-Qassam took his time to lecture his guests. He stated that 
what had happened in Egypt was not only a full military coup against the 
MB, but also against the values of democracy and freedom - a 
contradiction in terms: first he denigrates democracy as worthless then 
cites it as the solution to the MB’s problems (EP20: EX29) 
 
The references to democracy were positively presented in favour of the 
MB (available democratic alternative) against Mubarak’s dictatorship. The 
presenter and the Islamists (including the MB guests) frequently promoted 
the values of Islamisation in contrast to secularism.  
 
8.2.3 Islamists are best alternative to seculars 
 
The principle idea of the MB, as an Islamic party, was regularly present in 
the discussion in different electoral moments. It was depicted by the 
guests, endorsed or left unchallenged by Al-Qassem, as the advocate of 
an Islamic project which would not only lead the country to the promised 
Islamic awakening, but also to prosperity. 
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The table below shows the references regularly incorporated in the 
programme to describe the MB (Islamists) and the seculars (including the 
Mubarak regime): 
 
Islamists (the MB) Seculars (Mubarak) 
Revival of the ‘Brothers’ 
 
Destructive  
Natural extension to the spread of 
Ummah (universal community) awareness 
Cause poverty, backwardness, 
ignorance, diseases, corruption 
 
Embrace totalitarian governance,  
 
Encourage unlawful access to public 
and private resources 
 
Islamic awakening based on education, 
culture and realisation 
 
Accuse Islamists of misusing the 
name of Islam, and the terms ‘ballot 
boxes’ and ‘democracy’  
 
Islam is the solution Islam is a religion and is not limited to 
Islamists 
 
The Islamic project gave birth to Hamas, 
Jihad, Hezbollah, and the resistance 
 
Agents for Americans and Israel 
Stand for democracy Support dictatorships (Mubarak 
regime) 
 
Adopt development project to build a 
modern state 
 
Highlight terrorism 
Islamic project aims to build Ummah, the 
economy and societies 
 
Immoral 
Figure 15: The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to two 
different ideologies (Islamic) and (secular) 
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Al-Qassem and some of his guests positively emphasised the MB’s vision 
(ideology) of the ‘Islamic Awakening’ ةيملاسلاا ةوحصلا) ), unlike Ahmad 
Mansour’s Without Borders, in which he and his guests regularly quoted 
the words of the Qur’an and Hadith. Al-Qassem’s discussion in 2005, 
encouraged and guided his guest to elaborate on the vision of the Islamic 
awakening for the Egyptian people, which may have led to the temporary 
‘victory’ of the MB. This was evident in the MB’s verbal narrative since the 
2005 election in which the idea of the Islamic awakening proposed by the 
MB was explained by an Islamist guest as the MB’s comprehensive 
project: 
 
Fateh Al-Rawi (Islamist): The Muslim Brotherhood as a 
movement was a natural extension to spreading its ideology 
and awareness of Ummah, this is the reality of the Islamic 
awakening, based on education, culture and realisation [….] 
The MB is approaching its first century since its establishment 
and it is the oldest movement in the Arab world. Throughout 
history, the movement (MB) had been living under difficult times. 
The MB is not today’s or yesterday’s project, it is an [enduring] 
Islamic, educational, political and economic project. 
Al Qassem: Historic! (EP13: EX2) 
 
Noticeable is the incorporation of different positive adjectives in the above 
sample. They define the MB as a ‘natural extension يعيبط دادتما' ) ) to 
Ummah’s awareness (ةملاا يعو). The noun: (Ummah33) is used in this context 
to replace the nouns ‘people’ or ‘nation’, and refers to the community of 
                                                          
33
 Arabic, literally 'people or community': 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/umma [retrieved 8/05/2015] 
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Muslims bound together by universal ties of religion. The presenter offered 
a platform for his guest to explain the MB’s Islamic project, based on a 
renaissance (awakening): education (ملعلا), culture (ةفاقث), realisation (كاردلا), 
politics (ةسايس), and economics (داصتقا), which positively suggests the 
availability of all elements required for a successful political party that 
could not be ignored, according to the MB (see also EP13: EX9 and EX10 
- EP14: EX5 and EX6).  
 
The slogan ‘Islam is the solution’  لاالحلا وه ملاس) ) was also constantly 
defended. It was explained by an Islamist that it was not a religious slogan 
and did not contradict the principles of the constitution: the concept did not 
encourage violence or sectarianism, but rather, its aim was to encourage 
the sense of nationalism without ‘discrimination’ (EP14: EX8)  
 
The same concept of ‘Islamic awakening’ was repeatedly brought up for 
discussion. It was depicted as developing a project that would build a 
‘modern state’ ةثيدح ةلود) ) and offer a grand strategic vision leading to 
prosperity. This was arguably an illustration of the compatibility of Islam 
with democracy:  
 
Tala’at Rameh: Freedom for Islamists is essential because 
they are adopting the awakening project. They [propose] to 
adopt a development project to build a modern state […] is it 
not unusual to see all Islamists offering strategic programmes 
and plans? […]. Do you know that Morsi has offered a plan for 
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years to come to push this country towards ‘development’. We 
are witnessing a start of development and revival of Ummah, 
aiming to confront the occupation and aggression in Palestine 
and Iraq and elsewhere […] 
Al Qassem: Popular Islamist. 
Tala’at Rameh: This is to build Ummah, build the economy and 
societies […] (EP20: EX24) 
 
The model of the Islamic community (Ummah) was continually stressed by 
the guests supporting the MB view. This research also notes that the use 
of the pronoun ‘we’ aimed to emphasise the grand Islamic ideology of the 
MB and also to de-emphasis the secular vision. It is in this sample that the 
ideological separation between (‘we’: the good) and (‘them’: the bad) is 
apparent.  
 
The presenter evidently leaves his guest’s argument regarding Ummah 
unchallenged, but chooses to emphasise the fact that the MB represented 
a ‘widespread Islamic’ ideology. 
 
8.3 Summary 
 
The ideological square and the framing model were marked in Opposite 
Direction, in accordance with three rhetorical strategies: verbal mode, 
agency and time space. The lexical choice of the Opposite Direction’s 
presenter is particularly noteworthy. It was evident that Al-Qassam made 
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direct and indirect linguistic choices in an attempt to hide his partiality 
towards the opinion of one or the other guest.  
 
The MB and its members, by and large, were painted as the victims 
(empathy framing) in this programme, and a politically competent 
opposition and Islamic movement that deserved a chance to substitute the 
‘long-standing corrupt regime’ (negative framing).  
 
The Egyptian military leaders (Mubarak and Al-Sisi) were portrayed as 
obstacles (distance framing and ‘out-group’) to any attempts to improve 
the lives of Egyptian people. The MB, however, could offer hope and 
prosperity for all citizens by adopting democratic practices and freedom 
values based on Anglo-American principles. The ideology of secularisation 
was denounced in this programme, whereas political Islam ideology 
(proposed by the MB) was positively presented as compatible with 
democratic values and could bring about social equality. 
 
It was noted that the presenter and some of his MB guests had regularly 
moved between the past and the present, and indeed, the future, to 
positively support their arguments regarding victimisation, commitment to 
democracy, and grand Islamic ideology. 
 
The three themes: victimisation versus criminalisation, democratisation 
versus dictatorship, and Islamisation versus secularisation that emerged 
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from the critical inspection of the sample texts have been discussed in this 
chapter. The next chapter will examine the internal ideologies or 
perspectives of some of AJA’s journalists and former journalists in relation 
to the themes that surfaced from reading the literature review and the 
analysis of the two programmes (inductive approach).  
 
Various issues emerged from the analysis, for example, how AJA 
journalists viewed the rise and the fall of Islamists. The assigned roles of 
different actors will be discussed as well as the question regarding the two 
presenters’ ‘subjective’ views incorporated in the two programmes, 
Without Borders and Opposite Direction. Other questions posed to the 
journalists were based on the critical examination of existing literature in 
connection with the on-going debates surrounding the channel’s 
relationship with Qatar (channel’s independence and ownership), the 
journalists’ vision of the channel’s place in the Arab world, and finally, the 
debate concerning its motto of representing ‘an opinion and the opposite 
opinion’.  
 
The next chapter will discuss data collected from AJA and AJE’s 
presenters. The inside accounts of the channel in relations to its 
representation and relation with the MB and other political actors in Egypt 
will be presented. Equally, the relation between the station and host 
country, Qatar will be discussed. The journalistic assessment of the 
channel’s role in the Arab world will be also mentioned.  
255 
 
Chapter Nine 
INSIDE AJA: VALUES, PERCEPTIONS AND EDITORIAL 
JUDGEMENTS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The Ideological Square and Framing Model of two main AJA TV 
programmes, Without Borders and Opposite Direction, were examined in 
previous chapters. The Rhetorical Strategies: verbal mode, agency, and 
time space were also adopted in the scrutiny. Three dominant themes 
were identified in the selected texts (using the inductive approach) of the 
two programmes: victimisation versus criminalisation, democratisation 
versus dictatorship, and Islamisation versus secularisation. The separation 
between ‘us’ (the victims, democracy and Islamists) and ‘them’ (the villains, 
the dictators, and the seculars) was repeatedly underlined in both 
programmes. This separation was emphasised by lexical selection (verbs 
and adjectives) to describe a particular action by highlighting the positive 
angle of the MB (‘good’) and the negative side of the Mubarak regime and 
the military (‘bad’).  
 
The assigned roles of different actors (agency) incorporated in the two 
programmes (the Egyptian people, opposition powers, women, Copts, 
media, and so on) was examined. The Egyptian people, for example, were 
sometimes represented neutrally or positively (‘in-group’), as in the case of 
the 2005 and 2010 elections in Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders.  
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The reference to different periods (time space) was also evident, as the 
presenters and their guests, mostly from the MB, frequently evoked 
historical occasions to illustrate their suffering, allegiance with the people, 
and commitment to democracy. The intention was to emphasise the 
positive side of the MB (‘us’) and de-emphasis the negative elements by 
blaming others (‘them’).  
 
This chapter will present the inside accounts of some AJA journalists. A 
sample of interviews (10 in total) with AJA TV presenters will be the focus 
of this chapter. Some were working with the channel at the time of this 
research, and others had resigned over the channel’s alleged bias towards 
the MB. The journalistic insights on how the channel generally covered the 
Arab uprising will be discussed, with the main focus on the Egyptian 
political scene, before and after the fall of Morsi. 
 
The questions posed to the AJA journalists intended to discover what 
themes would emerge. A review of the existing literature (prior approach) 
will be made, followed by the scrutiny of the actual data from the two 
programmes. 
 
The objective is to generally understand the insider viewpoints in relation 
to the channel’s coverage of the Egyptian scene. The opinions held by the 
journalists regarding AJA’s editorial performance during critical political 
periods in the Arab world, are considered important for this research.  
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9.2 Qatar and AJA: Mutual Beneficial Ties  
 
The debate around the channel’s ownership and independence has 
always been at the heart of any study on AJA. The Arab uprising attracted 
many questions concerning the extent of influence Qatar, AJA’s host 
country, had over the channel’s editorial line, in its news coverage during 
that period. The literature review revealed that this important topic had 
been discussed in the media through opinion pieces, but there was little or 
no academic analysis of the issue. An analysis will be presented in this 
chapter. 
 
Qatar’s motivation regarding the establishment of AJA was primarily 
recognition, according to Abigail Hauslohner (2013) of The Washington 
Post. She notes that Hamad34, Qatar’s former emir, wanted to place his 
country on the map when he came to the throne in 1995, and by that, ‘he 
did well’. Hamad challenged other autocracies in the Arab world in 1996, 
by launching the AJA and introducing a new form of critical reporting to the 
region. The channel’s success, according to Barrett and Shuang, lies in its 
enjoyment of a margin of ‘editorial freedom’, unprecedented in the Arab 
world (2008).  
 
                                                          
34
 The Emir’s deposition of his father in a bloodless coup in 1995: available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-
1588698.html [retrieved 7/10/ 2014] 
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Hauslohner (2013) asserts that in the wake of the Arab Spring, Qatar was 
severely criticised for its coverage of the revolts that ensued. It was 
claimed that it had helped the Islamist governments, both in Egypt and 
elsewhere, to ‘have a voice’, and subsequently put not only this tiny 
peninsula in question, but also AJA’s own position. Hauslohner says:  
 
A military coup toppled Qatar’s allies in Egypt, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the new military rulers have found funding 
and allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — 
Qatar’s regional competitors. (Washington Post)  
  
Qatar’s ties with Islamists, according to Hauslohner, was evident in that 
Qatar hosts the Islamic Palestinian militant group, Hamas; the Sudanese 
President, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir; Darfuri, Libyan and Syrian rebels; 
Iranian diplomats, Egypt’s MB, and the Taliban.  
  
President Mohamed Morsi's unseating in July 2013 instigated many MB 
members and supporters in Egypt to flee to Qatar: a country considered to 
be a safe haven amid an on-going crackdown against Islamists in Egypt 
(El-Gundy, 2014). This considerable welcome to Islamists not only raised 
debates regarding the nature of the channel’s association with them, but 
the influence it had on AJA’s editorial practices in covering the Arab 
countries’ affairs. Morsi’s unexpected fall left the tiny Gulf state with a 
serious dilemma: the young Qatari Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani 35, 
                                                          
35
 Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s profile available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23046307 [retrieved 7/10/ 2014] 
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had only taken charge of the country a month before (Law, 2013). His 
father’s introduction to certain autonomy in ‘editorial freedom’ was 
challenged. Condemnation began to emerge of AJA’s apparent lack of 
independent reporting, both during and after the Arab Spring (Kühn, 
Reuter and Schmitz, 2013).  
 
The majority of AJA journalists interviewed told this researcher that there 
was general ‘harmony’ with Qatar but it did not exist in all aspects of its 
coverage. Mohamed Krishan, a principle TV presenter in AJA TV, believed 
that it is unusual to see disagreement between any news channel and its 
owner: in this case, AJA and Qatar. He explained however, that after the 
increasing role that Qatar played in the Arab Spring countries, it became 
difficult to persuade Arab audiences that Qatar neither had any influence 
or control over AJA’s editorial practices, nor over its journalists’ coverage 
of events in countries that had strong links with Qatar: 
 
As a general and golden rule, it is very difficult to see any TV 
channel or media project distant from its sole financier. Now, 
since the inception of AJA in 1996, Qatar did not have the shine 
and weight as much as now, therefore it becomes very difficult 
to convince some viewers that the Qatari policy has nothing to 
do with AJA editorial practices […] It’s hard to see a separation 
line between Channel24 and France, between Russia Today 
and Russia, Al-Hurra and USA, and so on […]. The active role 
of Qatar is not in all issues and countries, it might be noticeable 
in the Arab affairs, following the Arab Spring, but not in other 
countries such as Morocco, Brazil, Australia and others. You 
may find consistency and intersection between AJA editorial 
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values and Qatar policies in some issues or files, while not in 
others. (Mohammed Krishan, telephone interview 13/1/2014,) 
 
AJA had been criticised for its ‘uneven’ coverage of the Arab Spring 
countries (Baker, 2011). It was accused of ‘turning a blind eye’ in its 
reportage of the Bahraini uprising (Hesham, 2012). Aryan Baker (2011) 
argues that the channel’s justification was that the Bahraini government 
had blocked most coverage by simply preventing entry to journalists. This 
was an unacceptable excuse, especially coming from a media channel like 
AJA, which usually took such obstacles as a challenge, not a reason for 
retreat (Baker: 2011). 
 
A presenter (name withheld by request), currently working at AJA TV (at 
the time of this research), admitted in a telephone interview that AJA, as a 
Gulf-based channel funded from Qatar, is part of ‘Gulf money’ and the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC). The station works under a ‘freedom of 
speech’ which is granted by the Emir of Qatar, not acquired or earned by 
people. The coverage of AJA on the Bahraini uprising was less than any 
other country simply because Qatar was not keen to bring ‘chaos’ to the 
Gulf area, of which it is a part. The presenter further explained: 
 
A granted freedom might be withdrawn by the ruler at any time 
because it is not protected by any laws or constitutions. We, as 
AJA reporters, appreciate such a given freedom, but we 
understand fully that it not acquired and not protected, therefore 
might stop easily. (Telephone interview: January 2014) 
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Khadija Ben Ganna, a well-known TV news presenter, commented on the 
question of whether AJA’s coverage was aligned with Qatar’s foreign 
policy (which supports the MB in Egypt). She argued that there might well 
be alignment between Qatar and the channel’s editorial policy regarding 
the Egyptian uprising and its aftermath: ‘nothing is wrong with that’, she 
said. The MB, according to Ben Ganna: 
 
[…] was legitimately elected through ballot boxes, and therefore 
it is [AJA]’s right to cover [the MB] stories as newsworthy […] 
and it is not possible for any news organisation to ignore a 
movement [that] justly won the elections, simply because they 
are Islamists or the MB.  
 
Noticeable is the positive representation of the MB painted by Ben Ganna. 
She appears to believe in the concept of democracy and the MB’s 
legitimacy. It was ‘justly’ earned through ballot boxes, she points out, and 
in spite of what or who they are. 
 
Mahmoud Mourad, a news presenter in AJA TV said in a telephone 
interview that, since starting to work with the station in 2010, he was never 
‘told what to say’ nor ‘what not to say’ about covering a particular issue. 
Management always reminded its staff that ‘professionalism’ in covering 
the news was the main drive behind the channel’s strength and success. 
Mourad also explained that countries do not open satellite channels for 
‘charitable reasons’: 
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The BBC, as an example, in one way or another, works in 
alignment with British foreign policies. The ideal way to achieve 
a state’s foreign policy is through sponsoring a channel, like the 
AJ [Al-Jazeera] case, in order to attract the biggest number of 
followers. My personal impression is that I do not see any 
contradiction between the editorial line of AJ and Qatar foreign 
policy. (Mahmoud Mourad, telephone interview, 2014) 
 
The former AJA network’s Director-General, Waddah Khanfar (who 
resigned after eight years in the post36), denied any allegations that Qatar 
influenced the channel’s editorial decisions. He acknowledged that the 
very nature of the relationship between both Qatar and AJA was ‘mutually 
beneficial’ (ةلدابتم ةعفنم). The channel had benefited from Qatar’s financial 
support, and, in return, AJA offered Qatar an important position in the Arab 
world: 
 
I can confidently say that if AJA is a PR tool for Qatar, it would 
not have reached such significant popularity in the Arab world, 
and would have been categorised as any other Arab channels, 
controlled by regimes. […] however, the condition of such 
mutual benefit was a secured editorial independence, in order 
to achieve a remarkable presence, because, if this [were] not 
the case, AJ would have been a failed investment. (Waddah 
Khanfar, 2014, phone interview) 
 
Khanfar emphasised that the matter of the channel’s independence had 
been one of his top priorities when he was in charge. His aim was to 
                                                          
36
 Read more about the resignation of Waddah Khanfar at BBC News website (2011): Al-
Jazeera boss steps down: strains with Qatar royals? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-15129440 [retrieved 9/10/2014] 
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ensure the channel’s success through ‘diversity’ (عونتلا). He noted that the 
channel’s editorial line sometimes met with Qatari foreign policy and at 
other times it did not: 
 
I have tried to avoid the channel being a mouth-piece of Qatar 
or any other country, political party, or group. Diversity at AJ is 
the key to reporting news, in employing reporters from different 
ethnic groups, etc. Such diversity was evident inside AJ and it 
was the secret of the channel’s success […]. The channel’s 
policy sometimes contradicts with [sic] Qatar foreign policy. For 
example, Qatar’s relationship with the US was and is still very 
robust, as Qatar … [hosted]… a US military base during the war 
on Iraq. During that time, AJ relations with the U.S. …[were]… 
at …[their]… worst. Also, while AJ … [journalists were]… 
unable to travel to Syria and Libya to cover their news, the 
relations between Qatar and the two regimes – Libyan and 
Syrian – [were] very strong […]. The channel has offices almost 
everywhere in the Arab world, and sometimes our offices get 
shut down due to a particular news line or a story that often 
angered the host countries […] which put political pressure on 
our operational field offices and on Qatar […] However, we 
sometimes tried, directly or indirectly, to tone down our critical 
reporting on conflicting topics to avoid angering movements, in 
order to keep our offices open [in certain countries]. (Khanfar, 
2014). 
 
Karem Mahmoud, a former AJ Egypt Live (Mubasher) presenter, resigned, 
together with 22 other journalists, over the channel’s alleged relationship 
with the MB37. He told this researcher that Arab regimes largely dictate the 
editorial practices of satellite channels, therefore: ‘no one should think that 
                                                          
37
 Some 22 Al-Jazeera employees quit since the overthrow of Mohammad Morsi in July 
2013, details available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/07/09/ Al-Jazeera-
employees-in-Egypt-quit-over-editorial-line-.html [retrieved 8/10/2014] 
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there is any separation between Qatar’s policies and AJA (telephone 
interview 2014). 
 
Some AJA journalists agreed that, although the channel had covered the 
Bahraini uprising, it was not on the same level of its coverage of other 
Arab Spring countries. Mohammed Krishan (2014) challenged this 
assertion. He said that he did understand those people who thought that 
the channel had not adequately reported on the Bahraini uprising, but 
defended AJA’s decision:  
  
Some say that AJA did not cover what happened in Bahrain at 
all, and I say that was a lie. We sent a correspondent to Bahrain 
and covered the opposition and the government alike, but it was 
not as in-depth as in other countries such as Tunisia, Libya and 
Syria. Without an underestimation of casualty numbers, the 
Bahraini uprising had a death toll of almost 50 people: this 
number of casualties equals the number of victims killed by 
Bashar al-Assad [Syrian President] in an afternoon. The level of 
destruction and suppression is incomparable to what was 
happening in Syria, Tunisia, Yemen or Egypt. We in AJA might 
have not done enough in covering the Bahraini situation 
because it was not as big [news] as in other countries. (Krishan, 
2014) 
 
Ben Ganna also agreed with Krishan that the unrest in Bahrain was not as 
‘big news’ as the uprisings in Yemen, Syria or Egypt. She noted that the 
demands made by the Bahraini protesters were arguably less dramatic in 
comparison to other countries. She did admit, however, that AJA had 
fallen short in its coverage of Bahrain and it should have been given more 
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airtime by AJA’s editorial team. Khanfar explained why this did not 
happen: 
 
We were the first to send a crew of reporters to Bahrain to 
cover what… [was]… going on, but our team was evicted. Then, 
we sent a secret coverage which angered the Bahraini 
government, and some of our reporters were arrested. It is not 
fair to cover all countries evenly, because Arab countries have 
different strategic weights and importance. For example, the 
strategic weight for the Egyptian revolution is heavier than 
Bahraini’s or any other country […]. We are in the media 
services - we look at newsworthiness and its future implications 
and the given time for coverage of this or that story. I do not 
accept the allegations that AJA did not cover Bahrain because 
the majority of protesters are Shi’a or because Qatar is in the 
GCC, this is not accurate. The truth is that AJA tried to cover 
the Bahraini unrest with all possible means, given the busy time 
of all other mass uprisings which were happening around us at 
the same time. (Waddah Khanfar, 2014) 
 
Taoufik Ben Ammar’s Ph.D. thesis discussed media ownership. He quoted 
Van Dijk (1998: 20), who observed three different ways in which powerful 
groups can effectively control the media: media owners, journalists with 
shared ideologies, and lobbying: 
  
The first is media ownership which gives elite groups the power 
to tell the editors what (or what not) to publish or write about. 
The elite will always claim this is not the case, however, 
research shows the contrary (Curran, 2002). The second 
control method involves the dominant group hiring journalists 
that share its ideology, so that mind control is not needed. The 
third form involves the elite dominating the public discourse by 
saturating it with topics that are of interest to the government or 
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to other dominant groups such as lobby factions (Ben-Ammar: 
2009: p. 44). 
 
Based on Van Dijk’s above assertion, it can be argued that Qatar has the 
power to influence AJA’s editorial practices. This was marked in the 
example of the Bahraini uprising. AJA not only turned a ‘blind eye’ on the 
events occurring there, but also on its intimate coverage of the Islamists. 
The second model (shared philosophy) is that the dominant group hires 
journalists that have the same ideology: in this case, this research opens 
the debate that more or less most of AJA journalists share the same 
values and beliefs. It is true that although the channel hires journalists 
from diverse nationalities and backgrounds (as explained by Khanfar 
2013), most of them still share the same ideological viewpoint. It can be 
argued that, in line with Qatar, the majority of AJA journalists support 
democracy for example, and therefore the MB’s right to political 
participation against the ‘military coup’ in Egypt is justified as is the 
opposition against Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.  
  
9.3 Arab Uprisings: AJA and the Egyptian Uprising  
 
The channel’s role in covering the Arab uprising has been widely 
contested. Some believe that the channel’s advent in the Arab world 
brought forth a ‘media earthquake’ that opened up restrictions on freedom 
of expression and democratic participation. It made people aware of the 
opportunity to revolt against long-standing dictatorships (Ismail, 2011). 
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The channel, according to some observers, helped the Arab Spring to 
blossom (Fisk, 2011), and according to Gornall (2011), AJA helped the 
Arab Spring to bloom. Others however, viewed the channel’s coverage as 
‘provocative’ and that it had brought ‘chaos’ to a fragile region. The 
channel’s credibility collapsed as a consequence of its decision to support 
one side instead of remaining impartial (Hussain, 2013).  
 
Mohammed Krishan (2014) noted that two ‘exaggerated’ views existed in 
the public perception regarding the role of AJA’s coverage of the Arab 
uprising. The first praised the channel for having ‘a big role’ in it by 
steering, or even leading, the masses towards change. The second, a 
tarnished view that AJA’s role in the Arab uprisings was confrontational 
and destructive. He noted that the channel had played neither role: 
 
We, in AJA, have done our professional duties in covering the 
mass uprisings in several Arab countries. The very reality of the 
news we covered, as it comes from the field, is provocative by 
nature. For those who look for political change think that AJA 
has offered them a big honourable favour. However, for those 
who are followers of the regimes and oppose the public 
uprisings, think of AJA as provocative and destructive. In my 
view, the channel has played neither …[a]… provocative nor 
…[a]… preaching role, we have just covered the news as it is, 
but we might have made some mistakes here or there. It is 
impossible to change a system in any country as a result of 
television coverage, this is nonsense. Political systems in 
countries usually change due to social, economic and political 
accumulations, not media coverage (Krishan, 2014).  
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AJA has always been ‘pro-human beings’ ناسنلاا عم) ) according to Khadija 
Ben Ganna (2014), therefore it supports ‘the people’ and provides a ‘voice 
to those who have no voice هل توص لا نم توص' ) ). She clarifies that ‘Arab 
revolutions’ belong to the people and, as a journalist working in AJA, she 
would not have agreed to the channel ‘stand[ing] aside, or on the side of 
regimes, not the people’. She further explains: 
 
The channel has stood by the people. It stood by the Egyptian 
people against the Mubarak regime and by the Tunisian people 
against Ben ‘Ali, former president of Tunisia. What has 
happened is that the people have split and people are no longer 
one voice, which makes it very hard for AJA to choose which … 
[side]… it should stand by. On the Egyptian example, should 
AJA stand by Morsi supporters against Al-Sisi supporters? With 
military rule [Al-Sisi] against democratic rule [the MB] which has 
been chosen by the people in ballot boxes and legitimate[ly] 
elected …[a]…President [Morsi]? In the end, AJA was faithful to 
its own message and stood by the sound of right. The sound of 
right, in the Egyptian case, says that the legitimate President 
[Morsi] and the legitimate regime [the MB] came through the 
ballot box and that is why AJA stood by them in its coverage. 
(Khadija Ben Ganna, 2014) 
 
This research argues that the ideological square and framing models can 
be seen in the above testimony by Ben Ganna. The separation line 
between the two groups – ‘good side’ against ‘bad side’ - was emphasised 
in Ben Ganna’s narrative. AJA chose to stand on the ‘good’ and human 
side (the MB) against the ‘bad’ (Mubarak regime). Noticeable is the 
assigned role of different actors. The MB was positively presented as 
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‘legitimate’ (يعرش), ‘democratic’ (يطارقميد), ‘chosen by the people’ (  نم مهرايخا مت 
عشلا لبقب ), and so on. It can be asserted that the Egyptian people and the 
MB were together depicted as the ‘in-group’, whereas the Mubarak regime, 
the military, and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as the ‘out-group’.  
 
Egypt's military-led authorities shut down several stations, including AJA 
AJE, and AJ’s Egypt Live offices, in the wake of Morsi’s downfall in 2013. 
They detained several of its national and international reporters, accusing 
them of collaborating with the MB, a movement which, in December that 
year, had been declared a ‘terrorist’ group. The military-backed, interim 
Egyptian government blamed it for an earlier attack on police 
headquarters (BBC News, 2013)38.  
 
The political scene in Egypt became a complex one during this period. 
People were divided between those supporting the military intervention 
against the MB (calling it ‘continuing the revolution’s path’ (  راسلم لامكتسالاةروث ), 
and those who were against the military intervention and supported the 
MB (calling the takeover ‘a Military Coup’ ( يركسع بلاقنا).  
 
The majority of Western media saw what had happened as a ‘coup’ 
against a democratically-elected president, whereas some Egyptians 
standing against the MB saw it as a ‘revolution’ and a continuation of the 
                                                          
38
 BBC News, 2013: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood declared 'terrorist group', available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25515932 [retrieved 8/10/2014] 
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rebellion that took place at the beginning of the year. Mubarak stepped 
down in January 2011 and handed over power to the Egyptian Military 
Council (Nawara, 2013). Debates around the labelling of Morsi’s ousting in 
July 2013 were largely academic, according to The Washington Post’s 
Max Fisher (2013). He says what had occurred could be defined as a coup, 
as well as a revolution:  
 
Even though both words might apply, neither is in itself enough 
to describe what happened: It was both a coup and a popular 
movement, both the expression and subversion of Egypt's 
democratic experiment. 
 
This research argues that the channel had fallen into the ‘eye of the storm’. 
AJA had labelled Morsi’s removal from office as a ‘military coup’ from the 
outset. This, therefore, underpinned the general perception among most 
Egyptians that AJA positioned itself in favour of the MB rather than its 
opponents (Farhi, 2013).  
 
Mohammed Krishan (2013) was adamant that what had happened in 
Egypt in July 2013 was a ‘complete military coup’ (  لاقناناكرلاا لماك يركسع ب ) 
against a ‘democratically-elected president and an elected parliament’ ( سيئر
بختنم نالمربو بختنم). People, according to Krishan, should not be ‘selective in a 
democratic process’: they should accept whatever results arise from their 
votes. He further proclaimed that, except for a few Arab countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, the majority of the international community 
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described it as a military coup against a democratically-elected head-of-
state:  
 
From a professional and objective point of view, I agree that 
what happened is, without doubt, a coup. It is true that the 
military coup was backed by the masses, but there were lots of 
victims killed [referring to the MB members] as a result of this 
coup. (Krishan: 2014). 
 
Waddah Khanfar (2013) also said that it was normal media practice to 
sympathise with ‘victims of injustice and oppression’ (رهقلاو ملظلا اياحض). Being 
impartial, according to Khanfar, does not mean standing in the middle 
between ‘obvious rights’ (نئابلا قحلا) and ‘oppression’ (ملظلا). The media 
should be honest, accurate and courageous in describing events. The 
indication here is that the Egyptian incident was rightly named a ‘coup’ by 
AJA, according to Khanfar. He further explained that it was no secret that 
the first line in AJ’s code of conduct supported Arab people’s rights:  
 
The channel defends the right of Arabs…[to]… knowledge, 
rights …[to]… freedom and democracy, and …[the right 
to]…freedom in choosing his [sic] governments. 
 
Mahmoud Mourad, AJA TV presenter, agreed with his colleagues. He said 
that what had happened in Egypt in July 2013 was an action taken by the 
military to depose an elected president. He stated: ‘as the US Secretary of 
State, John Kerry, once said:  
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If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Hence, 
if the military factor has a decisive rule in ousting an elected 
civil regime, then this is a military coup. (Mourad: 2014). 
 
Zain El-Abideen Tawfik, a former BBC journalist, (working with AJ’s Egypt 
Live (Mubasher) at the time of the interview), said that most international 
media services, including the BBC and The Guardian newspaper, 
described what had occurred was a military coup, according to political 
science definitions and the channel was right to describe it as such 
(telephone interview, 2013). 
 
The above accounts symbolise the MB’s victimisation and the military’s 
criminalisation. The use of the loaded noun ‘coup’ to label the action taken, 
as this research argues, can be principally interpreted as ‘distance framing’ 
of the ‘doer’ of the action (subject: the military) and ‘empathy framing’ 
towards those who were subjected (object) to the action of oppression (the 
MB).  
 
Paul Farhi (2013) notes in his article: ‘Al-Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt 
over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood’, that ever since the military’s 
ousting of Mohammed Morsi in July, AJA, the pioneering Arab-language 
news broadcasting service, had not shrunk from calling his removal a 
‘coup’. AJA’s use of this contentious word, as well as its relentless and 
sympathetic coverage of Morsi and the MB movement, had turned the 
channel into a virtual enemy of the Egyptian state. Farhi quoted Hugh 
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Miles who substantiated this concept: ‘AJA has given a lot of support to 
the MB’. 
 
9.4 AJA and the MB in Egypt 
 
Examples of Mansour’s and Al-Qassem’s TV programmes were discussed 
with AJA presenter, Mohammed Krishan. He was asked about the criticism 
of the channel’s support of Islamic groups, namely the MB in Egypt. He 
argues that people needed to admit the fact that even before the outbreak 
of the Arab Spring, Islamists were the majority and the most powerful 
opposition in the Arab world. AJA’s coverage of the story of the MB 
movements in Tunisia or Egypt was newsworthy, according to Krishan. 
The channel may have appeared to be leaning towards the movement, he 
said, but accepted the fact that the channel had made a few errors of 
judgement: 
 
If the main oppositions in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Tunisia or Libya, were from Marxists and Lenin-based 
ideology, we might be accused of being [a] Marxist channel […] 
Having said that, the channel, in my view, has made some 
mistakes which may be apparent in the performance of some of 
its presenters in which they may have given the impression that 
they sympathised with one political Islamic movement or 
another. It might be shown by the nature of the questions posed 
to some guests, and the way they debated the answers. I 
consider this a mistake, and we, in AJA, have discussed this 
issue, and the editor-in-chief always reminded us [presenters] 
to pay more attention to this, saying that we need to stand 
equally …[regarding]… all parties, and should not show 
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empathy towards one side in favour of another. I need to 
confirm that this is not always the case, but such mistakes have 
given people… [this]… impression.  
 
Krishan’s acknowledgement of the mistakes made by some of the 
presenters (referring to Mansour and Al-Qassem) illustrate the empathy 
and support the two presenters gave to the MB (see Chapters Seven and 
Eight). This was shown in the nature of the questions they asked and the 
debates they had over the answers.  
 
Ahmad Mansour was directly accused by a presenter and one of his 
colleagues (requested not to be named), that the language he used in his 
weekly programme, Without Borders, was evidently sympathetic to, and 
supportive of the MB: 
 
Some journalists show their political views regarding a 
movement that had lost [political] control, based on the 
presenter’s level of professionalism […] Let’s be more honest, 
such political views are clearly shown in some of AJA’s talk-
show programmes, such as [that of] our colleague, Ahmad 
Mansour. However, in the main, News Hour  )مويلا داصح( , Today’s 
News (lit: Today’s Harvest) or other news programmes, such 
views do not exist. 
 
Other TV presenters such as Khadija Ben Ganna (2013) concurred with 
Mohammed Krishan, saying that in almost every Arab Spring country, it 
was always the MB or the Islamists that were the most prominent element 
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in the electoral scene: ‘How is it possible for any media to ignore the 
existence of this segment, just because it is the MB?’. 
 
Waddah Khanfar (2013) commented that, unlike many other local 
Egyptian and ‘unethical’ channels, AJA brought different voices to its 
screen: 
 
I see a real balance in AJA TV, sometimes this balance angers 
people supporting the coup. How do we judge if the channel is 
sympathetic or not? If the standard is according to the official 
[government] media services, then AJA might be seen as 
sympathetic towards the MB, which is not true. (telephone 
interview, 2014) 
 
Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (2014), (banned from entering Egypt, due to his 
work with AJA Egypt Live), offered a different point of view. He explained 
that the main problem in Egypt was that many people did not want to hear 
an ‘opposing voice’: ‘Islamists are not willing to hear the voice of liberals or 
secularists, and they in turn, are not willing to hear the voice of the 
Islamists’. He did clarify, however, that Islamists in Egypt were still the 
most organised and powerful political party:  
 
Capable of “harvesting” more electoral seats and should not be 
thought of as a minority. What is requested from AJA by the 
opposing voices […] to cover their news in the same ‘unjust’ 
way as the local media do, if not, the channel would be accused 
of being sympathetic towards them, which is not true. Rather, 
the channel covers their stories as evenly as others. […] at the 
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moment, in Egypt, there’s no other voice but the voice that 
supports General Al-Sisi.  
 
Ahmad Mansour39, a prominent programme presenter in AJA, including 
the Without Borders programme (see Chapter Seven), told this researcher 
in an email interview on 26 January, 2014, that media impartiality is a ‘lie’ 
and a journalist should be favouring the ‘weak’ ( يعضلاف ), ‘oppressed’ (مولظلما), 
and the ‘rights of people’ (سانلا قوقح): ‘that’s what I learnt from international 
trainers, including British and American [ones], who taught me media and 
journalism. Journalists are witnesses for good, not for lies’, he said.  
 
Noran Salam40, a former TV presenter, who resigned from AJA in October 
2013 over its editorial practices towards Egypt (Almogaz, 2013), told this 
researcher in an email interview, that the channel’s bias should not 
‘surprise’ anyone: only a limited number of Arab media outlets enjoy 
‘impartiality’. She further noted that the Egyptian people turned against 
AJA because the channel described their ‘revolution’ in 30 June as a 
‘coup’. 
 
Mohamed Krishan explained AJA’s language and why the channel may 
have appeared to sympathise with the MB or Islamists: 
                                                          
39
 Ahmad Mansour declined a telephone interview and requested that questions should to 
be sent to his email address only. Mansour ignored answering most of the questions 
related to his programme. 
40
 Noran Salam requested the questions to be sent to her via email only. The email 
interview date: (18.1.2014) 
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AJA’s vision is that it provides a voice to the voiceless, and 
sees itself as a representative of all political and socially 
marginalised groups. When the channel covered the mass 
uprising in Tunisia, no one said that AJA was sympathis[ing] 
with any side; likewise, when the mass revolution took place in 
Egypt against the Mubarak regime, no one […] accused us of 
being supportive of the MB, as we were representing all sides. 
When the election took place in Egypt and the MB won, the 
channel was committed to stand by their side, and give them 
the platform to explain their political vision and agenda, as a 
new legitimacy in the country. Perhaps, from this point, 
confusion happened that the channel was more empathetic to 
the MB than other [parties]. The channel will always stand on 
the side of the oppressed - in the case of Egypt, the oppressed 
in a catastrophic way are the Islamists. They were declared 
terrorists and some wish that, in a blink of an eye, the MB would 
no longer exist. However, if we look at real politics, the MB is an 
existing social and political power that should not be ignored. 
(Mohammed Krishan, 2014) 
 
Zain El-Abideen Tawfik argues that if AJA were sympathetic towards the 
MB by giving them a platform on which to speak out, so was the BBC: MB 
representatives often appeared on its TV screens. He acknowledges that 
the MB held a significant place as a rising political power in the region, but 
he keeps the logic of democratic values based on electoral practices:  
 
Islamic movements are the biggest and most widespread in the 
Arab world …[and are]… aligned with our traditions and culture. 
Is it an alternative to authoritarian regimes? I do not know, only 
ballot boxes tell us who would be the alternative. The 
alternative, in my view, is democratic rule, whether Islamic or 
secular, in which people practice their freedom and it 
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[democratic rule] does not distinguish between them for any 
reason. (Telephone interview, 2014). 
 
The notion of the MB’s victimisation was yet again evident and justification 
given for the empathy shown. Representation of the movement was driven 
by journalistic values, according to Ben Ganna, Krishan and others: 
standing on the side of the oppressed (MB) against dictatorships (Mubarak 
regime and the military). It can be argued from the above account, that the 
channel had become an active participant (agent) for the ‘good’ side (the 
MB) against the ‘bad’ side (Mubarak regime and the military). It was clear 
that AJA categorised itself as the ‘in-group’ alongside the democratic and 
Islamic victims, and conversely, the oppressors, dictators, and secularists 
in the ‘out-group’.  
 
9.5 AJA and Polarised Arabic Audiences  
 
The exact number of AJA’s viewership41 in the wake of the Arab uprising is 
widely questioned. The channel faced criticism for biased reporting and 
backing Islamists (Middle East Online: 2013). AJA began to lose much of 
its support regarding the alleged link to the MB, and underestimating the 
mass movement which took place in July 2013 (Yousef, 2013). 
 
                                                          
41
 Channel’s viewership figures available at: http://www.allied-
media.com/aljazeera/al_jazeera_viewers_demographics.html [retrieved 9/10/2014] 
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Were any AJA audiences lost, during its coverage of the Arab Spring 
countries, particularly in Egypt? AJA presenters were asked this question, 
and responded that Arab people were no longer in one political camp: 
people became polarised with strong and different political opinions which 
affected the viewership of all Arab channels: 
 
With all the complexities that accompanied the Arab Spring, 
audiences have stood in blocks. What does this mean? It 
means that there are blocks of Islamists and other blocks of 
those opposing them […]. audiences started to favour channels 
that shared their own political views. In other words, some 
audiences did not seek the truth of what happened, but rather 
sought a news channel which was closer to their own political 
views. The political division was followed by media division as 
well […] although AJA may be seen as close to one political 
party [referring to the MB], the channel was keen to provide a 
platform for two opposing voices, whereas if you look at Sky 
News Arabia or Al-Arabia TV, you would hardly hear an Islamic 
voice. (Mohammed Krishan, 2014, phone interview) 
 
Ben Ganna (2014) said that people’s political mood in Egypt had changed. 
Those who were against Mubarak and his regime, for example, were now 
either supporting the MB (an Islamist and so-called ‘terrorist’ group) or 
General Al-Sisi (a ‘remnant’ of Mubarak’s regime): 
 
I do not have any accurate statistics, but even if we assumed 
that AJA has lost some of its audiences in Egypt and elsewhere, 
I think the channel has morally won because it would have lost 
if it had aligned itself with the other side [the military coup]. The 
channel stood committed to its editorial line, therefore it has 
won [the argument], even if the station has lost some of its 
audiences. (Telephone interview, Ben Ganna, January, 2014,) 
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Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (2014) was enthusiastic that the channel had won 
a wider audience, contrary to what others were saying: 
 
History tells us that with all the harassments, assaults, lies and 
local media blackouts, citizens tend to tune in to AJA, to learn 
more about what is happening around them, the Arab region, 
and around the world - not provided by local media. The 
channel offers audiences with diverse views, and that’s why 
they come to us. Broadly speaking, all other channels have lost 
…[viewers]… due to the existing sharp polarisation in the Arab 
world, but AJA won by maintaining the principle of hosting all 
different views.  
 
Krishan also noted that for more than 17 years, AJA had played a 
substantial role in educating and informing Arab people. This consequently 
led to their political awareness. The rule of media, according to Krishan, is 
to inform and cover events as they happen, regardless of whether or not 
viewers or listeners like it. He explained that, if AJA managed to accurately 
cover all conflicting views, then the audience would be the judge and able 
to choose what is right and what is wrong, not AJA.  
 
Karem Mahmoud (phone interview, 2014), however, said that since its 
inception, AJA had represented the voice of all people, but now ‘the 
Egyptian people have no doubts that AJA adopts the MB’s position and 
disregards the other side’.  
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Mohammed Krishan commented on the vivid language expressed on 
social media platforms by some of AJA presenters such as Ahmad 
Mansour and Faisal Al-Qaseem. He said that the channel had discussed 
this matter and was ‘between two ideas’ concerning the political situation 
in Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. The first was to take a ‘military’ 
and ‘firm’ decision, in which no AJA journalist should have a Facebook or 
Twitter account, nor be given the space to write an article or ‘open his [or 
her] mouth’ regarding any political views or claims of impartiality or bias. 
The second was the right that AJA reporters had to express their own 
views, as no one was entitled to ‘confiscate’ someone else’s rights to 
having a personal opinion. He said: 
 
AJA has chosen the second option, the least restrictive. In my 
view, the worst [thing] is that the channel is adopting the values 
of freedom and democracy, and an opinion and an opposite 
one, while banning its own reporters from having a Facebook 
account, or to write an article. The dilemma has been solved by 
allowing journalists to express their own views but without 
exaggeration, verbal abuse or provocations. At the end of the 
day, judging any journalist should be based on his [or her] 
performance on the screen [on air]. Their own political views off 
the screen [off air] are a human right and should be preserved 
(Krishan, 2014)  
  
Khadija Ben Ganna said that, in general, social media use among Arab 
journalists was a ‘deep wound’ and ‘chaotic’. People usually judged this or 
that reporter based on his or her Facebook or Twitter accounts. She did 
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admit however, that sometimes journalists made mistakes. Ben Ganna 
explained: 
 
There are lots of fabricated, unverified social media pages in 
my name: one has more than three million followers and does 
not belong to me. However, I personally admit as a journalist, it 
is difficult to control my feelings, as we are human beings, not 
machines. Often, there is a state of emotional boiling inside 
journalists because of existing injustices which force journalists 
to say something, consciously or unconsciously. I understand 
that sometimes it is professionally wrong to write something 
with a particular view but it is hard to control myself when 
looking at the existing chaos and oppression (Ben Ganna, 
2014).  
 
What is the limit for journalists to express their personal views, while 
working for a media outlet? This question is still being discussed globally 
by large international media organisations. It has not yet been answered, 
according to Waddah Khanfar. He said that AJA had provided guidelines 
for journalists to use in social media: for example, a commitment to avoid 
using inappropriate, bigoted, or insulting language:  
 
Anyone using offensive language or verbal abuse is in violation 
of AJA’s social media guidelines and should be accountable 
and face disciplinary action. That was the rule I applied when I 
was in charge, and I am not sure if they are still using it or not.  
(Waddah Khanfar, 2014)  
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Ahmad Mansour insisted however, that journalists had the right to express 
their own views on social media outlets and write opinion articles as these 
do not necessarily represent their professional presentations on the air:  
 
All journalists and programme presenters have got the right to 
express their personal views in their social media platforms, 
without influencing what they present on TV. I am one of them. 
If you go back to my articles during Morsi’s era, you would see 
that most of it was against his regime and his approach to 
leading the country, and yet that did not affect my programme 
(email interview 2014)  
 
Social media platforms of some of AJA journalists maybe problematic, as 
some of the well-known presenters (such as Ahmad Mansour and Faisal 
Al-Qassem) are overtly critical about the regimes in Egypt and Syria. This 
arguably contributes to the perception that the AJA is favouring the MB’s 
ideology and against Egyptian governments led by Mubarak and Al-Sisi.  
 
Mohamed Krishan (phone interview, 2014) said that although the channel 
had not changed in general terms, the Arab political realm had been 
dramatically transformed. He said that, in the past, the majority of Arab 
countries had stood united against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the 
US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so on. Things were now 
different. Political polarisation had dominated the heart of the Arab world: 
‘it is really difficult to maintain a comprehensive popular consensus around 
widely disputed topics’. Ben Ganna further explained, in line with Krishan’s 
view: 
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There are internal division(s) in Arab public opinion. When AJA 
used to cover the Palestine - Israel conflict, there was a general 
consensus on the channel’s coverage, as no one from the Arab 
world supported Israel over Palestine. When the Arab Spring 
started, people began to have different views. Some supported 
the Mubarak regime, others supported the foloul [‘remnants’] 
and still others the MB. Those who hate the MB tune into Al-
Arabia TV [Saudi-funded satellite channel], whereas those who 
support the MB, tune into AJA, and so on. Each [one] goes for 
what fits his or her ideology - even sectarianism.  
 
Waddah Khanfar, however, suggested that AJA should revisit its motto: 
Opinion and The Other Opinion. He said: ‘since the launching of AJA, its 
motto was functional because the dominant view was that of the people 
together with the opposition and against the Arab governments’. A 
‘rainbow of views’ dominated people’s perceptions after the Arab Spring, 
as they no longer had a unified opinion against the authoritarian 
governments: ‘I hope from AJA to have a comprehensive motto that fits 
the phase we are living in’ (Waddah Khanfar, phone interview, 2014). 
 
Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (phone interview, 2014) said that the channel no 
longer occupied the same place in the Arab world, but its motto continued 
to be valid and operative in AJA. He added: ‘in my personal view, AJA is 
still the biggest pan-Arab network, and still has the largest viewership’. 
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9.6 Summary 
 
The above testimonies from AJA’s current and former journalists 
demonstrate a general agreement that Qatar’s influence on AJA TV 
channel does exist, but, according to Khanfar, it is a mutual arrangement. 
The question of channel ownership and independence - much debated by 
academics and observers – has been more evident in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, according to the journalists interviewed. 
 
The discussions around the channel’s coverage of the Bahraini uprising 
being less comprehensive than others were clearly driven by the channel’s 
alignment with the financial support received from its host country, Qatar. 
It might be true that the channel does not take direct orders from the 
Qatari Emir or the royal family, but AJA’s editorial practices regarding 
Qatar display a certain loyalty: self-censorship is arguably practiced when 
talking about the royal family.  
 
AJA, as this research argues, exemplified a real break-through in the 
stagnant Arab media. It presented a real transformation of media 
discourse in the Arab world by challenging Arab authoritarianism, 
addressing people’s daily concerns, and bringing voices from the 
opposition on to its screens. 
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AJA was, by and large, sympathetic towards the MB (‘good’ side) and 
offered a platform in Egypt to advocate for its rights to exist and to be part 
of the political scene. The channel defended its political competences on 
the basis that the MB had won through the ballot box and therefore its 
right to rule should be respected. The channel not only admonished the 
Egyptian military role (‘bad’ side), but also the masses which supported 
what was described as a ‘military coup’ against the MB’s legitimacy (‘out’ 
group). 
 
The majority of AJA journalists interviewed by this researcher, expressed 
their views that the MB and its members were the victims, therefore, it was 
the channel’s moral duty to defend them against injustice as they were 
‘voiceless’, ‘oppressed’ and ‘weak’. This issue was widely contested and 
AJA seemingly chose to stand on one side rather than the other: the 
channel’s apparent support of the MB caused it to lose viewers (at least 
audiences with opposing views to Islamists).  
 
The relationship with the channel’s audiences and the question of losing 
them is debateable. There is a perception that the channel was losing 
audiences by those who were against change and democracy, as Krishan 
(2014) mentioned, yet hardly any formal studies exist on the actual 
viewership of the channel.  
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The journalists’ use of social media was a good example of how much the 
channel actively participated in news coverage. It revealed their opinions 
regarding the unfolding events in the Arab Spring countries, including 
Egypt. Some presenters such as Mansour regularly criticised the military 
‘coup’ against the MB. He therefore not only positioned himself, and 
arguably the channel, in favour of the Islamic movement and the MB, but 
also managed to anger the supporters of the military ‘coup’ or ‘remnants’ 
(foloul). 
 
The validity of the channel’s motto (Opinion and the other opinion), as 
previously explained, was contested among AJA current and former 
journalists. Waddah Khanfar believed that the channel should revisit the 
motto because the people no longer had a single opinion about 
dictatorship. Other journalists thought the motto was still valid as, even 
after the Arab Spring erupted in 2010, the two sides were being offered a 
platform to express their views, albeit in unequal measure (see Chapters 7 
and 8).  
 
The next chapter will present a discussion and the conclusion of the 
previous chapters. It will explain how such findings relate to the theory, 
and more importantly, to answering the main research questions in 
relation to AJA and its coverage of the MB. The research implications and 
recommendations for further research will similarly be outlined.  
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Chapter Ten 
DISCUSSION  
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The inside accounts of some current and former AJA presenters were 
exclusively collated and inspected in the previous chapter. The questions 
(or main themes) asked were chosen based on the existing literature (a 
priori approach) and scrutiny of the text (inductive approach) of the two 
programmes; Without Borders and Opposite Direction. Van Dijk’s 
Ideological Square and Pier Robinson’s Framing Model were taken into 
account in connection with three Rhetorical Strategies in the discussion of 
the empirical data gathered from the interviewees.  
  
In this discussion chapter, the analysis obtained from the two AJA TV 
programmes and the data gathered from the interviews will be linked to 
existing literature previously reviewed on AJA, and to the theory of media 
and religion framing and ideology, with the aim of answering the main and 
sub-research questions. The research implications and future 
recommendations will be also presented in the conclusion. 
 
This research has allocated three different questions which will be 
answered in this section:  
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Main Question 
 To what extent has AJA’s coverage of the role of the MB as part of 
the Egyptian political landscape contributed to the formation of ‘in-
group’ and ‘out-group’ identities in the Egyptian society? 
 
Sub-Questions: 
 How do AJA journalists generally perceive the role of Qatar in the 
Arab uprising countries and the impact of such role on AJA 
narrative?  
 How do AJA journalists respond to the claims of favouring the MB 
and how have they reassessed their journalistic values and 
practices following the Arab uprisings? 
 
The discussion of these questions will be primarily based on examination 
of the targeted data of the two programmes, Without Borders and 
Opposite Direction, and the retrieved data from interviews. 
 
10.2 AJA: The Ideological Framing of the MB 
 
Based on the data analysis (two programmes and interviews) in which 
three principle ideas emphasised in relation to the MB’s political Islam 
ideology: victims, democrats, and Islamist, whereas the Mubarak regime, 
the military, and Al-Sisi were represented as villains, dictators and 
secularists, as explained below.  
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10.2.1 The MB was represented as the victim of all time 
 
It was evident from the data analysis that AJA framed the MB in an 
empathetic manner and painted them as perpetual victims, whereas it 
distanced the Mubarak regime and the Military Council as the villains. The 
verbal representation linked to the MB in the two programmes and the 
interviewees’ accounts incorporated a record of lexical references which, 
by and large, reinforced the perception of victimisation toward the MB, 
before and after the uprising, while it criminalised the Mubarak regime and 
its supporters, including the military. The table below shows examples of 
regular references integrated in the text of the two programmes and the 
interviewees’ opinions.  
 
The MB The Mubarak regime 
Banned group 
 
Imposed banning on the MB 
Subjected to cruel security strikes, 
arrest and killing 
 
Corrupt and tyrannical 
Victims of injustice and oppression 
 
Unjust and oppressive 
Weak and human 
 
Strong and inhuman  
Figure 16: Regular references of victimisation versus criminalisation in the two TV 
programmes and interviews 
  
These verbal references were predominantly based on selecting and 
highlighting specific events and actions, with direct or indirect empathetic 
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connotations which endorsed political Islam’s position of the MB during 
different electoral moments, against its opponents (including the Mubarak 
regime). Such events or actions equally stressed the ill-treatment practiced 
by the Mubarak regime (arrest, killing, torture, looting, and so on).  
 
The AJA’s representation of the MB’s political ideology, as this research 
finds, was often emphasised positively (positive ‘us’) while it de-
emphasised negative actions by the MB (negative ‘us’). The Mubarak 
regime and military (including Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi), on the other hand, 
were emphasised negatively at all times (negative ‘them’). 
 
The assigned role of different actors (agency factor) was another element 
of favouring the MB. It was noted that the role of actors shifted at different 
times, in accordance with the actors’ political stance towards the MB: 
when the actors (the Egyptian people and opposition powers) were 
supportive of the MB, then the representation of these actors was either 
neutral or positive (in-group). This was the case during two electoral 
moments before the fall of Mubarak; however, when the actors’ political 
stand shifted and became critical of the MB’s policies and ideology, they 
were represented negatively (out-group). This was the case after the fall of 
Mubarak. The representation of the Mubarak regime and the military, were 
regularly represented as the ‘doer’ or ‘subject’ of the action, whereas the 
MB was considered as ‘acted upon’ or ‘object’.  
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The framing and representation processes of an action, from a theoretical 
point, can determine how news recipients come to understand this action 
(Price: 1995) and thus become influenced by several socio-structural or 
organisational variables (Scheufele: 1999). The highlighting process of an 
action (transitivity) incorporates inclusion and exclusion of specific verbs 
and adverbs describing the action (the victimisation), the subject or doers 
(the Mubarak regime) and objects or actors subjected to the action (the 
MB as the victims).  
 
Mansour, for example, appeared to have remarkable access to the MB’s 
top leadership for his programme. This notable phenomenon arguably 
indicates that his TV show represented a convenient platform for the MB 
leaders to exercise their views, vision and party politics. Mansour regularly 
tried to clearly distinguish between the victims (MB) and the perpetrators 
(Mubarak’s regime, his supporters, and the military), a possible attempt to 
establish a concrete boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
Different times (time space) were regularly stressed with the purpose of 
illustrating the movement’s idea of suffering by the hand of the secular 
oppressors. The references to history, for example, exhibited negative 
actions (imprisonment, killing, torture, fabrication, and so on), to which the 
MB had been subjected, were regularly mentioned, perhaps aimed at 
highlighting the crimes committed by the Mubarak regime and the military 
in order to gain political support for the MB.  
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The process of moving between different times often involved roaming 
between different historical moments to pin-point the ‘heroic’ sacrifices the 
MB had made, and the anguish it had been through since 1928 (the 
establishment of the MB) such as the assassination of the movement’s 
founder, Al-Banna, and the arrests and assaults its members had 
undergone at different stages. The regular verbal references to history, as 
this research reads, were aimed at turning people’s attention away from 
the MB’s political incompetence in leading the country (de-emphasising 
negative ‘us’), through campaigning to win people’s votes during the 
elections and lobbying against dictator regimes, thus showing the ordinary 
Egyptian people that the movement had suffered just as much as they had 
(emphasising positive ‘us’ or ‘in-group’ with the people).  
 
The unsubstantiated subjective accounts of AJA presenters were 
interpreted by this research as taking one side against another. Mansour 
and Al-Qassem consistently criticised, often with offensive language, the 
Mubarak regime, the military (General Al-Sisi) and their respective 
supporters. The verbal choice at the introduction of each episode and the 
set of questions they asked their guests may be evidence of empathy 
towards the MB, ‘the all-time victim’, during the short term leadership of 
the MB. The movement leaders were offered the time to elaborate on the 
decades of being subjected to the brutality of the Mubarak regime and its 
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‘foloul’ with minimal or no interruption. Some interference or responses 
made by the presenters were leading questions or unverified statements.  
 
It was noted that the construction of the questions guest(s) were asked 
may have seemed challenging on the surface, but in substance, they were 
largely leading and perhaps aimed at promoting the MB’s political position, 
while denouncing opposition parties, the military, Al-Sisi, and Mubarak’s 
regime.  
 
10.2.2 The MB’s ‘democratic’ political ideology positively represented 
 
The endorsement of the idea of ‘victimisation’ in the two programmes and 
in the accounts of AJA presenters was evident. The Islamist MB was 
positively represented as committed to democratic values, offered a grand 
political vision for Egypt’s leadership, and was viable alternative to 
authoritarian regimes (including Mubarak’s).  
 
The chosen text of the two programmes and the collated testimonies have 
exhibited verbal choices which reflect the ideological political posture of 
the MB (positive ‘us’) as an Islamic movement committed to democracy, 
whereas they denounce the Mubarak regime’s secular ideology which was 
negatively presented (negative ‘them’) as irreligious and dictatorial. The 
assigned role of different actors in relation to democratisation versus 
dictatorship was also a noticeable feature. 
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The MB’s Islamic ideology (positive) was painted as inclusive – in harmony 
with democracy and willing to work closely with other political parties, 
women, and Copts, whereas the Mubarak regime’s and the military’s 
secular political ideology (negative) was distantly represented as narrow, 
divisive and exclusive of other political parties. Such representation and 
selection of actions, as this research argues, stood as an illustration of the 
channel supporting one side against another. The table below shows the 
regular representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in the two 
programmes and presenters’ testimonies: 
 
The MB The Mubarak regime 
People’s choice 
 
Fabrication of election results 
Call for reform and willing to participate 
in the political process 
 
Corrupt and divisive  
Democratic 
 
Dictatorial 
Denounced violence, accepted 
democracy, respected human and 
women’s rights 
 
Oppressors and violate human rights 
Legitimate 
 
Illegitimate  
Revolutionary 
 
Conspiratorial against the revolution  
 
Figure17: Regular references of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to 
democracy and dictatorship, in the two TV programmes and interviews 
 
It was noticed that the allocated role of different actors shifted between 
positive (in-group) and negative (out-group), depending on their support or 
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discontent with the MB’s political practices; where the Mubarak regime and 
the military were positioned negatively at different times (out-group), the 
assigned role of the Egyptian people and the opposition parties changed 
between ‘in-group’ – before the fall of Mubarak - and ‘out-group’ - after the 
fall of the MB’s Mohammed Morsi.  
 
The approach utilised in the two programmes to introduce and debate the 
MB leaders suggested that AJA had positioned itself on the side of the MB, 
compared to others from the Mubarak regime or from opposite political 
parties. 
 
Mansour, for example, regularly introduced his MB guests by listing their 
accreditations with their high level of education, professional and 
academic skills and experiences, and the number of times they had been 
jailed by the Mubarak regime. These accreditations for MB guests in 
acknowledging their achievements emphasised the elevated intellectual 
qualities of the Islamic movement’s leadership and the enduring injustices 
it had borne, similar to many other ordinary Egyptians. The introduction of 
guests from opposition parties, however, showed little accreditation or 
totally ignored the guests’ backgrounds.  
 
This research argues that the presenters’ stance was rapidly identified by 
the set of questions and nuance of language, which broadly involved 
‘cherry-picking’ subjective and sometimes unrealistic judgements. Based 
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on the text analysis and the interviews, the presenters positioned 
themselves on the side of the ‘human being’ (the MB), not only on the 
grounds that the movement’s ideology was an Islamic one, but also the 
fact that it was an opposition movement standing against unelected 
regimes (Mubarak and Al-Sisi), which were hindering the implementation 
of democratic practices promoted by the MB. 
 
The presenters’ intensely emotional and provocative lexical choices were 
obvious throughout each of their programmes. These habitually fuelled the 
episodes and led to a record of heated discussions – evident between 
guests in Opposite Direction.  
 
Subjectivity and personal views were another noticeable factor. The 
presenters’ personal views were apparent when they used phrases such 
as ‘said an observer’ or ‘as they say’, or ‘these are not my words’, or ‘this 
is what the people say’. These concealed the veracity of each argument 
and brought a doubtful element into their programmes. The presenters of 
the two programmes failed to provide balanced moderation and equal 
representation of the opposing views of each guest. This was evident 
when Mansour told this researcher (in an email interview), that impartiality 
and objectivity are a ‘lie’, and one should stand on the side of weak or 
support the ‘obvious right’ – also stated by other interviewees – against 
the ‘oppressor’.  
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The value judgements made by AJA presenters on the MB and the 
Mubarak regime clearly existed, and were possibly driven by their personal 
interpretations and prejudices of the Egyptian political scene. They 
strongly believed that journalists should not stand neutrally or ‘in the 
middle’ when reporting on issues that were recognisable as ‘right-doing’ or 
‘wrong-doing’: support the MB, ‘the obvious victims and democratic 
movement’ and reject the Mubarak regime and the Military Council, ‘the 
obvious criminals and dictators’.  
 
Time distribution and constant interruption were manifest in the 
programmes. Al-Qassem, for example, often gave the guest representing 
or supporting the MB more time with few intrusions. It was observed that 
sometimes he allocated the guest standing against the MB half the time, 
constantly disrupting him and occasionally using insulting remarks. The 
previous chapter showed that Al-Qassem described the ‘Salvation Front’ 
opposing the MB as a ‘Destructive Front’ and ‘democracy’ as ‘shit-
democracy’.  
 
The structure and nature of Opposite Direction and two guests with strong 
opposite views may seem balanced, but the essence of the debate and 
nuance of his language (verbal mode) clearly leaned towards endorsing 
the opposition, including the MB, against authoritarian regimes such as 
Mubarak’s and the Military Council, was evidently judgemental. The 
analysis of the text in his programme and the implication of his language 
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shows that Al-Qassem forced his own political views into the discussion. 
He not only provided an unbalanced set of questions but an unfair 
distribution of time, therefore, his stand as an ‘objective’ moderator is 
largely problematic and unsound.  
 
The AJA’s views reflected - in the text of the two programmes and 
interviews - an unconcealed personal belief in favour of ‘democracy’ and 
against authoritarianism in the Arab World. Respect for the outcome of 
ballot boxes was called for, no matter what the results were. The 
democratic election of Morsi (and the MB) through ballot boxes, in the 
case of Egypt, should be acknowledged, according to AJA. Hence, 
endorsing the MB’s position was a viable alternative to Mubarak’s 
totalitarian regime. AJA positioned itself as the ‘in-group’ together with the 
MB and democracy, not only on the basis that they were democratic but 
also Islamists, and the military ‘coup’ and dictatorship was represented as 
part of the ‘out-group’.  
 
10.2.3 The MB’s Islamic ideology positively represented as inclusive 
 
The third theme of AJA’s support towards the MB was the representation 
of Islamisation versus secularisation as an idea in harmony with the MB’s 
grand political vision of democratisation. This notion was evoked by the 
MB’s guests who were offered – in both programmes - the time and space 
for unrestricted communication, by the hosts. The MB occasionally 
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invoked the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the words of 
the Qur’an, especially in Without Borders, to explain the injustices to which 
they had been subjected.  
 
The MB’s vision of ‘peaceful Jihad’, for example, and ‘the divine wrath’ for 
those practicing injustice (referring to the Mubarak regime) were 
highlighted. The Islamic comprehensive awakening project adopted by the 
MB was often emphasised to reflect, as this research argues, that the 
MB’s Islamic political ideology was committed to, or compatible with 
democratic practices, as defined and implemented in the West.  
 
The stress of the assigned role of women and Copts in the two 
programmes was positively represented as the ‘in-group’. It was illustrated 
that women, for example, played a substantial role in the Egyptian political 
spectrum and the MB would give them a chance to play a key role in 
politics. The deep concerns, for instance, that the Copts in Egypt had were 
fears that they could be in danger of persecution if an Islamic government 
formed by the MB, were to lead the country. The table below shows the 
frequent illustration of the concept in two programmes and interviews: 
 
Islamists (the MB) Secularists (Mubarak) 
Adopt Islamic project 
 
Adopt secular project 
Islam is the solution Islamists misuse the name of Islam for 
political reasons 
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Support Islamic awakening based on 
education, culture and realisation 
Cause poverty, backwardness, 
ignorance, diseases, dictatorship, 
corruption, misdirect resources 
 
Stand for democracy Re-produce dictatorship 
 
Adopt Islamic Awakening project 
 
Adopt destructive project 
Aim to build the Ummah, develop 
economy and societies 
Desire sex and drink alcohol 
Figure 18: Regular references of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to 
Islamic and secular ideologies, represented in the two TV programmes and interviews 
  
 
These references reflect the MB’s ideology of political Islam, and, 
according to Van Dijk’s ideological square, it signifies the division of 
positive ‘us’ and negative ‘them’, and categorises different actors 
(Egyptian people, opposition parties, Copts, women, and so on) as either 
belonging to the ‘in-group’ or the ‘out-group’. 
 
The Islamic discourse narrative presented in the targeted texts, particularly 
in Mansour’s Without Borders, was based on the ideology of political Islam 
rather than Islamic theology. The very nature of his TV programme was 
predominantly political; the policies of the MB, as a political and Islamic 
movement, were assertively highlighted. Questions of concern by the 
Egyptians and international community were addressed by citing the 
Islamic movement’s vision, its rise on the political scene, and potential 
leadership opportunities.  
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Islamists (the MB) were generally represented positively in the 
programmes and the accounts of AJA presenters, and painted as the 
choice of the people for their grand political vision, whereas other liberal 
and secular groups (including Mubarak) were negatively depicted as the 
dictators and obstructionists to the progress of democratic practices.  
 
This research finds the answer to the main research question is that the 
AJA representation of the MB in the texts of the two programmes, 
surrounding four key electoral moments in Egypt (before and after the 
Egyptian uprising), was in favour of the MB’s ideology. This finding was 
established in accordance with the examination of the three predominant 
themes that emerged from the identified texts and interviews. The channel 
represented the MB during these electoral moments as the victims of the 
Mubarak regime and the Military Council. The movement’s Islamic 
ideology was positively portrayed as democratic, in which its grand political 
vision - communicated on AJA’s platform as a viable alternative to 
authoritarian regimes, on the basis that it was chosen by the people. The 
MB’s comprehensive Islamic ideology was positively framed and 
highlighted in the texts of the two targeted programmes and interviews.  
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10.3 AJA and Qatar’s Foreign Policy 
 
It was evident from reviewing the literature on AJA’s question of ownership 
and independence that there are wide academic debates around this topic. 
The issue regarding the extent of AJA’s editorial policies being aligned 
with Qatar’s foreign policy in relation to the ‘Arab Spring’ countries was 
discussed (chapter 9) with AJA’s presenters and former presenters. It was 
not possible to obtain data to answer the question from the text analyses 
of AJA programmes. It can be said that Qatar’s foreign policy towards the 
MB is broadly matched with AJA’s editorial practices. Qatar supported the 
MB and defended its political existence. The AJA’s predominant presenter, 
Mohammed Krishan, told this researcher about the ‘golden-rule’ - it is not 
unusual to see alignment between news channels and their owners. AJA’s 
former General Director, Waddah Khanfar, similarly explained the ‘mutual 
benefit’ between the channel and its owners. Such testimonies are 
perhaps strong indications that AJA is not only an example of soft power 
for Qatar but also a robust public relations tool, or at least widely perceived 
to be so in some Arab Spring countries such as Egypt.  
 
The overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 saw Qatar and Egypt 
(Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi) a complete clampdown due to its alleged support of 
the MB and the critical coverage of its own channel, AJA (Reuters: 2014) . 
Saudi Arabia brokered a reconciliation meeting between Qatar and the 
new regime in Egypt in December 2014, aiming to discuss a compromise 
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to end an 18-month standoff over Doha's support of the MB; consequently, 
Qatar shut down its dedicated Egyptian channel – Egypt Live – in a step to 
show ‘goodwill’ towards bridging the differences (Reuters). 
 
The question of AJA regarding the nature of its coverage of Bahrain’s 
upheaval (beyond the scope of this research), is worth briefly mentioning 
as it remains blurred. It was explained by one of the AJA journalists 
interviewed (who requested not to be named) that the funding by Qatar of 
the channel is ‘Gulf money’; therefore coverage was much less than for 
other countries. This view requires further investigation as others such as 
the former Director General, Khanfar explained, the channel was one of 
the first to rush and cover the uprisings, but Bahrain did not permit them to 
work inside the country. It was subsequently clarified that Bahrain’s 
uprising was not as widespread as other countries such as Egypt and 
Syria. The Guardian’s Ian Black (2011) stated that Bahrain protested to its 
neighbour, Qatar, about a film produced by AJE, highlighting continued 
anti-government protests by Bahraini Shi’ites.  
  
Based on the analysis, AJA’s alignment with Qatar in covering the 
Egyptian uprising was evident. Both AJA and Qatar were criticised over 
their support for the MB. The answer to the question of whether AJA’s 
editorial policies were aligned with Qatar in covering Egyptian affairs, is 
yes. Is this alignment between Qatar and AJA evident in all countries and 
events? The answer to this question is open for debate, but it may depend 
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on Qatar’s foreign policy and the extent of Qatar’s involvement in one 
country or another. The channel’s ownership remains in the hands of the 
Emir. It was evident that the decision to open and close a channel – such 
as AJ’s Live Egypt – comes from the Qatari foreign office, therefore it will 
be no surprise that the Emir of Qatar one day may decide to shut down 
AJA if he thinks it might cause serious ‘trouble’ between Qatar and other 
neighbouring countries - and why not? Qatar on December 2014 launched 
a new pan-Arab television network based in London called Al-Araby Al-
Jadeed, which might be seen as an alternative venue for AJA. The 
channel forced Qatar to lose political and media prestige created over 
almost 20 years (Kilani: 2014; Keys: 2014). 
 
10.4 AJA journalists: changing perception in a changing Arab world 
 
Have AJA journalists re-assessed their journalistic values and practices 
following the Arab uprisings? The perception of most journalists 
interviewed explained that the political paradigm in the Arab world 
changed since the breakout of the Arab uprisings, hence journalists 
themselves also changed. The former Director General of AJA, Waddah 
Khanfar, explained to this researcher that the motto and the vision of AJA 
needs to be revisited, largely because the whole situation in the Arab 
world has been transformed; according to him, the internal Arab affairs are 
widely polarised and AJA needs to cope with such changes.  
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It was evident that AJA journalists had become more active in presenting 
their subjective views and political positions which largely affected the 
image of the channel and its claimed place of impartiality. Journalists in 
AJA did not see themselves as ‘machines’, according to their arguments, 
as they had feelings and views. Social media, therefore, gave them the 
platform to more vividly express their views, and sometimes quite harshly. 
Their personal opinions in relating events, for example, on the Syrian and 
the Egyptian political situations, were difficult to forbid, according to 
Mohammed Krishan.  
 
The current journalists of AJA interviewed were deeply convinced that the 
MB, as a political and Islamic movement, was a victim and that they 
should not stand neutral; rather, they should provide a platform to 
communicate its views, equally with other parties, and provide it with a 
voice - ‘a voice for the voiceless people’ as the motto goes, and in the 
Egyptian case, the MB and its members were the voiceless. 
 
It can be argued that the channel’s journalistic values have indeed 
changed alongside the Arab political scene, according to the accounts of 
the AJA journalists. The channel’s construction of its place in the Arab 
world has shifted towards one side, (Islamists: the victim) which is seen as 
biased. The moral stand in supporting the MB which the channel took is 
open to interpretation. This interpretation is widely determined by the 
readers’ political views and understanding of the complex political scene; if 
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someone is sympathetic towards the MB as the victim of a political coup 
then he or she would find it permissible for AJA to stand alongside the MB, 
whereas if someone is against the MB and its policies, then AJA’s 
coverage of the MB is unjustifiable.  
  
It can be argued, generally speaking, that although the focus of this 
research is about the study of AJA and the MB in Egypt, the channel has 
played a significant role as a pan-Arab organisation. The question of 
whether AJA played a pan-Arab role or a pan-Islamist role in covering the 
Egyptian uprising is also noteworthy. The channel evidently covered the 
Egyptian uprising and its Islamic movement, the MB, on the basis that 
Egypt is a key player in the Arab world, and therefore, it placed the 
Egyptian 2011 uprising at the heart of its coverage. The assertion made 
that the channel had a pan-Islamist role is also true.  
 
The language used in its programmes by not only showing empathy 
towards the MB but also offering a platform for the MB’s leadership to 
express its political views was evident in the analysis of the programmes. 
The accounts of AJA journalists that the MB is a predominant movement 
and should be given a chance, reflects, furthermore, on their strong belief 
in supporting the victims, in this case the MB. The MB movement was 
depicted as the carrier of democratic values and able to bring the change 
that people desired.  
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Based on the text analysis of AJA TV programmes, and reading through 
some of their journalists’ social media contributions, the language 
incorporated suggests overt support towards the MB’s ideology and its 
members, not only because they are the victims and proponents of 
democratic values but also because some of the presenters themselves 
(Ahmad Mansour) had an Islamic background and was said to be a 
member of the MB. Al-Qassem’s language, on the other hand, reflects 
more the notion of pan-Arabism than pan-Islamism, as it does not seem 
driven by Islamic values like Mansour. It can be further argued that 
although favouring the MB against the Mubarak regime and the military, 
Al-Qassem’s position is based on the MB being an opposition movement, 
seeking to replace the authoritarian (Mubarak) regime.  
 
Some of the AJA journalists acknowledge – revealed to this researcher - 
the fact that the channel was (and is) working in an Islamic culture. They 
also repeatedly emphasised that Islamists are the most popular and are 
capable of bringing about change as an alternative to authoritarian rulers. 
 
The channel’s code of conduct and editorial guidelines clearly stands up 
for the values of democracy, universal freedoms including freedom of 
expression. The important question here is the reflection of the channel on 
democracy and whether or not AJA considered it as compatible with 
political Islam. Political Islam and democracy, as this research argues, are 
possibly seen as harmonious. Islamists such as the MB approved of the 
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role of democracy, respected the term and then were overthrown in a 
military coup.  
  
The two TV programmes: Opposite Direction and Without Borders, 
promote the value of democracy but limit it to the ballot boxes; for AJA, the 
Western democracy model can be implemented in the Arab world, namely 
Egypt. The channel promoted the idea that the MB was committed to 
democratic values as it was ready to cooperate with other opposition 
parties, welcoming women’s participation in the political field, able to work 
together with other ethnic groups, including the Copts. 
 
10.5 Summary 
 
AJA representation of different political actors and ideologies in Egypt, 
particularly the MB’s Islamic movement and the Mubarak’s secular party, 
was discussed in this chapter. The texts from two TV programmes 
(Without Borders and Opposite Direction) were also discussed, as well as 
some exclusive testimonies from predominant AJA and AJE TV presenters. 
It was argued by this researcher, in answer to this research’s main 
question that AJA was in favour of the MB during different electoral 
moments, before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011.  
 
The Islamic political ideology of the MB was largely represented in the 
texts of the two programmes inspected. It was noted that the 
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representation of the MB was positive, whereas it was negative regarding 
the Mubarak regime and its secular ideology. The Islamic movement, the 
MB, was projected as committed to democratic practices and enjoyed a 
grand political vision and offered a comprehensive Islamic awakening 
project. Such representation, as this researcher argues, was aimed at 
endorsing the very idea that political Islam and democracy are compatible. 
 
The ideological square by nature is divisive between (‘we’ the right) and 
(‘them’ the wrong). Such separation was regularly emphasised, based on 
different actors’ political stance, between those supporting the MB (‘in-
group’) and others supporting the Mubarak regime or the military (‘out-
group’).  
 
The study of media and religion, by and large, was beneficial to this 
research, helping to understand how and why a social force like religion 
(political Islam ideology) interacts with the other primary social forces of 
the day, to shape people’s perception regarding a particular political event 
or action through media. This has been a very helpful vehicle for 
ideologies such as the one of political Islam. The references to the words 
of the Hadith and Qur’an by the MB leaders, for example, can explain how 
the movement tried to gain political support by touching on a very sensitive 
but solid foundation implanted in the people’s belief (Islam). AJA was the 
ideal platform for the MB to communicate its political ideologies. 
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The next chapter is the final one in which the overall research will be 
summarised and the main argument(s) and contribution will be outlined. 
The research implication and future research recommendation will also be 
presented.  
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Chapter Eleven 
CONCLUSION  
 
11.1 Research overall summary 
 
It has been widely reported that the immolation and death of a Tunisian in 
December 2010, instigated a series of protests in North Africa and the 
Middle East, changing the geo-political scene in the region. Rebellions 
erupted in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, demanding changes 
to living conditions and of dictatorship regimes. People demonstrated 
against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and his 23-year-old regime, forcing him to 
step down and hand over power to the Military Council. Libya’s Muammar 
Khaddafi was ousted and killed by his own people. The Yemeni 
President, ’Ali Abdullah Saleh, stepped down after what seemed to be a 
political compromise. This later turned into a more difficult political scene. 
A peaceful protest against President Bashar Al-Assad in Syria resulted in 
a fierce civil war between the rebels and the president and the on-going 
crisis in Syria and many other countries has caused not only regional but 
also international turmoil.  
 
Al-Jazeera (Arabic) (AJA), which, for a long time, had been seen as 
representing Arab identity and had managed to capture the ears, eyes, 
and minds of Arabs, began to receive widespread criticism. It was accused 
of being sided towards Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB’s ideology) in Egypt, and against other opposition parties. This 
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research has examined AJA Satellite television’s coverage of the Arab 
uprisings. The main focus of this research was how AJA reported on the 
Egyptian uprising, particularly regarding its relationship with the MB, 
before and after the uprising. Critical discourse analysis was primarily 
used to scrutinise the language of AJA, aimed at understanding the shift of 
the channel’s construction of its place in the Arab world, following its 
coverage on the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Egypt.  
 
This research has also studied the theoretical framework of media and 
religion framing together with media and ideology. The study of media and 
religion benefited the understanding of the intersection between AJA, a 
media organisation, and the MB, an Islamic political movement. Media 
bias theory (particularly John Street’s categories of bias) was presented to 
assist in answering the main research question: whether or not the 
channel was in favour of the MB’s ideology. The examination of media and 
ideology led to the discussion on Pier Robinson’s concepts of framing. 
 
Existing literature on AJA and the little academic discussion surrounding 
its coverage and relationship with Islamic political parties were reviewed. 
An overview of the MB’s historical background and its changing political 
place was examined. The existing debates on AJA coverage of the MB in 
Egypt were principally driven by media reportage and opinion pieces - little 
academic work exists representing this gap in the literature. This research 
has contributed towards filling that gap. 
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Multiple data were obtained and inspected from two of AJA’s television 
programmes, Without Borders and Opposite Direction and interviews with 
about 10 AJA current and former journalists. Critical discourse analysis, a 
qualitative approach and interview technique method were useful in the 
data analysis. The application of the qualitative approach assisted this 
research in examining what stands behind the language used in the 
programmes and the effect it had on their audiences. The interview 
technique played a key role in this research in acquiring and rationalising 
data which could not be collected from the analysis of AJA’s actual texts. 
This research also adopted the interpretist (constructionist) approach in 
ontology and epistemology, taking into consideration the realist approach.  
 
The selected data from AJA’s two programmes was primarily around four 
electoral moments in Egypt: two before (2005 and 2010 elections) and 
another two (2012 and 2014 elections) after the fall of Mubarak. Three 
themes emerged from utilising a priori and inductive methodologies 
(existing literature review and the reading of the actual texts): victimisation 
versus criminalisation; democracy versus dictatorship; and Islamic versus 
secularist.  
 
This researcher interviewed 10 high profile AJA TV presenters, both 
current (at the time of writing) and former. The interviewees were asked 
semi-constructed questions on various themes, based on a priori and 
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inductive approaches. For instance, the questions included AJA, its 
ownership and independence, the channel’s coverage of the Arab 
uprisings particularly in Egypt, the alleged relationship between the 
channel and AJA, and its place in the Arab world.  
 
Different techniques were applied in the analysis in order to extract as 
much relevant information: Van Dijk’s Ideological Square, Pier Robinson’s 
Framing Models, and Chouliaraki’s three Rhetorical Strategies (verbal 
mode, agency and time space). The representation of verbal mode of 
different groups in different times was inspected in the analysis of the two 
television programmes. 
 
The extent to which the AJA satellite television provided a platform for the 
MB and opposition voices in Egypt, during its coverage of four key 
electoral moments - before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 - was 
essentially the focus of this research. The Qatari-funded Arabic channel, 
AJA, was subject to criticism of being in favour of the MB. The foundations 
of such allegations were scrutinised.  
 
The significance of AJA in the Arab world, the questions of the channel’s 
independence and ownership in relations to Qatar, and the channel’s 
coverage of Islamic theology and political Islam - including the MB - were 
discussed.  
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The MB’s ideology was positively framed in AJA’s two TV programmes. 
The principle ideas of victimisation, democracy and Islamic were 
emphasised in favour of the MB (positive). The Mubarak regime, the 
Military Council and Al-Sisi were equally represented through distance 
framing in which they were depicted as villains, dictators and secular 
(negative).  
 
It was evident from the analysis of the findings in this research that AJA’s 
language (verbal selection), according to the texts and interviews 
examined, was indeed in favour of the MB, especially during four key 
electoral moments, before and after the ‘revolution’. The representation of 
the MB and its ideology was emphasised as ‘us’ – good, while the ‘us’ - 
bad was de-emphasised, in order to predominantly reflect a positive 
picture. 
 
The role of actors changed at different times in accordance with the actors’ 
political position; when the actors, such as the Egyptian people and 
opposition powers, were supportive of the MB, then the representation of 
these actors was either neutral or positive (‘in-group’). This was apparent 
during the two electoral moments before and after the fall of Mubarak; 
however, when the actors changed their position and became critical of 
the MB’s policies and ideology, they were represented negatively (‘out-
group’).  
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The AJA presenters who were supposed to stand as balanced moderators, 
advocated principle ideas that the Islamic movement and the MB were the 
victims ‘of all time’, although they proposed a grand political vision and a 
willingness to work together with other political parties, ethnic groups and 
women. The MB’s political incompetence during its one year rule led to the 
ousting of President Mohammed Morsi in a military ‘coup’ in July 2013. 
This was de-emphasised in the two TV programmes (Without Borders and 
Opposite Direction) by blaming the Mubarak regime, its ‘remnants’ (لولف) 
and the military coup as ‘persecutors’.  
 
The language choice made in Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders, for 
example, during the four selected electoral periods in Egypt, showed that 
Mansour was overtly favouring the MB’s ideology, before and after the 
2011 uprising. The nature of the rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency 
and time space) in his programme, after the uprising, was punitive, daring, 
and critical compared to before the uprising. This research also notes that 
Mansour consistently and overtly criticised the Mubarak regime, the 
military (General Al-Sisi) and their respective supporters. He frequently 
defended the MB’s political practices, and repeatedly blended his 
subjective views with facts in an attempt to show his position as an 
‘objective’ moderator, of which there was little evidence in the analysis of 
his programmes.  
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The structure of the questions posed to the guest(s) by AJA presenters 
may have seemed challenging on the surface, but in substance, it was 
largely indicative that he was aiming to promote and protect the MB’s 
political position, while denouncing opposition parties, the military, Al-Sisi, 
and Mubarak’s regime.  
 
The narrative of the presenter’s introductions and the set of his questions, 
furthermore, showed evidence of both his overt and covert empathy 
towards the MB, ‘the all-time victim’. Mansour repeatedly allowed the MB 
leaders’ views to be expressed with minimal or no interruption. The 
technique of moving between different times in the programmes often 
involved travelling back in history to emphasis the anguish it had been 
through since the establishment of the movement. 
  
The fall of Mubarak, for example, and the short period under the MB rule, 
encouraged Mansour to often pose (arguably leading) questions to the 
leaders of the MB such as Morsi (at that time the Egyptian president) and 
Hisham Qandil, the Prime Minister, regarding their vision about 
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ as well as their view of various groups and 
communities in Egypt - questions that have indeed attracted on-going 
debates both in the West and in the Arab world. The positive role of 
Islamic parties regarding ‘democracy’, ‘women’, and ‘Copts’ were some of 
the issues he raised, and how Islam was compatible with these issues. 
This research, nonetheless, ascertains that Ahmad Mansour’s message 
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(through his own or his guest’s words) that Islam and Islamic parties - such 
as the MB – were committed to the value of democracy and freedom of 
expression, whereas the Mubarak and Al-Sisi regimes were dictators and 
had no respect for such values; they had conspired against ‘democracy’ by 
perpetrating a military coup against the democratically-elected Morsi 
government. 
 
Al-Qassem’s Opposite Direction has a different structure and presentation 
to Mansour’s one-to-one programme. His language position was more 
aggressive than Mansour’s. The verbal mode in Opposite Direction, this 
research argues, is widely over-stated, loaded and sometimes improbable 
as he usually applied a catalogue of unsupported, subjective, and inflated 
views and strong language during his role as a ‘moderator’. The 
programme, as this research finds, was also supportive. Al-Qassem 
regularly showed empathy and positive language towards the MB, while 
using negative and distance language against the Mubarak regime, the 
military, secular and other political parties opposing the MB and 
democracy.  
 
The structure and the nature of this programme of inviting two guests with 
strong opposite views may seem balanced, but the essence of the debate 
and nuance of his language (verbal mode) clearly leans towards 
supporting the opposition (MB in this research) and to authoritarian 
regimes (Mubarak and the Military Council) is evidently partial. Through 
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the analysis of the texts in his programmes and the implication of his 
language, it is not difficult to observe that Al-Qassem forced his own 
political views into the discussion. He provided an unbalanced set of 
questions and unfair distribution of time, therefore his stand as an 
‘objective’ moderator is largely problematic and unsound.  
 
The opening introduction with a set of questions which Al-Qassem read at 
the beginning of each episode is worthy of comment. This research argues 
that the presenter’s stance was rapidly identified by the set of questions 
and nuance of language. It was extensively ‘cherry-picked’, subjective and 
sometimes unrealistic. Based on the text analysis, he usually positioned 
himself on the side of the MB, not only on the grounds that the movement 
was an Islamic one, but more importantly, on the fact that it is an 
opposition movement standing against undemocratic regimes (Mubarak 
and Al-Sisi).  
 
It can be concluded from the interview chapter and by reading through 
AJA journalists’ accounts that AJA’s journalistic insight and construction of 
its place had radically changed, as had the transformation of the Arab 
world, following the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. The journalists of AJA 
believed that audiences as well as the Arab political scene had become 
polarised; according them, they should stand on the side of the ‘victim’ and 
‘democracy’ against the perpetrators of ‘injustice’ and ‘dictatorship’. The 
victims in Egypt were the MB and its members, and the offenders were the 
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Mubarak regime and the Military Council (represented by Abdel Fattah Al-
Sisi).  
 
The question of AJA’s editorial policies, and its alignment with Qatar (the 
founder, the host and financer of the channel), was also uncovered in this 
research. It is noted that the foreign and editorial policies of both Qatar 
and AJA were widely matching in the case of Egypt especially after the fall 
of Mubarak, due to the country’s support of the MB and for hosting the 
critical voice against the Al-Sisi regime by AJA. 
 
Some AJA journalists, furthermore, accepted that the channel’s vision and 
practices should be revisited, as Arab opinion was fundamentally divided 
and no longer represented one voice, hence, the channel’s motto of 
‘opinion and the other opinion’ is contested as being no longer applicable. 
 
11.2 Research Implications 
 
The interrelation between media and religion, from a theoretical point of 
view, is that AJA as a media organisation, and the MB as an Islamic 
organisation, was marked. Media remains a desirable vehicle to promote 
religious messages to a wider audience; in the case of AJA, although the 
Islamic theology was briefly offered, the political Islamic ideology was 
positively endorsed.  
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The main research questions in connection with AJA and its relations with 
the MB have been answered; the findings in this research have a wider 
research implication in the field of media. Media can play an active role in 
promoting religious ideologies such as political Islam, as in the case of 
AJA.  
 
The media can be a platform for stability as well as a tool for chaos during 
political polarisation. The media can easily fall into the eye of the political 
storm and become the news itself rather than a source of news when 
covering complex situations. Those media services which stand as a 
mouth-piece for their parent country, for example, can often be criticised, 
and their ‘objectivity’ be widely contested, even if they attempt to prove 
otherwise. The media is deemed to be an effective vehicle for promoting 
religion as a theology as well as supporting politics. 
 
11.3 Future Research and Recommendations 
 
The study of AJA and the MB, in the case of the Egyptian political scene, 
has opened some doors for further academic research on AJA. Additional 
research can be made into the general news output of AJA and its 
representation of different ideologies. How the Egyptian people, for 
example, perceived AJA TV coverage of the Egyptian uprising, before and 
after the fall of Mubarak, is a significant opening for audience research 
and requires further investigation. It is also important to understand how 
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AJA satellite television covered internal Qatari foreign policy affairs, which 
has been contested among academics for some time. How AJA covered 
the Bahraini uprising, as well the Saudi secret uprising, are important 
issues that warrant further examination. Comparative studies on the 
similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of AJA and AJE, 
in relation to the Arab Spring countries, would be significant. The primary 
aim to uncover how the network addressed similar topics for different 
audiences and cultures would also be useful.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix (1):  
Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders 
 
1.1 List of selected episodes from Without Borders 
 
# Title Translation  Date Code 
1 رصم يف ناوخلإل بقترلما ي سايسلا رودلا The expected political role of 
the MB in Egypt 
26.10.2005 EP1 
2 ذخآم ةاضقلا ىلع تاباختنا ةسائرلا 
ةيرصلما 
Judges’ remarks on the 
Egyptian presidential 
election 
2.11.2005 EP2 
3 مجح ةضراعلما ةيرصلما يف تاباختنلاا 
ةينالمربلا 
The size of the Egyptian 
opposition in the 
Parliamentary election 
9.11. 2005 EP3 
4 تاباختنلاا ةينالمربلا يف رصم  Parliamentary election in 
Egypt 
10.11.2010 EP4 
5 ةبقارم تاباختنلاا ةينالمربلا يف رصم  Monitoring the Parliamentary 
election in Egypt 
17.11.2010 EP5 
6 بابسأ ةكراشم ناوخلاا يف تاباختنلاا 
ةينالمربلا 
Reasons for the MB’s 
participation in the 
Parliamentary Election 
24.11.2010 EP6 
7 ةيؤر ناوخلإا نيملسلما ةليكشتل 
ةموكحلا يف رصم   
The MB’s vision in forming a 
government in Egypt 
25.1.2012 EP7 
8 ماشه ليدنق – ةيؤر لبقتسلم رصم ج1  Hisham Qadil (PM) – A 
vision to Egypt’s future – 
Part 1 
21.11.2012 EP8 
9 ماشه ليدنق – ةيؤر لبقتسلم رصم ج2  Hisham Qandil – A vision to 
Egypt’s future – Part 2 
28.11.2012 EP9 
10 ادن :ي سيسلا سيل لاهؤم مكحلل 
ناوخلإاو نل اوملستسي  
Nada: Alsisi is not qualified 
to govern and the Muslim 
Brotherhood will not give up 
9.4.2014 EP10 
11 بلاقنا رصم رسكنيس نم لخاد 
شيجلا 
Egypt’s coup will breakdown 
from within the military 
16.4.2014 EP11 
12 فلاحت ديدج دض بلاقنلاا ..له لكشي A new collation against the 7.5.2014 EP12 
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ةقراب ؟لمأ  coup, does it give a new 
glimpse of hope? 
 
1.2 Extracts from the selected episodes: 
 
In the below table, each extract (in Arabic) is translated in English and is 
given a code and episode number: 
 
(EX = Extract / EP = Episode) 
 
E1, EX1 
Arabic  روصنم دمحأ : نم عساتلا يف ىلولأا اهتلحرم أدبت نأ ررقلما نم يتلا ةيرصلما ةينالمربلا تاباختنلال يلزانتلا دعلا أدب
 ةهج نم مكاحلا ينطولا بزحلا نيب سيطولا ةيماح ةسفانم طسو كلذو مداقلا ربمفون ةمئاقو نيملسلما ناوخلإاو
 نيملسلما ناوخلإا نأ ريغ ،ىرخأ ةهج نم مكاحلا بزحلا نع نيقشنلماو نيلقتسلماو ةضراعلما ةدحولما ةينطولا ةهبجلا
 تابرضلا مغرف ،يرصلما عمتجلما يف لدجلل ةراثإ ةيسايسلا ىوقلا رثكأ مه ةروظحلما ةعامجلاب ايمسر نوفصوي نيذلا
 يتلا ةيساقلا ةينملأا رياربف نم رشع يناثلا يف انبلا نسح لولأا اهدشرمو اهسسؤم لايتغا ذنم ةعامجلا اهل ضرعتت
 ماع1949  فرعتلا لواحن ةقلحلا هذه يفو يرصلما عمتجلما يف اريثأتو اميظنت رثكلأا ةوقلا اهنوربتعي نوبقارلما نأ لاإ
 وقلا عم مهتافلاحتو ةينالمربلا تاباختنلاا ضوخل ناوخلإا ططخم ىلع مهنيب ةيرسلا تاقفصلا ةقيقحو ةيسايسلا ى
 يف ةيرسلا تاقفصلا لجر هنأب فصوي يذلا لجرلا عم ةرشابم راوح يف كلذو طابقلأاو ماكحلا ينطولا بزحلا نيبو
نيملسلما ناوخلإل ماعلا دشرلما بئان رطاشلا تريخ دمحم ناوخلإا. 
Translation Ahmad Mansour: The Countdown has started for the Egyptian 
parliamentary election as planned on 9
th
 February amid fierce competition 
between the National Ruling Party and the Muslim Brotherhood on one 
hand, and between the National Unity Front and independents and 
defected personnel from the Ruling Party from another. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, officially described as a banned group, is the most 
controversial political power in Egyptian society. Despite the cruel 
security strikes they have had since the assassination of its first founder 
and mentor, Hassan Al-Banna, on 12 February 1949, observers consider 
them to be the most organised influential political group in Egyptian 
society. In this episode, we try to understand the MB’s plan in 
participating in the Parliamentary Election, their coalition with other 
political powers, their secret agreements between them and the National 
Ruling party and Copts. Such questions will be discussed live with the 
man who is described as the man of secret agreements in the MB. He is 
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Mohammed Khirat El-Shater, Deputy head of General Supreme Leader of 
the MB.  
E1, EX2 
 ؟ةيرس ةمظنمكو يرس لكشب اولمعت اولظتس ىتم ىلإ :روصنم دمحأ 
 :رطاشلارصم يف انوناق ةدراطم ةعامج نحن …  ةيعمج اندنع وأ بزح اندنع ىقبي الم نيلقتسمك اولخديب اندارفأ انحإ
يعامج لكشب مئاوق ل
ّ
زنن نكمم حضاو لكشب اهب فر
َ
تعُم ةيمسر ةعامج وأ ...... 
 :رطاشلا ماظنلا فقوت ام اذإ ،اننّمأ ام اذإ تنرتنلإا ةكبش ىلع نيملسلما ناوخلإا ءامسأ لك نلاعلإ دادعتسا ىلع نحن
دلا تفقوتو اضيأ نكلو نوجسلاو ةدراطلماو تلااقتعلاا طقف سيلو ةدراطلماو قييضتلاو تلااقتعلاا ةسايس يف ةلو
 هيف ينعي ..تاعماجلا يف نيقوفتلما سانلا نييعت عنمب ،ةيرادإ فئاظو ىلإ نيسردلما ليوحتو مهفياظو يف سانلا ةبراحم
أ انعفديب نكمي يللا هد يلاتلابو ةريثك ةدراطمو قييضت لئاسو انسان لكو اندارفأ ..هيإ لك نع نلعن لا انحإ نإ انايح
 ناوخلإا ءامسأ لك عضول دادعتسا ىلع نحنف دلبلا يف ةرقتسم ةيسايس ةايح هيف حبصأو ناملأاب انرعش ول نكلو
.ةفورعم نلآا اهمظعم ىهو عيمجلا اهفرعيل تنرتنلإا ةكبش ىلع ءانثتسا لاب نيملسلما 
Translation Ahmad Mansour: Until When you will be working secretly and as a 
secret organisation? 
Al-Shater: We are a legally wanted group in Egypt … For that our 
members are independent candidates. When we become a [legally 
recognised] party or an institution or a movement then we can go to the 
election with a collective lists… 
Al-Shater: We would publicly list all the names of our members online if 
we have assurances. Until the regime stops the policy of arrests, 
harassing and chasing [members]; not only that, but also irritating citizens 
[in] their jobs and transferring the jobs of teachers to [governmental] 
administrative jobs and banning the appointment of distinctive university 
students [in governmental jobs]. There are so many harassment practices 
used against us. Such practices, sometimes, stop us from going public. If 
we [members and families] feel safe and the political life becomes stable 
in this country, we would be ready to announce all the names of our 
members online [publicly] without any exception.  
E1, EX3 
  :رطاشلا اهنإ اهلك ةيضالما ةيباختنلاا كراعلما يف انتاربخو انبراجتو انديصر انحإ ،ةيباختنا ةكرعم يف نيلخاد نلآا انحإف
 هذه لثم ىلإ ةأرلما ضرعن نأ ديرن لا نحنف ،قييضت ىلإو تلااقتعا ىلإ ضرعتنب ،يداع ريغ دهج ىلإ جاتحتب تناك
تايدحتلا… 
Translation Al-Shater: We are going into an electoral battle. Our past experiences in 
such electoral battles have been tough for us and it requires extraordinary 
effort. We normally get subjected to arrests and harassments. We don’t 
want to expose women candidates to such challenges.  
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 4XE ,3E
أحمد منصور: السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته أحييكم، على الهواء مباشرة من القاهرة ومن الهواء الطلق، لكني  
قبل أن أبدأ الحلقة أود أن أتقدم ببلاغ على الهواء مباشرة إلى السيد وزير الداخلية.. فقد تم الاعتداء عليَّ بالضرب 
ة هنا من شخصين اقتربا مني في شكل اتضح إنه كمين واعتديا عليَّ بالضرب المبرح المبرح تحت.. أمام عمارة قناة الجزير 
صبت بكدمات في وجهي ونزف الدم من هنا من خلف أذني 
ُ
ِسرت نظارتي وتحولت إلى فتات وأ
ُ
أمام الناس جميعا، ك
قف لانتظار الدكتور نعمان وعندي تورم شديد هنا ولاذا بالفرار في سيارة كانت تنتظرهما فيما اتضح إنه كمين، كنت أ
جمعة حتى أصحبه إلى الأستوديو فاقترب مني شخص وقال لي هل أنت أحمد منصور؟ بمجرد أن قلت له نعم ضربني 
بقوة شديدة في شكل اتضح أنه كان يريد أن يسبب لي عاهة وليس ضربا بسيطا فيما كان شخصا آخر خلفه انهال علي 
 قمت، إذا كان الهدف هو إسكاتي عن قول الحقيقة فلن أتوقف عن قولها الآخر بالضرب أيضا، لكني والحمد لله
 .وأرجو من السيد وزير الداخلية أن يهتم بهذا البلاغ فمصر الآمنة يجب أن تحمي أبناءها لاسيما الشرفاء منهم
 tsom eht ,hallA fo eman eht nI :gniteerG cimalsI lluF[ :ruosnaM damhA noitalsnarT
 morf ria no evil uoy emoclew I ,]luficreM tsom eht dna etanoissapmoc
 ,edosipe siht trats I erofeB .]oiduts edistuo[ noitacol nepo siht morf ,oriaC
 .roiretnI fo retsiniM eht ot – ria no evil – tnialpmoc a elif ot ekil dluow I
 nem owt ,gnidliub areezaJ-lA eht woleb detluassa saw I ,yadoT
 dias I tnemom eht ,ruosnaM damhA m’I fi em deksa dna em dehcaorppa
 ot tnaw ot demees yeht tahw ta gnimia em netaeb yllaturb yeht ,sey
 ot saw kcatta siht fo mia eht fI .]niorg eht[ ytilibasid gnirudne na esuac
 roiretnI eht ot laeppa I .pots ton lliw I ,hturt eht gniyas morf pu em tuhs
  …tnedicni siht no tca ot retsiniM
 5XE ,6E
المسلمين أو دخلت الحرب الكلامية والصدامية بين جماعة الإخوان …السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته أحمد منصور: 
الجماعة المحظورة كما يسميها النظام الحاكم في مصر وبين الحزب الوطني الحاكم وأجهزة الأمن مرحلة جديدة باتهام 
رئيس الكتلة البرلمانية للإخوان المسلمين في مجلس الشعب المنتهية ولايته الدكتور سعد الكتاتني لأنصار مرشح الحزب 
لة اغتياله في الوقت الذي يواصل فيه بعض البرلمانيين من الإخوان اعتصامهم في مجلس الوطني الحاكم في المنيا بمحاو 
الشعب احتجاجا على استبعادهم من الترشيح مع إعلان الجماعة عن اعتقال المئات من مناصريها ومنع مسيراتها 
قادم، وفي الوقت الذي طالب فيه كثير الانتخابية وذلك قبيل أيام من الانتخابات البرلمانية المقرر أن تجري يوم الأحد ال
من الإخوان المسلمين بينهم قيادات في مصر والخارج جماعة الإخوان بالانسحاب من العملية الانتخابية احتجاجا على 
ما يحدث وحقنا للدماء فإن قيادة الإخوان قررت أن تواصل المعركة إلى النهاية رغم إعلانها أن الانتخابات تم تزويرها 
ن تبدأ وذلك وسط تكهنات لكثير من المراقبين بأن الانتخابات القادمة ربما تكون الأعنف خلال العقود الأخيرة لا قبل أ
سيما بين الإخوان والحزب الحاكم وأجهزة الأمن، بل حتى بين أعضاء الحزب الحاكم المتنافسين ضد بعضهم البعض 
 حتى الآن. في كثير من الدوائر حيث قتل أربعة من أنصار المرشحين
 snoitatnorfnoc dna sdrow fo elttab ehT ,]gniteerG cimalsI lluF[ :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 lanoitaN eht yb debircsed sa – tnemevom dennab eht ro BM eht neewteb
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Ruling Regime [Mubarak’s] and his security services, have reached a 
new phase as the head of the Parliamentary Block of the MB, Dr Said 
Katatni has accused the National Ruling Party’s candidate for Al Minia 
constituency of attempting to assassinate him. In the meantime several 
Parliamentarians [from the MB] are on strike protesting about their 
exclusion from running as candidate [in the coming Parliamentary 
election]. The MB has announced that hundreds of its supporters were 
arrested and their electoral campaigns were banned just days before the 
start of the Parliamentary election, which was planned to take place this 
Sunday. Several members of the MB - including some of its leaders –
inside Egypt and outside, have appealed to the MB to withdraw from the 
election in protest of what is happening [referring to the arrest and ban] 
and to spare bloodshed. Yet, the MB leadership has decided to take part 
in the election and continue its electoral battle until the end, regardless of 
the fact that they [the MB] have declared that the election was fabricated 
before it started. Observers expect that this coming election will be the 
most fierce one in the past decades between the MB, the ruling National 
Party, and even within the members of the ruling National party 
themselves; battling for some constituencies. So far, four of their [the 
National Ruling Party] supporters were killed.  
E6, EX6 
  روصنم دمحأ؟نينسلا تارشع نم سانلا هيف شيعي يللا فوخلاو :)اعطاقم( 
:عيدب دمحم  لئاسو تحبصأ نملأا لئاسو مدختسا يذلا دسافلا ماظنلا اذه هيف ببسلا ،هيف ببسلا نحن انسل
 رجفلا رئازل نلآا ىلإ انلز امو ضرعتن نحن ،نييرصلما بولق يف ناملأاو نملأا عيشي مسلاا اذه نأ ضورفلما ،بعر
قلاغإو تاكلتملما ىلع ءلايتسلال. 
Translation Mansour: And the fear that people are living under for dozens of years? 
Badei: We are not the cause [of this fear]. The cause is the corrupt 
regime [Mubarak] which uses security methods to terrify people. The 
name of security services should have provided security and safety 
among Egyptians. Until now, we are facing great injustice by its looting 
properties, closing companies, jailing our brothers […]  
E7, EX7 
 ملاسلا :روصنم دمحأ مكيلع ةمحرو الله هتاكربو مكييحأ ىلع ءاوهلا ةرشابم نم ةرهاقلا بحرأو مكب يف ةقلح ةديدج 
نم جمانرب لاب ،دودح نييلام نييرصلما اوجرخ يف عراوشلا نيدايلماو مويلا اولفتحيل  ىركذلاب ىلولأا ةروثل سماخلا 
نيرشعلاو نم ،رياني يتلا تأدب يتؤت اهرامث ليكشتب  لوأ سلجم ينالمرب نم للاخ تاباختنا ةرح ترج ةرملل ىلولأا يف 
رصم ذنم ءلايتسا ركسعلا ىلع ةطلسلا يف رهش ويلوي يف ماعلا 1952، دقو ءاج رايتخا  روتكدلا دعس ينتاتكلا نيملأا 
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 فارقة علامة ليشكل الشعب لمجلس كرئيس المسلمين الإخوان لجماعة السياسية الذراع والعدالة الحرية لحزب العام
 كان كما المحظورة الجماعة لكن المحظورة، الجماعة باسم الثورة قبل يوصفون  كانوا الذين والإخوان مصر تاريخ في
 ما على حصلوا الذين المسلمين للإخوان بالأغلبية صوت الذي الشعب خيار هي أصبحت مبارك نظام خلال عليها يطلق
 في الرئيس ي الدور  ويلعبون  القادمة الحكومة يشكلون  سوف أنهم يعني مما الشعب مجلس مقاعد نصف من يقرب
 الثورة، بعد مصر مستقبل صناعة
 
 oriaC morf ria no evil lla uoy emoclew I ]gniteerG cimalsI lluF[ :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 evah snaitpygE fo snoilliM ,yadoT .)sredroB tuohtiW( fo edosipe wen a ni
 ht52 fo yrasrevinna tsrif eht etarbelec ot serauqs dna steerts eht nekat
 ni emit tsrif eht roF .tiurf sti raeb ot nugeb sah hcihw ,noitulover yraunaJ
 tsrif a ,2591 yluJ morf lortnoc ni neeb sah yratilim eht ecnis tpygE
 deeaS rD .noitcele eerf hguorht demrof neeb sah licnuoC yratnemailraP
 eht ,ytraP ecitsuJ dna modeerF eht rof lareneG yraterceS eht ,intataK-lE
 yratnemailraP eht sa detcele neeb sah ,BM eht rof gniw lacitilop
 dna tpygE fo yrotsih eht ni kram gninifed a sa sdnats pets sihT .tnediserP
 a sa noitulover eht erofeb debircsed saw hcihw ,noitasinagro BM eht
 ot desu ti sa ,noitasinagro dennab siht ,revewoH .’noitasinagro dennab‘
 elpoep eht fo eciohc eht emoceb sah ,emiger s’karabuM gnirud deman eb
 tsomla deruces ]BM eht[ ev’yehT .BM eht rof ytirojam a htiw detov ohw
 eht mrof lliw yeht taht snaem hcihw ,staes yratnemailrap eht fo flah
 s’tpygE gnikam ni elor lartnec a yalp erofereht dna tnemnrevog gnimoc
 .noitulover eht gniwollof erutuf
 8XE ,21E
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته أحييكم على الهواء مباشرة من العاصمة الفرنسية باريس وأرحب أحمد منصور:  
جديدة من برنامج بلا حدود، بعد صمود بطولي من قطاعات الشعب المصري الواسعة الرافضة للانقلاب بكم في حلقة 
وتضحيات الآلاف من الشهداء وعشرات  العسكري الذي قاده وزير الدفاع عبد الفتاح السيس ي في شهر يوليو الماض ي
علن اليوم في بروكسل عاصم
ُ
ة الاتحاد الأوروبي عن ولادة وثيقة وطنية الآلاف من المصابين والمعتقلين السياسيين أ
تدعو كل من شارك في ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير إلى المشاركة في استعادة الثورة ممن اختطفوها واستجماع 
النسيج الوطني المصري بكل أطيافه، وقد أعلن طيف واسع من القوى الوطنية والثورية المصرية عن قبوله بالوثيقة 
 للإعلان عن ولادة كيان وطني ثوري يجهض الانقلاب ومخططاته وقد كان الدكتور ثروت نافع عضو ومحتوياتها 
ً
تمهيدا
لجنة الأمن القومي في مجلس الشورى المصري أحد الذين أعدوا هذه الوثيقة وأحد الذين أعلنوها في العاصمة 
وآثاره على مستقبل ما يجري في مصر في ظل بروكسل وقد وصل للتو نجري حوارنا معه اليوم حول ما بعد هذا الإعلان 
 بك.
ً
 ترشيح عبد الفتاح السيس ي نفسه للرئاسة دكتور مرحبا
 a retfA .siraP morf sgniteerG ]gniteerG cimalsI lluF[ :ruosnaM damhA noitalsnarT
 desufer ohw elpoep naitpygE eht fo rotces ediw a fo ecnetsisrep cioreh
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the military coup led by the Defence Minister, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, in 
July... such a coup was met with sacrifices of thousands of martyrs, and 
tens of thousands injured and imprisoned. Today from Paris, I announce 
the birth of a national document calling on all those who took part in the 
25th January revolution, to participate in restoring the revolution from 
those who have abducted it. The document is calling to unite all Egyptian 
national political colours; a wide spectrum of Egyptian national and 
revolutionary powers has announced its acceptance of the content of the 
document, which announces the birth of a national and revolutionary 
entity, which will work to abort the coup and its plans […] 
E6, EX9 
  روصنم دمحأ نإ هيف تلق سمأ لوأ انايب تردصأ كنكل : يف نوكراشت اذالم ،أدبت نأ لبق اهريوزت أدب دق تاباختنلاا
؟ةروزم تنأ اهتفصو امك تاباختنا 
:عيدب دمحم  عيطتسي لا هنلأ ريوزتلا نمدأ بزحلا اذهو ماظنلا اذه نأ دكؤت نلآا ىتح ترهظ يتلا تارشؤلما ،معن
 هل توصي ايندلا يف بزح دجوي لاف نييسايسلا هموصخ عم ةفيرش ةرح ةسفانم مدقي ايندلا يف بزح دجوي لا تاومأ
 لاقتعاب هموصخ هاجت تاءارجلإا هذهب موقي ايندلا يف بزح دجوي لا نيحشرم ةسمخ نم رثكأ دحاو دعقم ىلع
 روتسدو نيناوقو تارارقل مارتحا مدعو ةصاخ ةيكلم تاكرش ةرداصمو تاكلتمم ىلع ءلايتساو لزانملل تامهادمو
إ كلذكو هومرتحي نأ هيلع اومسقأ ىرن نحن اذه لك مغر ،مويلا اذه ىتح ردصت تلاز امو تردص ءاضق ماكحلأ راده
 ةموضهلما يرصلما بعشلا اذه قح ىلعو انقح ىلع لصحن يك ينوناقلا يروتسدلا لاضنلا لاجم لاإ دجوي لا هنأ
.ةبولسلماو 
Translation Mansour: You issued a statement two days ago stating that the 
fabrication of the election had started before it began, why do you 
participate in an election you’ve described as fake? 
Badei: Yes, there are indications that confirm that this regime [Mubarak] 
and this party [ruling National Party] is addicted to fabrication because 
they are unable to compete with his political opponents in an honest and 
free method… There’s no party in this world that takes such procedures 
towards their opponents by making arrests, attacking homes, looting 
properties, confiscating private and public companies, disrespecting legal 
and constitutional articles which they’ve sworn to respect, wasting the 
verdicts of courts issued, and still being issued, up to this date. Despite all 
this, there’s no way out but the way of using a legal and constitutional 
struggle to restore the Egyptian people’s stolen rights. 
E8, EX10 
  ةديدج ةقلح يف مكب بحرأو ةرهاقلا نم ءارزولا سلجم نم مكييحأ هتاكربو الله ةمحرو مكيلع ملاسلا :روصنم دمحأ
 قتر عيطتسي نل لعف امهمف ،ةروث مايق دعب ةلود ةدايق ىلوتي نم قلاطلإا ىلع اظوظحم سيل ،دودح لاب جمانرب نم
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ات تتحول الحرية إلى شكل من أشكال الفوض ى ولا يرض ى الخروق التي حولت ثوب الدولة إلى قطع بالية وبعد الثور 
الناس عن أحد فنجاحهم في إزالة الطاغية يشعرهم دائما أنهم أكبر ممن يحكمهم مهما بلغ حجمه أو مكانته حتى لو 
كانوا هم الذين اختاروه وهذه حال مصر اليوم وحال من يحكمها مع شعبها، الشعب الذي خضع للاستبداد والفساد 
عقود حتى قام بثورته لا يريد أن يمهل الحاكم أسابيع أو أشهر أو سنوات حتى يفكر كيف يعيد  6غيان طيلة والط
 .صناعة ثوب جديد للبلاد، وبعد اختيار الشعب المصري لرئيس مدني منتخب يحكمه لأول مرة في تاريخه الحديث
 sretsiniM fo licnuoC eht morf sgniteerG ]gniteerG cimalsI lluF[ :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 a gniwollof ,noitan a dael ot ytrap yna rof ykculnu ylemertxe s’tI .oriaC ni
 seloh eht wes ot elba eb ton lliw ti ,seod ytrap siht revetahW .noitulover
 ,noitulover eht gniwollof ;ssem a otni sserd etats eht denrut evah hcihw
 eht gnivomer fo sseccus ehT .soahc fo mrof a emoceb sah modeerf
 ohw enoyna naht ]rednarg[ reggib erew yeht taht leef elpoep edam tnaryt
 sah nosrep siht fi neve - sutats dna ezis sih fo sseldrager ,meht snrevog
 ehT .yadot tpygE ni elpoep eht fo ytilaer eht si sihT .meht yb nesohc neeb
 naht erom rof noitpurroc dna pihsrotatcid rednu neeb evah ohw elpoep
 sraey ro ,shtnom ,skeew wef a relur rieht evig ot tnaw ton od sedaced xis
 eht gnitcele retfa ,yrtnuoc eht rof sserd wen a tink-er ot woh tuoba kniht ot
  .yrotsih nredom sti ni tnediserp livic tsrif
 11XE ,21E
أحمد منصور: إزاي ينكسر ويندحر في ظل الدعم الدولي الموجود الآن، السيس ي الآن يعمل الديمقراطية الشكلية إلي  
وشرعنة الغرب طالبها منه، الاتحاد الأوروبي سيبعث مندوبين لمتابعة الانتخابات في مصر كنوع من شرعنة الانقلاب 
السيس ي الولايات المتحدة تدعم حتى الاتحاد الأفريقي إلي كان مجلس الأمن والسلم رافض إن مصر تدخل وضد 
 سيرسل مندوبين فخلال أيام سيصبح السيس ي رئيسا شرعيا.
ً
 الانقلاب أيضا
باطل فهو باطل، أتفق ثروت نافع: الشرعنة ليست شرعية، الشرعنة هي محاولة للشرعية ومحاولة باطلة وما ُبني على 
 إلى الآن إلى اللحظة إلي إحنا 
ً
 إن هناك أيادي غربية رسمت هذا السيناريو حتى يتم الاعتراف لكن تذكر جيدا
ً
معك تماما
 فيها لم يعترف بهذا النظام سوى أربع أو ست دول إلي شافوا..
 أحمد منصور: بعدما يبقى السيس ي رئيس كله سيعترف.
ده أحد الاحتمالات وهي دي فكرة الشرعنة إلي سيعملونها لكن هل هذا يعطيه شرعية لا لن ثروت نافع: أعتقد هذا 
 يعطيه الشرعية.
 أحمد منصور: هل تستطيعوا إفشال وصول السيس ي في خطوته الأخيرة وبقيت أيام قليلة من الانتخابات؟
ط النظام من الداخل وليس من الخارج ثروت نافع: يعني إحنا نعول على يعني قدرة الشارع المصري ونعتمد على إسقا
 ونعتمد على إسقاط النظام بأيدي المصريين كما أسقطوا النظام إلي أقوى وإلي أعظم وأفظع منه.
 
 won troppus lanoitanretni lla htiw kaerb ]puoc eht[ ti dluow woH :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 ehT .tseW eht yb devorppa ,ycarcomed eslaf a gnidliub si isiS-lA -
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European Union will send observers to monitor the electoral process, 
which is sort of legalising the coup and legalising Al-Sisi [….] Al-Sisi, in a 
few days’ time, will become a legal president.  
Nafa’a: Legalising doesn’t mean legal. What is built on falsehood is false. 
I totally agree with you, that there are strange hands drawing such a 
scenario, but remember, until now only six countries have recognised… 
Mansour: When al-Sisi becomes president, all will recognise him. 
Nafa’a: I think this is one of the possibilities and this is the legitimising 
idea which they are trying to do, but does this give him the legitimacy? No 
it won’t give him legitimacy. 
AMansour: Will you be able to thwart al-Sisi’s final steps, a few days 
before the election? 
Nada’a: We count on the ability of the Egyptian ‘street’, as we count on 
the regime falling from inside, not from the outside, and by the hands of 
the Egyptians, as they have done with even stronger, greater and brutal 
regimes 
E1, EX12 
 نحن :رطاشلا لا يفخن لاو ركنن لاو لصنتن نم انتيوه ،ةيملاسلإا نحن باحصأ عورشم ،يملاسإ عورشم ةضهنل رصم 
ىلع ساسأ ةيعجرلما ةيملاسلإا هدو انتعانق يدو انتديقع هدو انجهنم يلاتلابو نحن لا دجن ةضاضغ يف نأ فصن 
انسفنأ اذهب فصولا وأ عفرن اذه راعشلا  قّوسنو هل جورنو هل دشحنو راصنلأا هلوح هبننو ةملأا ىلإ هنإ لحلا وه 
لثمتيب يف ملاسلإا انحإو ام ،شركتحنب حشرم بزحلا ينطولا يف دحأ رئاودلا سملأاب لاق ناوخلإا اولوقيب ملاسلإا وه 
لحلا انأ  لوقأب نآرقلا وه لحلا 
Translation Al-Shater: We do not hide our Islamic identity, we have an Islamic 
project; awakening project for Egypt based on Islamic values. This is our 
belief and approach. We do not find any problems describing ourselves 
as such or loudly market this slogan (Islamic identity)…I say not only 
Islam is the solution but also the Qur’an is the solution. 
E1, EX13 
  :رطاشلا هيوشت ةلواحم نع رارمتساب عروتت لا يتلا ةفورعلما ءارفصلا فحصلا ضعب نم ةلواحم ماهتلاا ةلأسم لك
هتاذ ملاسلإا نكلو طقف ناوخلإا سيل. 
Translation Al-Shater: The accusations from some tabloid media, not only hesitate to 
distort the image of the MB but also the image of Islam itself.  
E1, EX14 
  :رطاشلا ملسلما تيبلاو ملسلما درفلاب أدبتب يد ةضهنلا رصلم ةضهن قيقحتل ىعسن نكلو مكحلل ىعسن لا نحن
 ةلودلاو ملسلما عمتجلماوةيملاسلإا ةدحولل يعسلاو صرحلاو يملاسإ لكشب اهتاسسؤمب 
Translation Al-Shater: Our aim is not to rule but to achieve awakening for Egypt. 
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Such an awakening starts from the Muslim individuals and institutions, 
Muslim family, Muslim society and Muslim state, and to seek an Islamic 
unity.  
E6, EX15 
  :عيدب امك فقن امدنع ملاظ اي ملاظلل لوقنو فقن امدنع اننأ دحأ روصتي وأ هيلع تكسي رمأ اذه نأ روصتت له
 الله لوسر لاق امك لوقن نأ "رئاج ناطلس دنع قح ةملك داهجلا لضفأ نإ" ملسو هيلع الله ىلص الله لوسر انفصو
 ملسو هيلع ىلص نم رخؤي لاو لجأ نم مدقي لا هنإف هملع وأ هآر اذإ قحب لوقي نأ سانلا ةباهم مكدحأ نعنمي لا"
."قزر 
 
Translation Badei: Do you imagine that this is something we shouldn’t do anything 
about? We stand to say to the oppressor [Mubarak] that he is the 
oppressor. We are encouraged to stand against that, as described and 
advised by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) when he said: “The best 
jihad is a word of truth about an oppressor Sultan”; and we say as the 
Prophet once said: “the fear of people should not stop you from saying 
the word of truth when you acknowledge wrong-doing because this won’t 
change your divine livelihood.  
E6, EX16 
  روصنم دمحأ طابض اوحرجتبو بوطلاب نملأا اوبرضتب متنأ :..ةطرشلا 
:عيدب دمحم  ريوزتلا دوعت نم نإ لوقأ نكلو ةرلماب اذه اولعفي مل مهخيراتو نيملسلما ناوخلإا ةايح لوط ،ثدحي مل
 يبرحلا نجسلا لخاد نحنو مكاحن دمحأ ذاتسأ اي انك دقل .ةلطابلا تاماهتلاا هذه لثم هيلع دعبتسي لا بذكلاو
تب ةمكاحملل نومدقي مث نونفدي مث سانأ لتقيو يف مهونفدو مهولتق دق مهو ماكحأ مهيلع ردصي مث بورهلا ةمه
 تلفي نل يذلا باسحلا موي يتأيس نكلو اهبوعش ىلع بذكت بذكلا ىلع ةصيرح ةيلاوتم ةمظنأ ،ةيسابعلا ءارحص
.ىكنأو دشأ ةمايقلا موي لجو زع الله دنع هباسح اذه نم رثكأ لب ملاظ هيف 
Translation Mansour: You [the MB] are accused of stoning the security and hurting 
police officers… 
Badei: Throughout the history and life of the MB, this has never been 
done. However, I say that those who are used to fabricate and lie, it is not 
unusual to hear them saying fabricated accusations. We were imprisoned 
and sentenced in military courts. Some people were killed and buried and 
then fabricated accusation arose that these people tried to escape. 
Several regimes are profession liars; they lie to their own people. One 
day, Judgment Day will come and they will be punished. Allah’s wrath will 
be harder on them.  
E7, EX17 
 :روصنم دمحأ  و ىحلو حرط اهلك سانلا اوسبليه ناوخلإا نأكو عادبلإا ىلع نفلا ىلع ةماعلا تايرحلا ىلع قلق كانه
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 جلابيب؟
ما فيش حد بيلبس حد حاجة غصب عنه، هذا لا قانون ولا دستور ولا شرع ولا حاجة ما فيش حد  محمد مرس ي:
بيجبر حد إذا كان رب العباد سبحانه وتعالى أعطاهم الحق في أن يؤمنوا به أو لا يؤمنوا به فما بالنا بما هو أدنى من 
ر الاعتقاد في اختيار الإيمان من عدمه فهم أحرار ذلك، كل ما هو أدنى من ذلك الناس أحرار فيه ده هم أحرار في اختيا
في كل ما عدا ذلك، بس هذه الحرية التي لا تضر المجتمع بضوابط القانون والدستور اللي موجود في البلاد اللي متفق 
 عليه..
 seitrebil cilbup tuoba elpoep morf snrecnoc laer era erehT :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 ,sliev raew ot elpoep ecrof lliw BM eht fi sa ,ssenevitaerc dna tra gnidulcni
 ?sesserd cimalsI dna sdraeb worg
 ton ,lufwal ton si siht ;ecrof htiw gnihtyna sraew eno oN :isroM
 ot thgir eht meht evag elpoep fo rotaerC ehT .etamitigel dna lanoitutitsnoc
 dna sfeileb nwo rieht esoohc ot eerf era elpoeP .]doG[ mih no eveileb
 ni seiradnuob lateicos eht mrah ton seod taht modeerf eht tub htiaf
 deerga neeb sah dna stsixe taht noitutitsnoc eht dna wal htiw ecnadrocca
  .nopu
 81XE ,01E
 أحمد منصور: أنتم مستعدين تفتحوا حوار مع السيس ي أو مع الانقلابيين؟  
الرئيس الشرعي إحنا ندعو إلى الشرعية، والشرعية جاءت عن لا يوسف ندا: ليس من حق حد يفتح حوار مع أي حد إ
مع الشرعية إحنا ننادي لا يتكلم إيجوز أن حد لا طريق الانتخاب والشعب هو اللي جاب مرس ي مش إحنا اللي جبناه، 
 يمكن نكون أبدا..لا بعودة الشرعية إحنا ممكن نكون وسطاء لكن 
 إيه شكل الوساطة اللي ممكن تقوموا بها؟أحمد منصور: 
 نتحاور مع مرس ي.يوسف ندا: 
 ?sredael puoc ro isiS-lA htiw eugolaid a nepo ot gnilliw uoy erA :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 eht tpecxe enoyna htiw eugolaid a nepo ot thgir eht sah eno oN :adaN
 emac ycamitigel dna ,ycamitigel rof gnillac era eW .tnediserp etamitigel
 sah eno oN .su ton ,isroM thguorb evah elpoep eht dna noitcele hguorht
 eht rof gnillac er’ew dna ycamitigel hguorht tpecxe kaeps ot thgir eht
 .…ton tub srotaidem eb nac eW .ycamitigel fo nruter
 ?od ot gnilliw uoy era noitaidem fo mrof tahW :ruosnaM
 .isroM htiw eugolaiD :adaN
 91XE ,1E
نحن نتمنى على الحكومة وعلى النظام الحاكم أن يبدأ في إصلاح، إحنا حتى موافقين على إصلاح يبدأ بشكل الشاطر:  
تدريجي ولكن يبقى جاد وبخطوات محددة وواضحة بحيث إن يبقى في إصلاح سياس ي حقيقي في البلد لأن هذا الشعب 
وب أخرى نالت هذا الحق الآن، فلسنا أقل من العريق اللي بنى حضارات على مدار التاريخ أحق آلاف المرات من شع
قرغيزيا أو جورجيا أو أوكرانيا أو موزمبيق أو نيجيريا، هذه الدول أصبح فيها انتخابات وفيها تعددية وفيها تداول 
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 تايرحلا بايغ يف ،ةضهنلا قيقحتلو ةضهنللو ةيمنتلل ي سيئرلا لخدلما يه ةيرحلا نأ عيمجلا ملعيو ملعت امكو ةطلسلل
 لا ةيقيقح ةيمنت قيقحت يف لمأ 
Translation Al-Shater: We urge the government [the regime] to start the reform 
process. We would accept the reform to start gradually but a serious one, 
clear and specific in order to accomplish a true reform in this country. 
This esteemed nation [Egypt] who built civilisations around history, 
deserves [reform] as we are no less than other nations such as Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Nigeria. These countries have got democratic elections, 
diversity, and devolution of power. As everyone knows,freedom is central 
for development, Nahda (awakening). No freedom would mean no hope 
for real development. 
E1, EX20 
  :رطاشلا ةيرصلما ةيسايسلا ةايحلا كيرحت فدهب لمعت يتلاو رصم يف ةفيرشلا ةيسايسلا ىوقلا لكل حوتفم انباب انحإ
 حلاصلإ لوصولا ةلواحمو ةئيبلا تادرفم لك عم قيسنتلل دادعتسا ىلع نحن ببسلا اذهلو يقيقح يروتسدو ي سايس
ةلقتسلما تايصخشلا كلذكو ةهبجلا لخاد ةدوجوم يللا تاذلابو ةيرصلما ةيسايسلا 
Translation Al-Shater: Our door is open for honest political powers in Egypt which 
work on the basis of moving the political life forward in Egypt and attempt 
to reach political and constitutional reforms. We are ready to collaborate 
with all political powers, especially those from the Egyptian Front as well 
as independent political figures. 
E1, EX21 
  :رطاشلا دوكرلا ةلاح نع لوؤسلما وه نإ ىرخلأا ةيسايسلا ىوقلا عم ربتعنب انحإو هجمانرب هل ينطولا بزحلا نلأ
رصم يف ةدوجوم يللا ي سايسلا دادسنلااو ي سايسلا 
Translation Al-Shater: Because the ruling National Party [the Mubarak regime] has 
its own political programme, we - alongside other political powers - see 
this party [the Mubarak party] is responsible for political stagnation and 
for the political blockage in Egypt. 
E7, EX22 
 ا... :ي سرم رصم انفده ،ةيمنتلاو رارقتسلا وحن نوعاس مهتريسم يف نوداج نويرصلما نوداج انن  ،ةرقتسلما ةديدجلا
 فده ةيمنتلا ،كلذ قيقحتل 
ً
اعيمج ىعسن ،ةثيدحلا ةيروتسدلا ةيطارقميدلا ةينطولا ةلودلا رصم ،ةثيدحلا رصم
.الله ءاش نإ مهلك ،نييرصلما لك هيف كرحتيو هربعيس ليوط قيرط يف ىلوأ ةوطخ هذه ريبك 
Translation Morsi: We are serious and the Egyptians are serious in their choice. We 
will be moving forward towards stability and development. Our objective 
is to have a new and stable Egypt, modern Egypt, based on democracy 
and modern a constitution. We all seek to achieve this goal; development 
is a big objective and is the first step on a long road, which will be 
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crossed by all Egyptians, inshallah [if God wills].  
E1, EX23 
  )رطاشلا تريخل فيرعت( :روصنم دمحأ ماع ةيلهقدلا يف دلو1950 ، ةعماج نم ةسدنهلا سويرولاكب ىلع لصح
 ماع ةيردنكسلإا1974  ماع ةروصنلما ةعماج يف ريتسجالما ىلع هلوصح دعب ادعاسم اسردم مث اديعم نّيعو1981 
 ماعلا ىتح ادعاسم اسردم يقب ..ناك ثيح1981  كلذ دعب لصح ،ةريهشلا ربمتبس تارارقب نيلومشلما نم ناك ثيح
داهشلا نم اريبك ددع ىلع تاساردلا مولبدو سمش نيع ةعماج نم عامتجلاا مسق بادآ سناسيل اهنم ةيساردلا تا
 مولعلاو داصتقلاا ةيلك نم ةيموكحلا ريغ تامظنلماو يندلما عمتجلما مولبدو ةيملاسلإا تاساردلا دهعم نم ةيملاسلإا
 وستلا مولبدو سمش نيع ةعماج نم لامعلأا ةرادإ مولبدو ةرهاقلا ةعماجب ةيسايسلا ،ناولح ةعماج نم يلودلا قي
 ماع يملاسلإا لمعلا يف طرخنا1967  ماع نيملسلما ناوخلإاب طبتراو1974 ماع ىلولأا ،تارم عبرأ نجسلل ضرعت ،
1968  ماع ةريهشلا بلاطلا تارهاظم يف هكارتشلا رصانلا دبع دهع يف1968  ماع ةيناثلاو1992  يمس اميف ماع ةدلم
ف ةثلاثلا امأ ليبسلس ةيضقب ماع تناك1995  يتلا ناوخلإا اياضق ىدحإ يف تاونس سمخ نجسلاب هيلع مكح ثيح
 ماعلا يف تناكف ةعبارلا امأ ةيركسع ةمكحم مامأ ترظ
ُ
ن2002 ابيرقت ماع ةدلمو. 
Translation Ahmad Mansour (Introduction for Al-Shater): He was born in Doukahlya 
[east of Egypt] in 1950. He obtained his Bachelor degree in Engineering 
from Alexandria University in 1974. He was appointed as teaching 
assistant, following his Master’s degree from Al Mansoura University in 
1981. Then, he secured a large number of academic certificates including 
Diploma in Sociology from Ein Shams University, Diploma in the Islamic 
Studies from Islamic Studies Centre, Diploma in Civil Society and NGOs 
from Economics and Political Science from Cairo University, Diploma in 
Business Administration from Ein Shams University, Diploma in 
International Marketing from Helwan University. He became involved in 
Islamic work in 1967 and later joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1974. He 
was arrested four times. The first was in 1968 under Abdel Nasser’s 
regime because he was taking part in the famous student protests in 
1968. The second imprisonment was for one year in 1992 [as part of the 
Salsabil cause]. The third was in 1995, in which he was sentenced for five 
years, for one of the MB accusations which was looked at by a military 
court. The fourth one was in 2002, for almost one year.  
E9, EX24 
 .فيظن دمحأ شم ليدنقو كرابم شم ي سرم ينعي :روصنم دمحأ 
 قيرط نع هرييغت متي هريغ ديرأ اذإ بختنلما سيئرلا ،بختنم سيئر كانه يلاتلابو دكؤأ انأ ينعي :ليدنق ماشه
 يللاو ءاثلاثلا موي ثدحلا ،قودنصلا.تبسلا موي ةينويلم ثدحي دق يللاو ةعمجلا موي ثدحي دق  
Translation Mansour: This means that Morsi is not Mubarak and Qandeel is not 
Ahmad Natheef [Mubarak regime’s Prime Minister who’s known for his 
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corruption]. 
Qandeel: I assure you that there’s an elected president, and the elected 
president can be changed through a ballot box. 
E6, EX25 
 ف )عيدب دمحم فيرعت( :روصنم دمحأ دبع عيدب دمحم روتكدلا نيملسلما ناوخلإل ماعلا دشرلما عم رشابم راوح ي
 ماع ىربكلا ةلحلما ةنيدم يف دلو ،يماس ديجلما1943 بطلا ةيلك نم جرخت ، ماع هاروتكدلا ىلع لصحو يرطيبلا
1979  بطلل اذاتسأ حبصأو ةيذاتسلأا ةجرد ىلع لصح ،قيزاقزلا ةعماج يف يرطيبلا بطلا ةيلك يف اسردم نيعو
 ماع فيوس ينب عرف ةرهاقلا ةعماج بطلا ةيلك يف يرطيبلا1987 مث نيترودل يجولوثابلا مسقل اسيئر اهدعب حبصأ ،
اساردلا نوؤشل ةيلكلل لايكو ىلع فرشأ ،ةدحاو ةرودل ايلعلا ت15 و ريتساجملل ةلاسر12  تارشعو هاروتكدلل ةلاسر
 يف همسا جردأو نيترودل رصم يف نييرطيبلا ءابطلأا ةباقنل اماع انيمأ حبصأ ،هصصخت لاجم يف ةيملعلا ثاحبلأا
 ماع ةيرصلما تاملاعتسلاا ةئيه اهتردصأ يتلا ةيبرعلا ةيملعلا ةعوسولما1999  دحاوك .يبرع ملاع ةئام مظعأ نم
 ماع لقتعاو نيملسلما ناوخلإا ةعامج ىلإ اركبم ىمتنا1965  ديهشلا ميظنت مساب فرع يذلا ناوخلإا ميظنت نمض
 نجسلاب هيلع مكح ،بطق ديس15  ماع ليربأ يف هنع جرفأو ماوعأ ةعست اهنم ى ضق اماع1974 ةيناث ةرم لقتعا ،
 ماع1998  ى ضقو75 مث ،نجسلا يف اموي  ماعلا يف1999  ماع ليربأ يف مث تاونس ثلاث ى ضقو2008  ارهش ى ضقو
 ماع رصم يف داشرلإا بتكم يف اوضع ريتخا .ادحاو1996  نيملسلما ناوخلإل يلودلا ميظنتلل داشرلإا بتكم يف اوضع مث
 ماع2007 .ي ضالما رياني يف نيملسلما ناوخلإل اماع ادشرم مث 
Translation Mansour: [Introduction to Badei] The General Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Dr. Mohamed Badie Sami Abdul Majid, was born in the big 
city of Mahalla in 1943, graduated from the Faculty of Veterinary 
Medicine and received his doctorate in 1979; he was appointed a teacher 
at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Zagazig University. He obtained 
a professorship of Veterinary Medicine at the Faculty of Medicine, Cairo 
University, Beni Suef department in 1987, then became head of the 
Department of Pathology for both, then the head of the School of 
Graduate Studies for one semester. He supervised 15 Master’s and 12 
Ph.D. papers and dozens of scientific research projects in his field. He 
became Secretary General of the Association of Veterinarians in Egypt 
for two tenures. His name was included in the Arabic scientific 
encyclopedia, issued by the Egyptian State of Information Service in 
1999, as one of the top one hundred Arab world scientists. He joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood and was arrested in 1965 […] He was sentenced to 
15 years in prison; he spent 9 years in jail and then was released in April 
1974. He was then arrested for the second time in 1998 and spent 75 
days behind bars; then, in 1999, he spent 3 years in prison, and in April 
2008, he was jailed for one month. He was selected as a member of the 
High Guidance Office in Egypt in 1996, then a member of the 
373 
 
International Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2007, and then 
appointed as General Guide for the movement, last January 
E7, EX26 
 :روصنم دمحأ يفو )ي سرم دمحم فيرعت( هذه ةقلحلا  لواحن فرعتلا ىلع ةيؤر ناوخلإا نيملسلما لبقتسلم رصم 
مهعورشمو ضوهنلل اهب نم للاخ انراوح عم  روتكدلا دمحم ي سرم سيئر بزح ةيرحلا ،ةلادعلاو جرخت نم ةيلك 
ةسدنهلا ةعماج ةرهاقلا ماع 1975 لصح ىلع ريتسجالما يف ةجرد ةسدنه تازلفلا نم ةعماج ةرهاقلا ىلعو ةجرد 
هاروتكدلا نم ةعماج بونج اينروفيلاك ماع 1982 لمع  
ً
اذاتسأ ادعاسم يف ةعماج ثرون جدير يف تايلاولا ةدحتلما يف 
اينروفيلاك نيب يماع 1982 -1985 لمع  
ً
اذاتسأ  
ً
اسيئرو مسقل ةسدنه تازلفلا يف ةعماج قيزاقزلا نم ماعلا 1985 
ىتحو ماعلا 2010 ناك  
ً
اوضع  
ً
اسيئرو ةلتكلل ةينالمربلا ناوخلإل نيملسلما يف سلجم بعشلا للاخ ةرتفلا نيب يماع 
2000-2005 ريتخاو لضفأك ينالمرب يف ملاعلا نم للاخ هئادأ ينالمربلا للاخ كلت ،ةرتفلا  روتكد  
ً
ابحرم كب. 
Translation Mansour: In this episode, we try to introduce the MB’s vision for Egypt’s 
future and their project to evolve it [Egypt] through our dialogue with Dr 
Mohammed Morsi, the president of the Freedom and Justice Party. He 
graduated from Engineering Colleague, Cairo University in 1975, got his 
Masters in Filzat Engineering from Cairo University, and a Ph.D. from 
South California University in 1982. He worked as assistant professor in 
North Ridge University in the U.S. in California between 1982 and 1985. 
He worked as a lecturer and head of Filzat Engineering department in 
Zagazeeq University from 1985 until 2010. He was a member and a 
president in the parliamentary block for the MB in Parliament between 
2000 and2005. He was selected as the best parliamentarian in the world 
due to his performance…Welcome Dr. 
E1, EX27 
  :رطاشلا ريبك لكشب ةديدج ةيطارقميد ةلحرلم رصم لوخدل لخدم يه اهنأ ىلع اهعضو يف م
َ
خَضُيب ةينالمربلا تاباختنلاا
 هذه ىلع ةفلتخلما ةزهجلأاو تاسسؤلماو ملاعلإا لئاسو هب طلستب يللا ريبكلا مجحلا نأ دقتعأ لا انأو يف هنإ ةلأسلما
 تانوكلما ءايحإو داجيإو ءانب نم دبلا ،بعشلا سلجم ةرئاد جراخ ادج ةريثك ىرخأ رومأ ىلإ جاتحي عضولا هنلأ هلحم
 لبقتلا ةفاقثل ،ةيددعتلا ةفاقثل ،ةكراشلما ةفاقثل رشنو جيورت نيزياع انحإ ،ةيرصلما ةيسايسلا ةئيبلل ةيساسلأا
طلسلا لوادت ةفاقثل ،رخلآل...، 
Translation Al-Shater: The process of the parliamentary election is exaggerated and 
depicted as a gate for Egypt toaccess a new democracy. I do not think 
that the picture painted in the media and in the different security services 
[the Mubarak security services] is correct. There are so many things that 
need to be done outside the Parliament. We want a campaign to 
advocate for political participation’s culture, diversity, accepting the 
others, and devolution of power. 
E9, EX28 
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جمع فلول الناصريين واليساريين والنظام السابق والاشتراكين الثوريين والفنانين أحمد منصور: دكتور ما الذي  
والرقاصين والطبالين والدنيا كلها اللي خرجت في ميدان التحرير مع الفلول في هذا التحالف ضد الحكومة، وهم كلهم 
 عمرهم ما تحالفوا مع بعض ضد الحكومة وضد الرئيس وأنتم تتابعون المشهد ولا.
 ام قنديل: أستاذ أحمد الديمقراطية، الديمقراطية إن يكون فيها معارضة إن يكون فيها رأي آخر.هش
 suoiverp eht fo ’stnanmer eht‘ lla emoc woh ,leednaQ rD :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 era ,sremmurd ,srecnad ,stsitra ,stsinummoc ,stsitfel ,setiressaN :semiger
 ro enecs lacitilop eht wollof uoy oD ?tnemnrevog eht tsniaga noitilaoc ni
 ?ton
 .sweiv etisoppo dna noitisoppo sah ycarcomed - ycarcomeD :leednaQ
 92XE ,1E
محمد خيرت الشاطر: لو بحثت في التاريخ المصري الحديث لن تجد قوة سياسية تحالفت مع قوة أخرى ونسقت معها  
والآن قبل  7891، تحالفوا مع العمل والأحرار سنة 4891قدر الإخوان، الإخوان نسقوا مع الوفد وتحالفوا مع الوفد 
ا ذهبنا للعربي الناصري وذهبنا للتجمع وذهبنا للوفد انتخابات الرئاسة وفي بدايات الحراك السياس ي وقبله إحن
وعرضنا عليهم إن إحنا نعمل لجنة خمسين ونحاول صياغة مشروع لإنقاذ البلد مما هي فيه والإصلاح السياس ي 
 والدستوري 
 yna dnif ton dluow uoy ,yrotsih nredom naitpygE ta kool uoy fI :retahS-lA noitalsnarT
 .BM eht sa hcum sa srewop rehto htiw detaroballoc sah rewop lacitilop
 htiw noitilaoc a dah ,4891 ni ytrap defaW-lA htiw detanidrooc sah BM ehT
 eht htiw ,noitcele eht erofeb dna woN .7891 ni ytrap eerF dna ruobaL
 barA lA dehcaorppa evah ew ,erofeb dna scimanyd lacitilop fo trats
 a mrof ot meht dereffo dna ytraP defaW dna ,traP ytinU ,traP etarisaN
 dna ]tpygE[ yrtnuoc siht evas ot tcejorp lacitilop a tfard ot eettimmoc
  .smrofer lanoitutitsnoc dna lacitilop hsilbatse
 03XE ,6E
أنا أقول إننا التقينا بقيادات مصر السياسية في ثلاثة لقاءات كلهم كان همهم أن مصر الآن في مفصل  محمد بديع: 
تغيير ولا يمكن التغيير إلا بالصور السلمية عن طريق صندوق الانتخابات، الذين يرفضون الدخول في الانتخابات لا 
لأمر سيزور ولكن كل هذه القوى السياسية قالت يرفضونها من أجل أنها أسلوب لا يصلح ولكنهم يعلمون أن هذا ا
يجب أن نحرص على منع هذه الانتخابات من التزوير وبالتالي عندما يكون هناك موقف موحد لمنع التزوير سيسترد 
هذا الشعب حقه ولهذا أقول لكل من ينصحنا هذه النصيحة جزاك الله خيرا، نحن قد استطلعنا رأي مجلسنا 
 % مع الانتخابات مع العلم بأن كل ما سيحدث سيرتكبه الجهاز الأمني وسيرتكبه 89جة الشوري وكانت النتي
 tnereffid eerht no sredael lacitilop s’tpygE htiw tem evah eW :iedaB noitalsnarT
 dna egnahc eht tuoba denrecnoc ylpeed erew meht fo llA .snoisacco
 hguorht dna snaem lufecaep yb neppah ylno nac egnahc eht taht deerga
 yeht esuaceb ti ttocyob yeht ,noitcele eht ttocyob ohw esohT .sexob tollab
 noitcele eht fo esuaceb ton detacirbaf eb lliw noitcele eht taht wonk
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approach per se … I would say to everyone [from the opposition] who 
advised us not to go through with the election - thank you! We have 
consulted with Al Shoura Council and the result was 98 per cent not to 
boycott, despite all the awareness of what the security services may do 
[to us].  
E7, EX31 
 :روصنم دمحأ  ىلع متلصح متنأ روتكد اي نلآا47 اوطختت نأ ىلإ ةجاحب متنأ سلجلما ءاضعأ ددع ةبسن نم 
ً
ابيرقت %
50 وأ نيناوقلا وأ اهريرمت نوديرت يتلا تاعيرشتلا ريرمت اوعيطتست ىتح نيثلثلا ىلإ ةجاحبو ةموكحلا اولكشت ىتح %
 ىلإ ةجاحب متنأ ،نالمربلا يف اهريرمت نوديرت يتلا تلايدعتلا نم عم ،ىرخلأا بازحلأاو لتكلا عم نالمربلا لخاد تافلاحت
؟نوفلاحتتس 
:ي سرم دمحم  ءانبلاو دفولاو رونلاو ةلادعلاو ةيرحلا بازحلأا نم ددع نيب نالمربلا ليكشت ىلع قافتا دجوي نلآا
 
ً
اضيأ 
ً
اربعمو 
ً
انزاوتم 
ً
لايكشت نالمربلا ليكشت نوكي نأ ىلع انقفتا بازحلأا نم ددع كانه ةيمنتلاو حلاصلإاو ةيمنتلاو
.دعاقلما بسن نع 
Translation Mansour: Now, you [the MB] have secured 47 per cent from the overall 
parliamentary seats, you need 50 per cent in order to form a government 
and to be able to pass legislation that you would want to pass or make 
laws or make amendments to the existing laws. You require coalitions 
with other parties, with whom you would make a coalition? 
Morsi: There is an agreement to form the parliament between number of 
parties including Freedom and Justice party (the MB), Al-Nour, 
Development and Reform Party and others. We have agreed to form a 
balanced parliament and represent all parties on a percentage-based 
distribution. 
E1, EX32 
  :رطاشلا خياشلم تاباختنا نيزياع ،دمعلل تاباختنا نيزياع ،اهتاذ دح يف ةيسايسلا ةكراشلما يف لوخدلل سانلا معدل
 تاباختنا نيزياع ،تايلكلا ءادمعل نيزياع ،دلبلا هذه لك هنلأ ،ةيبلاطلا تاداحتلال تاباختنا نيزياع ،تاباقنلل
ةيسايسلا ةئيبلل ةيساسلأا ةينبلا تاموقم لامكتساو كيرحت هاجتا يف بصتب لئاسلما. 
Translation Al-Shater: We work to support people for political participation. We [the 
MB] ask for elections for county chiefs, mayors, colleges, syndicates, 
student unions. All these practices would complement the political 
infrastructure’s establishment and political environment.  
E6, EX33 
  روصنم دمحأ؟اوعجارتت نل : 
:عيدب دمحم ..الله نذإبو عجارتن نل 
 روصنم دمحأ؟نولصاوتس : 
 673
 
 الشعب المصري بإذن الله ستراه يقف مع جماعة الإخوان المسلمين حتى يستردوا حقهم وحقه المسلوب محمد بديع:
 ?]noitcele eht ni trap gnikat morf[ taerter ton lliw ]BM eht[ uoY :ruosnaM noitalsnarT
 !ton lliw ew ,on :iedaB
  ?eunitnoc ]BM eht[ uoy dnA :ruosnaM
 edis s’BM eht yb dnats lliw ,)ti slliw hallA fi( elpoep naitpygE ehT :edaB
 sthgir nelots rieht kcab ekat yeht litnu
 43XE ,6E
مصر إذا استمرت على هذا الحال ستكون كارثة على هذا الشعب وعلى هذا الوطن، أنا أقول يا عقلاء  محمد بديع: 
لكم ولسمعتكم بما تدعمونه به الآن،  المؤسسات الحكومية تداركوا مصر ولا تسمحوا للحزب الوطني أن يكون ملوثا
أثبت فشله وأخذ أكثر من مرة مؤسسات مصر ملك شعب مصر وليست ملك الحزب الوطني، الحزب الوطني حزب 
فرصا للنجاح وفشل فقد استنفد مرات الرسوب ويجب علينا أن ننحيه عن مكانه بالوسائل السلمية التي قررها 
 الدستور والقانون والتي هي حق الشعب المصري وحده وليس معه أحد آخر.
 a eb dluow ereht ,yaw a hcus ni seunitnoc tpygE ni noitautis eht fI :iedaB noitalsnarT
 d’I .yrtnuoc siht rof dna ]snaitpygE eht[ elpoep eseht rof ehportsatac laer
 ot deen uoy ,snoitutitsni latnemnrevog eht edisni elpoep esiw eht ot yas
 ruoy trotsid ot ]s’karabuM[ ytraP lanoitaN eht wolla ton od dna tpygE evas
 eht ot ton elpoep eht ot gnoleb snoitutitsni naitpygE ehT .noitatuper
 nekat sah ti ;eruliaf a eb ot nevorp sah ytraP lanoitaN ehT .ytraP lanoitaN
 rehtona nevig eb ton dluohs dna deliaf sah tub deeccus ot ecnahc sti
 wal eht ot gnidrocca – snaem lufecaep yb – meht tsuo tsum eW .ecnahc
 enoyna ton ,enola elpoep naitpygE eht ot gnoleb hcihw ,snoitutitsnoc dna
  .esle
 53XE ,1E
أحمد منصور: رشحتم سيدة واحدة هي الدكتورة مكارم الديري في دائرة مدينة نصر، هل هذا فقط من أجل أن  
 تثبتوا كإخوان أنكم لكم موقف إيجابي من المرأة أم أنه ليس لديكم مرشحات أخريات بالفعل؟
الشاطر: لا إحنا الحمد لله بفضل الله لدينا الكثير من المرشحات ولدينا مجال في العمل النسائي وعمل محمد خيرت 
الأخوات في جماعة الإخوان المسلمين عملوا معروف ولنا كثير من اللجان والجمعيات وده أمر مستقر ومعلوم من 
نا.. يعني نؤمن بالتدرج في الخطوات، فإحنا الآن الحياة السياسية في مصر والاجتماعية بالضرورة ولكن هي القضية أن
داخلين في معركة انتخابية، إحنا رصيدنا وتجاربنا وخبراتنا في المعارك الانتخابية الماضية كلها إنها كانت بتحتاج إلى 
 الآن جهد غير عادي، بنتعرض إلى اعتقالات وإلى تضييق، فنحن لا نريد أن نعرض المرأة إلى مثل هذه التحديات والله
ا 
ّ
فيه كلام إن الانتخابات هتبقى نزيهة أو شبه نزيهة فبنجرب بإمرأة واحدة وإن شاء الله تعالى في الانتخابات القادمة لم
يتأكد لدينا يعني عزم الحكومة والنظام الأكيد وإرادتها القوية في إنها تجري انتخابات نزيهة ويبقى الأمر ده معروف 
 .ترشيح العديد من النساءومستقر فنحن على استعداد ل
 ot ,irredlA merakaM rD ,ydal eno drawrof tup evah uoY :ruosnaM damhA noitalsnarT
 ,taht wohs ot siht si ,ycneutitsnoc s’ytiC resaN lA rof etadidnac a sa nur
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as the MB, it has a positive attitude towards women, or do you have other 
female candidates? 
Al-Shater: We, thanks to Allah [God], we have many female candidates. 
We have a track record for working with women. Sisters in the MB have 
are recognised for their work. We have so many committee and 
institutions [for women] in the Egyptian political and social spectrums. We 
believe in gradual work. We are going into an electoral battle. Our past 
experiences in such electoral battles have toughened us and requires 
extraordinary effort. We are normally ubjected to arrests, harassments. 
We don’t want to expose women candidates to such challenges. In this 
election, we will present one woman, but [if God wills it] in the coming 
election, once we make sure that the government [Mubarak] is serious 
and has the will to run a transparent election, then we would be ready to 
present more women candidates.  
E1, EX36 
 ؟طابقلأا نيبو مكنيب تافلاحتلاو تاقلاعلا ةعيبط ام يطبقلا حشرلما صوصخب :روصنم دمحأ 
 رخآ ليصف يأ نأش مهنأش ،ةيسايسلا ةايحلا يف طابقلأا ليثمت نم دبلا هنإ ةعانق ىلع نحن :رطاشلا تريخ دمحم
دوجوم  رصم ةضهن ةيضقو نلآا رصم ةيضق نع ملكتنب انحإ امنإ نيدلا ةيضق نع رظنلا ضغب يرصلما عمتجلما يف
 هنإ ىرن نحن يلاتلابو دوجوم يللا دادبتسلااو داسفلاو فلختلا ثلثم ى شفت دعبو ةديدشلا فلختلا ةلاح دعب اهءانبو
قلاع طابقلأاب انتقلاعو ةل
َ
ثممو ةدوجوم نوكت نأ دبلا ىوقلا لك تسيلو مايلأا هذه ةديلو تسيلو ةرمتسمو ةيحص تا
تاباختنلااب ةطبترم.. 
 Mansour: In relation to the Copt candidate, what is the nature of the 
coalition between you the Copts? 
Al Shater: Regardless of religion, We strongly believe that the 
representation - as much as other political parties - of Copts in the 
political life is inevitable. We talk about Egypt and its awakening and 
progress following its status of extreme backwardness; in the wake of the 
triangle of backwardness, corruption, and oppression [referring to the 
Mubarak regime] we have been living under, we believe that all political 
power must exist and be represented. Our relationship with Copts is 
healthy and continuing. It does not exist because of the election only.  
E1, EX37 
  :رطاشلا،عيمجلل مولعم وه امك ةنس ةئامعبرو فلأ نم رثكأ نم طابقلأا عم نيملسمك شياعت ةلاح يف انحإ هنلأ 
Translation Al-Shater: We are as Muslims in a status of co-existence with Copts for 
more than 1,400 years, as everyone knows.  
E1, EX38 
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 ؟نلآا ةسينكلاب مكتقلاع ةعيبطو :روصنم دمحأ 
رطاشلا تريخ دمحم:  ةقلاعو مهلافحلأ اننوعديو انلافحلأ مهوعدن ةماع ةفصب ةدوجوم ..تاونسلا يف ةبيط ةقلاعلا
اهركعي ام دجوي لا ينعي ..ةبيط ةيعيبط.  
Translation Mansour: the nature of your relationship with the Church now? 
Al-Shater: In general, the relation is good and existing! We invite them to 
our celebrations and in they invite us to theirs. The relation is natural and 
good and there’s nothing ruining it.  
E8, EX39 
  لوقن ام يز ايندلا مأ تلاز لا رصم ،ةباغ تسيل رصم لاوأ :ليدنق ماشه...  يللا ريغ روظنمب اناري ملاعلا نأ انل دكؤت
.يرصلما ملاعلإا شوفوشب ام مه نكمي وأ يرصلما ملاعلإا يف رهظي 
Translation Qandeel: Egypt is not a jungle. Egypt is the mother of this universe. The 
outside world see us differently from the picture [negative] which is 
painted by the Egyptian media …  
E1, EX40 
  :رطاشلا ةيباختنا ةلمح لك يف انحإ ،ةيضالما ةيباختنلاا تارودلا يف ماظنلا عم مهتقلاعو ناوخلإا خيرات رضحتست ينعي
فلاآ ةدع لقتعيب انيحشرمب  ...ةيضالما تاونسلا يف ةريثكلا ةينملأا تابرضلا ةجيتن انحإو... 
Translation Al-Shater: When referring to the history of the MB and its relations with 
the regime [Mubarak’s] in the past electoral periods, with every electoral 
campaign, thousands of us get arrested…we have been subjected to 
security strikes in the last few years. 
E1, EX41 
  :رطاشلا بزحلا نم مدقأ مه ةيخيراتلا ةيحانلا نمو ةنس نيعبس نم رثكأ نم نيدوجوم ناوخلإا هدراهنلا ينعي
ينطولا  ... ،ةخسارو ةتباثو ةدوجوم ةيروتسدلاو ةينوناقلا انتيعرش نأ ربتعنوةدوجوم ةيخيراتلا انتيعرش 
Translation Al-Shater: The MB has existed for more than 70 years. Historically 
speaking, they [the MB] are older than the ruling National Party. Our 
legitimacy exists, well rooted and historic. 
E6, EX42 
  .... :عيدب انملع امك هذه نودسفي مهكرتن نلو انعم اوجنو انوجن مهيديأ ىلع انذخأ اذإ ملسو هيلع الله ىلص الله لوسر
 نحنف نوروظحم اننإ انع نولوقي مهنأ امأ ،قيرعلا خيراتلا بحاص يلاغلا نطولا اذه نودسفي مهكرتن نلو ةنيفسلا
 رقميدلا نوعدت نم اي ديحولا رارقلا بحاص وهو يرصلما انبعش ىلإ مكتحن عقوم ام مكبعش اولس ،ةنطاولماو ةيطا
.مهبحو مهبولق نم لب مهتاوصأ نم طقف سيل نيملسلما ناوخلإا 
 
Translation Badei: As our Prophet (PBUH) taught us that if we support them [the 
Egyptian people] we will survive together. We will not let them corrupt this 
ship and this precious country that has ancient history. They [the 
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Mubarak regime] can describe us as banned, but we always leave the 
people to judge us, as they have the final word. For those who claim to be 
democratic and nationalists, ask your people about the place of the MB 
not only by counting their votes but also from deep inside their hearts and 
love.  
E11, EX43 
  :روصنم دمحأ يف قارعلا يف ايروس يف رصم يف ةريثك تاءلاتباو نحلم نوضرعتي ةيضالما ةنسلا نيتسلا لوط ناوخلإا
 اهل نوضرعتي يتلا ةنحلما نكل ةريثك لود؟كلذك سيلأ رصم يف مهخيرات يف ربكلأا ربتعت يه نلآا رصم يف 
 :ادن فسوي.لا 
 :روصنم دمحأ.رصم يف 
 :ادن فسوي.لا 
 :روصنم دمحأ؟ىتم يد نم ربكا ةنحلم متضرعت متنا بط 
 :ادن فسوي.قباس نوجسم دحاو كملكب انأ دمحأ خأ 
 :روصنم دمحأ لأاو تلتقو تدهشتسا يتلا دادعلأا هذه فسوي ذاتسأ ددع ربكأ نودراطي نيذلاو نوجسلا يف يتلا دادع
.ناوخلإا خيرات يف 
 :ادن فسوي.مامت هد 
 :روصنم دمحأ.حيحص 
 :ادن فسوي.حيحص 
Translation Mansour: The MB, during the last sixty years, has faced lots of crises in 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and many others places; in Egypt, this crisis they’re 
facing… in Egypt now… is the biggest in their history, isn’t that right? 
Nada: No. 
Mansour: in Egypt? 
Nada: No. 
Mansour: Tell me, have you been in a crisis bigger than this? 
Nada: I’m speaking to you… and I was in jail before. 
Mansour: Mr Yusif, the number of people martyred and killed, and the 
number of people in prison, and those being chased, is the biggest 
number in the history of the Brothers?  
Nada: That is correct. 
Mansour: Correct? 
Nada: Correct. 
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Appendix (2): Faisal Al Qassem’s Opposite Direction 
 
2.1 List of selected episodes of Opposite Direction 
 
# Title Translation  Date Code 
1 طاشنلا ي سايسلا ناوخلإل نيملسلما   The MB’s political activities 31.5.2005 EP13 
2 حاستكا نييملاسلإا تاباختنلال ةيبرعلا   Islamists’ sweeping vitctory 
in Arab Elections 
6.12.2005 EP14 
3 تاباختنلاا ةيبرعلا ..ءاسؤرلا  نوحجني 
امئاد  
Arab Elections … Presidents 
always win 
22.6.2010 EP15 
4 قييضت قانخلا ىلع تايئاضفلا ةينيدلا   Tighiting the grip on religious 
satellite televisons 
16.11.2010 EP15 
5 اذالم لا  روتث بوعشلا ةيبرعلا  Why Arab Nations do not 
revolt 
25.11.2010 EP17 
6 اذالم ققح  لولف كرابم جئاتن ةئجافم يف 
تاباختنلاا ؟ةيسائرلا   
Why have Mubarak remnant 
(Floul) achieved unexpected 
results in the presential 
election. 
6.6.2012 EP18 
7 تلاارنج رصم  نوبلقني ىلع ةروثلا   Egypt’s Colonels made coup 
against the revolution 
19.6.2012 EP19 
8 راصتنا نييملاسلإا ةميزهو تارايتلا 
 ىرخلأا  
The victor of Islamists and 
the defeat of other parties 
4.9.2012 EP20 
9 له هجتت رصم هاجتاب ةيروتاتكد ةديدج 
مأ يمحت ؟ةروثلا   
Is Egypt going toward a new 
dictatorship or revolution 
protection?  
4.12.2012 EP21 
10 نم دوقي رصم ىلإ ى ضوفلا ؟بارخلاو   Who’s leading Egypt 
towards chaos and 
destruction? 
2.7.2013 EP22 
11 عقاو تايرحلا ةيملاعلإا يف رصم دعب 
بلاقنلاا 
Media freedom’s reality in 
Egypt following the military 
coup. 
15.4.2014 EP23 
12 له مدختسي نملأا يموقلا ةعازف 
؟رصمب 
Can the national security 
issue be used to scare 
people in Egypt 
20.5.2014 EP24 
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 noitceriD etisoppO fo sedosipe detceles eht morf stcartxE 2.2
 
 0XE ,41PE
القاسم: تحية طيبة مشاهدّي الكرام، ألم يفُ ز الإسلاميون بنسبة هائلة من مقاعد البرلمان في مصر بالرغم من كل فيصل  
الضغوط والتزوير والبلطجة؟ يتساءل ناشط إسلامي، فكيف لو كانت الانتخابات حرة ونزيهة لفاز الإسلاميون بأكثر من 
% من الأصوات؟ ألم تثبت الانتخابات 08للإنقاذ في الجزائر بأكثر من  % من المقاعد تماما كما فازت الجبهة الإسلامية09
في معظم الدول أن الإسلاميين هم القوة الأولى في الشارع العربي بالرغم من اضطهادهم وقمعهم وملاحقتهم واستئصالهم 
العرب أي محل من الإعراب إلا في أميركيا وعربيا؟ ألا يسيطر الإسلاميون على المشهد العراقي؟ هل لليبراليين والعلمانيين 
محل مجرور؟ ألم ينضوي الليبراليون العراقيون تحت عباءة المرجعيات الدينية كي يصلوا إلى الجمعية الوطنية؟ أليس 
هناك صحوة إسلامية عظيمة من جاكرتا إلى عّمان؟ لماذا لا يحترم الذين يتشدقون بالديمقراطية إرادة الشعوب عندما 
يين؟ لماذا يصبح الشعب شعبويا عندما يصّوِ ت لحركة إسلامية؟ لكن في المقابل أليس تصويت الناخبين تختار الإسلام
للتيار الإسلامي دليل على تخلفهم وعدم نضجهم الديمقراطي؟ يتساءل آخر، متى يصّوِ ت الإنسان العربي من أجل 
ت المصريون حبا في الإخوان أم كرها في النظام؟ مصالحه الإنسانية بدلا من التصويت لإرضاء نزاعاته الغيبية؟ هل صوَّ 
هل صام الشعب العربي ليفطر على حكم كهنوتي قروسطي؟ من قال إن الإسلاميين مظلومون أميركيا وعربيا؟ هل كانوا 
 سيشاركون في أي انتخابات لولا المباركة الأميركية؟
 eht fo egatnecrep evissam a now stsimalsI taht eurt ti t’nsI :messaQ-lA noitalsnarT
 dna noitacirbaf ,erusserp eht lla fo etips ni ,staes yratnemailrap naitpygE
 ?riaf dna eerf erew snoitcele eht fi tahW .sksa tsimalsI na ?gniyllub
 t’nerA ]...[ ,staes eht fo tnec rep 09 naht erom now evah dluoc stsimalsI
 eno rebmun eht era stsimalsI taht foorp setats barA tsom ni snoitcele hcus
 dna tiusrup ,noisserppo ,noitucesrep fo etips ni ,teerts barA eht ni rewop
 eht t’nod ,dnah rehto eht no tub ]…[ ?sbarA dna snaciremA yb gnitoorpu
 fo kcal dna ecnarongi tcelfer ot dnet stsimalsI eht rof etov ohw sretov
 a ti saw ro BM eht ni etov yllaer snaitpygE eht diD ?ytirutam citarcomed
 era stsimalsI taht dias ohW ?emiger eht etah yeht esuaceb etov tsetorp
 ni detapicitrap evah ton dluow yehT ?sbarA dna snaciremA yb desserppo
 .gnisselb naciremA tuohtiw noitcele eht
 1XE / 41PE
فيصل القاسم: تحية طيبة مشاهدي الكرام، عاد الإخوان المسلمون مرة أخرى إلى الواجهة السياسية في مصر وسوريا  
وفلسطين والأردن وغيره مطالبين بالإصلاح ومستعدين للمشاركة في العملية السياسية، إنها يقظة الإخوان ما العيب في 
ستغل هذه الحركة العريقة الظروف الداخلية 
َ
والخارجية لتعزيز مواقفها؟ أليست القوة المجتمعية والسياسية أن ت
َبى؟ أليس من حق 
َ
َبى من أ
َ
الوحيدة التي تنافس الأنظمة الحاكمة وتستأثر بالشارع من المحيط إلى الخليج شاء من شاء وأ
وحرية التعبير  الإخوان دخول الساحة بعد أن باتوا يرفضون العنف ويقبلون بالديمقراطية واحترام حقوق الإنسان
وحقوق المرأة؟ أليسوا البديل الأفضل لمعظم الحكومات العربية التي أوصلت بلدانها إلى الحضيض سياسيا واقتصاديا 
 283
 
واجتماعيا؟ ما العيب في أن يتحاور الإخوان المسلمون مع أميركا؟ وهل هذه تهمة؟ ألم يصل الإسلاميون إلى السلطة في 
لإخوانية في اللعبة السياسية الفلسطينية؟ ألم تتخل واشنطن عن خشيتها من وصول العراق؟ ألم تدخل حركة حماس ا
الإخوان إلى السلطة؟ ألم يصبح تخوين حركة الإخوان المسلمين ووصمها بالرجعية والتخلف كذبة كبرى لا يمكن أن 
وزير الداخلية السعودي قد اعتبرهم  تنطلي على أحد؟ لكن في الاتجاه الآخر لماذا الاندفاع وراء الإخوان المسلمين إذا كان
أصل البلاء في العالم العربي؟ ألم تقل السعودية التي رعتهم وحضنتهم إن كل مشاكلها وإفرازاتها جاءت من الإخوان 
غّيِ ر جلدها لكن لا يمكن 
ُ
المسلمين وإنهم أساءوا للمملكة كثيرا؟ ثم هل تغير الإخوان حقا أم أنهم كالأفعى التي يمكن أن ت
غّيِ ر غريزتها؟ أليس الفكر الإخواني أخطر أنواع الفكر السياس ي الإسلامي؟ ألا يعتمد على الانتهازية؟ يتساءل آخر، ألا أ
ُ
ن ت
يحتاج الإنسان إلى ُمنّجِ م لكي يعرف موقف الإخوان من هذه القضية أو تلك؟ ويضيف أحدهم لا نريد حكما دينيا قائما 
زالوا يعتقدون أن الحاكمية ليست للبشر؟ ألم يصفهم كتاب آخر بجماعة العميان على قلة العقل واحتقار العلم، أما 
المسلمين في الدين والسياسة لأنهم خطفوا الدين ورهنوه عندهم مقابل الوصول إلى مكاسب سياسية؟ فمتى يكف 
 الإخوان عن العبث بالعالم العربي؟
 ,airyS ,tpygE ni eniltnorf lacitilop eht no kcab si BM ehT :messaQ-lA noitalsnarT
 ot gnilliw dna mrofer rof gnillac ,no os dna ,nadroJ dna enitselaP
 oS .srehtorB eht fo laviver eht si sihT .ssecorp lacitilop eht ni etapicitrap
 yolpme ot sehsiw ,tnemevom lacirotsih a hcus ,BM eht fi gnorw si tahw
 ti t’nsI ?noitisop lacitilop sti ecrofne ot redro ni srotcaf lanretxe dna lanretni
 semiger gnilur eht tsniaga sdnats taht rewop lacitilop dna laicos ylno eht
 eht fo trap eb ot thgir s’BM eht ti t’nsI ?teerts barA eritne eht slortnoc dna
 dna ,ycarcomed detpecca ,ecneloiv decnuoned sah ti retfa anera lacitilop
 tsom ot evitanretla retteb eht ti t’nsI ?sthgir s’nemow dna namuh detcepser
 ,mottob-kcor ot elpoep nwo rieht del evah taht stnemnrevog barA eht fo
 yhw ,noitcerid rehto eht ni tuB ]…[ ?yllaicos dna yllacimonoce ,yllacitilop
 roiretnI iduaS eht yb debircsed saw hcihw ,BM eht troppus ot hsur a hcus
 yb dias ti t’nsaW ?dlrow barA eht ni esruc eht fo ecruos eht sa retsiniM
 eht si ,rof derac dna detsoh evah yeht hcihw ,BM eht taht aibarA iduaS
 ?hcum oot modgniK eht demrah ]BM[ ti sa ,smelborp sti lla dniheb nosaer
 lacitilop fo epyt suoregnad tsom eht ygoloedi s’doohrehtorB eht t’nsI
  ?dlrow barA eht htiw gnissem pots BM eht lliw nehW ?ygoloedi cimalsI
 2XE ,31PE
 حركة الإخوان المسلمين جاء نتيجة مباشرة لانتشار الوعي لدى إنسان فاتح الراوي: أدخل الآن أخي ال 
ّ
صاُعد مد
َ
حبيب ت
الأمة، هذه حقيقة الصحوة الإسلامية وليدة العلم والثقافة والإدراك فمنذ امتلك الإنسان المسلم أداة المعرفة والثقة 
تنطلي أنا أستغرب من أخ كريم مثقف هكذا  بالذات استطاع أن ُيحلل ويميز، ذاب الثلج وبان المرج ما عادت الكذبات
يلخص تاريخ حركة الإخوان المسلمين خلال تحركات ثلاث سنوات وينسب إليها ما ينسب، الحراك السياس ي أخي الكريم 
هو وليد المد المجتمعي لا نكتمكم أن أقول إنه الحركة بفعل عوامل الوعي المساندة أصبحت أكثر قدرة على طرح أفكارها 
تم الآن القرن الأول من تأسيسها ولعلها التنظيم الأقدم في العالم العربي بل هي كذلك  وحركة
ُ
الإخوان المسلمين تكاد ت
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 عورشلما ،مويلاو ةحرابلا عورشم سيل نيملسلما ناوخلإا ..ناوخلإا ةكرح ىلع بصي يذلا فاجع نونسب ترم دقلو
..يداصتقا ي سايس يفاقث يوبرت عورشم يملاسلإا 
 لصيف.يخيرات :مساقلا 
Translation Fateh Al-Rawi (Islamist): The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement was a 
natural extension of the spread of people and (Ummah)’s awareness, this 
is the reality of the Islamic awakening; based on education, culture and 
realisation [….] The MB is approaching its first century since its 
establishment and it is the oldest movement in the Arab world. Through 
history, the movement (the MB) had been living in difficult times. The MB is 
not today or yesterday’s project, it is an Islamic, educational, political and 
economic project. 
Al-Qassem; Historic 
EX14, EX3 
  ينعي مهنأ ىلع نلآا نويملاسلإا روصي ملاكلا اذه يف ضقانت كانه :مساقلا لصيف اي نولوزعمو نويفنمو نودهطضم
 ةمظنلأا نم ريثكلا عم ينعي نوفلاحتم مه ينعي دحاولا فرحلاب كل نولوقي ينعي أزجتي لا ءزج مه نويملاسلإا يديس
 خلأا كل لوقي امك ندرلأا يف تاراعشلا كرغت لاو ةدسافلا ةيبرعلا ةمظنلأا هذه نم أزجتي لا اءزج نولكشي مه ةيبرعلا
تي لا ءزج مه نوه ناوخلإا ىتح رصم يف ةيكللما حانج تحت مه اذه هعمسنب يللا ملاكلا نع رظنلا ضغب ماظنلا نم أزج
؟ةيحضك مهنع ثيدحلا اذالم 
ً
اذإف ةيدوعسلا يف مكحلا ساسأ مه ةيدوعسلاب رصم يف نوملسلما 
 
Translation  Al-Qassem: Some people paint Islamists as oppressed, excluded…others 
say that Islamists have a coalition with lots of Arab regimes and they are 
an integrated part of such corrupted regimes (….) so why do you play the 
role of the victim? 
EP14, EX4 
 ملاسلا دبع قيفر:  ةعَباتمو نوناقلا صنب ةروظحم ىرخلأا ةيملاسلإا تاكرحلا نم مهريغو نوملسلما ناوخلإا امنيب
 ةيسايسلا تاضراعلما لك نم لضفأ يباختنلاا مهؤادأ نوكي كلذ عمو عمقلا ىلإ ضرعتتو ةقَحلامو{….} نوملسلما ناوخلإا
يعامتجلاا ىوقلا فرط نم ناضتحا لحمو لوبق لحم مهنلأ رثكأ نومظنم كلذ ىلع ْسِقو ةيرصلما ةحاسلا يف ةفلتخلما ة
 ْسِقو يرصلما عمتجلما قمع يف دادتملاا نم اونكمت مهسفنأ ميظنت نم اونكمت كلذلو يبرعلا عراشلا تانوكم بلغأ يف
يبرع دلب يأ يف كلذ ىلع 
Translation  Rafeq Abdelsalam: In spite of the MB, alongside other Islamic 
movements, being banned and subjected to pursuit and oppression, its 
electoral performance has been better than all political opposition parties. 
The MB are much more organised and accepted than other social powers 
in the Egyptian scene…they (the MB) have managed to organise 
themselves and extend into the depth of the Egyptian society as well as 
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 .seirtnuoc barA rehto ynam
 5XE ,41PE
رفيق عبد السلام: لا يمكن اختصار المشهد الإسلامي في بن لادن ولا في جماعة الإخوان المسلمين أيضا هذا تيار واسع  
ئات اجتماعية مختلفة ومن الخطأ ومن التعميم ومن الإجحاف اختزال هذا التيار في تعبير وعريض وتيار متنوع ويشمل ف
 واحد..
 eht ro nedaL niB ot detimil ton si enecs cimalsI ehT :malasledbA qefaR  noitalsnarT
 …sreyal laicos tnereffid sedulcni dna ,esrevid ,daerpsediw si BM ehT .BM
  .weiv eno ot tnemevom a hcus timil ot ekatsim a tI
  6XE ,41XE
 رفيق عبد السلام: هذه الصحوة الإسلامية هنالك استفاقة للإسلام في أشكاله المتعددة والمتنوعة هنالك استفاقة 
 للشعوب الإسلامية بأشكال وصيغ متنوعة وهذه حالة ليست خاصة بمصر ولا خاصة بالجزائر ولا خاصة بالمغرب العربي.
 فيصل القاسم: الإسلامي هو البديل الوحيد..
رفيق عبد السلام: تيار رئيس ي لا أقول إنه البديل الوحيد ولكن هو القوة الرئيسية في المعادلة السياسية بما لا يمكن 
 شطبه أو إلغاءه.
 cimalsI na si erehT .gninekawa cimalsI si sihT :malasledbA qefaR  noitalsnarT
 ylno ton snoitan cimalsI gnoma smrof tnereffid ni gnineppah gninekawa
  .tpygE
 …evitanretla ylno eht era stsimalsI :messaQ-lA
 eb tonnac hcihw ,ytrap ylno eht ton ,ytrap yek a s’tI :malasledbA qefaR
  .deteled ro derongi
  7XE ,41PE
كمال غبريال: الإخوان المسلمين ليسوا هم الصحوة الإسلامية الإخوان المسلمين بيمارسوا على الجماهير خديعة مثلثة  
إنهم أوصياء على الإسلام نواب الله على الأرض وبينزعوا أول ضلع فيها إن رفعهم شعار الإسلام هو الحل بيدُّ وا إيهام 
بيوهموا بها الناس إنه الفصل بين الدين والدولة معناه فصل الدين عن  ..… الإسلام عن ستين أو أكثر مليون مصري 
 .… الحياة أو فصل الإسلام عن الحياة من يقول ذلك مخادع
 
 yehT .gninekawa cimalsI tneserper ton seod BM eht :labruG lamaK noitalsnarT
 sdnats ’noitulos eht si malsI‘ fo nagols ehT ]…[ elpoep evieced )stsimalsI(
 eht taht elpoep evieced yeht …malsI fo naidraug eht era yeht fi sa
  …malsI morf efil gnitarapes snaem etats dna noigiler neewteb noitarapes
  8XE ,41PE
ن شعار الإسلام هو الحل ليس شعارا دينيا ولا يتعارض مع مبادئ الدستور ولا يدعو إلى إثارة الفوض ى : اعلي عبد القتاح 
أو الفتنة الطائفية وأنا عايز أقول له إن شعار الإسلام هو الحل شعار حضاري يعني بيرفع من راية المواطنة والمواطنة بلا 
 إحنا ما بنجبرش على تغيير دينهم ولا معتقداتهم. تمييز ده شعارنا وإن
 suoigiler a ton si ’noitulos eht si malsI‘ fo nagols ehT :hattaF ledbA ilA noitalsnarT
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 ton seod ti ,noitutitsnoc eht fo selpicnirp eht tcidartnoc ton seod dna nagols
 si malsI‘ fo nagols eht taht yas ot tnaw I …msinairatces ro ecneloiv egru
 ytilanoitan fo galf eht ecrofne ot smia dna eno desilivic a si ’noitulos eht
 noigiler reh ro sih egnahc ot enoyna ecrof t’nod eW .noitanimircsid tuohtiw
  .sfeileb ro
  9XE ,31PE
ّسِ مت سايكس بيكو البلاد العربية إلى لقم كان لابد من مشروع نهضوي عند ذلك نهض الإمام البنا ونهض  
ُ
فاتح الراوي: ق
من المقاهي بالإسماعيلية ومن الأماكن من الشعب وبدأت هذه الحركة ستين سبعين سنة الذي ُيصب على الحركة 
  يم إحنا صار عندنا فقه خاص اسمه فقه الزنازين والمعتقلات،الإسلامية من العذاب والتنكيل، أخي الكر 
 otni seirtnuoc barA eht dedivid sah tnemeerga tociP–sekyS :iwarlE hetaF  noitalsnarT
-lA mamI .tsum a saw tcejorp gninekawa na ,yltneuqesnoc ;seceip llams
 erom roF .stoorssarg eht morf dna pohs-efaC s’aiyylamsI ni detrats annaB
 dna erutrot ot detcejbus neeb evah tnemevom siht sraey 07 ro 06 naht
 dna erutrot fo erutluc eht ot detcejbus neeb evah eW .secitsujni
  .tnemssarah
  01XE ,31PE
ع الإسلامي العام ولا أقول الإخواني هو أكثر المشروعات تصادما مع المشروع الغربي المادي بمنطلقاته المشرو فاتح الراوي:  
وأهدافه وهذا معروف للقاص ي والداني، المشروع الإسلامي هو ابنه حماس وابنه الجهاد وابنه حزب الله وابنه المقاومة، 
 …إلا هو إسلامي  ما فيه إنسان نبت على رأسه للدفاع عن الِعرض وعن البلد
 eno si ,tcejorp s’BM eht ylno ton si hcihw ,tcejorp cimalsI eht :iwarlE hetaF  noitalsnarT
 no desab si hcihw ,tcejorp nretseW eht htiw lanoitatnorfnoc tsom eht fo
 ,hallobzeH ,dahiJ ,samaH ot htrib evag tcejorp cimalsI ehT .msilairetam
 dna ruonoh sih gnidnefed fo aedi eht sah enoynA .ecnatsiser eht dna
  .tsimalsI na s’eh taht snaem yrtnuoc
 11XE ,51PE
العالم العربي يخرج فعلا من حقبة الاستفتاءات والمبايعات إلى حقبة الانتخابات الرئاسية  هل بدأ فيصل القاسم: 
التعددية كماحصل في اليمن وتونس وموريتانيا والسودان وسيحدث في مصر قريبا؟ أم إن تلك الانتخابات ضحك 
من السخف تسميتها انتخابات مفضوح على الذقون؟ أليس حريا بالرؤساء العرب التوقف عن استغباء الشعوب؟ أليس 
% من الأصوات؟ 09تعددية لمجرد أن الرئيس يختار بعض المهرجين والنكرات لينافسوه في الانتخابات ثم يفوز بأكثر من 
كيف نسميها انتخابات ديمقراطية إذا كان الرؤساء يحتكرون وسائل الإعلام ووزارات الداخلية وأجهزة الأمن وكل آليات 
السخف وصفها بالانتخابات إذا كانت أحزاب المعارضة ومرشحوها ممنوعين حتى من الترويج  الدولة؟ أليس من
لبرامجهم في الجامعات والأوساط الشعبية؟ أليس من الأفضل توفير الملايين التي ينفقونها على الانتخابات الرئاسية 
لبائسة؟ يضيف آخر. لكن في المقابل أليس المهزلة لبناء مستشفى أو مدرسة أو إطعام الجوعى في الجملكيات العربية ا
الانتقال من حقبة الاستفتاءات إلى الانتخابات تطورا جديرا بالاحترام؟ أليس خطوة في الاتجاه الصحيح بالرغم من 
 هناته الأولية هل كانت الشعوب العربية ستخرج بالملايين للمشاركة في الانتخابات لو كانت تعرف أنها صورية؟
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Translation Al-Qassem: Has the Arab world started to depart from the era of Bia’a 
(appointments) to Presidential election and diversity such as what has 
happened in Yemen, Tunisia, Mauritania and Sudan, and soon, will 
happen in Egypt? Or are such elections largely a lie? Should not the Arab 
presidents stop treating Arab people as stupid? Isn’t it ridiculous to call it 
an election just because the president choosez some clowns to compete 
with each other in the election so he can win with more than 90 per cent of 
votes? How do we call it democracy if the presidents control media 
services, security services and all state means? It is silly to describe it as 
an election if the opposition party (MB) is banned from electoral campaigns 
in universities and public places? Isn’t better to save such millions spent on 
silly Presidential elections to build a hospital, school, or feed poor people?, 
said another.  
On the other side, aren’t elections a respected development? Isn’t it the 
right step in the right direction? Would millions of people go out to vote if 
they knew it is just not real?  
EP17, EX12 
  ميضلل اخوضر ضرلأا بوعش رثكأ يهو ةماركلاو ةزعلاو ةماهشلاب ةيبرعلا بوعشلا قدشتت اذام عمقلاو ملظلاو
 اقحلا نيبتيل ءاسنلا عم هتارماغمب سانلا مامأ امئاد رخافتي يذلا صخشلا كلذ لاحك انبوعش لاح سيلأ ؟داهطضلااو
 نم بوعش نحنو ةلوطبلاب قدشتن اذالم ؟اهلظ نم فاخت نارئف درجم نحنو ةلوجرلاب حجبتن اذالم !يطرخا ؟نينع هنأ
نحنو ةلاسبلاب رخافتن اذالم ؟كيلاعصلا  ىتم ،هبعش قحب اهبكتراو لاإ ةقبوم يبرعلا مكاحلا كرت له ؟ايندلا بوعش نبجأ
 يف اهتاغط مادقأ تحت ضرلأا ةيبرعلا بوعشلا ضعب لزلزت لاأ لباقلما يف نكل ؟ملاحلأا يف لاإ هيدلاج ىلع يبرع بعش راث
 لأا ةضبقلا ديدشت سيلأ ،مهدحأ لءاستي ؟رارجلا ىلع لبحلاو رصمو نميلاو نادوسلا لايلد يبرعلا ملاعلا مومع يف ةينم
 ىبأت لاأ ،ةيبرعلا تايصخشلا تانوكم نم ايساسأ انوكم ةوخنلاو ةماركلا ىقبت لاأ ؟اهيساخن نبجو بوعشلا لملمت ىلع
 يبرع مكاح يأ ةيامحل نيتدعتسم اكريمأو ليئارسإ تسيلأ ؟هتاذ نلآا يف ايجراخو ايلخاد اودع هجاوت لاأ ؟ميضلا انبوعش
 ول اميف  يأ دض ةيبعشلا تاضافتنلاا عمقل ةدعتسم ةيليئارسلإاو ةيكريملأا تارئاطلا تسيلأ ؟ةيبعش تاضافتنلا ضرعت
؟اهئلاكو ىلع اظافح يبرع مكاح 
Translation  Al-Qassem: Why Arab nations are proudly speaking about honour and 
dignity while they are the most supressed, living with injustice, oppression 
and dictatorship? Isn’t the case of our people as a man who proudly talks 
about his adventures with women while he is (sexually) impotent? Why do 
we fake manhood while we are just rats who fear our own shadows? Why 
do we fake heroism while we are a nation of cowards? Why do we speak 
courage while we are the weakest of the universe’s nations? Have Arab 
leaders not sinned against their own people? Does an Arab nation revolt 
against its oppressor only in his dreams? 
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On the other side, did not Arab nations shake the earth beneath Arab 
dictators in Sudan, Yemen, and Egypt? Someone asks! Does it not mean 
that tightening the security grip in the Arab world is an indication of fear by 
dictators from their people who are starting to wake up? Isn’t dignity and 
honour a significant component of Arab identity? Isn’t it true that Arabs 
reject injustice? Are they (Arabs) facing internal and external enemies at 
the same time? Aren’t the U.S. and Israel ready to protect any Arab ruler in 
case he faces uprisings? Aren’t the jets of the U.S. and Israel prepared to 
strike any Arab uprisings standing against Arab leaders to protect their 
agents (Arab leaders)?  
EP18, EX13  
 :مساقلا لصيف  لدبتسي يك ميظعلا يرصلما بعشلا راث له ،ءاكبلاك كحض هنكلو ،تاكحضلما نم رصمب اذ مكو
 ،ليق اميدق ؟لولفلا دحأ لدب سأرلا باختنا ةداعإ ةلاحلا هذه يف هل لضفلأا نم سيلأ ؟هبانذأ دحأب موكحلما ةيغاطلا
أ اي كنأكو ،بنذلا دعصف سأرلا عطق رصم يف نكلو ،بنذلا طقسي سأرلا عطقا بّرجي يذلا سيلأ ،تيزغ ام ديز وب
 نم ديدعلا يف ةلادعلل بولطلماو دسافلا قيفش دمحأ يرصلما بعشلا بختني نأ لقعي له ؟بّرخم هلقع نوكب بّرجلما
 ةلعتفم تامزأو ريطخ يداصتقاو ينمأ بارطضا نم هاناع ام لك نأ بعشلا ملعي لاأ ،يرصم ضراعم حيصي ؟اياضقلا
ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرلما للاخ  سلجلما لوحي ملأ ؟كرابم مايأ ىلع محرتي يك لولفلاو ركسعلا لبق نم هل اططخم ناك
 عطقي نمك ناوخلإاب ةياكن قيفشل تيوصتلا سيلأ ؟ةيرصلما ةروثلا نم ةيماقتنا ةلحرم ىلإ ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرلما يركسعلا
افشو ةهيزن ةريخلأا تاباختنلاا نكت ملأ ،لباقلما يف نكل ؟ههجوب ةياكن هفنأ قيدانصل ماكتحلاا لضفلأا نم سيلأ ؟ةف
 نم سيلأ ؟تناك ايأ نيبخانلا ةبغر اومرتحي نأ هلولفو قباسلا ماظنلل نيضراعلماب ايرح سيلأ ؟عراشلا لدب عارتقلاا
 قيفش ناك له ؟ةروثلا فادهأ قيقحتب لجرلا دهعتي ملأ ؟كرابم لولف نم ٍّّلف درجم هنأ ىلع قيفش ريوصت فاحجلإا
اختنلاا ضوخيل ؟قيفش زاف اذإ رصم لاعشإب ديدهتلا اذالم ؟لتقو داسف اياضق يف ءاضقلل ابولطمو ادساف ناك ول تاب
 ؟ةيطارقميدلا ىلع ٌبلاقنا كلذ يف سيلأ 
Translation Al-Qassem: How laughable what is happening in Egypt but such laughs 
leads to tears. Did the great Egyptian people revolt in order to replace the 
tyrant with one of its tails? Is it better in this situation to re-elect the head 
[Mubarak] instead of one of his foloul [remnants]? In the old times they 
used to say: cut the head and wolf the falls; in Egypt the head [Mubarak] 
was cut but the tail has risen, as if nothing has happened. Isn’t it a waste of 
time to try something twice? Is it logical for the Egyptian people to elect the 
corrupt and those wanted for injustice such as Ahmad Shafeq [opponent 
Presidential candidate for Morsi], says an opposition Egyptian. Did not 
people know that after all what they had suffered through economic and 
security chaos was made up – during the transitional period – by the 
Military and foloul in order to wish for the return of Mubarak’s era? Did not 
the Military Council transform the transitional period to a period of 
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revenge? Isn’t voting for Shafeq because of hate for the MB? 
On the other side: Wasn’t the latest election transparent and free? Isn’t 
better to go to the ballot boxes instead of streets? Isn’t it best for the old 
regime to respect the will of the voters? Isn’t it unjust to describe Shafeq as 
foloul of Mubarak? Did not promise to respect the revolution? … Why 
would Safeq go for the election if he were corrupt, wanted for injustices 
and accused of killing and corruption? Why protest against him [Morsi??] if 
he won the election? Isn’t that a coup against democracy?  
EP18, EX14  
 :ةكرب وبأ دمحأ  ،ضرم ،لهج ،فلخت ،رقف ؟تف
ّ
لخ اذام ،ةنس نيتس ،رصم يف ،هيف رظنا ،ايندلا لك يف ركسعلا مكح
ةروث ىلإ انجتحا ىتح هرخآ ىلإ ،تاورث بهن ،داسف ،دادبتسا 
 
:مساقلا لصيف  ةجيتن وه قيفش دمحأ وهو لاأ ،كرابم لولف دحلأ تيوصتلا اذه نإ ،لوقت نأ ديرت راصتخاب ينعي
..ىلإ ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرلما ليوحت ببسب وه ،ماع نم رثكأ ىدم ىلع ةيرصلما ةروثلل دمعتلما هيوشتلا 
:ةكرب وبأ دمحأ .ةيماقتنا ةلحرم 
:مساقلا لصيف لا اذه لقعي له ،ةروثلا نم ةيماقتنا؟ملاك 
:ةكرب وبأ دمحأ  هكردي يذلا ةطاسبلا ىهتنمب عقاولا ثيدح وه اذهو ،عقي نيح عقاولا ثيدح نم قدصأ لا ،ديكأت لكب
.عمجأ ملاعلا هكرديو ،برعلا هكرديو ،رصم عاقصأ لك يف نييرصلما 
 
Translation  Ahmad Barakha (MB): The Military control is widespread in Egypt - for 60 
years, what did they give us? Poverty, backwardness, ignorance, 
diseases, dictatorship, corruption, looting resources, and so on…until we 
need a revolution.  
Al-Qaseem: briefly, do you want to say that voting for one of Mubarak’s 
foloul, Ahmad Shafeq, is a result of intentional smearing of the revolution in 
Egypt for more than a year, which made transforming the transitional 
period to… 
Ahmad Barakah: revenge. 
Al-Qassem: revenge against the revolution, is that possible? 
Ahmad Barakah: without a doubt! This is the simple reality, which the 
Egyptians, Arabs and the world are aware of. 
EP18, EX 15 
 :مساقلا لصيف  اوناك مه ،ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرلما للاخ لاعف قرفلاب اورعش نوّيرصلما امدنع نولوقي نوريثكلا رملأا عقاو يف
 ةلحرم لاقي امك تناك ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرلما نكل ،رز ةسبكب ميعنلا ىلإ مهب لقتنتس وأ ،ققحتتس ةروثلا نأ نودقتعي
.ةيماقتنا 
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:نيدلا فرش ليبن ؟لوؤسلما نم 
 :مساقلا لصيف.يركسعلا سلجلما اهنع لوؤسم 
:نيدلا فرش ليبن .حيحص ريغ اذه 
:مساقلا لصيف .كرابم لولف 
:نيدلا فرش ليبن .حيحص ريغ اذه 
:مساقلا لصيف قيفش دمحلأ ةفاثكلا هذهب نوتوصي نييرصلما لعج امم كرابم بانذأ 
Translation Al-Qassem: In fact many Egyptians were thinking that this transitional 
period would be supportive of the revolution, will take them to heaven, but 
it turned out that this transitional period became revenge. 
Nabil Sharaf Aldine: who’s responsible?  
Al-Qassem: the Military Council is responsible. 
Nabil Sharaf Aldine: not true! 
Al-Qaseem: Mubarak’s foloul 
Nabil Sharaf Aldine: not true. 
Al-Qassem: the tail of Mubarak made the Egyptians extensively vote for 
Shafeq 
EP18, EX 16 
 :ةكرب وبأ دمحأ  ،داسفلا دض ماظنلا ،دادبتسلاا دض ماظنلا ،نيرشعو ةينامث ذنم فورعم نيملسلما ناوخلإا خيرات
..،موكحلماو مكاحلا نيب ةقلاعلا طبض ،للاقتسلاا ،ناطولأا ريرحت 
:مساقلا لصيف .ليمج 
:ةكرب وبأ دمحأ يبكلا بعشلا اذه ةيرح ىوس ءي شل لا ،تلاقتعلماو نوجسلا يفو قناشلما داوعأ ىلع لا يلاتلابو ،ميظعلا ر
هريغ وأ نالمربلا يف دعقم لجأ نم خيراتلا اذهب ىحضي نأ لاوحلأا نم لاحب نكمي … 
 :مساقلا لصيف.بيط 
 
Translation  Ahmad Barakah: The MB’s history is known for more than the 1928; a 
system standing against dictatorship, corruption, aiming to liberate 
homelands, achieve independence, organise the relationship between the 
people and those who govern them,  
Al-Qassem: OK. 
Ahmad Barakah: they [the MB] have been subjected to execution and 
imprisonment…nothing but freedom for this great nation [Egypt], therefore, 
no one can sacrifice this long history for a parliamentary seat…. 
Al-Qaseem: OK 
EP18, EX17  
 :مساقلا لصيف ..راوثلا ةلتق دحأ وه ينعي 
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 مش صحيح. نبيل شرف الدين:
 شفيق أحد قتلة الثوار، بس دقيقة، بس دقيقة، شفيق أحد قتلة الثوار، يا أخي دقيقة. فيصل القاسم:
 ليس هذا.. نبيل شرف الدين:
 seiranoitulover fo rellik a si ]qifahS[ eH :messaQ-lA noitalsnarT
 !eurt ton :enidlA farahS libaN
 …seiranoitulover fo rellik eht si qifahS :messaQ-lA
 .…ton si siht :enidlA farahS libaN
 81XE ,81PE
هل أسقط الشعب المصري شفيق؟ هل أسقط الشعب المصري شفيق بمليونية، هل أسقطه بمليونية  فيصل القاسم: 
 ولا لا؟ لشفيق لماذا تعيده؟
 انتخبه الشعب المصري..نبيل شرف الدين: 
 78كم انتخبه؟ انتخبه عشرين، خمسة وعشرين، أربعة وعشرون بالمائة طيب والشعب المصري  فيصل القاسم:
 مليون..
 واللي انتخبوا مرس ي كام؟ ده لم يفز..نبيل شرف الدين: 
 
 od yhW ?qifahS tsniaga detlover elpoep naitpygE eht t’nevaH :meesaQ-lA  noitalsnarT
 ?kcab mih tnaw uoy
 mih rof detov evah elpoep naitpygE eht :enidlA farahS libaN
 eht ,tnec rep 42 ro 52 ,02 ?teg eh did setov ynam won :messaQ-lA
 …noillim 78 era elpoep naitpygE
  ?isroM rof detov esoht fo egatnecrep eht tahw :enidlA farahS libaN
 91XE ,81 PE
لا يسمح للمصريين يا مصريون جربوا الإخوان المسلمين لبضعة سنوات وإذا لم ينجحوا هذا طب لماذا  فيصل القاسم: 
 ميدان التحرير موجود، شيلوهم، شيلوهم..
أنا أقدر أشيل شفيق، وأتظاهر ضد شفيق لكن ما أقدرش أتظاهر ضد مرس ي،  هو ده بقى الصعب،نبيل شرف الدين: 
لأن مرس ي الرغبة في التكويش على السلطة التشريعية، الرغبة في التكويش على القضائية واختراق القضاء بشكل كبير 
لسلطة هذا ما من خلال محمود الخضيري، الرغبة في التكويش على السلطة التنفيذية تعكس حجمهم ومدى شهوتهم ل
 أنهم صادروا الإسلام لصالحهم 
ً
 .…نخاف منه، خصوصا
 yeht fi ,sraey wef a rof BM eht yrt ton naitpygE eht od yhw :meesaQ-lA  noitalsnarT
 …ti evomer nac elpoep neht deeccus t’nod
 tub qifahS evomer nac I …tluciffid eb dluow siht :enidlA farahS libaN
 eht lortnoc ot erised a sah eh esuaceb isroM evomer ot elba eb t’now
 siht dna rewop rof erised siht stcelfer sihT .srewop laiciduj dna evitalsigel
 .…ruovaf rieht ni malsI deyolpme evah yehT .elpoep seracs
 02XE ,91PE
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 تلاارنج :ةقلحلا ناونع رصم  نوبلقني ىلع ةروثلا  
 Egypt’s Colonels made a coup against the revolution!  
EP20, EX21 
  اهيلإ اولصو مهنأ ملعلا عم ،ةطلسلا ىلإ مهلوصو نم رذحيو نييملاسلإا مجاهي ضعبلا لاز ام اذالم :مساقلا لصيف
 لا تاباختنلااب نييملاسلإا موصخب ايرح سيلأ ؟رصمو برغلماو سنوت يف احساك ايطارقميد ازوف اوزوفي ملأ ؟تابابدلاب
 يملاسلإا دادبتسلاا نم فوخلا سيلأ ؟ةيركفلا مهتاساقم ىلع ابوعش نييناملعلل قلخن له ؟بوعشلا تابغر اومرتحي نأ
 رخإو ،ءاشت نم باختنا ىلع ةرداق بوعشلا حبصت ملأ ؟هلحم ريغ يف ملأ ؟مهدوعوب اوفوي مل اذإ مكحلا نم ءاشت نم جا
 تسيلأ ؟هل ايطبق ابئان ي سرم دمحم سيئرلا نيعي ملأ ؟مهعابتلأ سيلو بعشلا لكل اماكح اونوكي نأب نويملاسلإا دهعتي
 هيبشت فخسلاو فاحجلإا نم سيلأ ؟اديدحت طارقونكتلا نم يملاسلإا سيئرلا اهنيع يتلا ةديدجلا ةيرصلما ةموكحلا
ا نييملاسلإا مكح ى شخي نأ ضعبلا قح نم سيلأ ،لباقلما يف نكل ؟نابلاط ماظنب ايطارقميد ةبختنلما ةيملاسلإا ةمظنلأ
 نادلبلا كلت يف نويملاسلإا ثبشتي لاأ ؟ةزغ يف سامح مكح ىلإ ةبسن ،ةيواّزغلاو ةيناريلإاو ةينادوسلا ةبرجتلا ىلع اءانب
 له ؟ةفئاز ةيطارقميد ىواعد تحت مكحلاب لشفت ملأ ؟ةوقلاب لاإ ينادوسلا يواملاسلإا مكحلا حيزي نأ دحأ عيطتسي
 ،انفيض لءاستي ؟جذاس يحور ساسأ ىلع نييملاسلإل ريثكلا توصي ملأ ؟ناكم نم رثكأ يف مكحلا يف نييملاسلإا براجت
اهحرطأ ةلئسأ ؟امهريغو سنوتو رصم يف ،مكحلا يف نييملاسلإا تاحاجنل ليلهتلا ركبلما نم سيلأ  ثحابلاو بتاكلا ىلع
.لصافلا دعب شاقنلا أدبن ،حيمر تعلط يملاسلإا ثحابلاو بتاكلا ىلعو ،ضايف ليبن يناملعلا 
Translation Al-Qassem: Why do some still attack Islamists and warn that their arrival 
means power, in spite of the fact that they [Islamists] arrived to the chair of 
power via ballot boxes, not tanks. Have they won democratically in Tunis, 
Morocco and Egypt? Isn’t it better for the Islamists’ opponents to respect 
the wish of the people? Do we need to create nations that fit the ideology 
of seculars? Isn’t the fear of dictatorship by Islamists unjustifiable? Aren’t 
people capable of electing whomever they want and remove those who are 
not fulfilling their promises? Aren’t Islamists pledged to be rulers for all 
people not only for their followers? Didn’t Morsi appoint a Copt as his 
deputy? Isn’t the government formed from technocrats? Isn’t it silly and 
unfair to say that Islamic regimes, democratically-elected, are similar to 
Taliban?  
 
On the other side: Isn’t it right that some people fear Islamist rule after the 
experience in Sudan, Iran and Gaza? Did they not try to control those 
countries under fake democracy? Can anyone remove the Islamic rule in 
Sudan without force? Didn’t the Islamic experience to rule fail in more than 
one country? Haven’t many Islamists voted solely on a naïve spiritual 
basis? Isn’t it too early to celebrate the successes of Islamists in Egypt, 
Tunisia and elsewhere? 
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 22 XE ,02 PE
  في الديمقراطية. فيصل القاسم: 
في الديمقراطية، هؤلاء وحدهم الآن هم من يقف في صف الديمقراطية، كل من يتحدثون باسم العلمانية طلعت رميح: 
وما إلى ذلك، الآن تحدثتم عن الدكتور محمد مرس ي، الآن العلمانيون ومن لف لفهم، هناك كلهم الآن هم من يقفون، 
هم من يقولون للعسكر انقلبوا، وهم من يقولوا هم من يعيدون إنتاج نظام مبارك، وهم من يلتحفون الآن بالعسكر، و 
  .… إن الإسلاميين، الإسلاميون الآن هم قلب جوهر فكرة الديمقراطية والتطور، والتقدم، والتحرر الوطني
  وصلت الفكرة. فيصل القاسم:
 .ycarcomeD nI :messaQ-lA noitalsnarT
 rof dnats ]stsimalsI[ yeht ,ycarcomed ni :hemaR ta’alaT
-er won era meht fo lla ,sretroppus rieht dna sraluceS…ycarcomed
 eht era yehT .licnuoC yratiliM eht hguorht emiger karabuM eht gnicudorp
 era stsimalsI .stsimalsI tsniaga puoc yratilim eht degaruocne ohw seno
  noitarebil lanoitan dna ,ssergorp ,ycarcomed fo traeh eht ta won
 !aedi eht tog :messaQ-lA
 32:XE ,02PE
الشعوب تحررت من الاستبداد، تحررت من الخوف، العولمة الإعلامية الآن، شعوبنا بالمناسبة أفهم  فيصل القاسم: 
وأذكى بألف مرة من الشعوب الغربية التي تصوت، ماش ي، الآن هذه الشعوب تحررت واختارت الإسلاميين، يا سيدي 
سنوات أو خمس سنوات ستنظر إلى سجل  لماذا لا تدعون الإسلاميين يحكمون لأربع سنوات، وهذه الشعوب بعد أربع
الإسلاميين وإنجازاتهم، فإذا كان هناك إنجازات ستصوت لهم مرة أخرى، وإذا لم يكن هناك إنجازات ماذا ستفعل؟ أحد 
المصريين كان رائعا، قال، فليحكم الشيطان، هنشوف كيف هيتصرف، عمل كويس، كويس، ما عملش كويس، دا 
  زل الشعب إلى الشارع مرة أخرى ويشيل الإسلاميين وأبو الإسلاميين، أعطوهم فرصة.ميدان التحرير موجود، هين
 
 aidem ,raef ,pihsrotatcid morf eerf emoceb elpoeP :messaQ-lA  noitalsnarT
 naht retrams semit dnasuoht a era snoitan ruo ,yaw eht yB…noitasilabolg
 uoy t’nod yhw ,stsimalsI rof detov evah elpoep esohT .snoitan nretseW
 rieht no desab ,meht egduj neht dna sraey 4 rof nrevog ot stsimalsI evael
 rof etov ,stnemeveihca eseht hcaer yeht fi ;stnemeveihca dna sdrocer
 lived eht neve tel ,dias ecno s’naitpygE eht fo enO .tca ,ton fi ,niaga meht
 steerts eht ot og lliw ew neht ,ton fi ,enif ,doog yna su sgnirb ti fi ,su nrevog
  .ecnahc a meht evig tsuj…stsimalsI evomer dna emit rehtona
 42:XE ,02PE
الحرية بالنسبة للإسلاميين هم أحرص عليها من كل أحد آخر لأنهم بناة نهضة، لأنهم أصحاب مشروع ..… :طلعت رميح 
أليس غريبا أن ترى كل الاتجاهات الإسلامية تقدم برامج وخطط استراتيجية، تعرف  …لبناء تطور لبناء دولة حديثة 
ية تطور ونهوض كبير لهذه الأمة، يقوده من نحن الآن أمام بدا …محمد مرس ي مقدم خطة برامجية لسنوات طوال تدفع 
 يقوده مواجها للاحتلال العنصري الغاشم في فلسطين والعراق وغيره، 
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 :مساقلا لصيف.يملاسإ يبعش  
:حيمر تعلط تاعمتجمو تاداصتقا ءانبو ،ةمأ ءانبل … 
Translation  Tala’at Rameh: Freedom for Islamists is essential because they want to 
adopt the awakening project. They want to adopt a developing project to 
build a modern state … is it not unusual to see all Islamists offering 
strategic programmes and plans?…Do you know that Morsi has offered a 
plan for years to come to push this country towards development. We are 
witnessing a start of development and revival for this Ummah, aiming to 
confront the occupation and aggression in Palestine and Iraq and 
elsewhere… 
Al-Qassem: Popular Islamist. 
Tala’at Rameh: This is to build Ummah, build the economy and 
societies… 
EP20, EX25 
  :مساقلا لصيف مكيلخن حر يخأ اي اوبرشت مكدبو سنج مكدب مكتلكشم متنأ ،كلأسأ يدب ،كلأسأ يدب ،ةقيقد سب
..سنجلا اوسرامتو ،اوبرشت  
:ضايف ليبن .تنأ كل لاق نيم يخأ اي ،سنج كل لاق نيم  
 :مساقلا لصيف.ايروسب كيه  
:ضايف ليبن ،ركسو سنج ةيناملعلا كل لاق نيم ،ركسو سنج ةيناملعلا كل لاق نيم 
Translation Al-Qassem: Your problems [talking about seculars] that you want sex, 
drink alcohol…go and have sex and drink. 
Nabil Fayad: who said that we want sex … who said that…? 
Al-Qassem: this is what is happening in Syria. 
Nabil Fayad: who said that secularism is about sex and sugar….? 
EP20, EX26 
 :حيمر تعلط  تلتق امنإو ماعلا يأرلا طقف لتقت مل ،ةلتاق ةرهاق ةدبتسم مظن اهيف تمكح ةلحرم يف اننأ يعيبطلا نم
 ىلعو ةنراقلما ىلع ةردقلا تلتقو ،ةيددعتلا ةركفب روعشلا تلتقو درفتلاو ةيدرفلاو ةيصخشلاب روعشلا تلتقو ةفاقثلا
ا نم يلاتلابو ينعي ءايشأ تلعفو ةريثك ءايشأ تلتق ،مهفلا تاباختنلاا ديكأتلاب معن ةديدش ةيعوضومب لوقن نأ يعيبطل
يقيقحو حيحص لكشب عضولا اذه سكعت ….. 
Translation Tala’at Rameh: We have lived under corruption, killers and oppressive 
regimes. They did not only kill the general public’s opinion but also killed 
the principles of culture, identity and diversity. Killed so many things, so it’s 
normal to objectively say that the election is the right thing.  
EP22, EX27 
  ةسايسلا لهأ نم دحاوب ينتآو ،بعشلا مكح يه ةيطارقميدلا ،قودنصلا يه تسيل ةيطارقميدلا :صابرش زيزعلا دبع
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عرف الديمقراطية بأنها الصندوق، من أين جئتم بكل هذا الكلام الفارغ الذي تتاجرون به، تاجرتم بالدين وتاجرتم 
بالثورة والآن تتاجرون بالصندوق وتاجرتم بمصر، والآن تتاجرون بما كان مبارك يقوله إما أنا أو الفوض ى وأنتم تقولون 
 وسيركلكم ارحل. إما نحن أو الإرهاب، الشعب المصري ركل مبارك
 elur eht si ycarcomeD .sexob tollab t’nsi ycarcomeD :isabruhS zizaledbA noitalsnarT
 .esnesnon hcus htiw emoc ev’uoy erehw morf wonk t’nod I .elpoep eht fo
 er’uoy won dna noitulover fo eman eht ,noigiler fo eman eht desu ev’uoY
 ro em‘ :yas ot desu karabuM…tpygE dna ,sexob tollab fo eman eht gnisu
 evah elpoep naitpygE ehT .’msirorret ro su‘ yas ]BM eht[ uoy dna ’soahc
 !uoy ot emas eht od lliw yeht dna tuo karabuM dekcik
 82XE 22PE
أنكم نجحتم في إزالة هذا الرئيس بهذه  فيصل القاسم: بدي ارجع له خلص بس خليني أسألك سؤال صغير لنفترض 
الطريقة الشوارعية الثورية، ماش ي أزحتموه ماش ي أنتم كما قال لك هذه نقطة أريد أن أجليها دخلتم في لعبة الغاب أو 
شريعة الغاب، طيب واستلمتم الحكم بعد مرس ي ووصلتم إلى السلطة وهل تعتقد أن جماعة مرس ي ستترككم وشأنكم 
ها ستزلزل الأرض تحت أقدامكم وبذلك ستدخل مصر في دوامة انقلابات وإلى ما هنالك، هذه ليست طريقة، أم أنها أو إن
الرجل جاء بالانتخابات فليذهب بالانتخابات إذا لم تلجأ إلى الصناديق فالبديل هو التوابيت هل تريدون التوابيت أم 
 الصناديق؟ تفضل.
، الجزيرة شعارها الرأي والرأي الآخر وهذا يعني أنها تأتي بالرأيين وهي  عبد العزيز شرباص: نعم صياغة السؤال مهمة
ً
جدا
 تقف على الحياد، وما تقوله يا دكتور فيصل ليس فيه أدنى حيادية..
 فيصل القاسم: جميل يا أخي عم أسألك عم أسألك؟
 tnediserp siht evomer ot deganam uoy fI !uoy ksa em teL :messaQ-lA  noitalsnarT
 fo wal eht deilppa ev’uoy neht ,yaw yranoitulover esiwteerts siht ni ]isroM[
 ,isroM fo llaf eht retfa rewop dednah eb lliw uoy taht yas s’tel …elgnuj eht
 htaeneb htrae eht ekahs lliw yeht ro enola uoy evael lliw yeht kniht uoy od
 emac ]isroM[ nam eht …?spuoc fo gnirts a ot sdrawot daeh neht dna uoy
 ot og uoy t’nod yhw …noitcele hguorht og nac ylno nac dna noitcele yb
 ?sniffoc fo daetsni sexob tollab
 -lA !yhtroweton si noitseuq ruoy fo erutan ehT :isabruhS zizaledbA
 eht gnignirb snaem hcihw ,’weiv rehto dna weiv eht‘ si nagols s’areezaJ
 fo esnes on sah yas uoy od tahw ,lartuen gnidnats dna rehtegot sweiv owt
  ..ytilartuen
  !uoy gniksa tsuj m’I :messaQ-lA
 92XE 22PE
فيصل القاسم: شو رأيك أنا اتصلت بمعظم ممثلي ما يسمونه المعارضة جماعة خراب مصر أو جماعة الإنقاذ مش  
مليون من جماعة مرس ي شو  51كلامي هم اللي بحكوا، الجميع يرفض أن يظهر مع الإخوان هناك على الأقل على الأقل 
رأيك نذبحهم يعني مش عاوزين أي حوار معهم  رأيك نذبحهم بس من شان أنت تنبسط، أنت وجماعة خراب مصر، شو 
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 ،ةضراعلما ىلع هضرعو لاإ 
ً
ابصنم كرتي مل اذك ىلع ضرعو سيئرلا بئان يحابص ىلع ضرع عيمجلل هدي دم ي سرم
؟درت فيك ،ةيطارقميد تسيلو ةيطارخميد هذه ءاصقإ اذه ثاثتجا اذه اذك ديرن لا راوحلا ديرن لا كديرن لا ةضراعلما 
 زيزعلا دبع..زايحنا ناك هلك كهجوو كتربن ظحلا :صابرش 
Translation Al-Qassem: what are you saying? That I’ve called most of the opposition 
party the Destructive Front instead of the Salvation Front? These are not 
my words, all of them refuse to take part in the programme with the MB. 
There are at least 15 million Morsi supporters, what do you think? You 
should kill them so you can be satisfied… you are a group of destroyers, 
what do you think we kill them al?l… you don’t want a dialogue with Morsi 
although he offered you a hand, he offered Sabbahi [an opposition Leader] 
to be the deputy president… the opposition don’t want him, don’t want to 
talk to him… this is shit-democracy not proper democracy, what do you 
say? 
 
Abdelaziz Shurbasi: notice you tone and your face - all of it is biased.  
EP24, EX30 
 ةقطنلما يف ةريثك هيبرع لود نأش اهنأش ىربك ةرماؤلم تضرعت رصم دلبلا يديس اي :ةيطع دومحم. 
 ؟ىربك ةرماؤم :مساقلا لصيف 
اعبط :ةيطع دومحم.  
؟لا لاو نامك نامك هينوك :مساقلا لصيف 
ةينوك شم لا هجاح لاو ةينوك شم لا :ةيطع دومحم. 
 لصيفراشب نم اهنيشطلا اهنيدخام هينوك تركف :مساقلا. 
؟راشب هلام راشب ،يديس اي وهأ :ةيطع دومحم! 
 اولاقو يروسلا بعشلا ىلع رمآتي ملاعلا لك بعشلا لك ةينوكلا عاتب همسا وش يللا نم اهنيشطلا ينعي :مساقلا لصيف
ةينوك ةرماؤم. 
Translation Attya: Egypt was subjected to a great conspiracy as much as other Arab countries 
in the region. 
Al-Qassem: Great conspiracy?  
Attya: Of course. 
Al-Qassem: Universal, right? 
Attya: It is not universal, no. 
Al-Qassem: I thought you had taken it or were stealing it from Bashar [Syria]. 
Attya: Bashar has nothing to do with this. 
Al-Qassem: Possibly, stealing it from this person [Bashar] who uses the word 
‘universal’ as though the whole world was conspiring against him. 
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EP24, EX31 
  يف ةسايسلا يف ةفورعم ةركف يف لجرلا وه ام ..داجيإ :ي سودقلا دمحم ةمزأ قلخت نأ ،ةمزلأاب ةرادلإا اهمسا اهلك ايندلا
يللا بورحلا لك ،هدك لمع رلته ،اودع قلخت نأو... 
رلته دلقت ةديدجلا ةيرصلما ةدايقلا ينعي :مساقلا لصيف. 
 طبضلاب رلته دلقت :ي سودقلا دمحم…جمانرب لاو ةيؤر نودب ةديدج ةدايق 
Translation Mohammed Qudousi: In politics there is a known idea called 
‘management of a crisis’, in which someone creates a crisis and an enemy, 
which is what Hitler used to do. 
Al-Qassem: This means that the new Egyptian leadership imitates Hitler? 
Mohammed Qudousi: Imitation of Hitler exactly… this new leadership has 
no vision and no programme.  
EP24 EX32 
 اماع نيتس نم رثكأ ذنم ةبذاك ةيمهو تاراعش عقو تحت شيعت رصم يف ةصاخو ةيبرعلا بوعشلا :مساقلا لصيف 
…ا سفن تداع نلآا يرصلما بعشلا راث نلآا ،ي شام ركسعلا ةدايبو ركسعلا ةيذحأ تحت ةنس نيسمخ ةنس نيعبرأ ةمغنل
 يأ اوققحي نأ اوعيطتسي لا تلاارنجلا ءلاؤه نإ لوقي ضعبلا ،باهرلإا ةبراحمو يموقلا نملأا ةكرعم ؟وش ةكرعم
 ؟نوقلتخي اذامف قوقحلا ديعص ىلع لا ةيرشبلا ةيمنتلا ديعص ىلع لا يداصتقلاا ديعصلا ىلع لا بعشلل بساكم
جحب باهرلإا ةحفاكم باهرلإا تاه باهرلإا عبعب نوقلتخي نملأا نلأ انل حلصت لا ةيطارقميدلا ،يموقلا نملأا ةيامح ة
 يدنهلا نالمربلا ناك برحلا زع يف يناطيربلا رمعتسلما دض ةيدنهلا برحلا زع يف لاؤس كلأسأ يدب انأ بيط ،دوجوم ريغ
 ةيسايس تاعارص ةفينع ةيسايس تاعارص لخادلاب برضلا ةلحرم ىلإ لصو هنأ ىتح تاعارصو تانحاشم دهشي
ع تناك ةيطارقميدلا عمقن نأ بجيو برح يف انحن هنإ انعمس ةرم لاو رمعتسلما دض ضرلأا ىلع براحت سانلاو ةفين
دنهلا يف اهزع يف ةيطارقميدلا..  
 
Translation Al-Qassem: For more than sixty years, Arab nations, especially Egypt, 
have lived under the impact of illusory slogans and lies, only the sound of 
battle has been heard. They have been living for the past 40 to 50 years 
under the shoes of the military. Now, the Egyptian people have revolted 
and then returned to the same story: national security and fighting 
terrorism. Many have said that such military generals are not able to 
acquire any political, economic or popular gains, so they create the 
scarecrow of terrorism and fighting terrorism, and therefore use the 
‘protection of national security’ as a reason. They [the people] say 
democracy does not work for us because of security […] 
Attya: This is….[interrupted].  
Al-Qassem: Every time two police officers are beaten, you tell me national 
security […] 
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Appendix (3): Interview Guide: 
 
Questions in Arabic Translation 
،راصتخاب له نكمم نا فرعت نع كسفن (،ةساردلا ،ةيسنجلا 
تاربخلا...خلإ)؟ 
Briefly, can you please introduce yourself 
(education, nationality, experiences and so 
on? 
ىتم تأدب لمعلا يف ةانق ؟ةريزجلا اذالمو تقحتلا لمعلاب يف ؟ةانقلا When did you start working for AJA? Why 
decided to work for this channel? 
ام وه كمهف ةلاسرل ةيؤرو ةانق ةريزجلا اهريثأتو ىلع دهاشلما ؟يبرعلا What is your understanding of AJA’s vision 
and its influence to Arab viewers? 
فيك  ىرت طخلا  يريرحتلا ؟ةانقلل ىنعمب له كانه تاهجوت ةنيعم 
؟هانقلل ؟اذالمو 
How do you evaluate the editorial line to 
AJA? Meaning – are there any particular 
alignments? Why? 
ةيضق ةيللاقتسا ليومتو ةانقلا اهطابتراو رطقب ةلاسم لاط شاقننلا 
،اهيف له دقتعت ناب ةسايس ةريزجلا قفتت وا ضراعتت عم ةسايس 
؟رطق 
The matter of channel’s independence and 
ownership has been a topic for discussion 
for a long time, do you think that AJA’s 
policy aligns or contradicts Qatar’s policy?  
ام وه كتيؤر تاضافتنلال وأ (تاروثلا )؟ةيبرعلا ضعبلا ظفحتي ىلع 
اهتيمست (تاروثب )قلطيو عاهيل تايمسم  ىرخأ لثم (تاضافتنا)، 
وهام ،كروصت ؟اذالمو 
What is your view on Arab revolutions or 
uprisings? Some call it ‘revolutions’ others 
call it ‘uprisings’, what do you think? 
نيعباتلما ةانقل ةريزجلا اوري ناب ةانقل ةريزجلا  رود يف تاضافتنلإا 
؟ةيبرعلا نم للاخ ،كلمع ام وه  رودلا يذلا هتبعل ةانق ؟ةريزجلا 
Some people view that AJA has played a 
role in the Arab uprising? Through your 
work with the channel, what role has AJA 
played? 
وهام كمييقت ةانقل ةريزجلا يف ةيطغت هذه تاضافتنلإا ؟ةيبرعلا What is your general evaluation of AJA’s 
coverage of the Arab uprisings? 
له تفلتخا ةيؤرلا ةسايسلاو ةيريرحتلا ةريزجلل يف ةيطغت 
تاضافتنلاا نم ةلود ىلإ ؟ىرخأ ينعمب كانه نم دقتعي ناب ةانق 
ةريزجلا مل زكرت ىلع ةيطغت ةضافتنلإا ةينيرحبلا ىلع ليبس لاثلما يف 
نيح تنافت يف ةيطغت ةضافتنلاا ةيرصلما ةيروسلاو ىلع هجو 
،صوصخلا اذام  لوقت يف ؟كلذ 
Do you think there are any differences on 
the channel’s editorial practices in covering 
one country or another? In other words, 
there are voices saying that AJA did not 
focus enough on covering Bahraini’s 
uprising, for example, but dedicated most 
of its airtime covering the Egyptian or 
Syrian uprising, what do you think?  
فيك ميقت ةيطغت ةانقلا ةضافتنلإل ةيرصلما نم اهتيادب (نم ةلحرم 
يحنت ،كرابم اورم باختناب ي سرم ىلا ةرطيس سلجلما  يركسعلا)؟ 
How do you evaluate the Egyptian uprising 
from the start until the control of the military 
council? 
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اذالم تاترا ةريزجلا ةيمست ام ثدح يف رصم ارخؤم ب (بلاقنلاا )لدب 
نم اهتيمست (ةروث)؟ 
Why did AJA label what has happened in 
Egypt as a ‘coup’ not a ‘revolution’? 
ام يه ةيؤر ةانق ةريزجلا عم مودق نييملاسلإا دعب تاضافتنلاا يف لك 
نم سنوت رصمو ايبيلو ،اهريغو له رعشت ناب كانه ةسامح يف 
ةانقلا مهئاطعلا ربنلما ؟رثكا 
What is AJA’s vision of the rise of Islamists 
following the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and elsewhere? Do you think AJA 
has given the platform to them more than 
others? 
له ةريزجلل هجوت نيعم معدي ناوخلإا نيملسلما تارايتلاو ةيملاسلإا 
 ىرخلاا امك ةانقل ةيبرعلا هجوت (امك لاقي )معدي نييلاربللا سلجلماو 
؟يركسعلا 
Does AJA support the MB and Islamic 
movements, as allegedly Al Arabiya TV 
supports the liberals and the Military 
Council? 
له كانه ةلاسر ةنيعم  لواحت ةانق ةريزجلا اهريرمت صوصخب 
ةضافتنلاا يف ،رصم وا يف عارصلا ي سايسلا مئاقلا نيب نييلاربللا 
نييناملعلاو نم ههج نييملاسلإاو نم ههج ؟ىرخأ 
What kind of message does AJA want to 
convey, regarding Egypt, or on the 
relations with the on-going dispute between 
seculars and Islamists?  
له ترسخ ةانق ةريزجلا اهتيطغتب ةضافتنلال ؟ةيرصلما ام يذلا 
؟هترسخ 
Has AJA lost from its coverage of the 
Egyptian uprising? What did the channel 
lose? 
اذالم دجوي  روصت دئاس يف رصم نأب ةانق ةريزجلا معدت ،نييملاسلإا 
ديدحتلاب ،ناوخلإا دض ( لولفلا )و(نييبلاقنلاا )نييلاربللا ؟نييناملعلاو 
Why do you think that there is a perception 
in Egypt that AJA supports Islamists, 
particularly, the MB, against the ‘foloul’, or 
the ‘coup’ or liberals and seculars?  
له كانه هجوت ةريزجلل ى شامتي عم رطق اهمعدب ناوخلال امك ةانقل 
ةيبرعلا هجوت ى شامتي عم ةيدوعسلا ةعادلا ؟ركسعلل 
Do you think AJA is aligned with Qatar on 
its support of the MB, as there is alignment 
with Al-Arabyia with Saudi Arabia on its 
support of the military? 
له  ىرت ناب ةانق ةريزجلا مدختست ةغل فطاعت عم ةيحضلا دض 
؟دلاجلا اذا ،معن نم ةيحضلا نمو دلاجلا يف ةلاح ؟رصم 
Do you think AJA uses empathy language 
towards the victim against the villain? If 
yes, who is the victim and who is the villain 
in Egypt? 
عباتلما ةانقل ،ةريزجلا  ىري نأب كانه ةغل فطاعت معدل ناوخلإا 
نيملسلما دض سلجلما  يركسعلا ،نييلاربللاو له ناوخلإا مه 
(ةيحضلا )رايتلاو رخلآا مه (دلاجلا)؟ 
AJA’s viewers may notice an empathy 
language supporting the MB against the 
Military Council and liberals, are the MB the 
victims and others the villains? 
له دقتعت ناب ةانق ةريزجلا  رود مكحلا وا ي ضاقلا فيرعتل فيقثتو 
شلمادها امب وه بئاص ؟ايسايس 
Do you think it is AJA’s role to judge or to 
educate people of what is politically 
correct?  
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ذنم ،اهتاشن تفرع ةانق ةريزجلا اهتأرجب يف حرط اياضقلا ةفلتخلما 
ةيرانو باطخلا يملاعلإا ،اهيدل له دقتعت نا ةانق ةريزجلا مدختست 
ةغل ةيروث ةيسامح معدل ةيطارقميدلا يف نطولا يبرعلا دض 
؟تايروتاتكدلا 
Since inception, AJA was said to be daring 
in addressing different topics and in using 
fiery language, do you think that AJA uses 
revolutionary language to support 
democracy in the Arab world against 
dictatorships? 
له دقتعت ناب ملاسلاا ي سايسلا وه ليدبلا ةدايقل ةلحرم ام دعب 
؟تايروتاتكدلا اذهل فطاعتت عم نييملاسلإا  نود ؟مهريغ 
Do you think that political Islam is the 
alternative to lead post-dictatorship eras? 
Is that why AJA sympathises with Islamists 
not others? 
له دقتعت نا تاعقوت  روهمج ةانق ةريزجلا ريغت عم تاضافتنلاا 
؟ةيبرعلا 
Do you think that the expectation of 
audiences has changed alongside the Arab 
uprising countries?  
نيبقارلما ةانقل ،ةريزجلا اوري ناب  روهمج ةانق ةريزجلا دق تفاخت 
ببسب اهفقاوم اهتيطغتو ،تاضافتنلال اذالم ؟كيارب 
Observers see that AJA’s viewership has 
been reduced due to its position and 
coverage of the Arab uprising, what in your 
view? 
فيك ميقت راعش ةانق ةريزجلا (يارلا يارلاو رخلآا )دعب ،تاروثلا له 
لا تلاز ةانقلا ظفتحت ؟اهتناكمب ما اهنا ؟تريغت 
How do you evaluate AJA’s motto ‘the 
opinion and the other opinion’ following 
revolutions? Do you think the channel still 
occupies the same place or has it 
changed?  
له كانه يأ ي ش رخآ دوت ؟هتفاضا Anything you would like to add? 
 
 
